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Suý" 
The thesis entertains dualism as a valuable conceptual frame of 
reference in the twentieth century. For the support of this contention, 
the Introduction calls on the writings of Piaget, Althusser, Chomsky and 
Levi-Strauss. All these dualists share, in distinction from traditional 
past approaches to a dualistic conceptual framework, an insistance on 
the primacy of the empirical term (or at least on the parity of the 
empirical term) vis-a-vis the d')-structural or covert term in their 
works, which two terms, on their accounts, indismissibly underlie the 
phenomena they tackle in their various disciplines. 
The terms of the dualism of the main concern in this study, pertain 
to social psychology, or anthropology in the Continental sense. They 
are, on the one hand, (a) an updated Hegelian 'object' as contaminated 
with a Hegel-akin 'subject' (with the terms 'my world', 'perspective', 
'lived reality', 'human reality', 'the self' as its usual expressions), 
and (b) the same 'object' as pure and uncontaminated with 'subject': the 
medium of society's 'carriership', indeed of the very being of society 
itself, whose positivity is overtly demonstrable in statistical charts, 
as Durkheim was the first to show. For that reason, not only the 
explicitly dualistic Continental students of the self upon whom the 
thesis focuses (the existentialist Sartre, Kierkegaard and Bultmann in 
the main), but also Durkheim figures centrally in the argument. 
Another task which the thesis undertook was to show that the 
Hegelian, implicitly dualistic element in Mead's thought (picked up by 
him in Berlin: the scene of his undergraduate studies), amounts, not to 
a flaw spoiling the orthodoxy of his behaviourism (as usually grasped), 
but (when pursued and pushed to its limits), to a fruitful basis of 
comparison with and a valuable contribution to the works of his openly 
dualistic European anthropologist colleagues, just listed above. 
Both goals are, on the whole, implicitly achieved in the thesis, as 
they are, in the main, phenomenologically approached, and the method of 
their treatment is to allow them to transpire through a structure 
dictated by an abandon to their implications in experience. 
The dualism of Sartre's social psychology provides the major basis 
of comparison to Mead's implicit dualism. A by-product of this 
circumstance is the emergence, in the course of the argument, if not of 
a Sartrian ethics, at least of an ethics which is very Sartrian. 
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Preface. 
The title of this thesis is 'George Herbert Mead and Dualism'. At 
first I aimed, as the sole topic and aspect of this study, to tackle the 
implicit dualism in Mead's work, for which he is often chided by his 
American colleagues and interpreters; and treat that in a somewhat 
novel light. There is a tension in Mead's lifework, both as a social 
psychologist and as a thinker, resulting from a dissonance in his oeuvre 
in both his fields, produced by his European, or rather Continental 
training in both his capacities, (theoretically ambitious and somewhat 
flamboyant in its style), and the puritanistic, application-biased 
behaviousistic tradition in psychology and pragmatism in philosophy 
which reigned supreme in his country, in accordance with which he was to 
practice both his trades during his working lifetime in Chicago. The 
theoretical hue of his work, as a consequence, represents a marriage (a 
happy and totalistically appealing and fruitful one, to us, and an 
unhappy one for his critics), between the Continental grounding of his 
thought, imbibed by him during his St ud er t days at Berlin 
University, where Hegel's and Marx's dialectic method of philosophic 
thinking has not yet been forgotten, and upon which Wundt's 
contemporary, partially but importantly philosophy-informed 
socialpsychologic teachings in Leipzig had a powerful effect, on the one 
hand, and, an the other, the new, positive science-biased and 
'speculation'-contemptuous intonation of the pursuance of social theory 
(Mead's speciality both as a thinker and as a social psychologist), 
with which he had to fall in in the later pursuance of his work in the 
United States. I endeavoured to treat Mead's lifework in a comparative 
light with that of his European contemporary colleagues, in whose 
handling of socialtheoretic thought a Hegelian-borne dualism between 
subject and object, latent in Mead, becomes explicitly further developed 
and full-blown as such, and to whose standards and lights the 
behaviourism as a psychologist and pragmatism as a philosopher, with 
which Mead's thought was willingly and importantly tinted after his 
return to the States, represents a limitation, - rather than in the more 
usual context of his American fellow-pragmatists and behaviourists, in 
whose eyes Mead's Hegelian leanings in socialecientific thought, are 
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seen as a blemish on his way of thinking which they wish to sweep under 
the carpet when his contribution to these fields is drawn on. In other 
words, in evaluating his work, particularly his most influential one: 
Mind, Self and Society, I wished to reverse the bias with which his 
somewhat schizophrenic thought, loyal to both contemporary European and 
American conventions, is usually viewed by his Anglo-Saxon tradition- 
abiding critics all over the world, to put right the theoretically very 
promising and fertile balance between Continental and Anglo-Saxon- 
inspired views and practices in the work of this exceptional thinker, 
and instead of bemoaning, as is fashionable in behaviourist and 
pragmatistic circles, that if only he had abandoned the dualistic 
transgressions of his theorising, he could have been a perfect champion 
of behaviourism and pragmatism, we say instead, with a Continental eye 
cast on his seminal contribution to social science and social 
philosophy, that but for his protestations of the metaphysical 
inconsequentiality of his dualism under behaviouristic pressures meaning 
to appropriate his oeuvre as a social psychologist, he would have been, 
and is, when teased out of him, a splendid dualist, his work valuably 
complementing the body of contributions, concurrent with his, to a 
dualistic social science as expounded by Sartre, Heidegger and Lacan, 
and the existentialist theologians, particularly Kierkegaard, Bultmann 
and Tillich. I undertook to give Mead as a social psychologist a 
Continental reading, and present his often commented-on 'weakness' as an 
implicit dualism, as a socialtheoretically pioneering virtue in the 
context of the work of these other thinkers just listed, and to show 
that his practical care for, as well as the soberness of, his 
environmentalistic bias to his topic as a behaviourist, enhances the 
dualistic thought of these others, underscoring in those the primacy of 
'object' or the manifest, positive behavioural term of their dualism: a 
great step in thrusting their thought ahead when compared with the 
monistic philosophic idealism chosen, in the final analysis, by Hegel, 
which made his work of the latter in its uninterpreted state, useless in 
the practice of socialscientific thought in this century. Mead is also 
more constructive in the field of social psychology than was Marx during 
his short flirtation with that field, for the latter (who was the first 
to reverse the primacy of 'subject' and replace that with that of 
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'object' compared with Hegel's postulation of the dialectic relationship 
between 'subject' or 'spirit' and social body), grew to be so strongly 
fired by the interdisciplinary possibilities of positing 'object' as the 
primary term in such a dualism, that he abandoned the field of social 
psychology altogether in his activity as a fully-fledged thinker, after 
the first four years of that. 
I would like to believe that this thesis, whose method is the 
phenomenological one in its greatest part, managed to accomplish this 
aim; however, in the course of its writing, the thesis became broader 
than this first aimed-at single dimension of it, and came to acquire an 
at first unintended secondary aspect. Marx and Sartre have an 
interesting and incidental feature in common: they both entertained, 
during the entire course of their lives, the writing of a theoretical 
treatise of the rationale underlying their output as social thinkers and 
practitioners -a pure dialectics in the case of Marx and an 
existentialist ethics in the case of Sartre - from the accomplishment of 
which their more urgent practical commitments both as authors and as the 
activists of their respective causes on the scene of the world, have 
kept them to the end of their days. As is well known, Althusser 
undertook to produce such a Dialectic as a philosopher on Marx's behalf, 
making that task the main aim of his work. I cannot boast that this 
thesis achieved an analogously valuable and complete supplementation of 
Sartre's work, in unearthing and offering a theory of ethics at the 
heart of his practical existential life-project which he promised to 
discern for us, but it can be said that what emerges on the pages of 
this thesis amounts to an ethics which is both very explicit and very 
Sartrian; it's not identical with that which is implicit in this respect 
in Sartre, but the overlap is very great. Sartre's militant 
dissociation of his thought system with the God at the centre of 
established Europian religions, does not amount in his work, as we see 
that, to a denial of the moral constructiveness, meaningfulness and 
effectiveness upon conduct of the entertaining of the radically person- 
anchored and informant, predominantly 'diachronic' God of the 
existentialist theologians; only he does not see that as corresponding 
to a positive, 'synchronic' structure which is 'out there' somewhere, in 
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tangible terms; a way of conceptualising the God of the 
social theoretically 'romantic' (for the meaning of this term see the 
Introduction), with which Tillich as a 'romantic' theologian, for 
instance, is quite happy. I" Nor is our regard for the contribution of 
Sartre's socialpsychologic thought to a modern ethics, rendered useless, 
I feel, by such a mode of the entertaining of a positive God which 
equates that with the being and facticity of society sui generis, as 
some disciples of Durkheim claim their master's work brought forth, 
though never in explicit terms. Sartre does not exclude the possibility 
of such a conceptualisation of God; he simply devotes relatively very 
little attention to the question of the external being of society as 
such, or the philosophic and ontologic trimmings trimmings that may 
attach to a preoccupation with that, though in his work he very 
explicitly and consequentially, if sporadically, entertains the being, 
meaningfulness and importance of the positive facticity of society in 
external terms, which, to his conceptualisation, is always there over 
against human reality as an indismissible and necessary background to 
that in all situations. For these reasons, the framework of ethics which 
comes to the fore in this thesis, has room in it for one or the other of 
these grasps of God, or rather, is not mutually exclusive with either of 
those, nor embarrassed by the postulation of God in either of these 
ways; this feature of it allowing for the provision of a greater common 
denominator between Sartre and the existentialist theologians, than 
Sartre himself was prepared to acknowledge; and the stress he gives to 
the functional and vital subsistance of the positive being of society in 
all human situations, allows, furthermore, for a fertile and instructive 
synthesis between Durkheim's work and Sartre's own, which we mean to 
systematically and consequentially demonstrate and draw on. Secondly, 
Sartre's socialpsychologic 'problematic' becomes a little bit tampered 
with in our treatment of that, in as much as in our treatment of the 
self and the make-up of its infrastructure as both 'object' and 
'subject', or, in Mead's denotation, as both "me" and "I", the Meadean 
"me" or its Sartrian synonym: the 'existing' in its relation to 
'subject' or Mead's "I", 1211 receives greater limelight in this thesis 
than Sartre directs toward it, thanks mainly to Mead's much more 
fruitful preoccupation with and contribution to that 
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socialpsychologically positive term - the "me", that is - and its role 
in the microcosmic or intrapersonal makings of the self than Sartre has 
offered; the analysis of the make-up of the self with such a corrective 
bias to the treatment of the Meadean "me", hopefully proving itself as a 
valuable supplementation to Sartre's (more 'Being-for-Itself' 
preoccupied) outlook on the same phenomenon. 
This thesis is an apology for dualism - an unapologetic one, in Sir 
Phillip Sidney's sense - endeavouring to present that as a consequential 
movement in the twentieth century, particularly in Europe, -with many of 
the contributors to such a framework, entertaining and cultivating 
dualisms whose terms are not comparable or compatible with the terms of 
the dualisms of other workers. The dualism we are interested in is that 
Hegel-inherited one which affects and is operative in the infrastructure 
of the self, with the focus, however, not on the intrapersonal operation 
of those terms, ('object' and 'subject') in the first three chapters of 
this thesis, or merely incidentally and subordinately touching an such 
microcosmic spheres of that. Rather, we hope to present a dualism which 
is homed in, in the main, an the relationship between the subjectivity- 
shot self as a whole, vis-a-vis an entirely 'subject'-free external 
social reality sul generis confronting that, the collective 
consciousness for man in Durkheim's sense, yielding a dualism which is 
expounded in greater or smaller measures in the thematically kindred 
anthropological dualisms of the workers whose list has already been put 
forward here. (The term 'anthropological' is meant here in the 
Continental sense. ) The postulation and delineation of the terms of 
interest to us has been greatly influenced by Roy Bhaskar's works on 
realism and particularly on naturalism 1311, in which he identifies, 
among other things, consistently with Durkheim, the reality of a 
positive society as such in nature which, as an autonomous content to 
consciousness, is at the heart of sociology as an independent 
discipline. On reading Bhaskar's works, we became encouraged to 
entertain the special relationship between two or more tiers of being in 
nature, varying in their subject matters and sophistication as a 
function of their evolutionary ranking as orders of being, which may be 
made relative to and the subject of comparison vis-a-vis each other in 
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theoretic argument, in instances where such a comparison is fruitful and 
instructive. We felt free to comment on systematic effects and 
countereffects holding between two of those in the main: social reality 
and human reality, or the being of society and of the self, which seemed 
to us to clamour for attention in their relationship. Had we not 
narrowed down the study of the interplay between strata of nature, to 
just two of those - to the social world and 'my social world', the 
subject matter of sociology and social psychology respectively, - our 
position could easily have become a pluralistic one (not a dirty word by 
any means). Indeed, at some points of this thesis we bring the 
physiology (the study of a third tier in nature) to bear organically 
upon our argument; however, always with a care for the predominance of 
the two terms at the heart of the dualism of our concern, as just 
identified, making sure that those would be safeguarded as the centre of 
our field of vision, by our continuous concern for the cardinal status 
of those in our consideration, with a view to those pivotal terms of our 
primary interest, and their relationship, becoming served, enhanced and 
enriched in the light of our excursions into such evolutionarily 
neighbouring orders of their being. 
One of the reasons for pointing out here that Bhaskar's 
'naturalistic' philosophy was an important source of our inspiration in 
approaching the socialtheoretic dualism which serves as the centre of 
our study, and for stressing that it was from a wide array of possible 
strata of being in nature that we picked two of those to serve as the 
dyads, in their relationship, which is at the heart of the dualism that 
we shall concern ourselves with, was to dissociate as strongly as 
possible the dualism of our concern from the dusty and traditional, 
'classic' dualism between body and soul, discredited and contaminated 
over the centuries by a philosophic idealism, which springs to mind most 
readily, with its awesome heaviness and solemnity, even to-day, when the 
term 'dualism' is mentioned. The dualism of our interest differs from 
that well-known and erstwhile postulation of 'dualism' on many 
accounts. First of all, it differs from that in the respect that the 
dualism of our study, unlike the 'classic' body-soul dualism, is the 
outcome of a fortuitous choice of a dyad, though with an important and 
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fruitful relationship inherent in that, from amongst many possible 
others, with no status of necessity attaching to the two terms chosen by 
us as privileged and solely suitable candidates to serve at the centre 
of a dualistic form of thought. It just so happens that the two terms of 
being which in their relationship feature at the heart of the dualism we 
entertain, are such that socialscientific thinkers of consequence in 
this century have preoccupied themselves with those and adopted those as 
the centre of their interest with a fruitfully interdependent view cast 
upon those, and that a comparative treatment of such workers has thereby 
become possible. Secondly, again as a product of the Bhaskarian 
naturalism-enabled choice of its central terms, our dualism differs from 
the traditional body-soul dualism in the obvious feature that it isn't 
primarily the terms 'body' (taken to mean 'flesh') and 'soul' which 
serve in a pivotal position in our dualism , (though this 'classic' dyad 
impinges occasionally and to some extent on the area of discourse of our 
dualism too), but the central dyad in our dualism is made up, in the 
bulk of our argument, by two evolutionarily higher-order terms; one of 
these being the Meadean "me", in the purporting of which the expression 
'body' needn't be used at all, but when it is (as it sometimes happens 
in the kindred 'problematic' of Sartre), it refers to that term ('body', 
that is), in a special, symbolic sense, meaning the 
socialpsychologically overt aspect of the self as such -a sense in 
which we as selves are participants in the interpersonal social and 
socialpsychologic reality which we share with others, in the 'body' of 
society, so to speak; and the other term in a fateful relationship with 
this Meadean "me" or the 'body' of this special, symbolic order, is 
afforded by the Meadean "I"-inclusive area of being for the self, 
(Being-for-Itself for Sartre), with the "I" indismissibly operative in 
that when grasped in an evolutionarily high enough sense to serve as the 
fitting dialectic partner in social or socialpsychologic reality, to 
that humanly sophisticated, symbolic and high-order "me": our first 
term. Finally, our grasp of dualism differs from the notorious classic 
body-sould dualism, in that the term 'dualism', for us, is a concept 
which concerns and consists in a form of thought rather than in the 
content which it supports, and which supports that; and any thought 
system or scientific method that relies on the relationship and 
Preface - 11 - 
interplay between any two terms both of which are indismissable for the 
adequate explanation or description of the total phenomenon or area of 
discourse to which they pertain, irrespective of whether those terms are 
evolutionary tiers of being or not, is deserving, on our view, of the 
title: dualism; as will be argued at length in the Introduction. 
However, this latter proviso is merely a conceptual nicety in the 
context of our dualism, which does concern itself with the relationship 
between two orders of being in nature, and which, on account of that 
feature of that as a thought system, amounts to a dualistic ontology. 
With the cropping up here of the term 'ontology', we are lumbered here 
again with another big word in addition to 'dualism', one pith a 
stiltedness, starchedness and datedness comparable with that of 
'dualism' at its unqualified, as a result of its traditional grasp of 
that in philosophy from medieval times onwards (in early preoccupations 
with it), in a manner which was contentually shot with and inclusive of 
the pleading of the being of God -a concept, therefore, with morally 
strongly committed connotations, arguments about which are marked by a 
history of bitter battles, verbal ones and such as brought even crusades 
and bloodshed in their wake; and which demands clarification, as was the 
case with dualism, to free itself from these connotations and 
misunderstandings attaching to its content in the course of its 
emotionally charged past history. 
We are therefore spurred an to stress at this early stage, that the 
word 'ontology', for us, is merely a generic term which means the study 
of being, or, in our case, the study of two orders of being with special 
interconnections between those. Orders of being or reality are not 
confined to the solemn and venerable terms traditionally deputising as 
the content of the discipline of ontology, as just outlined. My mother- 
in-law, for instance, in her earlier days of mild senility, lived in a 
world of delicate ontological variegation around her, in which neither 
graded layer of being for her was such that has a place or history in 
philosophical literature or social thought. Always a discerning 
conoisseur and committed pursuer of human reality, particularly the 
interpersonal forms of that, (which to her afforded the highest order of 
being), in her declining years, during her ever-greater confinement to 
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the house, was condemned to ever-increasing recourse to television, 
yielding her, as a function of the ontologically qualitative hierarchy 
of orders in the viewing material (marked for her by its intensity as 
interpersonal human reality as discerned by her), a wide array of kinds 
and modes of being-with-people and a guide to surrendering her own 
commitment as a person to those. Highest ranking in her life, were the 
occasions of mingling with a friendly and relaxed crowd of real people 
in the streets and promenades, in the circle of her family and friends. 
These occasions afforded her the chance of a gluttony in savouring and 
participating in social life, chiefly in the colloquial sense, in the 
total richness and completeness of that with all the tiers of 
interpersonal human reality which she cared for: in the totally 
satisfactory proximity (in order of importance and qualitative ranking) 
of family, friends, and the jolly human tapestry in the background 
peopled by happy, holidaying strangers or just passers-by. (Even 
recourse to such memories afforded her some degree of a high-ranking 
order of being-with-others. ) Second, third and fourth to such 
experiences were occasions in which such togetherness with greatly 
enjoyed company came to her not in such a total bundle of concurrence, 
but piecemeal or in less than total combinations of those. With her 
introduction to television, the reproduction of life on the screen came 
to graduate to her to a form and range of reality in which grades of 
higher-or lower-order modalities of being were discerned by her, no less 
than in real life, and on similar lines to the layers of that which were 
more or less treasured by her, though the reality of television ranked 
for her lower, an the whole, than the reality of real people in her 
surroundings, and the quality of the experience of her viewing became 
complicatedly influenced by the above-outlined qualitatively graded 
real-life company which happened to watch with her. But even with these 
riders, it was true for her that the variegated classification of 
broadcast material became the extension of her range of experience and 
scope for participation in types and orders of being-with-others, 
fulfilling to her as a reality and animatedly peopled environment to be 
with, to greater or lesser degrees, according to criteria consistent 
with her real-life reference to types of company, which caused her to 
judge and to experience the level of 'being' presented for her and 
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engaging her consciousness during viewing, as a more or less intense, 
satisfying and qualitatively graded social reality, for her indulgence. 
Highest of this canned and televised reality, which offered itself for 
experience along a descending qualitative continuum, were such morally 
high-tone dramatic pieces, involving people, in which good and bad 
agents were clearly recognisable (she was incapable of discriminating 
the identity of the people beyond such bald and grossly signalled 
attributes to them), in which the bad came to a sticky end and the good 
triumphed. Below such encounters followed such pieces which she didn't 
understand but the family liked and which passed for her as good, 
worthwhile and enjoyable on that acount, and, in equal second place, 
films with a big cast, such as epics, which in their colourful 
crowdedness struck in her the chord of promenading people. In shared 
third place came the appearance of a man or a woman, simpatico or 
simpatica of course, such as that of a newscaster, and any scenario in 
which people could be seen as moving, such as plays beyond her 
understanding with small casts and documentaries with a human topic. 
Below this rock bottom in exposure to the presence of people in personal 
relation to her, were such strata and categories of TV-being which were 
devoid of the human element, such as travel documentaries, or were less 
than human, such as animal and nature films. At the very lowest extreme 
of her scale of classification of the forms of reality and being she was 
prepared to be exposed to, were cartoons, which appeared to her, in the 
sketchiness of their presentations of human life and reality, as the 
betrayal of those, dragging into a pastiche counterfeit her 
anthropologic ideals: people in any manner of their presence and 
representations; the surrogate being of whom as presented in film 
animations, offended her to such an extent that she was not prepared to 
watch such material even in Congenial company. It seems to me that my 
mother-in-law's sharply delineated classification and view of the levels 
of being surrounding her, as a partly very valid one and resting, to 
quite some extent, on objective insight and sensitivity, and insofar as 
this is true, amounting to a perfectly meaningful system of an 
ontological hierarchy and variegation. 
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In a contrast of style with that of the argument of the thesis 
itself, which, as has been said, is in its greatest part a 
phenomenology, an introduction of a drier and more scholarly tone will 
follow this Preface, which is to perform a dual function. First of all, 
in keeping with the modern convention, mainly in the English-speaking 
world, of approaching socialtheoretic and socialscientific topics in an 
appealingly disciplined and orderly manner, this Introduction will 
assume the task and function of a so-called sociologic or 
socialpsychologic write-up, affording a summary of related theoretic 
work as the basis of the study, allowing the proposal and identification 
of the hypothesis or hypotheses which underlie the whole undertaking in 
the light of such a background, which theoretically catapult the thesis 
into being, which afford a framework and serve as criteria in judging 
the plea for that in the main argument, and whose success or lack of 
success to stand up to detailed investigation there, is properly 
summarised and evaluated in the Conclusion. To anticipate this function 
of the Introduction here, this topic and set of hypotheses in our case 
will be now identified, firstly and most importantly, as the claim for 
a place in twentieth-century social psychology for a dualistic view of 
that, secondly to demonstrate the rightful place in such a modern 
dualistic socialscientific framework of the implicit contributions of 
George Herbert Mead, and finally and incidentally, to put forward a 
rather more elaborate existentialist ethics than Sartre presented us 
with, and which is nevertheless compatible with his thought, though not 
completely coincidental with that. 
Apart from this main, socialscientifically orthodox aim and 
function, the Introduction will also serve as an excuse, partly in the 
guise of affording a theoretic background to this thesis, to introduce 
there some special concepts upon which the main argument of the thesis 
will heavily rely, so as to make subsequent reference to those easy in a 
concise and convenient way. 
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Introduction. 
The threefold aim of this study has been identified at the very end 
of the Preface, but is usefully repeated and re-summarised here, as the 
explicit task of showing a certain brand and trend of modern, twentieth- 
century dualism to be an insightful and relevant mode of approach to the 
study of social thought, with particular reference to social psychology, 
on the one hand; and to interpret and demonstrate a decisive portion of 
George Herbert Mead's lifework within social science to be fruitfully, 
if implicitly, compatible with and contributory to that area of inquiry, 
rather than apologising for the dualism implicitly underlying his 
thought, for which he is often criticised by fellow-pragmatists and 
behaviourists. The third aim of the study (the unfolding of an ethics 
which is very Sartrian) is an incidental by-product of the argument 
which has been arrived at post-hoc and wouldn't be honestly represented 
in the Introduction as an aim which has been circumspectly set up with 
the purpose of the demonstration of it in the main bulk of the argument, 
so an exposition of it will form no part of the Introduction. For this 
reason, we shall concentrate here on the outlining and elaboration of 
the first two hypotheses, as set out above, which have inspired this 
thesis into being in the first instance. 
In defining 'dualism', we invert Richard Schacht's approach to the 
study of alienation in a monograph bearing that title. We say of 
dualism, as he did of alienation, that it is a contrast concept, and 
therefore dependent in every context of its grasp on the two terms 
between which this contrast holds, if we want the notion to be 
meaningful. 'I But while that work proposes that unless both terms 
sustaining the concepts in their relationship can be specified and the 
pairs for its candidature narrowed down in numbers, the far too widely 
and vaguely used expression 'alienätior" remains unworthy of academic 
usage, 12' we say that just because so many pairs of terms are being 
treated, in modern conceptual practice, as in a dualistic relationship 
to each other in consistent and revealing ways, the concept 'dualism' is 
beginning to deserve academic attention and respect. 
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Dualism, no less than 'alienation', is an area of study which has 
come to considerable disrepute through the history of its usage; 
principally, because before this century, the terms between which a 
dualistic relationship was postulated and discussed, were confined to 
'mind' versus 'body' or 'matter', and considerations of this topic were 
conducted in the spirit of philosophic idealism, that is to say, with 
the primacy of 'mind' in the relationship taken for granted. However, in 
this century, the contents of dualisms, or the dyads between which 
dualistic relationships were postulated, became far more numerous and 
varied. The venerable 'mind' and 'body' or 'matter' pair, which 
interpretations of, say, Piaget or Althusser can be stretched to fit, 
still receive a place in the repertoire of dualisms, but are of course 
no longer idealistically approached, instead the primacy of the 
externally anchored component in these dualistic pairs, or, in the case 
of the structuralists, at least the causal concurrency and parity of 
that with 'mind', is strongly maintained and insisted on. As a result, 
the mind-matter dualism - that form in which dualistic thought is 
traditionally best known - is no longer equated with speculation 
directing attention away from reality as it really is and is experienced 
in the world, veiling that irrelevantly, and dualism is beginning to 
have a sympathetic hearing on the merit of works produced in the many 
fields of its updated forms. 
Whether the dyads affording the twentieth-century dualisms of our 
interest, consist of modern restorations of the 'mind'-'body' (or 
'matter') relationship, or in the postulation and analysis of dyads 
different from that, the concept 'dualism' is seen here as a generic 
notion which can profitably be (and is here) formally taken to refer to 
any two terms consistently tied to one another in a peculiar 
relationship. The twin terms affording, in their irreducible otherness, 
dualisms in the pregnant relationships to one another, can be related 
sets of phenomena, or uncongenial yet mutually necessary components 
operating, in their fateful and characteristic duality, within any 
process and area of study in any field whatsoever. It's enough for the 
two related terms sustaining a dualistic stance of their study, to be 
free from any contentual overlap in relation to one another (in other 
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worlds, for them to be mutually exclusive), and for the terms to work 
to each other's exclusion yet in a peculiar ensemble for the 
maintainance of the phenomenon of which they are fundamental components, 
to qualify their relationship to be deserving of the label 'dualism'. In 
other words, the tag is in place if the relationship which the two terms 
are supporting at the heart of the particular phenomenon they underlie, 
is a dialectic one. The relationship must be, moreover, one in which 
each of the two terms - indelibly bound as components in the ensemble in 
which they work - is indismissable in and for a full understanding, a 
complete account of the phenomenon or area of study which the terms in 
question sustain. 
Examples of dualistic thought systems in modern areas of study - 
among many others - are (most famous of all because of Althusser's 
reading of it) Marx's explanation of the phenomenon of surplus value, 
centrally supplemented by his hypothesised model of the relations of 
production; Chomsky's model of the semantic as distinct from the 
grammatic structure of language, one that lends itself to the expression 
of mathematic formulae denoting and decoding the deeper dimension 
underlying the obvious grammatic structure of language and affording the 
most complete account to date of the circumstance that young children 
are able to deal with far more numerous and creative word combinations 
than an account of that in terms of the input alone would justify. 
Thirdly, Levi-Strauss has developed a symbolic way of expressing such 
patterns in the relationship within the extended family which are not 
fully represented in their descriptions in everyday usage, which, 
however, explain, in conjunction with the everyday language labels 
denoting kinship, some important additional patterns of culture within 
and outside the extended family, over and above slavish descriptions of 
the mere genealogic branchings of family trees. 
Not only does such a formal approach to dualism afford a connection 
between phenomena in any field an methodological grounds and by virtue 
of their formally comparable internal workings, it doesn't draw, in 
principle, a sharp dividing line between the strengths and the depths in 
which dualisms are propounded, held, to encompass them as dualisms. Our 
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classification is flexible and unaxacting in respect of whether the 
relationship in a dualistic model holds between absolutes or relatives, 
whether a dualism is a thought system within epistemologic bounds such 
as that of Piaget, or involves and carries ontological claims touching 
on being in its totality, such as that of Sartre. This doesn't mean that 
we will be unattentive as to which of the latter identified pigeon- 
holes, epistemologic or ontologic, any particular dualism we argue does 
actually belong to; a differentiation of dualisms in the latter respect 
is extremely important in the particular context of the concrete 
examination of any one dualism, or in the comparative treatment of two 
or more dualisms approaching the same subject matter, and due heed will 
be taken in the identification of particular dualisms on the latter 
score whenever such will be in place and required. 
The question also arises whether a work which sets cut to argue, to 
probe a dualistic system, with the intent, and possibly effect, of 
reconciling and synthesising its two supporting terms in the final 
analysis, or suppressing one altogether, should be regarded as 
dualistic? We may argue with Schacht that two well-defined terms which 
are relevantly sustaining a relationship in their organic contrast, are 
a sufficient condition for the contrast concept in which they 
effectively serve to be valid, meaningful and justified... or with Kant 
that if it's possible for any one of the terms to maintain a universe of 
discourse in which it is indismissable, the term attains an existence in 
a special sense at least. We may also usefully call, in this context, on 
Heidegger's notion Fragestellung, which literally translated means 
'positing the question' or 'question-positing', and which refers to the 
delineation of the problematic of a work; with the argument in the work 
itself affording the answer to the problem-area posited. Works with a 
Fragestellung (all conceptual works) don't of course fall into two 
distinct part, first a Fragestellung and then subsequently the working 
out of the answer, but the Fragestallung underlies the whole work and is 
the base and organic part of that throughout, as is the resolution of 
the problematic. It seems that if the heterogeneity (in the author's 
interpretation) of the dualistic relationship between two central terms 
farms an essential core of the argument (amounts to a Fragestellung), 
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the work should be regarded as dualistic as a matter of its form and 
methodology at least; whether the author does or does not reconcile the 
terms in the final analysis appears to be rather a matter of content. 
Many works (certainly those of Mead) would seem then, on such a 
classification, as inadvertently and implicitly dualistic, (and are 
often identified by critics accordingly); this quality is either 
apprehended as a flaw - or, alternatively, such works lend themselves in 
the eyes of their students to interpretation as unashamedly dualistic, 
and to incorporation, in a valuable way, into the body of dualistic 
works, which in this century, in their explicit forms, are building up 
into a coherent school of thought as well as methodology, and to an 
intellectual movement with some following. 
This thesis intends to explore a dualism which in this century 
governs some areas of social thought. It does not encompass all 
dualistic social theorising in this century, for instance the terms in 
Lacan's dualism between schemata of social categories in consciousness 
(s. a. that of the father) and the filling of that capacity with 
concrete human content in actuality, are too narrow to bring that 
dualism on a par with the terms which define the dualism examined here. 
The dualism we are considering is an ontological one. One of its terms 
is the social world as that exists in its positivity, as identified, 
posited and demonstrated by Emile Durkheim in his work Suicide. (3' He 
showed in that work that demographic statistics pertained to acts of 
individual conduct and consciousness in terms of sociologic laws as 
distinct from and independent of psychologic ones. He saw these 
statistical patterns as indices of the being of society as an autonomous 
positive stratum of reality in nature sul generis, located in and 
mediated by consciousness on its peculiarly collective level, in a way 
which was very definitely external in its experience and operation, to 
particular individual consciousnesses, and independent of those taken 
singly and psychologically, which peculiar being of society on its own 
merits he was the first to demonstrate. The other term of the dualism 
considered here is the compass of the being of consciousness as the 
self, Durkheim's own antonym to the former one in that work; 'anomie' or 
the morbidity of consciousness in relation to its collective aspect of 
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being (which is tantamount to the phenomenon and being of society), the 
two forms of consciousness, the collective and the psychology-governed 
individual one, consisting of and operating as uncongenial and damaging 
potentials to one another, as will be elaborated in later parts of this 
thesis, particularly in the Section in Chapter 3. entitled: Being 
Subject too: Which Came First, the Chicken or the Egg? ' Some concepts in 
world literature related to this problem-area, afforäs some noteworthy 
synonyms or at least well-nigh identical conceptualisations of this 
second term in the dualism of our interest: individual consciousness or 
the self. Such are Heidegger's notion of 'my world' or man-in-the world, 
Sartre's human reality and the self in his elaborate sense, or Mead's 
discerning model of the self in Mind, Self and Society CA' or the 
'perspective' in his later work The Ph Qwphy of the Present 16' (the 
latter term serving in a comparable manner in the works of other 
contributors to this Fragestellung) - to name but a few. (6' 
The identification of these two terms may be phenomenologically 
approached; tackling them from such an angle for a little while, might 
provide a more dynamic start to get them and their relationship off the 
page than the mere listing of synonyms for both these terms, though 
lists of related notions to both will be presented at the point when 
the train of thought dealing with those can support them with a 
minimally sufficient measure of familiarity and richness of meaning. But 
for the moment, a phenomenalogic approach should get them off the 
ground. 
It could be said that the object of this study accords with the fact 
that the social aspect of consciousness (Hegel's 'object' or Mead's 
"me", for instance), lends itself to two differential approaches. It may 
be approached from within the self in which context it's open, amenable 
to individual reflection, to psychological processes, to attraction to a 
subjectively centred frame of reference -a characteristic feature with 
which Durkheim would agree. But at the hands of those commentators an 
the subject matter who are predominantly the students of the self (the 
second term of our dualism, with all its synonyms offered so far) - such 
as Heidegger, Sartre, Mead and others yet to be listed - this 
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infectedness of the 'object' aspect of consciousness as the self with 
egocentric factors, receives far more elaborate and articulate 
expression in analytic models of the self than Durkheim's essentially 
hostile, grossly approached and dismissive presentation of it. On their 
various interpretations, the social aspect of the self is grasped as 
entering into, tied in a consistent and interactive union, with the 
corporate system of inner, subjective, individually anchored, psychology 
or social psychology-borne functions/capacities, which are not inclusive 
of the social or 'object'-aspect of the self itself (that ingredient of 
the self as such which is offered in resume form in one's curriculum 
vitae). And this surplus aspect and ingredient of the self over and 
above the "me", consists of and is indicated, generated and propagated 
by such inner functions as self-consciousness, psychologic or 
socialpsychologic reflection, the individual's endowments with the 
various talents of the particular self, the changing/ permanent needs of 
the self of a psychologic, social and idiosyncratic kind, the 
dynamicity, inventiveness, spontaneity of the self, to name but a few. 
(A fuller list of these functions/capacities of the self making up its 
core of interiority, and their various synonyms and aspects, will be 
offered in later parts of this thesis, particularly in the three parts 
of Section 6. at the end of Chapter 3. ) Some experts on the self drawn 
on here see the ensemble of these functions/capacities as a unitary but 
elaborate structure complexly made up by a number of subjectivity-shot 
and dependent factors, which in their organised togetherness make for a 
coherent dimension within the self opposite its 'object'-aspect, the 
Meadean "me" and its literary brothers and relatives, as does Sartre. 
Others, for instance Mead himself, conceive of it as a single strand of 
interiority: his "I". But all these models of this inner core of self- 
capacities in the works of the committed students and analysts of the 
self listed above, whether rudimentarily or sophisticatedly conceived, 
presented and entertained by them, have in common the feature that this 
innerly informed and operative dimension and component of the self is 
envisaged by them as in an ever-active interrelation with the overt 
sociologic or socialpsychologic 'object'-aspect or the "me" etc. 
vis-a-vis that within the self's infrastructure. Furthermore, all these 
conceptualisations, by the authors drawn an here, of the resulting 
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relationship and interplay between the overt social and 
socialpsychologic aspect of consciousness on the one hand and the more 
or less elaborately structured core of interior functions/capacities 
within the self on the other, share the pedigree of their origins in 
Hegel's epistemological 'object'-'subject' dualism, from which all of 
their models of the self directly or indirectly derive. 
The Hegel-inherited 'object'-'subject' dualism, characterising, on 
the understanding of these authors (as well as by us) the integral make- 
up of the structure of the self - (just one of the terms in the grosser 
dualism of the Durkheimian 'social world' versus the 'my world of the 
self' which serves as the central theme of our thesis), may seem as a 
dualism within a dualism, seemingly yielding a complicated web of more 
than two terms to juggle with. However, with the relationship between 
the latter dyad (Durkheim's social world and the 'my world of the 
self'), approacke. d with the bold ontological outlines, viewpoint and 
method adopted here, this will not be so. Thus apprehended, the 
epistemologically composite view of the 'my world of the self' in 
relation to Durkheim's 'the social world', yields but two strongly 
delineated areas, terms, in distinct counterdistinction with one 
another: the overt social and/or socialpsychologic 'object'-aspect of 
consciousness either engaged, affected by and exposed to, on the one 
hand, or unengaged, and unaffected by and unexposed to, on the other 
hand, the dimension of the Hegelian 'subject'-ingredient within the 
infrastructure of the self, or one of its updated descendants and 
varieties in the works of the social thinkers treated here. The 
shouldering on the part of consciousness to this interior dimension of 
the self, yields the world of the authentic self, properly synthetic 
with 'subject' or the "I" or whichever of its modern-day relatives and 
rivals we find ourselves on our hands with, for the stratum of 
socialpsychologic rather than social reality, the world of the self, one 
of our cardinal terms, to be what it is. In contrast, the sheding by 
consciousness of the "I", on the other hand, yields, amounts to and 
affords the external structures of Durkheimian social reality as such, 
in the scientific purity of the properly social aspect and sphere of its 
being, which amounts to society itself and to the peculiar being of it 
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sul generis; which is governed by, subsists in, and is experienced as, 
social laws (including the law in its colloquial sense), operating and 
fathomed as independent and outside of the world of the self, coolly and 
unaffectedly standing over against that and amounting to the other 
cardinal term of the dualism of our interest: society. The first of 
these realms of the being of consciousness refers us to, affords and 
consists in its infrastructure, the other amounts to its external 
structure as society; one affording and operating as its microcosm, the 
other as its macrocosm; one of these realities innerweltlich, the other 
weltlich; 'my world' and 'the social world' - the two terms at the back 
of the dualism to which we mean to direct our attention in, the main. 
There is no need to be evasive or shy about the scientific impurity 
which by definition attaches to - more than that: axiomatically defines 
- the very meaning and experience of one of the terms which will serve 
in a pivotal position in the dualism which we adopted as the central 
theme of our study: the 'my world' of the self or 'human reality'. Its 
opacity with emotional, usually unreflected-on, or 'impurely', 
psychologically reflected-on content, is the very qualification whereby 
it amounts to that which it simply is: the world of the psychologic or 
socialpsychologic self, and for which it is so characteristic and 
familiar to us in everyday life that we are, as a rule, reluctant to 
credit it with suitability as the object of academic analysis, as a job 
to be done to socialtheoretic benefit. Even Durkheim, one of the most 
volatile foes, on moral grounds, of such an ego-affected application of 
consciousness, recognises the resulting, experience-horizoned, innerly 
shot, murky, unscientific, mundane little world of human reality into 
which the social 'object'-aspect of consciousness is prone to be and is 
commomly, normally and actively drawn to afford the psychologic or even 
socialpsychologic content of itself, as an effective factor to be 
reckoned with in socialtheoretic thought, which is a reality well- 
delineated in its meaning and and sphere of efficacy no less than is the 
being of society in Durkheim's sense; amounting to a sphere of reality 
which subsists and operates as an appreciable force and potency for 
effectively opposing, bedeviling, thwarting the outer structure of 
consciousness as society, precisely by virtue of its hybridness with the 
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"I"; an attribute of it which is regrettable-to Durkheim, and which is 
the decorous condition whereby the self becomes dese. r, ving of the morally 
valiant epithet of authenticity to Heidegger, Sartre and some of the 
other students and interpreters of the dualism of consciousness as 
innerweltlich and weltlich, socialpsychologic and social, (to be 
referred to later. ) The resulting synthetic stratum of reality: that of 
the world of the self, in its proper capacity as such, is hardy, and 
resists attempts of its denial by monistic environmentalists who claim 
that the 'object' or "me"-component of the self is supreme compared with 
the 'subject'-component, to such an extent as to make the "me" of the 
self on all occasions indistinguishable from its operation in and as 
society, equating and reducing the being of the self in all contexts to 
that of society, without residue. Equally stubbornly, the peculiar 
hybrid ensemble of the world of the self or Sartre's 'Being-for-Itself' 
or human reality, resists attempts by philosophic idealists, such as 
Hegel, to abstract and distill the "I" or 'subject'-ingredient within 
the self so as to elevate that to, identify and equate that with the 
fibre and medium of society. Hegel was just as wrong to demand a throne 
for the "I" vis-a-vis the "me" as a candidate for a higher-order aspect 
and function of consciousness; that which amounts to society, 
discontent with the merely psychologic or socialpsychologic role of 
'subject' or the Headean "I" within the self as such, contaminated 
within that sphere, for Hegel's money, by its mesalliance to the murky 
socialpsychologic 'object' or "me", as are the pro-"me" promoters of the 
opposite psychologism, fretting to face and accept the role of the "me" 
in its socialpsychologic corruption and marriage to the "I" in human 
reality as an autonomous, legitimate and common sphere of the being of 
consciousness. Each of these positions is as guilty as the other of 
blurring the palpably meaningful and apt distinction between the role of 
the "me" within the self, on the one hand, where it serves as the 
limited, feather-brained, sozzled and gorged, yet indismissable 
ingredient of the necessary phenomenon of the self, married to its 
psychologic roots, to its roots in the 'life' sciences as a condition of 
its being what it is, and, on the other hand, the being of the "me" as 
part of the collective consciousness, Durkheim's synonym for society, as 
the voluntary or involuntary 'carrier', representative and building- 
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brick of the latter: a role whose fulfilment is the inescapable lot and 
conscious or unconscious activity of everyone, as a matter quite apart 
from the psychologic and physiologic factors of the self; affording a 
second and concurrent aspect, role and sphere of being for the self's 
"me", which Durkheim was the first to identify and demonstrate. 'The 
... body' Sartre writes, referring to the "me" in its socialpsychologic 
aspect and sphere of being, 'is meaningful... There could be no question 
of exhausting its meanings. ' It is 'the totality of meaningful relations 
to the world. In this sense it is defined also by reference to the air 
it breathes, the water it drinks, the food which it eats... The result 
is that (it)... is for me a synthetic totality'; (" amounting to a 
radius of being for the "me": that of human reality, which is sharply 
distinct and different from its sphere of efficacy and operation as a 
Durkheimian or Althusserian 'carrier', sustainer, agent and pillar of 
society, adequate or inadequate, and nothing else. 
It is not difficult to see that Durkheim shares with Paul the 
apostle the problem of dealing with hybrid human reality in the given 
actuality in man's life and experience, which, to both of them, gets in 
the way of the traffic with and the dedicatedness of consciousness to 
its purer form, to its sublimation into the external being of the 
collective consciousness to Durkeim and of God to Paul, over against the 
corrupted little world of the self. The difference between Paul and 
Durkheim is that Paul was ashamed of the hybridness of man's everyday 
condition as mere human reality on account of the 'body'-component in 
that in the sight of his God, the "I" enthroned, whilst Durkheim was 
ashamed of man's soiled everyday condition as the self or human reality 
in the sight of the collective consciousness: the "me" enthroned, on 
account of man's soul, the anima, the "I"-component within the self, 
steaming up the window, obscuring the view of the truth of pure positive 
science; producing a 'glass opaque' in reverse, to Durkheim and his 
followers. 
It is, then, the being of the "me" in the self within horizons both 
stretched and limited, precisely defined by the radius of its "I"-drawn, 
distracted, engaged and therefore heterogeneous structures innerly 
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anchored within consciousness, socialpsychologic rather than sociologic 
in its nature, whose locus is concrete individual consciousness, whose 
compass and medium is concrete individual experience, which is one of 
the terms of the dualism to which we mean to direct our attention in 
this thesis in the main: the world of the self; a unitary and autonomous 
order of reality and area of study, of which the twentieth-century 
students of socialtheoretic dualism whose works we wish to analyse, have 
usefully and relevantly offered up models of greater or lesser 
elaboration, and which even the sworn enemy of this mode of the being of 
consciousness: Durkheim, has recognised in his work The 
S ci 
to cic al Method, as the proper object of psychology (the particular 
area of social psychology within that field of study was still in its 
embryonic stages then), emphatically indentifying that individually 
anchored, drawn and operative sphere and mode of consciousness (in sharp 
counterdistinction with the collective consciousness: the subject matter 
of pure sociology), as a subject matter of its own, one that corresponds 
to and is interpretative of that separate substratum of reality and 
being for man which consists in the world of the self, completely 
different anc discrete from that of the collective consciousness, and 
acknowledging that individually circumscribed and engaged sphere of the 
being of consciousness, as legitimately at the centre of a discipline of 
its own, peculiar unto itself, fitting (in its distinctness from 
sociology's object: the collective consciousness), to inform its own 
scholars of its own peculiar operations, laws and rules. 19' 
The grasp and appreciation of the fact that the social aspect of the 
self or the "me", 'object', etc., lends itself to another approach than 
the socialpsychologic one, is a very important cornerstone in our 
thesis. This alternative grasp, usage, role, frame of reference and 
capacity of the "me" or the social aspect of consciousness is outside of 
the self, as Durkheim showed, indicated by way of the demographic 
statistical patterns of society or the collective consciousness, which 
subsists independently of our awareness of that "me" as particular part 
of the psychologic or socialpsychologic structures within consciousness, 
which goes towards upholding society itself, and which amounts to the 
other term of the dualism of our paramount interest in this thesis, 
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opposite the first term of that as just discussed: socialpsychologic 
reality. This, the second of our terms, is the social aspect of 
consciousness (the 'object' of the Hegelians, old or new, and the "me" 
of Mead), intact, unperturbed by, outside the frame of reference of the 
interplay of the epistemological 'object' and 'subject' division and 
dialectic within the self, it is consciousness free and independent of, 
unengaged by any individual, self-saturated, subjective component. 
Defined less negatively, it is (to recapitulate), the order of the being 
of consciousness which is subject, exclusively and necessarily, in a 
systematic, coherent and characteristic fashion, to laws of a 
sociological nature peculiar unto themselves, the level and medium of 
its scientific projection in sociology, of which demographic charts 
afford the countainance and indication: the proper subject matter of 
sociology, as has been said, and the very being of society. 
At this stage it may be useful to draw up a list of the concepts 
used so far to denote the terms of the dualism of our paramount 
interest, to afford a somewhat enlarged thesaurus for referring to them. 
Durkheimian positive social reality the self 
in nature, society 
human reality 
'my world' 
the collective consciousness 
sociologic 
perspective 
'Being-for-Itself' 
the 'body' «' 
anomie of consciousness 
to Durkheim, langest' to 
Kierkegaard, consciousness 
to Sartre 
individual experience 
socialpsychologic 
Other major synonyms and notions related in some vital respect to 
the terms of our main interest, which will emerge mainly in the course 
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of subsequent arguments in this Introduction, will be advanced here for 
inclusion in this list now. 
social stimulus, the gesture response 
sociologic anthropologic 
the sacred the profane 
(The last synonym-pair for denoting our 'the social way of being'-'my 
social way of being' dyad from a certain, fertile point of view, will 
first crop up in its own merit only in Chapter 1. ) 
It is the problem of the "me"'s dual participation in the two 
orders, the sociologic and socialpsychologic tiers of reality, to both 
of which (on the conglomerate account of many reputable social 
scientists and in the single accounts of some) it simultaneously belongs 
in ways foreign, other, irreconcilable with one another, which is the 
object of this study. The Introduction aims to summarily touch on the 
thinkers who are preoccupied with this problem, and on the 
socialtheoretic positions they take with a view to dealing with this 
paradox. 
Durkheim, in Suicide, showed that the terms of dualism postulated 
here - the prevalence of the collective consciousness on the one hand 
and that of the frame of reference of the self on the other, were 
organically and consistently related to each other as opposites in the 
statistical variations in the incidence of suicide. Nevertheless it 
seemed to him that in spite of its principal and integral role in the 
relationship, the frame of reference of the self could ideally be 
rendered out of play altogether, or more precisely that the frame of 
reference of consciousness as the ego was entirely accountable for and 
subject to the laws and factors of the collective consciousness and was, 
in his rendering and interpretation, engulfed as a sphere of being into 
the collective consciousness. Durkheim regarded himself as a monist and 
positivist; he identified the being of society as a positivity in 
nature, granting no room in his ontology to the self as such. He 
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referred with derision as 'anomie' to the patterns which human conduct 
in the self's frame of reference occasioned in his statistical tables, 
and the references he made to the self in its psychologically 
experienced context, are relatively few, and too grossly observed and 
emotively veiled to afford any appreciable scientific value in the 
field of study of that tier of reality; that of the self. In sharp 
contrast, he mapped out in thoroughgoing and fine detail the nature and 
attribute of the being of society as such, and the collective 
consciousness in which it subsists. 
To redress this imbalance in Durkheim, a group of thinkers who 
provide a very colourful, full and vivid rendering of the self - all 
existentialists - will be called upon in this thesis. Their works are 
seen as in a special relationship to Durkheim. Out of these, the one 
whose social theory most readily offers itself for complementation (and 
perhaps unexpectedly, comparison) with his, is Sartre. Like Durkheim, he 
acknowledges the concurrent being of human reality or the order of being 
of the self and that of external positive reality in nature as mutually 
exclusive: the definition of one is what the other is not. Though he 
never states with great elaboration that he regards the external being 
of society as part of that natural order outside, 1110" it's clear that 
he appreciates the external being of society which subsists over against 
the human reality of the self in a scientific, distant and different 
manner, and acknowledges it as a being in a strong, positive sense 
outside of human reality, apprehending it as a limit to the self as 
such; and while in terms of volume he makes no more than sporadic 
references in Being and Nothingness to the positive reality of society 
outside, he does not dismiss it from his cosmology the way Durkheim 
banishes the self, but, dualistically, maintains it alongside with the 
being of the self, even granting it primacy in relation to the latter. 
Similar positions, from this point of view, are offered by the 
existentialist theologians Kiekegaard, Tillich and Bultmann, all of whom 
make elaborate, emphatic and weighty contributions to 'my world' in 
their writings, whilst their attempts to treat external social reality 
(like Durkheim's treatment of the self) remain gross, hazy inexact, 
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unscientific in their treatment; though they all valuably distinguish, 
in rough outlines, the being of that positive society from the 
socialpsychologic ladenness of consciousnesses within the selves of both 
its ascriptionally humble and prestigeous 'carriers' as individuals, and 
the corruption of the relationships and institutions sustaining society, 
by the human element of their representations on the part both of the 
ascriptonally lowly and the mighty. These theologians equate, implicitly 
or explicitly, the positive being of society outside with God. Some 
interpreters of Durkheim give the collective consciousness a similar 
reading, though there is nothing in Durkheim's own writings which would 
seem to necessitate this. 
The works of Mead will also be excessively drawn on in analyses of 
the self within this thesis. Mead is by no means a dualist in the above 
indicated ontological sense; his cosmology is contained entirely within 
epistemology and social psychology, rather than in sociology at its pure 
and classical. As already touched on, at the core of his model of the 
self (central to his socialpsychologic work) is the "me"-"I" dialectic. 
His treatement of the "me" in his most influential work, Mind. Self and 
Society, yields a richly postulated, described, wideranging and 
variegated concept. Its conceptualisation there scans a vast continuum 
encompassing the role of the "me" with its role ranging from that in 
the interior aspect of the consciousness of one individual, through its 
part in the formation of interpersonal relationships between two or more 
selves, or even in larger human groups, always considered in 
conjunction with the "I"-s in all its participants as concrete 
individuals, to its widest context, the construct of the generalized 
other: grasped as a homogenised body, afforded by everybody's "me", a 
coherent repertoire of the universally cognised totality of the stimuli 
of the world related to and defined as such by everybody's response 
capacity to that as an "I", symbolised in language in a commonly and 
therefore socially grasped manner, which is shared by all mankind and 
which, to him, amounts to the mind and informs the conduct of the whole 
species. The generalized other, however, is not the collective 
consciousness. Universal though it is, it's contained entirely within 
social psychology by virtue of the fact that its locus, medium, 
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justification and touchstone, is concrete human experience. It may be 
said that the generalized other is the experiential, socialpsychological 
'inside' of the collective consciousness. The idea and act of producing 
a cosmology which is entirely contained within one order of being: the 
socialpsychologic one, is a very ingenious attempt on Mead's part to 
offer up a monistic thought system under pressure from the academic 
culture of which he was part, and where such a theoretical framework 
was prized, even demanded. By approaching the world outside in terms of 
stimuli, he transforms its immutable, external, ontologically absolutely 
facticity-constituted being, into the universe of shared 
socialpsychologic reality, into which even the humanly universal 
generalized other, the ultimate "me" on the scale of that of the 
species, belongs; the resulting totality of stimuli, no less than the 
individual stimuli for human experience taken piecemeal, subjectively 
encoded with and carrying with it a response-potential as the very 
definition, condition and nature of it as psychologic and/or 
socialpsychologic stimulus, or as the total and coherent cluster of 
humanly meaningful stimuli in the case of the generalized other. The 
generalized other may be paraphrased as the repertoire of the humanly 
recognisable and appreciable stimuli in the world, which is sometimes 
used interchangeably with the "me" in Mead, though the "me" also referS 
in his usage to the repertoire of this system of stimuli internalised 
by, contained within and concretely and personally operative in a 
single individual self; and the response to that cluster of external or 
internalised stimuli, or any one of those presented to the self, is the 
"I", in every case, irrespective whether the "me" is understood as the 
generalized other or as the social aspect of an individual self. Words, 
language signs, symbolise the world (the ultimate stimulus), and/or 
particular portions of it in bundles of smaller-scale stimuli, all of 
which are tied to the responses to those stimuli, in a very special, 
integral and organic way. Each particular symbolic stimulus-response 
pair forms and presents itself in the same package, as it were, with 
the stimulus and response components in them inextricably tied to one 
another as language and meaning. Stimulus sign and response don't follow 
each other in a relationship of contiguity - the stimulus simply and 
immediately encompasses the response and comes in terms of the response, 
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in the simultaneity of the occurrence and concurrence of both. The 
responses to the stimuli are their meaning, and it is that which is 
universally shared - it is through that that the system of stimuli which 
amounts to the world to man, becomes amenable to cohesion into a matter- 
of-course system of signs, language, which universally informs, and is 
the standard and medium of human rationality, in other words, of the 
generalized other. 
The generalized other is the feat of the adult, socialised self. The 
accomplishment of sharing responses in that fluent, matter-of-course, 
automatic way in which the response becomes associated with the stimulus 
in such an integral union with it, immediately, without cerebration, is 
acquired gradually in the practice of the act of 'taking the role of the 
other'. It is through the practice - first piecemeal in childhood - 
taking stimuli one by one - of learning what the stimulus means to 
others, what response it invokes in them, in other words, in 'taking the 
role of the other', approximating with the "I" the way in which the 
stimulus (the other) displays his own "I" or understanding of what he is 
as his own self or his response to the "me" in him as such, that 
responses to a stimulus can be and are learned to be shared, and the 
stimulus is incorporated into the self with its symbolic, its public, 
rational identity, its shared meaning. This piecemeal, hesitant, 
experimental, particularistic mode of social learning at the beginning 
of the individual's life and socialisation process, is called by Mead 
the play, in distinction from the agent's playing the social gam, in 
full possession of the rules of that, once he is completely socialised. 
The child at first handles, on Mead's account, just one or two roles; 
he sees the policeman, plays at being a policeman, at length, in depth, 
taking just that role, or two roles, say that of the policeman and that 
of the criminal; he arrests himself, experiencing both roles 
exhaustively. On Mead's account, the role of the physical object too, 
can be, and is, taken - consequently the symbolicity of stimuli of all 
kinds is gradually acquired in a skilled and fluent manner, and 
language, and a public standard of rationality - mind - is assimilated, 
gained. 
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The generalized other is attained later in life, when the many roles 
taken into the self cohere. A change in the quality and mode of learning 
occurs, comparable to that which the psychologists call the difference 
between learning and skill; a facility in identifying, handling stimuli 
- human ones and inanimate ones - is acquired, without having to delve 
into the self to consult the "I" for the meaning or the shareable, 
comprehensible response to them, one by one. This process yields and 
maintains the layer of being which Sartre labels 'human reality' (any of 
the above listed synonyms of the concept will do for denoting it), a 
layer of being and reality with both intellectual and ethical 
consequences, subject to varying and differential evaluation by and in 
the handling of the self. The generalized other emerges as a body, a 
stratum of reality with many facets - as fluent language amounting to 
the coherent universe of discourse of the comprehensible world, as an 
effortless frame of reference for practical rational behaviour in 
everyday reality, as a code of conduct, a set of etiquette, as a routine 
standard of law-abidance, which is at the back of people's mind and is 
referred to without explicit recourse in consciousness to those with 
whom language signals are being shared, in their concrete identity, or 
to concrete articles of the law, or to those subject to it in 
particular. Routine conduct arises in all these respects, in which the 
"I" is suppressed and attenuated; the most conventional responses settle 
into the groove of their most well-trodden meaning. The "me", Mead 
implies, is the citizen "111; he 'is a conventional, habitual 
individual. ' C2 Responses are not matched to stimuli with particular 
thought, taking time, idiosyncratically, personally inventively, 
surprisingly, as they are by the child, but are tied to the stimulus in 
a ready-made way via the quickest, ready-to-hand route to it, 
cognitional or moral. The "I", the response becomes stereotyped, the 
most obvious response becomes firmly bonded to the stimulus with a 
certain degree and air of inevitability. Mead also calls socially 
symbolised stimuli 'gestures'; these 'gestures' amount to a command, 
demanding, calling for the response specially built into them through 
the process of social conditioning in the course of their historic 
background in ontogeny and in long-standing social convention. As 
accounted for by Mead in Mind, Self and Society, the roles of the 
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stimuli of the social world, originally separately absorbed into the 
self, literally do become those roles in the self, engulfed within 
there, and equal the "me", the generalized other and society, which is 
gradually taken through this process within the self, by way of the 
repertoire of the social stimuli thus appropriated, this process 
maintaining society and simply amounting to it. Consciousness does not 
progress, as in play, with particular reference to the stimuli drawn on 
by it, but moves along the lines of the rules of society which have by 
now been acquired and absorbed as the primary mode of its conduct, and 
is underlain by, governed by and operates observing and keeping in the 
forefront, these rules, as in the game - any game - in baseball for 
instance; and this mode of conducting the self, is itself simply 
labelled 'the game' by Mead, distinguishing, as already said, the 
capacity of the adult for this fluent facility of conduct, from the 
'play' of the child. Like the game in the ordinary, colloquial sense, 
the course of the Meadean social game as a mode of consciousness is a 
process - kept going, sustained by the action of the players intertied 
by the rules. The game then, attains, in Mead's usage, the meaning of 
the mode of the conduct of the socialised, mature generalized other, 
that of his manner of handling roles. Consequently society, by a Meadean 
implication, is not ontogenetically prior to self-centredness, though 
Mead always goes out of his way to stress that phylogenetically and 
ontologically it is. 
This daily flux of the generalized other is not the society of 
Durkheim, the collective consciousness - as Mead himself shows he is 
aware in a single reference late in his work to the existence of society 
as a structure external to individual conduct 'really there in nature' 
which the generalized other merely approxim dteS through its limited 
ability and compass for doing so in any given social act by a self in 
the process of assuming 'what is common (to all men)... in the continual 
passage from attitude to attitude. ' 1131 The generalized other, then, is 
not the external structure of the being of society itself, not 
Durkheim's psychologic or socialpsychologic reference-free collective 
consiousness - it's a human attitude, conduct, lining it, indicating it, 
affording it occasion in the process of living and conduct by 
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individuals, endowed with and exercising their capacity for choice in 
opting for conduct in this generalised modality, that of the 'game' (by 
no means the only available manner of action, as we shall see), however 
unconsciously the agent may exercise this choice of his. The 
generalized other merely affords medium, peculiarly human 'passage', 
concrete temporality to the collective consciousness; it's the 
socialpsychologically passive noise of the collective consciousness 
'running idle' an the scene of the human world as it were, intellectual, 
moral musac in the background, the 'white noise' of nothing in 
particular happening in the commonsense world of the human everydays 
(the only world there is, on Mead's account) - the world which is 
disrupted on exceptional occasions only, in which belief is not often 
suspended. But while the Meadean 'citizen "me"' is reminscent of Adam 
Smith's 'spectator', Heidegger's das Man, Bultmann's 'legalistic agent' 
- the very embodiment of unauthenticity in the book of the latter two 
thinkers, regarding the agent's ethics - the generalized other as an 
intellectual construct is completely novel and unique to Mead, with no 
rivals in the systems of fellow-workers, and is very informative about a 
vast area of properly social situations, that, for instance, which 
prevails in the tax office, as a condition of making possible the 
business conducted there, as well as in other commonplace, hurried, 
routine or routinised spheres of activity, in which the generalized. 
other as a frame of reference for conduct is by no means necessarily the 
vehicle and instrument of unauthenticity at all. Person-irrelevant 
conduct in the ordinary everydays is not at all necessarily unauthentic 
unless it operates as a feigned indifference camouflaging hate, for 
which Sartre depicts it in Being and Nothingness, 174> or unless it 
takes the place of conduct where an explicitly personal approach would 
be in place. Such conduct - the labour-saving and person-irrelevant 
modality of relating to people - can conventiently be called 'thirdness' 
as it is by some Mead-scholars. t'r, ' Thirdness of conduct is perfectly 
normal and desirable, say, in a professional context; businesslike 
conduct is perfectly appropriate in business. Heightened personalness in 
medical or social work would be untenable for its practitioners, and 
quite conceivably unproductive of the long-term good of the client, who 
has to be returned to society as an efficient caper with its manifold 
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intricacies, demands, and made a participant, once more, in its smooth 
operation in the thirdness characteristic of it as such in everyday 
life, and who will have to be prepared by the various practioners of his 
rehebilitation for functioning within such spheres. From the social or 
medical practitioner's point of view, it's also easy to see that a 
demand of deep personalness in his relationship to the client is both 
unrealistic and inappropriate. A Freudian psychiatrist, for instance, 
can't be expected to go through the rigours of ego-fieldwork in empathy 
with his client; it's enough, and preferable, if he knows the right 
remedy on the strength of his professional experience, and applies it in 
the most effective professional manner; given, of course, that he 
maintains a civilised, proper and polite demeanour towards the client 
the while prompted by his respect to him as a human being, in a routine 
behavioural idiom which is, in universalistic terms, constently 
underlain in the practitioner in unobtrusive discretion, by a meant 
attitude of sympathy to all of his fellow-men and women in general, his 
client not excluded. 
It is quite clear that, in its capacity as society in Mead's sense, 
the generalized other belongs to, is contained within, a completely 
different order than the collective consciousness, and is different from 
that. Wide as it takes, complete as it makes the universe of man as 
active and effective in the everyday world of practical rationality, 
Mead's account of society by way of the generalized other, has nothing 
substantive to say (though the subject matter is eminently meaningful) 
of consciousness outside the stratum, and discipline, of social 
psychology, outside the laws, or rather rules of the game as 
experienced, lived, flexed inside the bounds of that. He never specifies 
the rules themselves as such as they subsist outside the process of the 
game as it appears to the concrete grasp, knowledge and experience of it 
by the players; he devotes no attention to the law itself as such in its 
own peculiar modality of being, in the indifference of the latter to the 
individual consciousness of the players at any moment, the way Durkheim 
does. His individual "me" is indistinguishable from the generalized 
other; both are, in his treatment, regarding their functions, the 
platform, the temporal barometer and index of the individually anchored 
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process of 'the conversation' between the "me" and the "I" in the self 
or selves of the concrete players of the game; socialpsychologic in its 
genre. His generalized other is a socialpsychologically soiled 
collective consciousness, inseparable from and dependent on the study of 
the self, and belongs within social psychology. The laws of society 
which are the same whether the "I" is brought to bear on them, whether 
reflected on, or not, and the area of being of the external social 
positivity of consciousness: the collective consciousness, of which they 
are an aspect - perhaps to which they are tantamount, does not make an 
appearance in any extensiveness and depth in his account of society and 
rendering of the world. As a result, there is no room in h. s 
socialtheoretic thought system for the acknowledgement of the key 
difference between the law itself in such a Durkheimian sense, which 
notion his model of consciousness and of the universe lacks, and the 
human attitude of legalism (also absent in his oeuvre), which consists 
of an unquestioning allegience, as a matter of individual consciousness 
and choice, to society's demands of the individual, no matter whether 
those appear as justified or unjustified by the measures and dictates of 
human reality, which blind society-abidance amounts to the 
unauthenticity of consciousness in the socialpsychologic idiom (by no 
means unavoidable as an important individual matter), and which is, for 
instance, one of Bultmann's consequential and informative 
preoccupations. Mead believed his account of society in terms of the 
generalized other to be complete without the notion of the being of the 
law as such over and above the individual's volitional and conscious 
rule-abidance in the socialpsychologic game, and his social psychology 
to be complete without a differentiation between the choice of the 
individual modality of consciousness to be personally loyal or disloyal 
to the self as such, in other words, his social psychology is devoid of 
the notion of the individual consciousness's freedom, opportunity and 
call to be personally authentic or unauthetic within the confines of 
social psychology, of 'my world', of the self. 
Mead can, then, in no way be seen as a dualist in, say, Sartre's or 
Bultmann's sense (and in the sense which coincides with the dualism of 
the central theme of our thesis), all of which positions rest on the 
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appreciation of a rigid and decisive counterdistinction, and the ensuing 
necessary and uncongenial relationship, between the coldly human- 
reality-free and unaffected being of the body of the law as society sui 
generis, and the 'my world' of the self, which sharp division is absent 
in Mead. Nevertheless, Mead's work can certainly and easily be seen as 
dualistic in the weakest sense - as belonging to the inadvertant and 
implicit kind and effective merely within epistemological widths and 
depths, and he received much criticism even for his flirtations with a 
dualistic position of such an attenuated kind. In answer to such 
criticisms, he claimed that although his Hegel-reminiscent "me"-"I" 
dialectic was central to his model of the self, he was a monist because 
he never entertained the "I" in metaphysical terms but merely as a 
methodological device, and because his thought system was indeed 
entirely accomodated within one order of being - the socialpsychologic 
one - in other words, within experience. Yet Mead's "I" is not as 
methodologically subservient as he makes it out. The "I" in his system 
as a never out-of-commission component of the self, really operates, 
effectively touches on and shapes overt socialpsychologic reality, and 
even the positive reality of the world, its social tier included, by 
courting, at all times, the stimuli of the world, appropriate to its 
needs and suitable to 'answer to' those, to enter into an ensemble with 
those for their realisation in the self. The "I", in his rendition, 
actively scans the world for such stimuli, incorporating those, if its 
scanning is successful, into they repertoire of the self, passing by 
useless others - by this selection shaping not only the self but the 
world to a great extent, as has been said. In this respect his thought 
strikes a chord in the dualism of the structuralists who hold that 
systems of objects, or structures, in whatever order of nature, do not 
pre-exist the categories of the mind which apprehends them as such, 
according to the organisational capacity and sophistication of the 
'mind' of the 'organism', the living specimen in question, (man, in the 
case of the structuralists), which 'mind' is encoded in terms of the 
categories to which it is receptive. Prior to being 'seen' as objects 
in the context and by the measures and criteria of capacities which 
define them so, the empirical world is just raw material. Mead writes in 
like vein, descending the evolutionary scale somewhat for his example to 
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describe the potency of even the pre-human rudiments of the 'mind' to 
shape both its awn compass of operation and the world: 'If an animal 
that can digest grass, such as an ox, comes into the world, ' he reasons, 
'then grass becomes food. That object did not exist before, that is, 
grass as food. The advent of the ax brings in a new object. In that 
sense, organisms are responsible for the appearance of whole sets of 
objects that did not exist before. ' And a page earlier: 'We pick out an 
organized environment in relationship to our response, so that these 
attitudes, as such, not only represent our organized responses, but also 
represent what exists for us in the world; the particular phase of 
reality that is there for us is picked out for us by our response. We 
can recognize that it is the sensitizing of the organisms to the stimuli 
which will seet free its responses that is responsible for one's living 
in this sort of environment rather than in another... Our world is 
definitely mapped out for us by the responses which are going to take 
place. ' 1161, This Kantian element does, without a doubt, form part of 
Mead's sociology of knowledge, lifting his dualism out of those modest 
methodological confines within which he claimed his dialectic to move. 
'Stimulus' as conceived of on the scale of the world, and 'response' 
conceived of at the scale of the totality of organised human attitudes 
in relation to that, emerge as a pair of concepts which deserve a place 
in the list of synonyms for the terms of the dualism which forms the 
care of this thesis, and which new pair of terms has already been 
advanced and included when we drew up our thesaurus of concepts kindred 
to the terms of the dualism of our main topic, earlier on in this 
Introduction. 
However, even though Mead's philosophical position differs from the 
dualism of the existentialist students and exponents of the self 
referred to above, his work is embraced here in the body of contributors 
to the world of the self because of the richness and exceptional 
scientific worth of his social psychology - surpassing in this respect 
many of the existentialists, whether or not Mead's approach to the study 
of the self is valuably accomodative of a distinction between its 
socialpsychologic authenticity or unauthenticity, the way Heidegger's, 
Sartre's, and (implicitly) Bultmann's are. Mead's thought touching on 
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the self, irrespective of this important difference between his 
viewpoint upon that and that of his European colleagues, blends well 
with existentialism in many important respects, as discovered and 
pointed out by others before us - by Pfuetze, for instance, who wrote a 
work comparatively treating the oeuvres of Mead and Buber. < "' The 
existentialists mentioned here share with Mead a grasp of the self as 
the human organism reflective on its being and experience as such, by 
virtue of its being endowed with a human individual consciousness 
Sartre, Kierkegaard, for instance I'll - and all the exponents and 
specialists of socialpsychologic reality enlisted here lend themselves 
to being seen as inspired, at least indirectly, by Hegel's"model of the 
self, and their thought systems as attempts to overcome the implausable 
idealism of the 'subject'-'object' opposition there C20) (a) by positing 
the 'abject'-term as primary in accounting for both social and human 
reality - this is particularly stressed by Mead and Sartre - and (b) by 
their pragmatism - this is important in all - if by pragmatism we 
understand the maintenance of the overt act in conduct over the role of 
the covert act of thought by itself. (Pragmatism in this sense is to be 
distinguished from its meaning, much maligned by Althusser, as the 
limitation of the compass and reference of philosophical thought to the 
practical activity of men in the world - Mead alone can be accused, in 
this group, of pragmatism in this Althusserian sense, over and above his 
pragmatism in our sense. ) Further, and most importantly, all these 
existentialists share with Mead (Sartre in the most elaborate detail), 
as already mentioned, the characteristic that the self is grasped and 
presented by them, as its most pertinent feature, as hybrid, internally 
made up (as the very condition of its being and operation) by the active 
union within it between the "me", and, indismissibly, the "I", the 
dynamic, diachronic aspect, the exigency of the self, other in its 
nature than the "me", whether in the individual or extra-individual 
(social) form, role and application of the latter. It is by virtue of 
this irreducible, second component of the self - the "I" - that the self 
is individualistic, inventive, spontaneous, never totally predictable. 
It is in this second aspect, the "I", that the source of the change and 
novelty both of the self and of the world lies, and in which consists 
the medium and link tying, leading, pointing the self to the future. On 
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the account of all the students of the self listed so far, it's by 
virtue of the very hybridness, in such a manner, of the self with both 
the "me" and the "I", that it differs from the area of the being of 
consciousness as pure society, as Durkheim's collective consciousness: 
the "me" pure and intact of the "I", and that the self, or the 
'perspective', or the 'my world', is made the subject matter of 
opposition with the latter, purely and properly social modality and 
level of the being of consciousness, which concurrently subsists 
alongside with its socialpsychologic modality, that of the self. 
To summarise and recapitulate, at this point, the main. sphere of 
interest in this thesis, we may stress here again that what we mean to 
show as the central issue of our concern is that these two separate and 
non-overlapping orders of reality which consciousness dually supports, 
the socialpsychologic and the social one, are both the case, that 
consciousness occupies these spheres of its being and effectively 
operates within them both, ceaselessly and simultaneously, without 
either of these strata of and for its being reducing to the other. 
In the face of this apparent paradox, there are, in those types of 
social science which are intolerant of and hostile to dualism, two 
logically possible and actually perpetrated strategies for the reduction 
of the sociologic-socialpsychologic dualism which we mean to present, 
plead and advocate. One of these is propounded by sociologists in the 
main, and the other predominantly by social psychologists (or just 
psychologists), both of whom typically encroach on each others' 
disciplines. The first of these reductions is psychologism (or social 
psychologism, to coin a phrase), which attacks, means to do away with or 
tactically (or genuinely) fails to grasp the Durkheim-postulated stratum 
of positive social reality in nature, approaching the study of the being 
or phenomena of society in terms of its simultaneous but society- 
irrelevant socialpsychologic workings, bringing human volition to bear, 
in an explanatory way, on the processes and structures peculiar to 
society. Oddly enough, this type of reductionism, common amohg5t 
psychologists and social psychologists of course, is also found amongst 
sociologists themselves. This Durkheim-postulated and demonstrated being 
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of society as a positive stratum in nature of its own peculiar kind, 
once grasped in the light of his argument, is a simple and axiomatic 
insight which one either has or hasn't got, and it escapes some people 
altogether, even if they work within sociology 
The opposite case and strategy for the doing away with a dualistic 
postulation of the being and operation of consciousness similar to ours, 
is the denial and reduction of the self, rather than that of society. 
This latter case amounts to a more complex matter than the former 
reductional paradigm, that of psychologism or 'socialpsychologism'. 
Because of the hybrid make-up, to our understanding, of the self, as 
both "me" and "I" at all times, it can be subjected to both an upward 
and downward reductionism, so to speak, in other words, to a reduction 
to the "me" only, or to the "I" understood in a way to be completely 
exhausted by man's biological hungers. Its upward reductionism is that 
which identifies the self as the "me" only, it's the appropriation by 
sociology of human reality, the proper compass and medium of the self, 
by way of the explication of the world of the self in terms of its 
social role-performance alone, abolishing the autonomy of the study of 
the self as hybrid and as a reality unto itself, sul generls. The self's 
downward reduction, in contrast, threatens the world of the self as such 
from within experimental psychology. Because of the empirical non- 
demonstrability, by definition, of the "I" (except by the 
phenomenological method which to modern experimental psychology is 
suspect), it often, not to say typically, suffers at least indirect 
reduction within the latter discipline, to an empiricistically grasped 
psychologic level, holding out the impoverishment and therefore the sham 
semblance of the "I". The fact that the self's often displays an 
exigency and motivation leading that to its fulfilment as a better 
adjusted and more successful and satisfactory self with that end 
explicitly in mind, is explained by empiricistic psychologists in terms 
of 'secondary reinforcement' (as empirically remunerative in an indirect 
and delayed manner, that is), and the processes spurring on the self by 
the springs and desires of its socialpsychologically peculiar values and 
operations, are seen by workers in that discipline as, at the bottom of 
it, an exclusively empirical goal-directed rat-intelligence raised to a 
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human level at which it is credited with the capacity of the toleration 
of the postponement and symbolicity of empirical reinforcement by way of 
tokens implicitly instrumental to completely tangible rewards. A 
secondary type of reinforcement (such as a high social standing, for 
instance), is prized, according to psychologic empiricists, because it 
holds out the promise of eventual 'primary' or crudely empiricistic 
reinforcement, such as, ultimately, the saccharin pellet for the rat 
and the carrot for the proverbial donkey. 
This thesis refutes and sees as erroneous the reduction either of 
society or of the self, in other words, either one or the other of our 
two major terms whose relationship we mean to present and analyse as the 
main topic of our argument. It refutes, as socialscientifically self- 
defeating, psychologistic attempts to absorb society into social 
psychology, as well as Durkheim's assumption that just because the the 
psychologic and socialpsychologic order of consciousness is the source 
of negativity to the collective consciousness, which erodes the latter 
and is the source of its changes, corruption and mutability, it can be 
banned from thought and from conduct. The phenomenological scepticism of 
the totally inward-looking and solipsistic scholar of the self is just 
as purile and socialscientifically inadequate in disallowing the being 
of anything outside experience, such as the social world and its 
externality, (21 as the scepticism of the doctrinaire Durkheimian 
positivist in dismissing any phenomenon which touches society 
unscientifically, wrongly, inarticulately put, sentimentally tied, 
emotively shot, hazy with the human element. The reality of the two 
orders, both of which human consciousness properly occupies: the social 
and the socialpsychologic, complement each other: and we hold that 
social science is neither complete nor realistic without knowing, 
acknowledging, reckoning with them both. 
The irreducible simultaneity of the consciousness of man in both the 
sociologic and the socialpsychologic order, is worthy of assertion for 
its own sake, for the sake of these two discrete areas of reality, and 
is of interest here because the appreciation of this phenomenon is a 
necessary pre-requisite for providing the theoretical background to the 
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job undertaken here: the demonstration and pleading of the 'social 
world'-'my world' dualism, a direction of socialtheoretic thought in 
twentieth-century Europe, which, to our view, is worthy of note, and of 
attempts of its corroboration. 
f 
In this thesis, rather than treating the simultaneous relationship 
between the terms of the dualism of our main interest from the point of 
view of these two spheres of reality themselves, the stress will be on 
the way in which the concurrence of these two realities figures and 
operates in experience, using the phenomenologicalrnetkocl u 
hic6 iS 
particularly suited to exploring the relationship between these two 
cardinal terms as those that lends itself to study in individual 
consciousness. 
There will be an imbalance in our argument between the presentation 
of these two terms, the purely social and the psychological reflection- 
sailed concrete individual area of the being of consciousness as those 
will emerge as the by-product of our method, the first of which terms, 
Durkheim's externally positive collective consciousness, is properly 
independent of, untouched by and uncongenial and unsusceptible to 
introspective psychologic and socialpsychologic processes to which the 
main bulk of our argument will be devoted, while the second one, human 
reality, naturally lends itself to, not to say consists in and is 
maintained, by the phenomenological awareness, observation and 
cultivation of itself in individual consciousness and experience, our 
method enriching, strengthening descriptions of this second, 
socialpsychologic layer of the reality of human consciousness, and 
which our phenomenological approach will, as a necessary by-product of 
its use as a method, explore in greater depth and expansiveness than it 
will be able to convey about the sphere of the being of society as such. 
For that reason, the job of stressing the indismissable being of the 
Durkheimian collective consciousness, one essential part of our aim, will 
have to be restricted to emphatic statements, in a factual idiom, 
whenever appropriate, of its indismissable role in any paradigm of human 
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consciousness, however psychologic or socialpsychologic the manner of 
its genre appears to be, as well as by proclaiming here, in a general, 
blanket manner, the tenet and conviction on our part that the 
collective consiousness is omnipresent in the context and the background 
of all individually conscious experience - indeed, is the preconditon of 
that - and that all grasps of the self, its world and its phenomena, are 
complete and make sense in conjunction with the collective consciousness 
only, which ever operates in tandem (at least implicitly), with all 
socialpsychologic phenomena in all of their operations. 
This feature of our forthcoming argument - that of its. 
disproportionately greater informativeness about the 'my world' or the 
'my social world' in comparison with 'the social world' as a modality of 
consciousness, is not an unqualified disadvantage from every point of 
view. It holds out one benefit at least: that of supplementing a 
characteristic weakness and shortcoming, due to an opposite bias, in the 
works of some of our well-known allies in acknowledging, upholding and 
treating the dualistic concurrence of the role of our selves as the 
egocentricism-irrelevant 'carriers' of society, (voluntary or 
involuntary building bricks in the collective consciousness) on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, as perpetrators of what is often referred 
to in their works as 'lived reality' (a kin of our 'my world'). Such a 
converse bias to ours in the treatment of the dualism of our interest, 
is characteristic chiefly of the seminal works of Althusser, alongside 
with those of Durkheim, whose unworthily rudimentary treatment of and 
hostility to the 'anomie', the psychologic and socialpsychologic 
soiledness of consciousness as an indismissable potential, and, if 
activated, actual destructiveness of the collective consciousness as its 
fateful dialectic partner, we have already critically pointed out. It 
would be gratifying, to our way of thinking, if this thesis would do the 
job of emancipating the 'my world' term of the dualism which we mean to 
treat here, from its relegation by these two great thinkers, and others 
loyal to them in this respect, to an irksome and regrettable aberration 
of and distraction from the elevated role of consciousness as the 
'carrier' of the collective consciousness, which it is best not to talk 
about, or at any rate not to talk about with socialscientific 
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impartiality and respect as a tier of reality - that of human reality - 
sui generis, a firmly wedded, uncongenial partner in its being and 
operation to the collective cansciousnes and equal to the scientific 
status of that as such. For that reason, we adopt the task of the 
demonstration of the universal subsistance, not only of the collective 
consciousness but also of human reality in all situations where there 
are people, as a paramountly important aspect of our aim in this thesis 
- maintaining that the socialpsychologic modality for approaching all 
such situations really and universally persists, if no more than as a 
dormant possibility in grasping and living those in the idiom of human 
reality. To support this claim, we shall have to substantiate with good 
arguments (a) that the social psychologic, no less than the social 
stratum of reality, has a persistent identity and can always be, at 
least potentially, apprehended in its own characteristic idiom, which 
lies, as has been argued, in its hybridness, in the integral 
completeness and syntheticity of its mode of being with both "I" and 
"me"; and (b) the soundness of the contention that human reality is a 
universal ingredient in, and the condition of the possibility of, all 
situations involving people, no matter at what scale, will depend on the 
identification of ego-anchored mechanisms not only within the integral 
compass of one individual's consciousness, but also in the context of an 
interpersonal socialpsychologic reality, conceivably reaching to the 
dimensions of the entire species, to successfully rival the collective 
consciousness as a modality of being, and offer a socialpsychologic 
alternative to that in whatever volume, bundle and packages of 
anthropologic units the Durkheimian dimensions of society comes, 
operates, and faces us. Fortunately, we have already pinpointed and 
presented a socialpsychologic notion, dimension and mechanism of being 
which encompasses the whole of humanity at its widest, to offer a 
socialpsychologic counterpart to the collective consciousness at its 
universal; this notion was the generalized other of Mead. We have noted 
that the adoption of this general but still socialpsychologic dimension 
of consciousness, is indicated by and yields in concrete human behaviour 
the attitude and mode of conduct which we (and some students of this 
notion before us) have dubbed the 'thirdness' of conduct, overt or 
reflective; the vehicle and modality of consciousness, in any case, in 
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which the self functions in personal unauthenticity as a self, an 
account of the fact that the "I" has bf made practically redundant in 
it, that there is hardly an "I" to it. 
(It may be mentioned, in parentheses, that there is an additional 
socialpsychologic construct to the generalized other, in the form of 
whicht human idiom of consciousness sometimes presents itself at a 
grand and conceivably anthropologically total scale. This is Sartre's 
'spirit of seriousness': an attitude which is personally supportive of 
the external being of society, yet which is not that being itself, only 
the human medium of its upkeep. This construct may be defined here 
briefly as a sense of consciousness of being at one, by choice, with the 
collective consciousness, rather than with its personally and 
individually authentic and dedicated mode of its being as a self, as 
human reality. ) 
The 'thirdness' of the generalized other and the spirit of 
seriousness are not one and the same thing. The spirit of seriousness is 
not a routinised, shorthand mode of unreflectively and unnoticeably 
carrying on with, accepting and supporting, as a matter of course, the 
rational and moral operations of society in one's behaviour, in the 
modality of the self as very nearly a "me" only, the way the 
'thirdness' of the generalized other is. If the 'thirdness' of the 
everydays of social routines is the humming which the collective 
consciousness makes when running idle, then the spirit of seriousness is 
the heavy echo it makes in its solemn, elevated, knowing, self-conscious 
capacity as society or the solemn representation of that, resounding in 
the human conduct of those perpetrating it; its sonorous moral tone. 
Like the generalized other, the spirit of seriousness too is an 
eXtra-individually coherent, continuous modality of consciousness, but, 
like the generalized other, it also consists of and is amenable to being 
grasped in the socialpsychologic makings of consciousness, and it can 
come and be recognised in parcels of the individual selves sustaining 
it. Such an ego-analytic approach to it reveals the spirit of 
seriousness as in fact being filled with an enhanced sense of an "I", 
bastardised and unauthentic though it is, the intensely personal feeling 
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of being 'one of us', one of the Sacred, at one with the licenced, 
ascribed righteous, and other than those who are not 'one of us' or 
'Sacred' -a sanctioned, sociaipsychologic ego-trip, albeit an 
unauthentic one, with hardly a "me" to it in consciousness. 
Although, as has been observed, Mead does not entertain the 
differentiation in personal conduct between the socialpsychologic 
authenticity or unauthenticity of the self carrying that on, he 
contributes importantly, when looked at with an eye keen and sensitive 
to this distinction, paradigms and descriptions what Sartre and Bultmann 
would regard as authentic conduct in great richness, without himself 
using that epithet to denote and characterise those paradigms. Moreover, 
we have him to thank, in great part, for the term 'authenticity' (which 
he never used himself, as we said), attaining wider and more 
interdisciplinary dimensions than the confines of the self within which 
the term is usually understood (normally qualifying conduct in 
socialpsychologic dimensions. ) However, many situations, as Mead 
recognised, are predominantly and properly social in their overriding 
intonation, and conduct in authenticity to society becomes, in such 
situation, a distinct possibility, endowing the term 'authenticity' with 
a special meaning, differing from its usual, narrower one. Ve have 
already referred to a general 'thirdness' in socialpsychologic conduct 
as appropriately matched, true to, expressive of society as it is in its 
uneventful 'passage' in the mundane everydays - Mead's contribution - 
which is authentic to and in properly social situations, and is 
unauthentic only if it falsely deputises for an attitude, mode of 
communication in a personal, socialpsychologic modality of consciousness 
and conduct when the latter would be appropriate, for instance, in the 
context of the family, within which the idiom of the self is natural in 
a manner which goes without saying. Focussing, once again, on the 
'thirdness' of the generalized other (quite distinct from the spirit of 
seriousness, as has been said), we may identify, at this point, the 
socialpsychologic antonym of that 'thirdness' as a type and manner of 
conduct, which alternative style of attitude to people and mode of 
consciousness we label the 'salience' of consciousness. 'Salience' means 
'with the "I" at play in, brought to bear upon the self in conduct, 
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personal or interpersonal; in a word, conduct in the idiom of human 
reality. ' The term 'salience' has been inspired, though not used, by 
Sartre; albeit his concept ekstasis, used in his description of the 
self's temporality to denote that highly particularised state of the 
self in which a close relevance of the future (or "I") and of the past 
(or "me") to the present state of the self, throws its current mode of 
existence and experience into strong relief, is highly akin with our 
notion of the salience of the self. 122) In other parts of Being and 
Nothingness too Sartre often refers to the self in its fully assumed 
capacity as such (influenced by Gestalt psychological usage) as 
'figure', plastically standing out in consciousness against, and in 
counterdistinction with, the 'ground' of the attitude of 
impersonality: c2: 3a against the 'they', in other words, a kin of our 
'thirdness': an "I"-less, 'flat', 'two-dimensional', routine mode of the 
being of the self. (24) 
In the terminology of Mead, who also entertains what we call the 
'salience' of consciousness in its contrast with the 'thirdness' of 
conduct, 'salience' is denoted by the term 'significance'. The 'salient' 
mode of conduct is the appropriate and typical one in psychologic and 
socialpsychologic situations in which we naturally relate to ourselves 
and to others in terms of persons rather than as objects of a 
physiologic kind (as in the doctor's surgery), or of a sociologic kind, 
where the 'thirdness' of conduct is appropriate, say, during a job 
interview or a driving lesson. Conduct and the definition of a situation 
between two or more people in intimate ensemble, such as in the circle 
of friends, or, again, in the family - just as much as in relation to 
ourselves as a solo consciousness - is 'salient'; the "I", in such 
cases, is brought to bear upon our relating to others, and is 
appropriately put into play by others in response. 'Salient' conduct is 
therefore authentic to those situations which are characteristically 
socialpsychologic, personal. It is conceivable that such appropriately 
socialpsychologic situations are approached and handled in the modality 
of 'thirdness'; but if the latter possibility is acted upon in spheres 
where the socialpsychologic modality of conduct is in place, our conduct 
vis-a-vis our properly intimate human environment will be unauthentic; 
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and such an occurrence would be personally unauthentic in relation to 
our own selves, too, as a necessary by-product of treating others as 
less than fully operative selves for their own part. 
Authenticity to the collective consciousness is not assumed 
exclusively in the modality of 'thirdness'; it may be assumed in the 
'salience' of consciousness too, in cases where a society is meaningly 
and significantly approved of by an individual, and emphatically and 
personally supported by him as a self. Such a case presents an 
interesting paradigm of dual authenticity, social and socialpsychologic. 
It's a self's distinct possibility to assume authenticity-to the 
positive social reality in the world , whether that social reality is 
established or emerging, in a concurrent, socialpsychologically also 
authentic 'salience', that is to say (in sharp counterdistinction with 
the spirit of serousness) with the completeness and peculiar standards 
of the 'my world' not given up but retained as such and used to 
significantly endorse society in its fully assumed capacity as a self; 
this possibility, not to say power of the self is one which strongly 
preoccupies Kierkegaard and Bultmann out of the existentialists, and the 
fellow-existentialist Sartre's notion of 'elective assumption' is 
strongly akin with it. 126"' 
It may be added here, conversely, that the 'salient' mode of 
conduct, like its 'thirdness', can be, and often is, unauthentic, for 
example when its bearings on the true standards of human reality, and 
its imperative demanding a universalism in one's mode of relating to 
others with the same degree of respect as we regard ourselves, are 
shortchanged, dislodged. (Authenticity and unautheticity will henceforth 
be used in their customary socialpsychological sense again. ) The 
'salient' mode of conducting ourselves interpersonally is almost always 
unauthentic in Sartre's descriptions of that in Being and Nothingness 
(in his rendition of love, for instance), but 'salient' interpersonal 
conduct can of course also be authentic, as it is, in the main, in 
Bultmann's and Mead's works relevant to the topic currently discussed. 
An unauthentic 'salient' consciousness is that in which the scope, the 
being or the values of persons, the agent's own or those of others in 
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relation to him, are slighted as selves in the course of conduct, and 
the authenticity of 'salient' conduct consists in the agent's respect, 
both in himself and in all others, of a person's capacity and need to be 
a self in its fully dignified and operative sense as such. 
Finally, in our job of introducing and qualifying some notions here 
in advance to their analyses in later parts of our argument, we should 
throw some light on the notion of 'romantic' social thought which will 
consistently crop up in later parts of this thesis. 
Because Mead's work will be integrally, and other non 
existentialists passingly, drawn on in forthcoming treatments of the 
world of the self, a wider term than 'existentialism' is needed to 
encompass the exponents of the position opposite that of Durkheimian 
positivism and its jealously exhaustive possessiveness and reservation 
of consciousness for the unquestioning service of society as its only 
proper and appropriate repertoire and sphere of being. The phrase 
'romantic social thought' has been chosen to encompass the resulting 
wider class of socialtheoretic thought opposite this Durkheimian 
position. The term 'romantic' is taken from literature. There is, in 
literature, a specific epoch labelled the 'Romantic era' during which 
all works produced in the decades of its reign can automatically be 
regarded as 'romantic' ones, but in our endeavour to find a summary 
label for works loyal to the self, the term 'romantic' is based on a 
looser understanding of that; one which attached to the term in the 
usage of those students of literature who see the history of literature 
as a process of alternating phases between 'classical' and 'romantic' 
eras within that, in a general sense. Classical phases, in the latter 
frame of reference, are typically governed and informed by the structure 
of thought and of the work to be produced, romantic phases and products 
of thought and art being those on which the individual, his spontaneity, 
upsurge of immediate inspiration chracteristically leaves its stamp and 
less attention is paid to the rules and the structure of the writing. It 
seems, by analogy, that Durkheim's preoccupation with the form of 
society, his identification of that with its structure, and his anti- 
individualism made him comparable with the 'classicists', and that those 
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social thinkers who allowed the self complete with its spontaneous, 
fortuitous, unruly potentials integrally into their approach to their 
subject matter, resemble in this sense the 'romantics'. The term of 
course is, and must be, used advisedly - particularly as many of the 
supporters of the social notions in this thesis come from literature, - 
and must not be confused with the era in literature of Romanticism 
itself as many of the contributors drawn on later on in this argument as 
social romantics, do not belong to that era in literature at all. 
'Romantic' in the sense used in the thesis is always to be taken in a 
socialtheoretic context, referring to the renditions of such social and 
socialpsychologic phenomena which involve, rely on the self, generate 
novelty, and are characterised or vitally affected by individualism. 
The academic genre of this thesis is socialpsychologic, or 
anthropologic in the Continental sense. Anthropology, in any of its 
forms, differs from sociology in that its subject matter is not society 
itself, but human reality, albeit sometimes in dimensions writ large, as 
it is in its grasp in this country, where anthroplogy consists, by and 
large, of the study of large patterns of man's culture, externally 
approached in a more Durkheimian idiom, and empirically oriented. The 
subject matter of anthropology is, in any case, man's world, including 
the things, concepts and practices in the radius of human reality, 
whether projected, approached, presented and viewed on a wide epic 
screen, so to speak, as it is in this country, or in close-up', as on 
the Continent - and the expressions 'sociologic' and 'anthropologic' 
have, accordingly, been entered, in advance of the present train of 
thought, into the list of the opposite pairs of concepts which enrich, 
in their synonymity or relatedness, the pivotal terms of the dualism 
which will provide, in their relationship, the axis of this thesis: 
human reality and social reality. To distinguish the term 'anthropology' 
in our usual Continental sense in which it normally assumes 
socialpsychologic dimensions, from its grosser grasp as approached in 
this country, the term in its Continental, socialpsychologically grasped 
sense, will be provided with a suffix and referred to as 'micro- 
anthropology' in future use. 
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THE SCHISM IN SOCIETY. 
Section 1. Seriousness. from the Inside. The Schism in Society. 
The terminology for the basic classification of our topic into the 
contrasting spheres of being treated here - those of society and of 
human reality - has been taken from Durkheim, but the terms adopted in 
future arguments are not, in the main, the 'collective consciousness' 
and 'anomie' which figure in Durkheim's Suicide, but 'sacred' and 
'profane' which serve in a pivotal position in the work by the same 
author called The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. " This is 
because the latter dyad allows for the classification of the topic not 
just in terms of concepts, but also in terms of humanity itself, and the 
thesis will concern itself with people a great deal, in whose sphere of 
being as people and conduct these two orders of consciousness operate. 
The 'sacred', as Durkheim argues in the latter work, is 
indistinguishable in essence from society, and is therefore analogous 
with the collective consciousness (which latter term will, of course, 
not be jettisoned from our future usage, just because its virtual 
synonym, the 'sacred', will elbow into the forefront of our argument. ) 
The 'profane', on the other side, opposite the 'sacred', is pertinently 
representative, to our understanding, of human reality, in that, 
compared with the 'sacred', it is soiled in its ideality as a form of 
consciousness, is foreignly affected as such, thereby changing its 
sociologically pure and orthodox nature and made mutually exclusive with 
the 'sacred' or the collective consciousness. 
'Sacred' and 'profane' are orders of being, a classificatory frame 
of reference, and labels for classes of humanity. Durkheim evocatively 
considers the sacred and the profane as those classes of mankind and 
things human whose opposition creates the greatest chasm that divides 
mankind and man's world into heterogeneous - opposite genuses. Durkheim 
studied and presented the 'sacred' and the 'profane' as those terms as 
forms of consciousness operate in the world - as observable and 
discernable in Aboriginal cultural patterns in Australia - but the two 
notions may also be studied from within the individual's perspective, 
they are also experienced in human reality, in 'my world'. 
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When phenomenologically approached, the world seems to emerge in two 
characteristically different ways, which peculiar dual experience of the 
world will be utilised here as the first step in approaching the 
'sacred' and 'profane' as experienced 'from within'. Such a view of the 
world yields a 'small-letter world' and a 'big-letter world'. 
It may have been during my studies of German a long time ago that 
such a dual frame of reference for the world first occured to me; in 
that language nouns are formed by altering the small-letter initials of 
verbs, adjectives and adverbs, to stand for those originally dynamic and 
vital notions in a solidified, arrested way as it were, conceived of as 
things; abstract things, but things none the less; the original nations 
taking their place, by virtue of their graduating to a big-letter 
status, and function from then onwards as noun-objects in an unchanging, 
positive reality, at one with institutions. In English, the concept-pair 
'liberal' and 'Liberal', may serve as analogous examples. Many concepts, 
notions - possibly all - can be grasped in these two differing ways, 
typically dynamic and human reality-wise discriminative, such as verbs, 
adjectives, or typically thing-like and ossified, socialised, 
institutionalised, so to speak, in spite of the fact that their latter 
aspect is not necessarily denoted by big-letter initials in the English 
language to mark off and signal their being and capacity as inert noun- 
objects; as, for instance our way of referring, differentially, to the 
notion 'romantic' (ego-oriented) and 'Romantic' (meaning the 
practitioner of literature strictly within the movement and era of 
Romanticism) . Our way of spelling some common nouns with a capital 
letter in future parts of this thesis, at times when their use in our 
big-letter sense needs to be accentuated and distinguished from their 
small-letter use, serves as a means to denote the genus of the being and 
aspect of a concept - its noun-like, social one as opposed to its 
lively, human reality-expressive, enriching and congenial one. Our 
small-letter understanding of any of these terms yielded at times when 
the notion in question is approached and seen in a personal, concrete 
manner, intimate in its grasp and conceived of in the idiom of selves, 
and, contrastingly, the big-letter aspect of the same notions, words, 
(whether actually spelt by us with a big capital or not), is afforded by 
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one's approach to those in the Durkheimian, social idiom and sense, with 
the icon-like stiffness of an already established, Sunday-best positive 
social reality attaching to them. Some examples of concepts, notions 
which acquire different aspects and being as a function of whether one 
thinks of those in a small-letter way - as the process of its personal, 
immediate upsurge in experience in the intimate mode, or in the big- 
letter, already established, immutable, elevated, thing-like way, are 
'family', 'generosity', 'home', 'life'. Some of these dually evocative 
and operative concepts were, it seems to me, originally small-letter 
words - the "I" (in spite of its usual English spelling), 'man', 
'spontaneity', 'fun' - others may have been big-letter words to begin 
with and patriated later on into the small-letter world, such as 'God', 
'Love' (I think), 'organisation', 'management'. Further, there are such 
words which seem to me to have differentially reflected, throughout the 
history of their usage, their separate meanings in the two worlds, big- 
letter and small-letter, to such an extent and with such consistency, 
that they have completely grown apart in their meanings in their 
present-day use. Such words are 'gift', meaning ability with which 
people are endowed, and 'gift' meaning things that are given to people. 
The same distinction obtains in the terms 'talent' and 'Talent', the 
first sense of that term referring to the personal talent with which one 
may be blessed through being able to be creative as a person, and 
'Talent' referring to the money which the practice of this ability 
earns one. 'Committed' personally to an idea surrendering one's freedom 
to it, and 'committed' to prison, parting with one's freedom in a 
different way, externally imposed on one, seems to provide a further 
example, as does the distinction between the words 'trust' and 'Trust', 
the first, small-letter sense of the word generated by and consisting in 
one's safe, intimate anchorage in the interpersonal world of human 
traffic between people, and in the big-letter sense, 'Trust' (often 
spelt with small letter too), referring to an organisation in a business 
sense. 
But the realisation of the possibility of such a simultaneous 
appreciation of objects and concepts in the world in both a big-letter 
and a small-letter sense came to me explicitly, not when first grappling 
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with German, but when thinking of a particular elderly person in whose 
life and personality many positive issues have played a very important 
part in a big-letter, institutional sense -a woman and a Friend, 12' 
both in a big-letter sense - but which many notions in the small-letter 
sense hardly touched her experiential repertoire and whom life, in the 
small-letter sense, seems to have passed by altogether. 
The small-letter world is close in meaning to the profane - as 
experienced - as in the small-letter sense. It is also close in meaning 
to what is widely referred to in philosophy as 'lived reality'. Let's 
hope that being able to use the novel term 'small-letter world' and 
'small-letter profane' in the place of 'lived reality', will help 
safeguard the notion in future considerations of it against some of the 
notoriety and ambiguity which attached to the latter expression through 
the history of its use, thanks in no small part to a scholastically 
respectable and fashionable appreciation of that term (or rather 
contempt towards it) in present-day, mainstream socialscientific dogma. 
The concept 'society' itself can offer itself for experience in 
these two differing ways - referring us to two different strata in 
nature where it simultaneously prevails - to the socialpsychologic 
stratum, where its experience is personal, intimate, profane; and to 
society in the external positive reality in nature, as it publicly, 
immutably, factually subsists, in a way independent of our need far it, 
requests of it, thoughts about it, as persons. My dual appreciation of 
bus routes amounts for me to an example of how these differential 
properties of this public service, social institution, subsist in these 
two different ways at once, and are experienced, accordingly, in these 
two different ways, small-letter and big, at once, or perhaps 
alternately. In one sense, bus routes mean to me getting together with 
my friends, family, in spite of not having a car, in spite of my living 
in an isolated, rural spot; in this sense, the intimate one, bus routes 
and time-tables mean company, social intimacy, they are in this first 
sense a service. In another sense, and another, equally palpable stratum 
of reality, bus routes subsist for me in terms of their pre-planned 
logistics, order me absolutely in time and in space. I parcel up, in its 
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light, my freedom to do as I like all day long; I have to arrange my 
plans, my projects so as to be able to organise my activities and life 
around the bus time-table and in between the running times of the buses, 
if I want or have to participate in anything at a distance from my home. 
In this second way my personal freedom yields to its constraints, is 
altered by those. Durkheim was also aware of, and referred to, these two 
ways in which society figures in experience - of society as 'currents' 
and 'lived experience', apart from its mode and being as positive, 
external reality. 13' 
Existentialists typically distinguish between their various 
contenders for the collective consciousness, which they appreciate as a 
universal, immutable whole, an absolute as a standard sui generis, in 
which lies its human reality-constraining capacity, its commanding 
status, its endowedness and efficacy as sacred, as man's experience of 
it as the norm and his inclination to obey it, as distinct from the 
concrete human content of that, provided by the inevitably ego- 
contaminated and therefore ethically fallible, actual agencies who do 
the job of its representation. The latter, actual mechanism of the 
representation of the collective consciousness, yields an aspect and 
understanding of society, whose standards as such are corrupted in this 
way relative to the ideality of the social norm at its pure, and which 
in its given state is far from morally fit to order man and his freedom, 
in Tillich's eyes, for instance. C°' When a shipment of Czech Jewish 
women sang in the gas chamber the Czech national anthem along with the 
'Hatikva' (the national anthem of the then-day Palestine) with their 
last breath (as an eye-witness reported), it was the collective 
consciousness at its ideal which they envisaged in their hopes for 
Czechoslovakia, that they were addressing themselves to and demonstrated 
in the name of, as distinct from the actual Czechoslovakia under its 
current regime which allowed them to be innocently sacrificed and wiped 
out in this fashion. The two different modes of apprehending society (as 
ideal and actual) seem to correspond to the big-letter meaning and 
small-letter meaning of that, respectively. This discreteness of the 
being of society as its humanly mediated representation and network, 
from the collective consciousness at its ideal, figures in Kierkegaard's 
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and Sartre's thought too. But Durkheim doesn't make this distinction. To 
him, society as established is just that universal, immutable stratum of 
being, in the big-letter sense, which was there in nature as human 
society, as the external modality of man's conduct and consciousness, 
ever since the human species was there too, and which is going to 
indismissably prevail in this capacity of itself as long as there will 
be humans in the world - as the universal form, category: society. He 
does not consistently contrast this concept of socety with the 
particular content and lived human furnishing of that, with society as 
an ongoing process, as an historical content which is subject to the 
corruption of time and corruption in other senses to, in amoral sense 
certainly; I think that this is a shortcoming in Durkheim. The 
distinction between society as the absolute positive normative being for 
which Durkheim recognised it, and its given content which can be rotten 
to the core, is a useful one. Bultmann correctly interprets the death of 
Socrates, or rather his choice to waive the chance to have his death 
sentence commuted to exile, as a demonstration of allegience on 
Socrates' part to society and to the state as such. 11: ' At the same 
time, Bultmann appreciates this and we would like to stress, the society 
and the state as such is not the same thing as the content of an actual 
society and an actual, given, concrete state. The death of Socrates, his 
acceptance, without quibbling, of the sentence passed on him by the 
legislative and normative authority of the state as such, did serve, 
uphold and strengthen society 'as such' in its universal, absolute 
capacity in which capacity it is a normative standard as an end in 
itself, and in which capacity it no doubt exists in a real way, as 
Durkheim maintains, irrespective of the corrupt state of its given 
content. But at the same time, the error by 'profane' or human reality- 
informed standards of the state in passing such an undeserved sentence 
on Socrates, the wrongness of the concretely given society of his day 
and of the fallible institutions in it, were shown up by the 
absoluteness of the standards and choice of Socrates which he exercised 
in his capacity as a self -a self informed by and consisting in his 
abidance by the moral code of human reality and judgement vis-a-vis the 
ways of actual society, and his death, the meant and personally 
authentic product of his own choice of that, was martyrdom, a 
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demonstration against the moral contingency of the actual, given 
network of society's representation, in relation to which he died in 
freedom. Under comparable circumstances, Galileo chose to recant his 
teachings and live; by his choice, in contrast with that of Socrates, he 
endorsed the authority of a corrupt and ignorant government and its 
irrelevant institutions which he saved the embarrassment of his 
martyrdom, and lived on with a modicum of freedom, professing allegiance 
to standards, both social and personal, which he knew to be untrue; 
therefore betraying both himself and society in the sense of, and as 
prevalent, in its normatively uncompromising absoluteness. As Durkheim 
rightly saw, the psychologic fallibility of human conduct which is at 
odds with the norm of society itself, harms the being of the collective 
consciousness in a real way; but his preoccupation with non-normatively 
coincidental conduct and its ill effects on the collective consciousness 
always firgures in his work as occurring in isolated individuals and 
never as one which is prevalent and operative in the organisational 
behaviour of the people in power and which comes to expression in 
institutional behaviour too, causing that to be appreciably different, 
regarding its moral quality, from the collective consciousness at its 
ideal. This noncoincidence between the corrupt, self-interest-shot, 
self-presentation and perpetration-motivated actual conduct by society's 
great and well-placed, in institutional dimensions, and the ideal of an 
institutional conduct at the executive level of society's 
representation, pure and intact from such ego-affected considerations, 
(an imperative holding good in relation to the representatives of 
society, in no lesser measure than in relation to the relatively 
anonymous subjects under the rule of those), is, in a word, the schism 
in society itself. It's a pity that Durkheim is insensitive to the 
distinction, within the collective consciousness, between the ideal 
quality and function of its representation, and the conceivable, indeed 
frequent corruptedness of its actual institutions and networks by virtue 
of the imperfect quality of the conduct of its representatives. Because 
of his indifference, or blindness, to this eminently meaningful and 
valid distinction between these two capacities of society in any 
historic moment (its capacity as an ideal standard and ideal body of 
institutional morals on the one hand, and, on the other, its capacity as 
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the compromised actuality of these pure social standards in its reigning 
form -a great preoccupation of the existentialists), this important and 
consequential duality in the social norm itself, at its ideal and at its 
actual, and the social schism which this non-coincidence affords, forms 
no part of Durkheim's thought system, even though this schism in social 
being itself eats away, degrades and ruins the collective consciousness 
just as surely as do statistically summated incidents of suicides 
committed by desparate individuals in a socially 'morbid' and 
dysfunctional frame of mind, which Durkheim exclusively devoted his 
attention to, or rather against, with a zeal, evocatively representing 
this phenomenon in his statistical tables. Tillich's and his fellow- 
existentialists' distinction between the collective consciousness at its 
pure as an end in itself and society in its actual, given state, is a 
useful one. 
Kierkegaard and Sartre are preoccupied with this separateness 
between the norm as such and as the actuality perpetuated in its 
representation in the society of the day, both from the point of view of 
society and as a matter of individual consciousness, and both these 
thinkers characteristically mistrust those ascribed as 'sacred' who wear 
the spirit of seriousness on their sleeves. Both these men are more 
prepared to trust the profane idiom of consciousness, consciousness as 
human reality. Kierkegaard writes: 
Oh, it may be dreadful to see a man who is almost 
unrecognizable in his humbleness and wretchedness, 
to see such wretchedness that one can hardly distinguish 
a man; but to see meaningless highness and to perceive there 
is no man there, is horrible. (6`1 
To Kierkegaard, the only morally satisfactory way to a serious way 
of life in the big-letter sense is experiencing one's way through the 
thicket of profane being, through one's immediate, personal experiences 
of the notions which one eventually aims to match and tackle in one's 
conduct in the big-letter sense. No short-cuts, no direct bee-line to 
the big-letter world in the manner in which the 'Friend' and Woman, 
referred to in our earlier example, seems to have found her way. 
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Existentialist phenomenologists are typically preoccupied with the 
non-coincidence in experience of a sense of decency in the small-letter 
idiom (the moral code of human reality), and the notion of institutional 
righteousness in the socially explicit, big-letter sense, and all the 
anthropologists considered here give thought to the difference made to 
the self when there is a happy colncjcbce between a person's notions of 
the moral biddings of small-letter reality (or one's privately 
assimilated set of morals), and the knowledge (to which all men are 
susceptible) that in their activities they do the right things by 
standards they intuit as universally right too - not just that it would 
appear so if it were actually espied by an onlooker and thereby their 
reputation in the terms of and within the framework of actual society 
would be enhanced - but that by the absolute norms of the collective 
consciousness at its pure, they may recognise and experience their acts 
as a real contribution to, corroboration of the social world as it 
should be - that what they do matters in fact in that light, as judged 
by themselves. Consciousness has, to use Piaget-ian jargon for a moment, 
social 'schemata' - (Lacan, in different terminology, makes the same 
consequential claim), in other words, the consciousness of the 
individuals of our species is encoded to grasp positive social reality 
and its standards and structures as such - that individual 
consciousness is sensitive and responsive to the collective 
consciousness to which it has a primary capacity to respond directly, 
appropriately and relevantly, and also to knowing that it does so. One's 
normal code of responding to and cognising this properly social 
framework of consciousness is normally a fussless, small-letter feat and 
affair, desired by all as the effortless and natural moral framework of 
their ordinary, everyday conduct. Yet one knows in what way one's acts 
as a small-letter person hit the universal standards of social reality 
external to the personal horizons of those, and if they go amiss, if the 
standards of the positive social reality and justness are missed - 
either because the agent in question senses these standards as 
significantly absent, or because his own actions appear as wrong in 
their light, he feels a sense of loss and unreinforcement. Both Sartre 
and Kierkegaard were pessimists who suffered anguish through their sense 
of superfluousness, Sartre through his appreciation of the powerlessness 
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of the individual in the face and sight of the heavy, individual- 
indifferent being of external social reality in general, and Kierkegaard 
through his concrete experience of being relegated to a low human status 
in a crude and unthinking society to which his insights, so important to 
himself, seemed superfluous; and both these men hated, with a passion, 
people who appeared certain of their own importance to the community and 
who experienced no doubts about the justification of their own sense of 
seriousness as official moral authorities, without the corroborative 
weight and credentials of a sound and coherent set of values and a body 
of salt-of-the earth experiences behind them as selves - or indeed with 
such a set of personal standards which ran counter to the serious ones 
professed - not necessarily through dishonesty in a personal capacity, 
but because the institutional standards which informed them in their 
personal conduct were themselves out of joint, schismic, relative to the 
collective consciousness at its ideal. Sartre's pessimism was so great 
that he believed there could not be a match between a serious attitude 
and personally truthful insight, and to his way of thinking the spirit 
of seriousness is always insincere. Bultmann takes a more optimistic 
view; to his mind, a match between the standards of 'my world' and 
socially 'sacred' standards as such is common - and Kierkegaard believes 
that a personal authenticity (necessarily inherent in the profane idiom) 
is both the real possibility of the positionally high and often the case 
in their conduct in fact. 171 
The sacred or the collective consciousness is not the same thing as 
the spirit of seriousness. The spirit of seriousness is a state of 
inflated personal unauthenticity -a primitive socialpsychologic 
attitude which is unauthentic both in respect to the serious themselves, 
and also in respect to the people they deal with; a personally savoured 
and indulged-in fullness with the borrowed sacredness which attaches to 
their persons through their office - it's an arrogant identification 
with the expediency-infected, actuality-tied and guided, concrete 
institutional norm and ethics which inform their office in fact, related 
to by them as though those were the true stadards of the collective 
consiousness. True, like the sacred (or society), the spirit of 
seriousness is a mode of consciousness in which there is a schism 
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between the ideal morals publicly propounded, and the serious agents' 
abidance by that norm and moral as selves; a schism in this sense which 
is externally observable, recognisable, discernible and appreciable from 
the outside. There is, in the spirit of seriousness, a flagrant 
noncoincidence in the conduct of the 'serious', between their publicly 
professed, ideal morals, and the actual and fallible way in which they, 
as persons, understand, interpret, judge and exercise their discretion 
and latitude in the social reality at their disposal to represent the 
collective consciousness vis-a-vis the individual, which is their job, 
However, 'seriousness' being a socialpsychologic frame of mind, (unlike 
sacredness which is a social quality of the highly ascribed, as a matter 
of social fact), it figures, both in its perpetration by the 'serious' 
and in their evaluation by their critics, as a matter which touches the 
'serious' as an individual, rather than as a faceless representative and 
part of the social network, in his inert, external and socially 
axiomatic capacity as ascribed sacred. In principle, the spirit of 
seriousness (unlike the actual social norm, the sacred being of society 
itself in general), is amenable to being effectively related to in the 
socialpsychologic, personal idiom by the 'serious' agent himself, and 
therefore 'seriousness' is susceptible to the possibility of its 
jettisoning as a personal attitude by the act of the 'conversion' of the 
'serious' agent by his own effort and decision, to a more authentic 
frame of mind; and the ensuing redemption, according to the criteria of 
the existentialist moraliser, can in such instances avail itself to the 
'serious', as a personal matter. It's possible, on the occasions of his 
authentic moments, for the 'serious' agent to recognise and experience 
the guilt, by human standards, of the schism of his consciousness from 
the 'inside', as it were, and to relate to that, even to supersede that, 
in self-critique. However, this potential insight opening up, in moments 
of personal authenticity, the 'serious' person's original schism to 
himself, usually exists for the prototypical 'serious' in principle only 
- as his possibility - one that is usually dismissed by him as a 
redundant embellishment in conduct. As a normal state of affairs, the 
'serious' agent will firmly deny the availability and meaningfulnes of 
the ideality of a collective consciousness for everybody, including him, 
to abide by, as distinct from the corrupted public norm of which he is a 
Seriousness, from the Inside. The Schism in Society. - 64 - 
representative and a servant, and his recourse to such a more ideal 
collective consciousness than the one that he is part of, and with it 
his integrity and self qua a self, will be given up, surrendered 
completely to the public morality, represented in actuality as it is. 
The spirit of seriousness is seldom challenged, recognised and admitted 
by the ascriptionally high as a personal, socialpsychologic 
unauthenticity in him, but is allowed to cohere, in a functional way for 
the society of the day as actually perpetrated, into a homogeneous We- 
concept between the 'serious' egos who endorse society at its given with 
their chosen mode of consciousness, this phenomenon used by them to 
supply them the blinkers necessary for the problemfree upkeep of their 
office, so as to shield their vision against the truer values of and the 
possibility of a greater sensitivity to the collective consciousness as 
that morally purely, availably and meaningfully prevails. The spirit of 
seriousness, in this coherent capacity of itself as the We in its 
solidarity and socialpsychologically unquestioning, unauthentic oneness 
with the entire body of the 'serious', can define the tone of a 
situation even if some of the participants in it don't conceive of 
themselves as part of the We, and may amount to a coercive force over 
against the mode of consciousness and the conduct of the more 
authentic amongst the prestigeously ascribed; however, even in this 
extraindividually effective capacity of itself, the spirit of 
seriousness must be distinguished from the collective consciousness. 
Unlike the collective consciousness, this We, however extraindividually 
coherent and potent, is a socialpsycholagic mechanism, a code of conduct 
experienced as operating as the collective Subject of the elevatedly 
ascribed -a kind of 'generalised "I"' - which endows the 'serious' with 
a fondness of endorsing and bringing, and has the capacity of 
sanctioning, in the name of the We, policies, whether of a sociologic or 
human kind; and gives the 'serious' a sense of qualification for, and 
instigates in them, self-indulgently, the constant exercise of 
judgement. It's important to recognise in the spirit of seriousness, in 
sharp counterdistinction with the collective consciousness (the sacred, 
or society), that it is socialpsychologic, is unauthentic as such, is 
inadequate as such because lacking an underpinning with individual 
judgement, and that it is contingent, both as a referent for human 
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standards, and in the sense that it is, as already remarked, susceptible 
to being given up and changed into authentic consciousness. The sacred, 
in contrast, is sacred without the hallmark of authenticity in 
individuals required to qualify it so; <°' its being a positivity, it is 
not contingent on attributes of human reality. 
The spirit of seriousness is not the exclusive privilege of 
politicians and religious dignitaries, but is available to anybody who 
belongs, in whatever humble a capacity, to a prestigious institution -a 
professional body, for instance - who adopts the dignified plural idiom 
of that as the mode of his consciousness, and exchanges for that the 
practice of speaking for himself as a self. 
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Section 2. The Schism Grasped as the Discrepancy Between the Social 
'Ought' and the Social 'Is'. 
The schism, noncoincidence between humanly corrupted standards 
affecting and degrading the collective consciousness, and those of the 
collective consciousness in its moral absoluteness and purity as its own 
ideal - the difference, in other words, between everybody's capacity to 
intuit society as the social 'ought' and their acting at a tangent with 
that perfect social ideal, does figure in Durkheim's work. He refers to 
this discrepancy in conduct by him by the term 'anomie'. 'Anomie', to 
him, is that which the incidence of suicide, recorded in the statistical 
tables of his work Suicide, is the index of. However, as pointed out in 
the later part of the preceding Section, he does not see and entertain 
the possibility that society itself is schismic, in other words, that a 
discrepancy between the ideal of exemplarily abiding by the standards of 
the social 'ought', the morally pure dicta of the collective 
consciousness at its unadulterated, on the one hand, and the corrupted 
standards of its institutional execution, by necessity, by morally frail 
human agencies and representatives of that, on the other hand, does 
occur within society itself, this noncoincidence between the social 
'ought' and the social 'is', afforded by the non-identity of the ideal 
and actual representation of the collective consciousness itself, 
causing society, too, to be schismic, anomic, on the same account as 
the consciousness of one individual, sensitive to and aware, by 
definition, of the schemata of society iniLs (purity, who nevertheless 
fails in his duty to abide by those completely, is schismic, in a more 
familiar sense. 
Durkheim himself is sensible of the difference between the social 
'ought' and the social 'is', in the context of society, but not to 
society's possibility of being schismic. This is because he considers 
these two functions of society, the normatively ideal and the socially 
actual positivity of it - its 'ought' function and its 'is' function, - 
as always perfectly coicidental, as a matter of social fact; and there 
is one important sense in which he is right to maintain this 
consequential insight: the scientifically and purely sociologic one. 
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Society, as he was the first to demonstrate with socialscientific 
authority, is a stratum of being and a positive category of human 
consciousness, in which social 'ought' and social 'is' coincide, in the 
sense that it is a normative stratum of positive reality which exists, 
whether we like the standards and qualities of its norm by the measures 
of human reality, or not. Society, approached in the sociologic idiom 
appropriate to itself, is simply the social norm as that is, not 
susceptible in such a grasp of it to the individual critic's recognising 
and commenting on the normative quality of that as right or wrong, as 
that appears to him in his capacity as a cultivated and discerning 
spokesman of the self, his own or that of another, or of many others. It 
is only when approached from the perspective of the individual, through 
the conventions and the deployment of the socialpsychologic modality of 
selves, that consciousness acquires the power to dislodge society's 
reign and capacity as the given norm at its sociologically absolute, 
that society can be deposed as the only moral source which holds good 
as the imperative properly informing everybody's conduct; this is why 
Durkheim locates the 'anomie', which has the potency to deconstruct 
society, exclusively in the individual, the self. In contrast, 
existentialism will not abide by the Durkheimian veto banning individual 
agents from applying their perspectives as selves in relating to 
society, not even in sociologic contexts. They feel justified in their 
practice to bring the standards of the self to bear on all social 
situations, even in a scholarly sociologic context, by the effectiveness 
of the deployment of their consciouness as society-wise critical 
individuals in showing society up as a mode of being and sphere of 
operation in which there is, in a very meaningful sense, a hypocritical 
divorce between its being as a normative perfection (as open to 
intuition for everyone), and, on the other hand, the moral actuality of 
the existing, given society, imperfect by the very dicta of the 
collective consciousness at its ideal, of which the individual agent is 
directly sensible as a condition of his authenticity; with these 
thinkers very definitely insisting an the individual agent's 
qualification, capacity and place to pinpoint this discrepancy, schism 
in society itself. Mead importantly contributes to the deposition of 
social actuality from its properly socialpsychologically untouchable 
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Durkheimian heights, by equating society with a psychologic, or rather 
socialpsychologic stimulus to man, which depends on, and is ever defined 
and justified (as are all stimuli) by the individual agent's response 
to it. If society can be grasped in individual consciousness and conduct 
(one's response as an individual to the social stimulus) as schismic, 
this is so - one can stretch this Meadean position to imply - because 
this capacity is inherent in the stimulus. It would be absurd and 
philosophically idealistic to suppose otherwise, that is, to isolate the 
origin of the schism or 'anomie' (a phenomenon characteristic, in a 
meaningful sense of society too), solely in the individual, and to put 
the blame for the frequent anomie of society itself, on the individual's 
doorstep. This argument will be further pursued in a little while. 
To remind ourselves of Mead's position regarding the grasp of 
society as 'stimulus' (already enlarged on in the Introduction), we may 
remark once more on the fact that he uses the terms 'social stimulus' 
and 'gesture' interchangeably. Responses, he claims, become, in the 
course of socialisation, tied, through conditioning, to the stimulus or 
gesture, in a strong bond, with gestures coming to carry within them 
easily, immediately and appropriately, the obvious response conditioned 
to them. The socially stereotypic response to the socially symbolic 
gesture 'chair' is to sit down in it. The gesture is a command in 
socially conditioned terms, and the meaning it has come to acquire for 
man in terms of his correct act associated with it in this close bond, 
is the automatically prompted, routine, 'right' response to it, 
determined by custom. Mead thought of this model of his in 
socialpsychologic terms, in the main; in the present, larger context, we 
see society, the positive norm itself as stimulus, and the entirety of 
conduct as the response to that. 
Socialpsychologically speaking, as already observed, Durkheim was 
right to assert that in society 'is' and 'ought' do coincide, by 
definition, always, as a matter of fact, in that society is the norm 
that La, looming large independently of our opinion of it or our will 
regarding it. But this peculiar stimulus-gesture of both 'ought' and 
, is, - society - can be grasped, approached as, taken to have two 
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different meanings - one, that what society ought to be, it is; and two, 
what society is, that is what what ought to be in society. The two 
statements are different in their meaning, and, sociologically speaking, 
Durkheim is right to imply that both are correct. The second 
implication: what society is, that is what ought to be, stands as 
maintained by Durkheim: if its laws, normative standards are faulty, 
bad, wrong, they are nevertheless binding, they are sacred and must be 
obeyed. But the existentialists are not unequivocal about this 
implication of Durkheim's dogma; in approaching the meaning of this 
being - society - as both 'is' and 'ought', they see a difference 
between whether it is the case that the actual condition of society 
comes up to the 'ought', the standards of the norm as absolute which man 
is both encoded and motivated to be responsive to, or, alternatively, 
whether the standards gestured to us as the norm to be maintained, the 
'ought' demanded, is forced by the gesture to shed its ideality so that 
it may be brought down to the level of the 'is', possibly a rotten one, 
so as to coincide with that, to become equal with and indistinguishable 
from states of affairs in far from perfect societies, and made 
subordinate to a degraded practical institutional ethics which has 
ascriptive powers, too, with the difference between the two sets of 
social norms, ideal and actual, blurred, to suit the being of society as 
it is, making society's being and morality self-fulfilling in its own 
terms. The existentialist wouldn't consider normative standards under 
the latter circumstances as that forum, that absolute social level of 
the being of consciousness, which the individual would want to hit with 
his own personal standards and his conduct as coincidental with and 
corroborative to that, as a condition of finding thereby the measure of 
his goodness, and of feeling that his acts as an individual make a 
difference to the world in the light of those standards corrupted in and 
by social actuality, seeing through the pretentions of those standards 
to moral perfection; and he retains the motivation to entertain and 
refer to a social framework of standards more absolute than is the given 
society of his day, in informing his private conduct, which are 
signalled to one's consciousness and intuition by the recognition that 
, they come from God, form nature, from "my nature", from society', as 
Sartre writes, adding defiantly: 'These ends ready-made and pre-human 
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will therefore define the meaning of my act. ' «' The same notion 
(society as a structure and category in nature), is also Durkheim's 
society - the collective consciousness, the being of the 'ought' which 
is - which subsists in its structures, in its standards in nature. But 
the existentialist, unlike Durkheim, will see the matter of the 
coincidence of the heavy being of the social 'ought' with the social 
'is' also in the context and at the level of the actual social world he 
knows, with the 'ought' demanded by one's given, established society, 
recognised as compromised by its pragmatic synthethisation with the 
actual states of affairs of the society of the day there, and he will 
distinguish the outcome, the quality of the normative, ethical standards 
there C9' from the more absolute standards of the collective 
consciousness to which man's sensitivity lingers on and which are 
intuited as not met, shortchanged in the social reality as given. 
Durkheim doesn't make this distinction between these two levels of 
society - its absolute being as the collective consciousness, its 
structures and patterns in nature as demonstrable there on the one hand, 
and as it is in its given state in the humanly mediated ongoing 
processes and practices filling the structures of social relations and 
institutions with actual representational content on the other hand, 
though the probity by human measures of a government, its weight, 
quality, hue as human reality, if very far from the ideal dicta of the 
collective consciousness at its pure and ideal, certainly does 
contribute to the anomie or lack of anomie which obtains at society's 
statistically measureable, scientific level. The state of the collective 
consciousness at its actually represented and operative, if highly 
schismic and divergent relative to the normative promptings of the ideal 
of a society in its (perfectly fathomable) morally pure form, goes 
towards swelling up the prevalence of social anomie (as already 
observed), just as effectively as does the pooled conduct of society- 
aversive and critical individuals, which latter factor and phenomenon 
Durkheim goes to so much trouble to capture and chart in his 
statistical tables. Yet Durkheim doesn't connect the possible morally 
questionable state of institutions and the rise in the incidence of 
anomie in society (the way he connects the individual's deviance from 
the collective consciousness and the incidence of anomie), and puts the 
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source of social anomie (the inverse notion and measure of society's 
stability), squarely and wholly on the doorstep of the conduct, and 
tendency to certain conduct, of individuals in their emphasised capacity 
as such. He never allows for the schism in society itself, afforded by 
the clashing values of the always-ready-to-hand and perfectly 
perceptible ideality of the collective consciousness, constantly 
niggling at everyone who is willing to pay attention to its promptings, 
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the bastardisation of these 
ideal social standards by a society in power, whether that morally 
unsatisfactory actual society subsists in small units (within a family, 
e. g), or in large ones (say, on the scale of an entire state. ) Durkheim 
always considers these two levels of society, that of the collective 
consciousness as the standard of the norm in its absoluteness, and 
society as the given government of the day, as unitary, blurring the 
difference between those to such an extent as to appear non-existent, 
and his understanding of the collective consciousness is always 
inclusive of the given standards and practices of any social actuality. 
His work certainly carries the implication that society is what it ought 
to be and because of that its standards ought to be seen and accepted as 
right. He is right in the socialscientific, or rather sociologic sense' 
that society in its actual representation (instrumentally human), 
however imperfect, remains (in its proper sociologic capacity) social, 
commanding, institutional, as opposed to individual in its grasp and 
idiom, in that it is other in its modality than profane or human 
reality, in that it retains its normative capacity, and in that the 
things and people who stand for it and represent it, draw from it the 
quality of the sacred, and are themselves sacred in this sociologic 
sense. An example of an object that is sacred by virtue of being social, 
is a ballot paper, distinct in its socially symbolic solemnity from 
another piece of paper, identical to that in all respects except that it 
does not carry the power for voting for or against the government, and 
does not represent the person filling that in as a citizen in the 
solemnly sacred, official sense. But an object need not have political 
weight and significance attached to it to be sacred in a social context 
and sense. A gift-wrapping can also be seen as a thing with such powers; 
it transforms small-letter objects such as chocolates or things of use 
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around the house, into 'potlatch' or other representations of the 
institutionally, socially symbolic occasion which is being celebrated, 
weddings, birthdays, christenings, coming of age, retirement after a 
lifetime of service, and the relationship between the people between 
whom the objects pass, into the stilted, fossilised, solemn formality of 
rites (rituals) and routines. Routines and rites are both social, 
formalised acts, but routines are everyday rites or rituals, which 
usually symbolise, express and perpetuate affairs and things social 
indirectly only, and do not directly stand for society itself on 
explicit occasions of the evocation and representation of that the way 
rites and rituals do, such as handing over a Bar Mitsvah present or (in 
a more modern and less usual understanding of such an occasion), as 
filling in a ballot paper. Another example of a social object, at the 
everyday social level, is a diary. Entries in that transform the flow of 
life, the vivid course of its events, into an organised system of 
external sociality, which once jotted down, gain a finality and 
permanence which should not be disturbed: creating from the spontaneous 
surprise of the future, a fixed structure of things to come, with the 
solidity of a historic fact which already has the authority of the past. 
Red letter days and activities in the diary are even more sacred, sacred 
at the level of rituals, sacred in the more conventional, symbolically 
social sense of the term. Finally, an example of the sacredness of 
persons by virtue of their institutionalised office, are postmen. 
Employees in the service of the Royal Mail - one hesitates to approach 
them for a favour in their private capacity, such as retrieving a letter 
which has already been posted. It may additionally, 
observed here to 
complement former examples of things sacred because social, that a 
personal letter with small-letter news in it, acquires a solemn, 
official quality as the property of the postal services whilst in the 
custody of those, and will regain its profane idiom only once already 
delivered to the person to whom it is addressed in the intimate, 
personal modality and grasp of small-letter friendship, in which it has 
originally gained its being. 
In Durkheim, the undeniable normative efficacy of the machinery, 
establishment, institutions of the society in power (any society)) no 
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matter what use that is being put to, merges with the collective 
consciousness in its scientific ideality, whose being sul generis 
Durkheim was the first to demonstrate. The collective consciousness, on 
his account, equals society in any of its manifestations, and the 
resulting unity is to Durkheim that absolute normative positivity, that 
extraindividual, grand Gesture to which the right response of man, 
unquestionably inherent in that, is an unqualified 'Yes'. The 
equilibrium of society, any society in the givenness of the world, is to 
Durkheim the normative ideal, and man's individual, psychologic or 
socialpsychologic equilibrium, as he showed, indeed lies, to a great 
extent, in his compliance with that norm, as that actually'operates in 
terms of the society of the day. So much greater the responsibility of 
any particular government, we might justifiably intercept in an 
existentialist vein, in making sure that the quality of the given norm 
does not deviate significantly from, does not betray too much, the ideal 
standards of the collective consciousness at its positively extant and 
morally pure, to which every citizen in his capacity as an individual is 
present through his direct intuitiveness to that as a self, which 
informs his critical standards to society's actuality, and which any 
given government represents, conveys, makes real as the collective 
consciousness for all individuals in social actuality. However, in a 
sociological context, Durkheim scores again in the respect of this 
vision of his, against the human reality-wise scrupulous existentialist 
and generally 'romantic' moral guard and champion of the collective 
consciousnessinits purity, in correctly recognising that the society 
which happens to be the case, has really got 'sacred' properties, is an 
effective union of 'is' and 'ought' of sorts in the world, and is the 
most powerful occasion in actuality for the collective consciousness, in 
whatever compromised a sense it conveys its actual norms in comparison 
with the morally more satisfactory pure ideality of those as 
individually intuitable, and in correctly and socialscientifically 
informatively maintaining that presumably it is true that if a 
community lived in a spirit of a sense of security, compliant 
identification with a society that was cannibalistic or fascistic, the 
incidence of suicide would nevertheless be low; indeed, he showed that 
suicide rates are lowest in societies at war. 
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In contrast to Durkheim, the exitentialist and other 'romantic' 
social theoriser, in approaching the matter of the coincidence or non- 
coincidence between the social 'ought' (the normative ideality of the 
collective consciousness) and the social 'is' of established societies, 
- while wholeheartedly agreeing that the social 'is', states of affairs 
in the world as they are, should meet the social 'ought', will not 
equate this recognition with, and will not additionally endorse, the 
Durkheimian implication that every society is what it ought to be, 
however weighty the positivistic scientific orthodoxy which supports 
such a position; and society, to his socialpsychologically committed 
experience of it, will come over with 'is' and 'ought' separate in that 
- as an 'ought' which is in a privately verifiable sense, experienced 
as significantly not being, and as an 'is' which is, experienced as 
antivalue. 
To emphasise and elaborate a consideration which has already been 
hinted at, it must be stressed here clearly that existentialism as a 
brand of socialtheoretic thought, is a response to a schismic society - 
an adequate response -a schismic response to society which is 
apprehended as schismic. Durkheim claimed that society (stimulus in our 
sense here) is a unitary positivity in its being, and that the 
individual is the origin of and is causal in the patterns of anomie in 
society which the pooled schismic responses by individuals affect there. 
However, it must be recognised that society as the stimulus - in 
whatever capacity, in fact - is prior to the response to it by man; it's 
prior to the modes of being and relating to it by the consciousnesses, 
conduct and attitudes of individual men and women, and, as we have 
already pointed out, it seems absurd and philosophically idealistic to 
claim that individuals, the attitude of individuals, should be causal in 
attributes of, phenomena of social being. A stimulus could not be 
apprehendeed and responded to schismically if it did not itself have the 
capacity for being so. It must be the case that the stimulus itself is 
schismic. The schism in society is between the ideal, the standard of 
society - an end both for the individual and in itself - and the 
compromised actuality of its concrete representations, in which packages 
it in fact comes. It cannot be that existentialism -a schismic 
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perspective on society and consciousness based on such an undestanding 
of society - is causal in the rise of the anomie there; it must be, as 
existentialist thought claims and analyses, that social actuality is 
schismic in characteristic and coherent ways, and existentialism is the 
response to it - schismic, anomic, but not causal; though responses to 
society, both in compliance with it and in the alternative mode of its 
critique, do act back an society, affecting it in an undramatic, but not 
irrelevant dialogue. 
Drawing once more on the descriptive capacities of the Meadean 
gesture, existentialism is, from the sociological point of-view, the 
wrong response to society as the stimulus which carries in it its 
command for man. The response gestured, as already remarked, is social 
compliance. The address which is inherent in society as symbolic 
stimulus - in society as command - is 'don't see me as schismic but 
apprehend me as unitary. Do not entertain your idea of the social 
'ought' and do not dedicate yourself to it. See me as the being in 
which 'ought' and 'is' are at one and dedicate yourself to me. Do not 
match the schisms, the anomies in my body with your responses as 
adequate to those as an individual, and accept me as the being which is 
in charge and issues its commands, in terms of my standards as they are, 
and accept them as "the good" by definition. Mend the schism in your own 
response and you shall be contented. ' 
But the existentialist cannot conceive of the good in any set of 
norms, whether social or individual, in which the truth, the faculty of 
authentic vision, does not form a part. He sees 'the good' as a 
composite structure which is inclusive of the truth or authenticity, as 
prompted by the collective consciousness at its ideal and as that is 
endorsed and recognised in the intuition of that collective 
consciousness in its ideal form in the consciousness of the individual, 
searching for and insisting on this existentially verifiable criterion 
of truth; both in the context of society as stimulus and in the context 
of the consciousness of the individual perceiving it, in his response to 
it, this response occurring not as a result of careful cerebration, but 
as given at a stroke, as a matter of insight. This is well expressed in 
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standards of the truth - existential and, incidentally, logical, - both 
the truth and 'the good' are violated. Secondly, Sartre's example 
demonstrates the relationship between the schismic social stimulus (just 
identified) and the individual consciousness which perceives it; 
something that concerns both the slavekeeper and especially the black 
person who wishes to be converted for whatever reason (to save him from 
social slavery by means of Christianity or so as to be able to exercise 
the being of his self as everybody's equal, and to be present to and a 
member, in such a capacity, of a spiritually liberating ideal society of 
the anthropologic equality of all, just the same as the authentic white 
Christian). The existentialist will insist that the black person in his 
humanly and socially deprived situation in the social actuality of his 
day, is uniquely placed, as well as called, to respond to the reigning 
society's vetoing gesture to him as a potential Christian, to 
authentically respond to this gesture, at least in existential terms, 
but probably also, unavoidably, in intellectual and political ones as 
well. The black person wishing to be a Christian, the existentialist 
will say, has a choice in this situation. He may either choose the 
difficult course of responding to his situation as a would-be authentic 
Christian (his chosen potential), without being institutionally 
baptised, and shoulder the existentially considerably taxing burden of 
an explicit presence to and awareness of the ideality of Christianity 
(the ideology which represents in this case the collective consciousness 
itself at its normatively ideal), and an appreciation of the personal 
consequences for him, both in actual and spiritual or psychologic terms, 
of his excluded situation in the given society of the social 'is', in 
the light of that ideological and social ideality. Alternatively, he may 
give up Christianity in this authentically socially sacred sense, in the 
name of the 'christianity' dragged down to the personally interested 
level of the ascriptionally high, bastardised into the degradation of 
the expression of the collective consciousness in the world, to make it 
fit the conditions of their rule there, and accept his situation and 
himself as a slave and an anthropologically lesser being, in compliance 
with and in dedication to that debased pragmatic ethics. (Someone badly 
placed on grounds of class origin in a Communist country can be in an 
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analogous situation. ) The existentialist (prompted by Sartre) calls the 
latter choice 'bad faith'. 
In view of the fact that in the English translation the term 'faith' 
in this expression is ambiguous and implies religious faith as well as 
the trivial meaning of the term in the Sartrian expression 'bad faith', 
it could be pointed out here that in the French this Sartrian turn of 
phrase and the term 'faith' in it, merely refers to the act and project 
of responding to the call of any human or social situation with one's 
authentic faculties as a person given up, made redundant, responding not 
in one's capacity as a free, responsible, critically articuaate 
individual, but hiding behind the facade of the set of expectations 
defined for one in society's stereotypes, as 'gestured' for one by 
society, and prettiending to oneself that one has no choice to respond 
otherwise. Because in the above example it's Christianity of all 
possible sets of norms which is being usurped and used by the 
established norm as the matter-of-course done thing, rather than the 
term 'Christianity' figuring according to its original function and 
capacity as one's personal religious code of practice, providing one's 
possibility to respond freely and authentically to the ways of society 
as an individual, the coupling of the religious connotation of 'bad 
faith' with its less weighty Sartrian sense is particularly enhanced in 
the context of our example. But this is entirely coincidental and a 
peculiar yield of the English language, and those authors in foreign 
tongues (Bultmann, for instance), who wish to suggest that in a 
religious context, conduct in Sartrian bad faith makes for religious bad 
faith as well, have to labour the point. 
Of course, it would be a pity if on account of this point of 
linguistic precision, one would lose the benefits of Durkheim's 
consequential and original insight that in primitive societies at least, 
the concept of 'social' and 'the sacred' completely overlap; the two 
terms kindred to the concepts of Sartrian 'bad faith' and, on the other 
hand, to the Bad Faith of the normative authority of the reigning 
Ideology, particularly if that sees itself as reliant in its morality as 
the norm an the mainstream religion in the culture, but even otherwise, 
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as society and its norms are, whether explicitly informed by a body of 
religious dogma or not, as we tried to show, simply tantamount to the 
'Sacred'. One's inclination to brand with the label 'big-letter Bad 
Faith' the moral practices and quality of the reigning norm, which 
demands, by coercive as well as socialpsychologically persuasive means, 
the absolute attitudinal loyalty of the masses whose interests as 
individuals it systematically shortchanges, seems to me particularly 
apt at such times and in such cases when the own moral quality of the 
mainstream Ideology of the actual society, which informs and affords the 
reigning social norm, is itself manifestly very schismic, as it was in 
our last example, whether its schismicity transpires and ib experienced 
as offensive in a religious framework and terms of reference, or in 
those of an explicitly secular ideology underpinning that norm, whose 
properties as society remain, again as we tried to show before, Sacred, 
simply as a matter of its operational definition and function as 
social. ) We are justified, then, it seems to me, in retaining a strong 
awareness of the consequential coincidence between the concepts 'social' 
and 'the sacred', not only in the cases of the explicitly religion- 
informed norm of the primitive societies which Durkheim originally 
studied; the kinship, even interchangeability, to an important extent, 
of the 'social' and 'the Sacred', seems worth pursuing in modern 
cultures too. As already suggested, all social authorities and 
situations may be sacred in the sense that they are institutionally 
constituted and conceived, at times in an emphatic manner, as opposed to 
such authorities and situations being related to in irreverent doubt, in 
the individually searching, analytic, socialpsychologically 
authenticity-producing and demanding idiom, which attitude vis-a-vis the 
sacredness of society as such, amounts to and operates as heresy, in 
modern contexts too. The relationship between society's conceivable 
institutional Bad Faith and small-letter Sartrian 'bad faith', is that 
small-letter bad faith, unlike Bad Faith in the heavy and solemn social 
sense, is not a 'macrosociologic' or purely sociologic affair and state 
of consciousness. The strength and the enhancement of the big-letter 
sacredness and other big-letter qualities of the social stimulus 
(society), are the function of their intensity as social, of their 
generic purity, application and tonality as such. Small-letter 
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socialpsychologic bad faith comes into its own in routine, small-letter 
social situations, and in social contexts affected by, and related to 
in, the socialpsychologic idiom, the idiom of human reality, even if in 
the unauthentic form of that idiom. Small-letter, Sartrian bad faith is, 
first of all, the stuff of the being and operation of consciousness in 
what was identified as the socially low-key 'thirdness' in the 
Introduction, it is the 'stuff' of the 'social' in the colloquial 
sense, of routine social ways, not elevated to the enhanced and 
significant echelons of society in its solemn capacity as Sacred an 
special, particularly and self-consciously social occasions; it is the 
idiom of the unquestioning, socially routine operation andcarriership 
of society by the agent, whose socialpsychologic unauthenticity is a 
small-letter one, whose 'rites' are merely 'routines', as distinguished 
and discerned a little while ago, whose sacredness in the purely 
sociologic sense is not poignant, is unobvious, even dormant. Secondly, 
in a way not unrelated to this first mentioned capacity of itself and 
sphere of its operation, small-letter bad faith is a socialpsychologic 
response capacity of consciousness to society's big-letter schism. In 
this latter of its capacities, it is the way of positively, 
corroboratively responding by the agent or agents to the reigning norm, 
in instances when it is discovered as guilty of big-letter Bad Faith. 
Small-letter bad faith is the alternative possibility to the 'heretic's' 
critical and personal authenticity in responding, in the 
socialpsychologic idiom, to the schism in society, if it psychologically 
inconvenizi1tly, and morally taxingly, stares one in the eye; it's the 
unauthentic modality, as the individual's response to it, of choosing to 
disregard that big-letter schism, that Bad Faith of the norm on a social 
scale, and giving society and its schismic norm the moral go-ahead as 
far 
aS the individual agent is concerned, by being blind to it. In turn, 
the personal socialpsychologic unauthenticity, or the bad faith of the 
agent in responding, or rather significantly not responding in a 
personal capacity to the schism of society, comes to amount to a comfort 
and to offering socialpsychologic solace and shelter to the agent 
against the disturbing, explicit recognition of society's schism and its 
echo and personal implications in individual consciousness, small-letter 
bad faith thus working towards the equilibrium of the existing society 
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in macrosociologic dimensions, and, in socialpsychologic ones, affording 
equilibrium in the consciousness of the agent relating to any society, 
even if it be very schismic, in uncritical compliance with it. 
The two best scientific demonstrations to date of bad faith and its 
relationship to the morally incongruous social authority in charge of 
it, with the Bad Faith of the latter scientifically devised in the 
laboratory, are Asch's and Milgram's classic experiments. " (` In 
these experiments, it was something sacred, though not in the obviously 
and literally religious sense - the professional respectability of the 
white overall-clad, bespectacled, bedside-mannered team of'scientists 
who explicitly or implicitly presided over the experimental situation, 
which moved the participants to betray, in personal bad faith, the most 
elementary standards of human decency and probity, bowing to the sacred 
authority which 'gestured' them to do so, for the gain of a modicum of 
what these scientists dubbed as 'social desirability'. In both 
experiments, as aleady said, a schism was contrived, by experimental 
means, in the stimulus situation, between the 'social good' (whose 
semblance was guarateed, to appearances, by the gesturers' social, 
institutional respectability), and the plain truth (in Asch's case) or 
the personally authentic the biddings of the standards of human reality 
in relation to oneself and to one's fellow-men (in Milgram's case); 
somewhat analogously, in the latter case especially, to the above 
described example of the slave-keeping Christian society. In Asch's 
experiment, the participants were 'gestured' as a condition of their 
social conformance, to contrAdict the evidence of their eyes and to 
misjudge from time to time the comparative lengths of lines plainly 
printed on large cards, in accord with the preceding incorrect 
judgements of the relative length of those lines by planted, false 
witnesses, confederates of the experimenters. In Milgram's experiment 
the participants were 'gestured' to do violence to the witness of their 
true nature as individuals, as simply human beings and their sense of 
authenticity as such, in a more figurative way. For a small payment, 
they were made party to an experiment by inflicting painful electric 
shocks (as far as they knew), often to the point of death, upon a 
fellow-experimental subject - who was, in fact, played by an actor not 
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really subjected to such pain, but feigning agony. Both experiments made 
dramatic discoveries - the most sensational no doubt being that almost 
all participants, recruited from the street, were in fact prepared to do 
the humanly dishonourable task demanded, gestured by the social 
situation, in the case of Milgram's experiment, to the paint of 'killing' 
a fellow-'experimental subject'; but the other findings of these 
experiments are also worthy of note. To interpret the results somewhat 
unusually, both experiments showed what an untenable pressure an 
explicit awareness of the schism in the social stimulus between the 
socially expected standards of behaviour and the truth amounted to in 
the consciousness of the individuals called on to repond tp it and to 
act in compliance with it. The inventiveness of the human organism in 
concealing from consciousness the trauma of the cognisance of the social 
schism - the armoury of bad faith in guarding consciousness against the 
need for the articulation of such a split between the command of the 
social 'ought', the good of the norm as institutionally demanded, and 
the truth as individually witnessed, were shown to go to such lengths as 
to lead to the actual perception of shorter lines as longer, longer 
lines as shorter, when so declared by a rigged consensus; and in cases 
where tricks of perception did not come to the rescue of individual 
consciousness to shield it from an awareness of the schism between the 
divergent values of the social 'good' and the truth in the social 
stimulus, it led to extreme distress in the tested individuals. 
It is an existentialist insight, one underscored by Mead too, to 
insist that the acceptance of and compliance with the sacredness 
dictated by social situations, whether elevatedly religious or just 
socially strongly and enhancedly convention-governed and demanded, is 
not the only possible prompting and way for the individual to respond. 
Mead's words remind us that man may respond, instead, in an inventive, 
idiosyncratic way, in ways which may deviate from this immediate, 
conventional, commanding meaning of the gesture; or he needn't respond 
at all. 'There is a moral but no mechanical necessity to act', Mead 
writes; 111=' in being able to delay, choose the ways of or altogether 
forego responding is what distinguishes man from animals, (13) and it is 
in this in which lies his freedom. Existentialism is a free response to 
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the command of society's gesture. Society gestures: 'Give up your sense 
of the social 'ought'. ' Existentialism responds: 'Give up the state of 
the social 'is'. ' The response to itself as gestured by society is bad 
faith, but the existentialist cannot accept a code of the 'good' which 
doesn't tally with his intuition of the truth, which does not ring true 
against the touchstone of his authenticity. Maintaining that the 
testability of the norm by the authentic individual's critique is the 
precondition of its 'goodness' in any sense, he responds with both 
social 'ought' and social 'is' maintained in his repertoire of demands 
and awareness vis-a-vis society, but with these two functions and 
qualities of society perceived by him as separate in the given norm of 
the day, if that lends itself to recognition as schismic. The 
existentialist's response to the bidding of blind society-compliance 
inherent in society's gesture to him, is a personal 'no'; it's an answer 
of its critique. Durkheim's work Suicide carries the implication that 
those who in the lights of their selves deviate from the standards of 
the good of society to a sufficient extent to cause them to commit 
suicide, deserve to die. Existentialism's answer to Durkheim's vercict 
passed an all deviants such as himself, is a 'sh'an't'. 
Anomie in conduct - critique - does affect the collective 
consciousness; it's a source of change in it in two ways: one which 
could be called social 'constitution' ('social creativity' in Mead) and 
the other social 'disconstitution'. Both 'constitution' and 
'disconstitution' are achieved by bringing the individual's 
unconventional lights, profane, schismic insights, to bear on a social 
situation which subsists in big-letter terms. Schismic response - 
retaining a personal vision of the social 'ought' in relation to the 
social 'is' or the actual society of the day - is the vehicle both of 
constructive innovation and of 'disconstitution' ('deconstruction' to 
the French), I'll the undefinition of the spirit of seriousness, 
representative of the being of the Sacred, of positive society as it 
both is and ought to be. Such 'disconstitution' is the reverse process 
of the social reifying of the small-letter concepts in the German, 
described in the previous Section; it's the reverse of the process of 
turning the vital activities and the lively qualities that verbs and 
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adjectives stand for, into more stilted, socially abstract things, by 
changing the small-letter initials of those verbs and adjectives into 
big-letter ones. In reverse, 'disconstitution' may be seen as the 
transforming of the originally sacred, big-letter social reality into 
the small-letter, human idiom of being. This reverse process to the 
social reifying of the vital qualities of adjective- and verb-concepts, 
may, and does, as Durkheim himself saw, truly effect, unmake the reality 
of society and social situations, occasionally bursting the whole 
content of that as social, metamorphosing its sacred nature, showing the 
make-up of the profane reverse to it, divesting it of the veneer of its 
outside and showing the joints, the filling of its cracks from within; 
it does the job of critique - constructive or otherwise - which unmasks 
the incongruous makings of the social show if it's founded on the base of 
standards untrue to, schismic with those of the collective consciousness 
in its ideality, to which, the existentialist insists, man's 
consciousness is directly present, and thus endowed and empowered with 
the faculty of its guardianship and promotion vis-a-vis the corrupted 
state of society, underneath its glossy surface. 
An example of 'disconstitution' may be found in literature in an 
episode of The Goad Soldier 
^veik. C1'-' This episode describes how 
private veik, constantly picked an and pushed about by the 
officiousness of the officers with whom he is in daily contact, is one 
day standing guard while the officers in question are sitting in a row 
on the latrine. Suddenly, an seeing an officer approach, higher in rank 
5 than the ones constantly plaguing him, Sveik calls out: 'Attention! ' 
Much more fell on that occasion than the officers' trousers. In 
socialpsychological, interpersonal terms, the tables were turned - he 
whom his selfimportant superiors have always gone to lengths to 
humiliate, has humiliated them. The schism, or anomie of the slice of 
society that reigned in the barracks, and with that the total 
Durkheimian one which the officers existed to uphold and maintain, has 
waxed, gained territory, and the schismicity of the social situation 
that obtained in the set-up in the Kaiser's army, was, among other 
things, made bare. In showing the ridiculousness of the actual r6gime 
within which humanly undeserving people, no cleverer than Sveik, are 
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being given superior roles, elevated ranks as a matter of their 
birthright, the author demonstrates the standards of the social 'ought' 
and the social 'is' as separate and divergent, their constellation 
absurd and self-contradictory. By literary means, and the introduction 
of 'poetic justice', the author could devise a situation in which both 
the 1fterpersonal makings of that (a socialpsychologic affair) has been 
'taken to pieces', 'blown sky-high', 'disconstituted', and society as 
such too has suffered, been eaten into, demoted - with a discontinuity, 
gap affected in it, made into nothing by way of its being turned into 
the unconventional, spontaneous, immediately experienced, personal, 
v 
profane idiom; - redefined thus by the act of Sveik who seized the 
opportinity to get his own back for formerly being certified as a 
lunatic by that lot, and thereby having had his own order of being as a 
person dragged down accordingly. Through 
xveik's 
act, the formerly 
prevailing social order and idiom has become, so to speak, atomised, 
deprived of its former quality of being as a whole - it is, at the 
moment of Sveik's revenge, no more. The gold, the halo on the icon-like 
image of its former being as sacred, faded away, disappeared - baring 
the little primitive stick-men, whom the artist, unconcerned with and 
unschooled in the secrets of living anatomy, had clad in lavish gold to 
hide their humanly lacking condition. 'The Emperor has no clothes! ' 
cries the little boy in the story analogous in its message in many ways 
with the above considered example. 
The direction in which Sveik took his aim in 'disconstituting' - 
knocking off the halo of the mighty - is not the only one in which 
'disconstitution' can work. The social dignity of the people in the low 
ranks of the social spectrum is being disconstituted all the time by 
others high up above. The wholesale 'disconstitution' of persons, 
affected from up high, who have done nothing to deserve to be unmade as 
sacred, to be ranked with the ascriptionally profane of the world, 
begins, in many cases, at the moment of birth. 'As soon as you are born 
they make you feel small', John Lennon sings. There are more ways than 
one in which to qualify for a place among the demoted. Some of these 
possibilities will now be given consideration. 
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THE SCHISM AS A MACROSOCIOLOGIC MATTER. 
Section 1. The Three Ascribed Paradigms of the Sacred-Profane 
Relationship. Blemish by Circumstance and by Virtue 
of Heretic Personality, Hubris. 
The division of the human world into Sacred and Profane in 
Durkheim's sense, is an original, archetypal separation of mankind into 
two, involving both the Profane and the Sacred in the solemn, elevated, 
big-letter sense. The Sacred are sacred in their weighty, self- 
conscious, self-important capacity as such, and the Profane are profane 
also in the big-letter sense, as judged and decreed thus in the spirit 
of seriousness, as a matter of ascription by the Sacred and on their 
terms. This relationship, when so grasped, is a macrosociologic primary 
structure of sociologic calibre, not a matter secondary to its 
experience and not a function of that; it prevails prior to its being 
made the structure and the object of critique for individual 
consciousness, and in independence of that for its definition in that 
capacity. Anomie, the modality and fountainhead of profane conduct - the 
prevalence of society-variant conduct and mode of consciousness, as 
Durkheim points out, 'is of whole cloth', in other words, to his 
understanding, is a sociologically basic and axiomatic entity first and 
foremost, un-atomised, un-parcelled up at its sociologically 
primordial, into particularly individual human consciousnesses; a 
sociologic phenomenon with socialscientifically predictive weight and 
properties, to which the individual's particular experience and 
psychologically sophisticated cultivation of it is subordinate. As 
'whole cloth' so to speak, it may be envisaged as the dark areas in the 
statistical charts that yield forth, express the patterns of society. 
It's this anomie, as a mode of consciousness and conduct, which erodes 
the white areas that statistically evidence society as such as the 
uneventful and undisturbed state of its equilibrium;, anomie is that 
society-alien medium which gets, gnaws at the sociologically wholesome 
coincidence of behaviour in man with society's norms as established, 
corroding that in its incidence, taking chunks out of society's very 
being in this sense, of its subsistance, its domain. 
But in this gross, wholesale, sociologic grasp of this partnership 
between the two opposite sides of humanity, the sacred and profane, is 
not the only possible one. The relationship may be, and indeed is 
unavoidably, approached 'existentially' as well, in its more micro- 
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sociologic makings, in the mode of anomie particularised, as conscious 
human reality in the living. The collective consciousness as Durkheim's 
hard-and-fast phenomenon, as sociologic facticity, which comes over in 
experience as external to individual consciousness, is in a special 
relation with the generalized other, the microsociologic or social- 
psychologic package with experience as its medium, in which society 
comes, corruptly, in its living, familiarly in everyday life, as 
outlined in the Introduction, society as a process, pliable, fluid, 
society as it feels and is being mediated, sustained by human conduct. 
The two, the collective consciousness and the generalized other, afford 
in their relationship an aspect of the schism in society, as discerned 
in the first chapter. It is possible to bring a socialpsychologically 
slanted grasp on the solemn Sacred-Profane relationship as entertained 
by Durkheim, yielding a sociologically inappropriate, dishabille, fresh, 
disconstitutive, dynamic view to the workings of this primal tie between 
these two opposite genuses of mankind, deposing in its effect, 
unflattering, deconstructive to the Sacred and uncongenial to their 
properly sacred idiom, the spirit of seriousness, in which their chosen 
made of being as sacred, thrives, on which it depends. A profane, 
scrutinising, critical 'look' at the Sacred when engaged in the solemn 
business of their upkeep as such, disconetitutes the Sacred and is 
uncongenial to their characteristic social idiom, their home ground, 
showing them as merely man-size, as transposed into human reality 
alongside with the Profane, and repatriating the latter category of man 
into its more homely, mundane, small-letter habitat of human reality, 
the mire, the microscopic culture of life where it flourishes, from 
within which confines it knows itself as profane and can define, or 
rather undefine, the Sacred as such, too; as illustrated on the last 
pages of the last chapter. 
It may be protested, in the light of the current exposition, that 
because Durkheimian positive social reality, when 'playing at home' as 
it were, in instances when encountered as operative, as supreme in its 
own terrain, on its own terms, as in a court of law for instance, is 
postulated here as independent for its proper being on any profane 
definition of it by human reality, and, conversely, because the same 
Durkheimian positive social reality is seen as prone and amenable to 
being checked and even deposed in moments of its weakness and at its 
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anomalistic by human reality (music to vulgarian psychologistic ears), 
our argument is either self-contradictory or half-right, properly 
pleasing either hard-nosed Durkheimian positivists or psychologistic 
solipsists, and the other half of our position, inconvenient to either 
are of these schools of thought, has to be thrown away. But far from 
it: what we claim here, dualistically, is that both are the case - that 
both positive society as such, is a complete stratum of nature, as 
Durkheim claimed, sui generis, and so is the coherent tier of the being 
of human reality, with these two orders in a special relationship to 
each other, as will transpire in the course or later arguments in 
greater detail, with one of these strata of reality ever potentially 
destructive of the other, each authentic and congenial to itself, but 
inappropriate, embarrassing, disconstitutive vis-a-vis its opponent as a 
possible modality of conduct and consciousness, and to their own perpe- 
tration, as already touched on in the Introduction. To be big-letter 
Profane, the grasp of the self of itself in this weighty sociologic 
idiom if one be so ascribed, is certainly the possibility of individual 
consciousness, but unauthentic to it in its capacity as human reality, 
and mutually exclusive with defining oneself in the latter idiom. Even 
if identified, decreed as 'carrier' of big-letter anomie, as less than 
sociologically wholesome, even then small-letter profane is the 
personally authentic way of being profane as an unavoidably always 
available mode of the being of consciousness. 
A socialpsychologically conversant, inclusive grasp and view of the 
Durkheimian Sacred-Profane relationship, makes it susceptible and prone 
to the classification of it into eight particular comprehensive 
categories, to being analysed into the molecules of its dignified grasp 
and presentation as an unassailable macroanthropologic whole, yielding 
up even such aspects of the relationship which are other than those 
ascribed. These, however, will be treated in the next chapter. 
This chapter, the first out of the two which will do the job of 
listing, analysing paradigms of the Sacred and Profane, will consider 
those three aspects of that bond between these two opposing halves of 
humanity which are determined and maintained primarily by ascription. 
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These will each be presented in diagrammatic form. However, before 
putting forward the first of these, the choice of one pair of terms 
which is taken here as often interchangeable with the Sacred and the 
Profane, and frequently used, calls for some explanation. The terms in 
question are the Pukka and the Rachmones; the two, when juxtaposed, 
yielding an odd, culturally heterogeneous dyad. 'Pukka', as is well 
known, refers to the East Indian elite in the heyday of the caste system 
there. 'Rachmones' is Yiddish for the little Jew (extendable in its 
meaning to the little man in any culture), down in his luck in the 
world, in the face of which he nevertheless stumbles along there as best 
he can. 'Untouchable' offered itself first in the course of choosing 
this near-synonymous dyad to the Sacred and Profane, to evoke, to stand 
for the other half of humanity vis-a-vis the Pukka; and has been 
rejected. If chosen, it would have kept its ensemble with the Pukka 
within one culture, moreover, would have provided the correct 
description of the attitude of the Pukka towards the class of humanity 
apprehended by him as the opposite to itself -a sense of abhorrance of 
the kind which those abiding by kosher customs feel in the face of 
treflach. But Rachmones has been chosen because so consistent with the 
meaning of small-letter profane - with profaneness as experienced from 
within, from the point of view of the profane, warmly, innerly 
encountered, lived as such: the everyday experience of being a loser and 
having to fulfil the job of living all the same - an experience of 
oneself as at home in the profaneness which is the only life one has, 
assimilated through the virtues of wisdom, of realistic resignation, of 
spirit still privately cultivated, of the adequate management of being 
assigned low in the once-for-all manner in which this casting usually 
takes place; a somewhat endearing term: poor, pathetic fellow, the 
notion with a smile, with self-mockery and self-knowledge, chosen here 
because of its authenticity by profane standards: not Untouchable, but 
Pauline sinner, Rachmones, harajan, profane. 
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Table 1. 
Type I Blemished; The Blemished by Virtue of Circumstance Only. 
The Sacred or Unblemished; the Pukka. The Profane, Blemished. the 
$achmones. 
Fit to be stewards (biblical sense), 
mediating, allocating my lot to me, 
your lot to you. A more modern term 
for steward is the caretaker in 
Pinter's sense; to be elaborated later. 
government, social security social worker (i) the poor. 
government, medical authorities, 
charities, social security, social 
worker head of family, (ii) the 
spouse, guardian handicapped 
It is a vital insight on Mead's part that the "I" has the duties, 
the "me" has the rights. The "me" in this context is the capacity of the 
self as citizen; the self is a "me" in so far as it is continuous in its 
being with the generalized other, the concept which could be - has in 
the Introduction been - defined as the experiential or 
socialpsychologic inside of the collective consciousness or the Sacred, 
the moral status quo as established in society, of positive social 
reality. The concept of the Profane as a class of people may be defined 
as such selves in whom the duties of the "me" and the rights of the "I" 
have been deemed as separate, an account of the fact that they are 
blemished in some sense and are unfit, or are deemed to be unfit, to 
autonomously co-ordinate and to independently judge or handle, manage 
the relationship between their rights and their duties - in other words, 
to be reponsible. The two classes of 'blemished' listed above are so, 
and cannot as a consequence manage independently, because of reasons to 
do with purely external facticity attaching to their selves as "me"-s. 
There is an Aristotelian sort of freedom and socialpsychologic autonomy 
as a self, as an internal matter, which is the possibility of these 
blemished, as indeed it is of all classes of Rachmones, but not as a 
matter, and on the plane of ascription, of external, social fact. 
The above two classes of circumstantially incapables, are to be 
distinguished from certain other types of ascriptionally damaged. The 
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next category is provided by those who are ascriptionally blemished 
because of their society-variant, or heretic, personalities. This 
category is comprised, in the main, by the criminal and the mad, and 
their heresy consists in the fact that they are informed, and abide as 
the mainspring of their set of standards by other than the established, 
reigning one, other than the norm, the standard informing and 
maintaining society. 
Table 2. 
Blemished. or The Blemished 
Caretakers, Sacred, Pukka. 
an. Qm 
The Undeserving 
(in the sense as 
expounded by Doolittle 
in Shaw's Pygmalion) 
Psychiatrists, health 
service, the government, 
the fuzz social worker, head 
of family, guardian, 
spouse (i) the mentally ill 
The fuzz, the government social worker, 
probation service____ (ii)ttye'pre criminal' 
or 'pure heretic' 
or political offender 
He shares with groups 
(i), (iii), (iv) & (v) 
that it's the body of 
the social norm and 
of the given doctrines or 
the existing confines 
of the law, in his case, 
which he explicitly 
means to affect, and 
make inclusive with his 
redefinition of that 
according to his lights. 
This is the explicit 
aim of his deviance 
which is clear in its mo- 
tivation of other petty 
or sordid content. 
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Same agencies as above same agencies 
as above -(iii)the common criminal He, in addition to being 
guilty on account of the 
soiled, self-seeking con- 
tent of his crime, is also 
guilty of offending against 
the collective conscious- 
ness as represented in so- 
ciety, though he doesn't 
mean to change the latter 
or take it to task; he means 
that to remain unruffled 
and himself to be undetect- 
ed in the framework of it. 
Same agencies as above. 
The generalized other, 
established academics (iv)pure heretics as 
scientific innovators 
such as Giordano Bruno, 
Kepler or Galilei - also, 
for instance, a geneticist 
in the Eastern (conceivably 
also in the Western) world 
who backs hypotheses dis- 
continuous with the body 
of science furnishing the 
current scientific and 
ideologic norm 
Same agencies as in 
group (iv) (v)social innovators in 
the arts: 
an Orton, a Lennon, a 
Marlowe, a Rousseau e. g. 
- their possible separa- 
tion, setting apart from 
the Pukka, may not be per- 
petrated in crude and 
manifest ways - their 
punishment, Profane status, 
'excommunication', may be in 
symbolic terms, possibly 
secretly, unbeknown to them. 
The mainspring of the mode of conduct of the political criminal - 
that variety of the 'pure heretic'- may be likened to the hubris of the 
hero of ancient Greek tragedy. The conflict between the ascribed norms 
of society and the agencies, or agent, upholding those, versus the 
hubris of the main hero, formed the central theme of that genre. The 
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hero of the tragedy, by Aristotle's definition and ruling, had to be an 
individual to whom the audience looked up in every respect, who was 
great and had no petty faults, the only flaw in his character - the 
reason why he had to fall and for which he was to pay with his life, was 
this only, big-letter crime: hubris, or putting his consciousness, his 
personal standards of human reality on a par with the order of the gods, 
the sacred as established in the order of society, bringing his "I", 
when at variance with that, to bear on that order, making a bid for his 
human standards to be assimilated in that reigning order: it was heresy 
in the sense of taking it upon himself to have his own standards as 
human reality, in an instance of its 'deviance' with the Sacred as 
defined in the word, embraced, absorbed in the Sacred, in society, so as 
to alter and affect society through a significant, critical, socially 
consequential, personal act, such as that of Antigone in the face of 
Creon - in an act that was moral according to her different, personal 
lights (those of human reality>, one that was the product of her unique, 
inner, ethical insight and that alone, not yet endorsed by the mores as 
they were, as constantly propounded by the Chorus. Because of the hero's 
greatness, the conflict was great - sacred - in its nature; it was 
between the gods and their stewards, and the hero: himself a divine 
pretender. In the context of the Greek drama, the question of the virtue 
of the hero, his sin through the act of his hubris, was equivocal. It 
was seen by the audience as sin - because pointedly at variance with 
society - his or her consciousness big-letter Profane by definition; it 
was seen as profane, or sin, but one to be admired because consisting in 
and illuminated by consistent alternative standards, those of human 
reality. At the same time as the hero's act of hubris being, to the 
audience's mind, a blatant violation of the order of the Sacred, it had 
an underlying, socialpsychologically compelling rationale to it, 
amounting to a demand and obligation in terms of a personal set of 
morals, unavoidably moving the hero in his individual capacity to commit 
his act of hubris; and the audience could identify with the hero's 
personal set of motivation also. The view the Greek took regarding the 
hero's motivation as hubris was coloured by their dualism, an aspect of 
which linked them to the dualism of those thinkers who are considered in 
this thesis; they saw the problem of the proverbial coin which has two 
sides to it, consciousness in this case, one collective and the other 
the set and medium of standards anchored in human reality - two kinds of 
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reality upheld by contradictory structures, bodies of dicta, external 
and established versus individual and inner - an extreme, polarised 
situation; and that which makes an act right in the light of one of 
these angles, makes it wrong from the point of view of the other angle 
on it. Hubris is the vehicle of the project both of the subsequent saint 
who succeeds in having his insights stemming from human reality 
emancipated, and of the common or garden heretic whose lights as made 
public do not come to sprout roots in a following. It - hubris - is 
highly akin, if not synonymous, with Mead's notion of social creativity 
(to receive comment later. ) Social creativity may be seen as hubris - 
pure crime, sin, pride (111, challenging, individual, socially 
consequential arrogance, made good. 
The essential feature which the conduct of the mad, the heretic and 
the social pioneer have in common, may be labelled 'social surrealism'. 
It consists in the fact that the project of these would-be sacred 
pretenders (sacred on their own terms), is to create social reality ex 
nihilo. 'Ex nihilo', consistently with Sartre, is from the realm of 
possibilities for the "I" or in his choice of words, for Being-for- 
Itself. The pure heretic offers up, at the price of being branded big- 
letter Profane, the possibility which is the object of his heresy, his 
insight, his proposal for an amended generalized other inclusive of it, 
his self uncurtailed of his vision, to be patriated into the body of 
norms as universally upheld in established social reality. He means to 
graduate from the big-letter would-be Sacred or heretic, fighting solo 
for himself and others like him, to licensed acceptance complete with 
the claim of his "I" as small-letter sacred as it were, in the everyday, 
run-of-the-mill society as it is. Small-letter sacred is a term usefully 
introduced here; it is tantamount to small-letter profane, personally, 
normally becoming human demeanour in the ordinary way, profaneness 
realising itself in the world without a hitch as proper, as undisturbed, 
unruffled for what it is - the human condition, nothing better and 
nothing worse, allowed to make its way in the world without being 
stripped of its natural privilege and responsibilities as a person. It's 
the fussless bid, practice and management of the self, complete with the 
"I" in one's normal business in freedom as a self, as the self one is 
in one's unblemished, uncurtailed liberty to simply get on with one's 
life. The small-letter sacred are people who find room, neither 
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necessarily very obtrusively nor particularly apologetically, as 
salient human realities in the world (for the meaning of 'salience' see 
the Introduction), as the unselfconscious human realities they are as 
profane, as individuals on their platform in the world through their 
"me" somewhat consequentially anchored in the society of one's 
everydays, in the routine way of one's activities. Bultmann and Sartre 
reserve the label 'grace' for this unhassled, personally dignified, 
ordinary way of the individually adequate management of the self. 
'Small-letter sacred' is definitely to be distinguished from the big- 
letter counterpart of the concept, from the ascribed, self-important 
Sacredness of the Pukka when officially asserting and promoting 
himself, that usage of the term for which we usually reserved the label 
'Sacred' so far; and we shall for that reason fully spell out 'small- 
letter sacred' when that's what we mean, to avoid ambiguity. 
The mad misjudge the extent to which this "I"-emancipation can be 
done in the world to accommodate the radius of their bid for the 
realisation and of their innovative selves as fully accepted human 
realities, as small-letter sacred. The social pioneer whose heresy will 
find response in social reality and thereby indeed will become 
emancipated, gets it just right. The completely uncreative person 
doesn't take on this project at all in the conte:: t of social reality, 
not even to a very slight extent. To the romantic existentialist 
moralist, he is the worst sinner of all, as he doesn't practice, doesn't 
act on his possibility of being small-letter sacred (though he may be 
imitative of the big-letter Sacred as his route to being with some 
personal excellence) - he doesn't act on his possibility of being in 
part god in the small-letter sense himself, or at least one who takes 
his degree of divinity as a man (or woman) through personally direct 
intuition, in his capacity as an individual, as a human reality, 
through giving leeway to himself as the divine spark which as a mode of 
being is the possibility of every self, is the possible fountainhead and 
informant of everyone's conduct, if this path, this project for the 
self's management be chosen. 
The 'pure' political and social heretic, then, may be seen as one 
who aims to alter the generalized other as it is, by widening it to 
accammodate in the future, in 'kingdom come' as it were (here an earth 
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of course), the standards of his lights, personally intuited and upheld 
as human reality -a society more tolerant than the current one, one 
catering for his absolutely compelling personal standards. Of course, 
it's perfectly possible that the altered generalized other he is 
yearning to be part of, is more exclusive rather than more inclusive in 
its accommodation of universal humanity than the present one, that his 
lights as a person prompt the narrowing of the generalized other's 
condition of membership in the aimed-for established society of the 
future - our 'pure heretic' can easily be a reactionary, a fascist for 
instance. 
A few classificatory and summary remarks are usefully made here. 
Taking, once again, Type II Blemished as a comprehensive category, 
complete with the subclasses 'mad', 'criminal' (of both sorts), 
'scientific innovator', 'social innovator in the Arts', as posited in 
Table 2, a point should be made regarding a consequential difference 
between the two main generic classes comprising this cluster of 
heretics: the criminal and the mad; -a difference which is lodged in 
Pukka attitude. While the Pukka admits that the setting apart of the 
criminal from the Sacred and constraining him, serves the interest of 
society, he usually would not admit that this holds for the mentally 
ill, too. He would say that the confinement of the mad, his caretaking- 
recipience, the curtailment of his freedom as responsible citizen serves 
the interest of the individual so blemished (the turn of phrase 'for 
his, or her, own good' a familiar verbal tag attached to implementing 
such measures as curtail the radius for his being as a self) - yes, the 
Pukka would typically deny that his constraining classification of 
varieties of the mad by psychiatric labels is an ideologic ploy, and 
that the assumption of the effected person's duties by the agencies 
identified in Table 2, safeguards the edifice, the Pukka's edifice of 
the norm at its manifold as it roots into, upholds and indeed comprises 
the generalized other by which the Pukka abides and which maintains his 
order, an insight which unfolds under the analytic prism of Thomas Szäsz 
and of Foucault, in the different ways of these two workers. 
In comparing Type II Blemished, so rendered because of their 'social 
surrealism', with Type I Blemished, those marred by circumstantial 
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factors in the main, certain differences and similarities should be 
noted. In the cases of Type II Blemished, the Heretical because of their 
personality and conduct, the separation between their rights and duties, 
"I"-s and "me"-s, and their subjugation as selves to caretaking, has 
been effected by definition rather than by physically tangible, external 
factors setting them apart from the Pukka. Their loss of autonomy as 
selves is 'constituted' by decree, as it were, by legal means. 
Nevertheless, their constraint, albeit by ascription only, obtains in a 
very real sense, on the level of social fact, of recorded positive 
reality, which will not go away in its hard-and-fast factual idiom, 
which stands outside them and between their project as selves to act 
upon their wishes and the realisation of those on their platform in the 
world in a free "me" as available to the sacred, big-letter or small. 
Even so, the curtailment of their "me", the privation of that from 
serving their will, however real, does not amount to the same order and 
extent of privation as that of the circumstancially damaged, 
particularly the physically handicapped. The handicapped person cannot, 
of course, be emancipated in the sense of mending his blemish without a 
trace at the end of his project aimed at transcending the dislodgement 
between the ideals of his self as an "I" and his "me" as given, he 
cannot have his project yield him the freedom of a dignified and 
autonomous self, except, as has been said, in an Aristotelian sort of 
sense, important as that is. No project of hubris, no degree of success 
in affecting the world to accommodate heir lights, no project of 
martyrdom, crusading or unauthentic bid for transcendence (as that of 
the Jew in Sartre's Antisemite and ew) can lift the confining facticity 
which is his lot, curbing his actio radius as an autonomous self; no bid 
for a comely balance between the will as an "I" and set of actual 
opportunities as a "me", will do away with his blemish, palpable to the 
eye. 
Secondly, and conversely, as legislatively created ascription can, 
and does, curtail Type II agents as selves, rendering their "me" 
disabled in a real sense as such on the long term, so does the 
physiological or other circumstantial disability concomitantly introduce 
sociologically and socialpsychologically lesser, Profane status in the 
real terms of social reality, into the mode of being of Type I agents, 
with the Sartrian lack, constrained psychological sense of anomie, and 
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experience of big-letter Profaneness which goes with it - though Good 
Faith (and the Aristotelian freedom it can generate) and bad faith can 
both come to the rescue to some extent in attenuating the cognisance and 
sensation of the ensuing dislodgement of the self. The physically 
handicapped person, for example, may have urgent need for a new 
technical device which would make his life easier... or an economically 
disadvantaged family may undergo a spell of stress and want to shield a 
child from its effects; they may contemplate a brief period in public 
school for the child while the family trauma is being weathered. On 
application, there will be calls by the social worker... means tests... 
An intrapersonal schism, a split between what the person needs (the 
"I"'s function) and what he is assessed as worthy of having (his set of 
opportunities as defined for him as an actual "me"), is established, 
comes to transpire, and graduates to the being of a social fact (and as 
a consequence a psychological one too), facts which are now the case in 
a positive sense. Institutional agencies enter and become the judges of 
the "I1"s aspirations, staring at those and at the inner structure of 
the self to which those cohere, through the magnifying glass of a so- 
called objectivity. The schism is judged, measured up, audited, made a 
note of, entered onto files, debated, acquiring an existence on the 
big-letter continuum of society as a system of rigid, accomplished 
social facts, rising to the order of a Type II: Blemish as a matter of 
legislated social reality, and assumes its place alongside with the 
socially ascribed imperfects, sharing with those their order of 
officialdom-induced and maintained Profaneness. Needless to say, the 
institution, if approached for help in bringing nearer one's aspirations 
to the real opportunities for those in the world, may even have the 
power to sort out the applicants' private problems and emergencies in 
ways which are most easily at the disposal of the institution rather 
than in ways the recipients would need and envisage for themselves - an 
application for boarding school landing the child in care. 
Socialpsychologically speaking, the blemish of the poor and the 
handicapped, is not just that which stares one in the eye when one sees 
the manifest signs of it. go; in addition to both the genres of the 
circumstantially blemished, the handicapped and the poor, marked off 
from the rest as a matter of crude, external facticity, their status 
among the physiologically and/or financially well-off Pukka as equally 
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dignified selves in an anthropologic sense, as people who as a matter of 
course are taken for granted as also pukka, small-letter sacred, their 
sense of being persons who know their own minds and are able, at least 
potentially, to normally and responsibly act on their own likes and 
choices, is also characteristically taken from them - as the radio 
series Does He Take Sugar? so perceptively shows in the context of the 
physically handicapped. In the context of the all too common 
mistreatment of the poor in the face of the insignia of their blemish, 
Mark Twain's Prince and Pauper affords a sensitive study. 
Finally, the third macrosociologic form of the sacred-profane 
relationmship should be identified here, albeit an intermediary type, in 
two senses. Firstly so because this type owes something to the 
socialpsychologic notion 'the stranger' (explored in greater depth in 
the chapter called "Rosebud or Bpte Noire? ") - and impinging on that to 
a certain extent. It's also intermediary in the context of the present 
chapter, as it is, in many ways, a mixture between Type I and Type II 
Rachmones, in some respects a circumstantially and in others an 
ascriptionally created type of handicapped, so created in equal parts. 
Table 3. 
Type III Blemished. Minority Subcultures. 
Pu Sacred. Caretaker 
Government, immigration 
authorites (if applic- 
able), patriotic indige- 
nous citizen (generalized 
other), the fuzz. race relations 
officer (i)racial minorities 
Same agencies as above (ii)national minorities 
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Government, established 
Church (both of own deno- 
mination and that of 
religious majority (iii)religious minorities 
The generalized other, 
government and other 
security vetting 
agencies (iv>other minority sub- 
cultures such as homo- 
sexual ones. 
These will not receive 
comment in the same 
detail as other Rach- 
mones groups mentioned 
here. 
The above types of Rachmones share with Type II Blemished the 
feature that their relegation to Profane status subsists by virtue of 
being legislatively so created, by ascription only. Exceptions are 
group (i): racial minorities, and the homosexuals of group (iv), whose 
separation, setting apart from the generalized other of the majority, 
owes something to physiologic factors too - groups whose Rachmones 
status is constituted by the double burden of being 'constituted' 
Blemished in both Type I and Type 11 ways. 
Type III Rachmones groups have in common with the mad that when 
dealt with individually by the ascribed Pukka, there is a pretence that 
caretaking is in the interest of the recipients, that those are better 
off due to caretaking in terms of the reigning indigenous norm than they 
would be otherwise; that they need the caretaking. With regard to some 
Type III Rachmones, there is some truth in this, particularly in the 
case of immigrant groups, especially white ones. When political refugees 
seek asylum, the freedom they are after is typically freedom to be 
middle-class, and not freedom to continue leading a life of probing, not 
freedom to be consciousnesses unfetterd by, liberated, as Being-for- 
Itselfs, from anomalousness of the norm as society wherever and whenever 
this may be the case, and they settle in their niches offered for them 
by the receiving subculture as sanctified by the reigning main one. 
Immigrant subcultures are buffer zones, shielding the immigrants as 
individuals, from culture shock and tempering that for them, a crutch 
for postponing having to deal with it in the first person singular, 
spreading out that job in time and handing the need for it down to their 
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children -. sidestepping, delaying the call for transcendence bath of the 
unjustifiable norm which they fled, and of segregation in the chosen one 
- postponing that for generations, leaving to their descendants the 
unavoidable need to integrate. Again, coloured immigrants present a 
different case - being marked off as alien (and being regarded as 
Rachetones on account of that) on the long term across generations, due 
to the colour of their skins, the job of transcendence, of re-writing, 
redefining their future for themselves and thereby altering the reality 
which separates them from the Pukka and from the mainstream generalized 
other is not open to them, with emancipation for that reason harder - 
and because of the prolongediy differential attitude to them by the 
Pukka and by the generalized other, membership in their own subculture 
has a different, authentic meaning and validity for them. 
The immigrant contingent of all groups within the Type III Blemished 
category share the feature with the criminals in Type II that the Pukka 
will admit that their separation from the Pukka as a matter of 
legislation and the dislodgement between their "me"-s and "I"-s as the 
by-product of their subjection to caretaking, serves the interest of the 
state. (As already touched on, the Pukka typically denies that this is 
so with the mad. ) The way in which caretaking in the service of the 
state and of established society applies to the physically handicapped 
and the poor in their special ensemble, will receive comment later. 
Finally, it should be noted in the context of Type III Rachetones, 
that within their own subculture, not all people who seem so classified 
on the surface, are in fact Rachmones. Some are Pukka or willing 
caretaker vis-a-vis those who are profane in other than their own 
subcultural aspect, conceivably even on account of subcultural factors 
which tie them to other subcultures. This situation is further 
complicated by the fact that these socially relatively elevated Pukkas 
in the context of their own in-groups may simultaneousely be Rachmones 
in relation to more prestigeous in-groups and of course to the host 
culture. But looking at this observation within the confines of the 
subculture, the effect which these individuals have, due to their 
somewhat prestigeous ascription, upon the more lowly ascribed in their 
subculture, does not basically differ from the effect which the Pukka 
in the host culture have on every kind of Rachmones. 
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Section 2. The Three Sociologically Relevant Functions of the 
Specialisation of the "me" and the "I". 
In this section we examine certain key ways in which the 
institutional separation of the "me" and the "I" through ascribed 
caretaking comes to be of systematic macrosociologic importance. There 
are three such ways. 
In the classes of Rachetones so far identified, the 1: 1 relation 
within the self of the "me" and the "I" is removed, not merely as a 
socialpsychologic matter concerning the individuals so affected (and 
irrespective of the re-uniting of these functions of the self within any 
Rachmones as a personal Aristotelian feat), but in a once-for-all 
manner, as a matter of legislation, and effectively so. An example is 
afforded by Sophocles' Oedipus Rex; he is uncovered as and therefore is 
a sinner, big-letter as such, and intolerable as such to society, even 
though he didn't mean to sin and was unaware, throughout his adult 
lifetime, that he was doing so. The two intraindividual aspects of the 
self, the components of its infrastructure, the "me" and the "I", will 
each be involved, in different and specialised ways in the overt 
phenomenon and process of society when thus uncovered as Profane, each 
going their separate way and playing a part predetermined for it in big- 
letter social reality. The "I" is assumed by the representatives of the 
Sacred, the caretakers of it, the choice of the "I"'s duties, its job 
of picking the causes to be served, of casting projects, venturing 
hypotheses, opinions, having ideas, disposing with resources, defining 
responsibilities, shaping its destiny, is institutionally requisitioned 
in loco the self and channelled towards the We, swelling up its 
prevalence. At the same time the "me", the self's overt arena of 
positively realisable or realised chances in the world as such, is 
sparingly apportioned and accessed to the self as though a gift from 
those anthropologically above, and not something already the 
recipients', not something already belonging to the Rachetones, by 
virtue of their being selves. The "me", the system of real opportunities 
to the self, of real occasions for realising the functions and calls of 
the "I", spans three categories in nature in which the "me" is 
simultaneously involved, as will be elaborated later - the physiologic, 
the socialpsychologic and the sociologic. It has the nerve endings and 
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the concrete, demonstrable outlines in the first person singular as an 
autonomous nervous system, a socialpsychologic personality and a social 
unit with a name, within which composite confines the pay-off of the 
projects, launched by socially more prestigeous agencies than himself, 
(particularly when those have gone wrong) really does hurt, where the 
citizen's mutation, name, his dignity as a prestige-wise intact 
social 'carrier', is marred, where its life as a personality, 
socialpsychologic entity is curtailed, witnessed and experienced as 
other than small-letter sacred, as deprived, devoid of the evidence in 
his personal demeanour of a well-managed "I", of the evidenceable 
unity and completeness of his "me" with an "I" of his own - or 'grace' 
by Sartre's definition of that term. This process, the by-product of the 
'specialisation' in this manner, of the "I" being seeped off by the 
Pukka and the "me" judiciously parcelled out by him to the Rachmones, 
takes place much of the time incidentally and automatically as the 
natural by-product of the everyday business of bureaucracy, but can at 
times be (and is, more often than meets the eye), strategically 
engineered. The systematic dislodgement of the 1: 1 correspondence 
between the "me" and the "I" in people has the practical advantage to 
the Pukka that it's the mechanism whereby the individual or groups of 
individuals can be sacrificed in the name of the We when the causes and 
the projects of others misfire, or even otherwise, as a lasting 
arrangement of interpersonal intercourse or as an insurance for the 
prolongation of ascriptive states of affairs as they are, as a matter of 
long-standing policy. The expression and the concomitant. underlying 
sentiment of 'this is going to hurt me more than it'll hurt you' is the 
sure fire heralding of a project of the sacrificing of the addressee of 
this pronouncement for something unpleasant to him and useful to the 
Pukka. 
The second macrosociologic or rather macroanthropologic purpose 
which such a dislodgement between the two basic functions of the self, 
the "me" and the "I" fulfils, is that the Pukka may be good. This point 
requires enlarging on to some extent. 
It's a basic and axiomatic need in an that he wants to be good or 
'excellent' as human reality. Mead's notion of the 'sentinel' traces 
back the origin of the notion of the display of personal excellence to 
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pre-human society, referring by this term to that animal in the herd 
which is best, most outstandingly endowed with the discriminatory powers 
of his senses, thereby becoming the leader of the other animals, 
followed by all. Such a sentinel is singled out by nature in the herd in 
this way by virtue of the refinement of its perceptual capacities. 
In man, the sentinel capacity becomes an object for reflection, 
illuminated by the cognisance of this excellence in the context of the 
self, and is desired as an intrinsic quality of the self which is prized 
as an end in itself. Mead considers that, generally speaking, the 
avenues to excelling as an individual can be classified into the outcome 
of one out of two possible approaches to that project, one more 
primitive than the other. In simpler societies, and originally, 
excellence is understood and is being pursued in terms of and in 
compliance with the ruling norm, only more successfully and more 
intensely than the others, such as dressing according to the fashion 
and surpassing, in doing so, current taste itself, imitating and 
exercising that in its own superlative idiom and quality, the self 
revelling in its outstanding and enhanced 'sameness' in comparison with 
everyone else, aiming to display in what one is, seems and has, that 
which everyone else is and seems and has, only bigger and better. A 
more sophisticated and later strategy to excellence is that of being 
superior to the norm in terms of one's differences compared with it, 
excelling vis-a-vis the norm by nonconformity and originality of gifts, 
aspirations, accomplishments. "I To want to be sentinel in whichever of 
these two possible veins, the wish to be paramount good to all and 
acknowledged as such, is probably universal in man. The explicit 
knowledge that one is not good is not easily tolerable and if shown in 
the socially prominently placed, is not popular, unless succesfully 
masked by bad faith in the existentialist sense of the term, by the 
socially uncreative agent, or by big-letter Bad Faith in the heavy 
biblical sense: big-letter Hypocrisy. Bad Faith in this sense - the ploy 
of the Socially Uncreative high up in society parading as the paramount 
sources of goodness, in spite of their moral passivity or even counter- 
productivity in relation to the Social Good of all, is not confined to 
Old and Yew Testament times where the perpetrators of such hypocrisy 
were exposed by the contributors to the Bible in religious terms, but 
are recognisable, with their activities often secularised and updated, 
in twentieth-century times. In our day we can identify the morally 
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divisive practices of those high up by ascription, in the form of the 
cynical, programmatic and relentless stage management of the semblance 
of goodness in such highly ascribed people for the eyes and ears of the 
public, which semblance of goodness in the modern socially Pukka is 
achieved, quite commonly with the help of the media, by the stimulus 
pairing on the public arena of High Up personages with opportunities, 
indeed the monopoly, to ostentatiously do and be good. The Socially 
Elevated are systematically shown in conspicuous acts of the help of the 
Less Fortunate whose selves, "me"-s and "I"-s, more commonly than not, 
these Pukka are the ones to keep permanently dislodged and therefore 
inadequate, as a result of the arrangement of the assured and long-term 
distance in and for the 'profane' between the chances to become 
fulfilled "me"-s on the podium of the tangible, real social world, and 
the needs, deserts and rights of their "I"-s for such fulfilment, not 
less well developed in socially low-ranking people than they are in 
high-ranking ones. This kind of modern-day, big-letter Hipocra c. ks 
functions, thrives, is gratified and fed through the systematic, shop- 
window display of the Pukka continually assisting and patronising those 
who aspire, hopelessly, to first-person-singular excellence themselves 
(with their opportunities to do so thwarted), so as to cause on the long 
term the values which are considered the touchstone of goodness to 
become and stay firmly fixed, attached to themselves in the high 
echelons of society. Goodness, contentment, self-realisation is, to 
appearances, issued from these high quarters as the ruling (often 
established religion-coincidental) ethics, instances of the fulfilment 
of ordinary people in the state of alienation from it are systematically 
attached to the Initiated Select by the diligent and relentless 
Pavlovian association between moving instances of dishing out 'help', 
and the sight of the Pukka as indismissibly instrumental in any degree 
of adequacy attained in the socially lowly on such occasions. These 
knowingly engineered instances of charity are occasions for a Laingian 
complementary arrangement (writ large) between those (socially) low by 
whom fulfilment as human reality, not fully accomplished by them, is 
authentically pursued but to whom such fulfilment through one's own 
means and exertions is not available - (these agencies serve in this 
social symbiosis as object, strategically conditioned and kept so), and, 
on the other hand, the High Up to whom personal fulfilment as choice 
quality human reality is available but not usually personally pursued 
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and cultivated; these agencies figure in this two-stroke differential 
process as subject. The prizes to be won in this exercise are also 
differential; acknowledged goddness and all the moral privileges and 
hallmarks that go with that for the Pukka, and, in contrast, marks and 
certificates for effort awarded to the Rachmones whose bid for the 
transcendence of their unjustifiable lack in the world is deemed 
'deserving' by judges informed by the ideals of ascription (as distinct 
from the ideals of human reality). The mechanism of this discriminatory 
separation of functions into the socially low and the socially high 
respectively, will receive more comment later in greater detail. For the 
moment, an example will be called upon to highlight how the jealous 
monopoly of access to the privilege of goodness as such by -the Pukka, is 
maintained and kept operative in everyday life. Not long ago I had a 
conversation with a recently released prisoner: a criminal Blemished. He 
told me how his tainted image in the eye of the generalized other has 
barred him, since his release, from any occasion to perceive himself as 
a fully rehabilitated, freely breathing individual, from abandoning 
himself in participation as an equal among human beings in any walk of 
life, even in the religious community where he was known. I pointed out 
to him - he was a capable runner - that the annual London Marathon, is 
an elementally emotional event where people share, celebrate together in 
uplifting anonymity (or so I thought) the feeling of a challenge 
conquered together, and suggested that participating may provide for 
him the kind of unqualified experience of being one of the brave and 
sporting among many others, which he was missing so much. He thanked me, 
but when I met him later I learnt that he did not take part after all; 
on being told that permission to participate was subject to satisfying 
conditions in an application form, on finding that even this avenue of 
stretching himself, without compromise, as the person he still felt he 
was, as small-letter sacred, was closed to him by the establishment's 
all-encompassing red tape, he turned his back an the undertaking and 
started getting used to the Aristotelean confines within which alone his 
kind - an ascribed Rachmones - was free to continue to percieve himself 
as the human being he knew felt and believed himself to be, at least 
prospectively. 
There is no source of goodness, excellence as human reality other 
than that deriving from the project of and success in 'mending the 
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lack', in Sartre's sense. The lack, of course, is not necessarily the 
dramatic affair exclusively touching the greatly disadvantaged, their 
absent desired "me" to match the "I" strikingly displaced from the 
greatly blemished "me" which is their lot in actuality. The undramatic 
business of getting by with dignity in the everyday complexities of 
life, managing satisfactorily with regard and in response to a 
discriminating "I" in the ordinary job of living, is excellence enough, 
is elating enough. Success at this project, the project of summoning a 
graceful "me" in response to an unsurrendered "I" in instances calling 
for that, may be called the 'closure' or completion of the self, the 
filling of the lack identified and proclamed by the "I", with the object 
of its hunger, a realised "me" just fitting that, precisely 'answering 
to' that, the completed, satiated end, pay-off of its project, in 
however small a way. Everyone has lack, as Paul and Sartre point out, if 
temporarily no more than the potential for being with one; it's simply 
consciousness, the faculty of judgement of one's self, and that of 
another, as a person, as persons. The instance and occasion when the 
lack is met with positivity (the "me" rooted into its threefold system 
of tiers of reality), that positivity exactly which is appropriate to 
it, we can speak of closure. Closure is a paradigm of the self; it's the 
self at its fulfilled, in the process of social creativity. Closure of 
the self is no other that its grace, the fulfilled yield in the self of 
social creativity at its active and successful, or being small-letter 
sacred; it's the moment of affecting these almost synonymous conditions 
of the self. Social creativity is a fruitful aspect of the process 
directed towards this condition, to which a whole section will be given 
later in this chapter. In anticipation of that, the briefest of 
definitions will be given of it now, with just one or two examples as a 
guide to its applicability in practice. 
Social creativity is the process of the tropism of the self towards 
closure in a human reality-wise fulfilled and fulfilling way, in oneself 
and in others, and the course and medium in which this is achieved in 
the overt act, in overt conduct. It's the dynamic project, inclusive 
with the occasion, of justice being done to the "I" of a deserving self, 
which "I" is that self's system of rights, needs, lights and clamouring 
capacities as such, in the accomplishment of these attributes to the 
self in the bid-at "me" at the end of the projects which aims at this 
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accomplishment explicitly. It is the desire for such a "me" which will 
be fulfilled, gratified and expressed by this project if successful. The 
act, in this sense, is the union in actuality of the coming true of 
the stated "I" in the accomplished "me", and, if realised, becomes the 
unit of the self at its active, with the act the molecule, the natural 
unit of the process of human reality, of the course of the life of the 
self as such. It's the undertaking, and phenomenon, of the "I" casting 
a project and its consolidating that in the "me", the platform for 
itself in the world, a brick in the repertoire of the "me" in the 
structure and radius of social positivity, though not with the "me" 
grasped in Althusserian impersonality, as 'carrier' of society only, but 
apprehended and experienced in personalness, with the "me'= engaged in 
the project of its realisation ever expressive of the "I", an index of 
that, and of its particular project, in a concrete way for the 
individual as such. This 'fusion' of the "me" and the "I", its 
realisation in the accomplished act, can certainly be affected within 
the confines of a single self, though Mead usually refers to the 
interpP. rsonaL fusions of these constituent parts of the self when using 
the term 'social creativity' (something that will be explained anon). 
Examples of such a 'fusion' between a project-thirsty and generative "I" 
and the "me" poignantly 'answering to' it within the act of one 
individual, can be something as dramatic as writing a book to its 
completion, breaking a record in a sport, or something as undramatic as 
running a farm, a shop, pursuing a craft or any means of earning a 
living, making ends meet, enabling one for the project of quite simply 
conducting one's lifcz, making good any undertaking in which the socially 
creative "I" of the self is gratified, made possible in actuality, in 
its marriage, fusion in an envisaged, and managing, "me". 
But, man being a social animal, his need to be active in society an 
axiomatic hunger among all his other capacities as an "I", the object or 
"me" fitting, 'answering to' the "I"'s project, may be brought about, 
affected in cross-personality between two or more particular selves, 
with the "I" realising itself in terms of someone else's "me", and the 
"me" in one lent to another, realising, justifying someone else's "I". 
One's own "I" is also involved in such an instance, in the act of one's 
lending a "me" to another. 'The impulse of the "I" in this case is 
neighborliness', Mead writes, and he goes on to explain: 'It is that 
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social tendency which we all have in us that calls out a certain type of 
response: one wants to give", to lend a "me" to another's "I". Cq% In 
this light, interpersonal paradigms of the fulfilment of "I"-s with 
"me"-s, "me"-s with "I"-s, must be enlisted in the repertoire of genuses 
of 'closure'. Mead finely analyses processes and instances of multiple 
interpersonal engagements of "me"-s and "I"-s, such ensembles of "me"-s 
and "I"-s which are complete, gain particular, concrete 'closure' 
between two participants (possibly more) as well as within the self of 
the giver as an individual, in the course of simply using language, in 
simple conversation; and a story by Haupassant affords an instance of a 
very striking incident of the manifold engagements of "me"-s and "I"-s 
between two people, in very heightened interpersonality. 
A wetnurse and a soldier, the short story goes, travel in the same 
train compartment. The nurse has been dismissed from service; her 
breasts, unsucked, bursting with milk to the point of crucifying her, 
and the soldier, having had nothing to eat for days, at the brink of 
starvation. After some initial words bringing these people closer to one 
another, the wetnurse comes to give suck to the soldier in the 
compartment. This is the entire story, but it lends itself to analysis 
in terms of intricate complexities of giving and taking, matching "me"-s 
with "I"-s both intra- and interpersonally. Both these characters bring 
their "I" to bear on one another, both by voicing their need and by 
offering their "me"-s in inventingly original and strikingly innovative 
social creativity, gaining their rewards as individuals both by way of 
the accomplishment of the hoped-for "me" in the other, in love in a 
certain sense, and in the form of the relief, satisfaction and 
successful gratification of their own "me"-s, these two distinct sets of 
rewards, personal and interpersonal, coincidental, synchronised and 
homogenised in time and in kind. That the nature and order of their 
mutual exchange of rewards is most obviously physiological, when 
narrowly viewed, should of course in no way detract from the elementally 
strong sense in which their gratification at the socialpsychologic plane 
also takes place, concomitantly. It has already been pointed out that we 
see the "me" as an individual human unit which spans, is rooted, in 
three orders of nature in concord, the physiologic, the 
socialpsychologic and the social; the soldier's and nurse's 
interpersonal encounter in the story as finally rewarded selves is, for 
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that reason, meaningfully construed as affecting the self as such in 
spite of the apparent predominance of the biologically 'material' nature 
of their respective hungers and the satiation of those. Moreover, in 
apparently taking only, the soldier also gives to the nurse, not only by 
relieving her physiologically and therefore being instrumental in her 
greater physical comfort, but also in the context of the 
socialpsychologic project they are simultaneously engaged in, by being 
party to the social unconventionality of their way of acting on their 
complementary personal needs, and the same can be said of the nurse - 
her giving in this dual sense perhaps even more obvious than in the 
case of the soldier, since she does the feeding in the most literal 
sense on the physiologic plane, too. The socialpsychologic"I" of both 
these characters is most definitely engaged, put actively into play in 
this situation at the properly symbolic, evolutionarily higher level of 
human reality as such. In the inventiveness and spontaneity of their act 
they transcend the 'death' inherent, according to Maupassant's message, 
in slavish, stereotypic confinement to social conventions and in the 
face of those; and their mutual and complementary giving and taking 
nourishment in terms of their "me"-s touches concomitantly both an the 
actual and the symbolic, social and socialpsychologic levels, too. 
To Mead, any 'fusion', in authenticity, between the "I"'s projects 
and the "me"'s realisation of them, whether this occurs intra- or 
interpersonally, is classed as social creativity - the act of creatively 
bringing to bear one's capacity, talent, gift as an "I" on a "me" in the 
positive world of stimulation, in everyday, simple acts of complementary 
interpersonal exchanges, quite as much as in writing a poem in 
seclusion. This is so to Mead's way of thinking because he doesn't 
entertain the Being-for-Itself of an individual as a paradigm of 
consciousness separate from its Being-for-Others mode (to turn to a 
Sartrian nomenclature for a moment), but any mode of conduct of the 
self, in however private a context, is, to Mead, society internalised. 
And conversely, the 'fusion' of the "me" and the "I" is the sole 
purveyor of any excellence. Mead and Paul postulate the gift of social 
creativity as one of the repertoire of all and any talent in man, as 
well as a common dimension underlying, informing the application of any 
or all of these gifts - (a tall order in its message and implications 
for the scientist and his ethics. ) 161 
Sociologic Functions of the "Me"-"I" Specialisation. - 111- 
The lack intuited in oneself and in others in empathy, is a strongly 
moving cognisance, and the experience of the 'closure' of the lack 
strongly cathartic. The lack derives, irrepressibly, from the "I" 
liaising, unavoidably, with the collective consciousness and its 
primarily, directly available schemata, as its norms are immediately 
fathomed at first hand, and from its measuring itself and others, the 
lot of those, against that, instead and in critique of the norm as it is 
and the "me" of oneself or another over against that current norm in 
actuality. Furthermore it derives from endeavouring to affect 'closure' 
for oneself or for others as a self, or selves, which are rightfully 
more worthy than their prevailing standing as such in the light of the 
collective consciousness thus grasped in its ideality, intuited, in 
first-hand authenticity. This is the responsibility of the "I" and there 
is no let-off; this capacity for responsibility is ceaselessly mobilised 
in response to detected small lacks or instances of great atrocity 
confronting human reality and its judgemental capacities, such as war, 
even if we are not directly involved in its perpetration, by Sartre's 
rigorous standards. No-one is exempt from coping with such 
responsibilities at first hand, and from doing one's damnedest to repair 
affairs if such duties are implicated by present anomalous states In the 
world, morally belittling one (for we are all responsible for these and 
such affairs are everybody's guilt) - no-one is exempt from having to 
manage as a self in response to such anomalies, in other words, from 
authentically earning one's grace. The specialisation of the "me"-s and 
"I"-s into the two major anthropologic classes, the Pukka and the 
Rachmores, syphoning Subject status into those Pukka and affecting 
permanence of the lack between the possibility of such a status and the 
state of the "me" as given in others, leaving them to grapple, if they 
so choose (though they can't choose otherwise), with the job of the 
bridging the gap between that "me" and a more deservedly 'closed' or 
graceful self, has the effect of transposing 'grace', unearned, into 
those up high, and keeping those who carry the can for such social and 
socialpsychologic anomalies in the current constellation of "I"-"me" 
displacement in many, or in most people, from success, from first-hand 
experience or 'closure' by their own design, rearing by way of 
caretakership a portion of humanity to carry themselves with their heads 
hanging from early childhood, socially ungraced. Stewardship is assumed, 
moving conditions of 'closure' and with it excellence of a person, into 
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their exclusive radius, with selective access to it parsimoniously 
issued, as already observed. 'Wir wären gut, anstatt so roh, Doch die 
Verhältnisse, die sind nicht so', Peachum sings in Brecht's Threepenny 
Qpera. Presenting this process and phenomenon more positively, without 
recourse to the lack (though there is no reason why one should dispose 
of the concept), every "I", every project realised, is a dramatic 
instance of excellence (the only, 24-carat proof of that), whether to 
bring off such a feat is spectacular or quite a small, practical 
'mission accomplished', in one's everydays. There is no source of 
goodness or excellence as human reality other than affecting a "me" of a 
certain order of oneself or another, a "me" of a certain stamp and 
condition, one which is proof and witness of an unsurrendereä "1" 
vindicated, evidenced in it. The capacity of generating goodness, 
achieved excellence, is, the monopoly, in truth, of the socially 
creative, those who affect such "me"-s in the course of the Deed (in 
Goethe's sense), the act. Excellence and goodness, grace at its 
successful, is generated exclusively by a productive "I" of one's own 
or another's appreciated and responded to in personalness at first hand, 
fulfilling itself in agents in a "me", in a project of individual 
'closure' or more than one concurrent individual 'closures'; though the 
point of fruition of the 'closures' of the self as human reality, its 
moment of the Nirvanah of that moment, and the conditions for such a 
'closure', may be passed into care, and sparingly and meanly portioned 
out from above, from the ruling class which appears, by careful design, 
as the sole source of goodness. 
It may be of benefit to distinguish here between the terms 
'excellence' and 'goodness', which have been used interchangibly so far. 
In doing so, it will be helpful to recall and stress again that Mead 
as well as Paul (as just quoted under Reference 4), both postulate 
social creativity as one of the repertoire of all and any talent in man 
with which he is endowed as an "I" - social creativity ranking as a 
capacity equal in status to, say, one's facility with figures, aptitude 
for writing novels, turning beautiful table-legs or having an ear for 
music; and at the same time, both Mead and Paul also regard social 
creativity as an entire common dimension underlying and informing the 
application of all or any particular gift. 
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We may recognise and define social creativity in our activities 
(whether that figures there in its own purity or as an underlying 
concomitant of the performance of any particular form of creativeness), 
as that kind of authentic, personal ceativity born of the peculiar and 
exclusive, first-hand productivity of human reality, which benefits, is 
meant to benefit, and causes the realisation of our other gifts to 
benefit, directly or indirectly, one or more Others. 
It is, of course, easy to see that social creativity comes about and 
is served in a way to satisfy this criterion and definition In instances 
when "me"-s meet and realise "I"-s, "I"-s meet and realise "me"-s 
interpersonally, as in the example of the wet-nurse and the soldier, 
just quoted above. But the performance, the carrying out of any project 
of 'closure' between "I" and "me" within a single self - in other words, 
the engineering of a meeting, within one and the same self, between the 
"I" with its claims for its realisation, and an actual "me" to fit, 
gratify, represent or vindicate this creatively keen "I" in the overt, 
positive terms of the world, can also be classed, carry the hallmark of 
and belong to the genus of social creativity, if one or both of the 
following justification for a 'closure' within one self are in effect: 
(a) the agent conceives of himself, if such a vision be in place, as 
rightfully the equal of an Other - any Other - in the respect of his own 
human rank and dignified right to be a fulfilled self, and therefore as 
deserving to be a realised self as the next man (in other words, when in 
our interpersonal and personal authenticity, we take the attitude to 
ourselves which we authentically take to another); and (b), we are 
socially creative in occasioning the act of self-realisation within the 
radius of our awn selves (as has just been said), if we mean to, and 
succeed in doing justice to some outstanding peculiar talent that we 
happen to be endowed with, in a manner, and with the explicit or tacit, 
self-conscious or unselfconscious intention, of thereby gaining and 
sustaining our capacity for benefiting Others as selves too through the 
successful and effective 'closure' of our own selves in the act of the 
realisation, of the bringing to fruition our own peculiar gift, in the 
course of doing our particular thing, whatever concrete form that may 
take. 
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We may succeed in doing our thing, flaunt, prove our 'sentinelship' 
in any area of accomplishment in the performance of which we may be 
endowed with the capacity to distinguish ourselves, without reference to 
the question whether we are or are not socially creative the while. Any 
instance of the brilliant performance of any of our particular talents 
(whether or not this feat of ours is permeated with social creativity in 
the above outlined sense), will earn itself the epithet 'excellence'; 
but our success at bringing off a project of clear-cut, sheer social 
creativity or performing some other feat which is explicitly or 
implicitly underlain by and shot with a meant social creativity, will 
alone earn us the epithet 'goodness'. In other words, goodness is 
excellence at social creativity. In demonstrating our excellence through 
doing outstanding justice to any single gift of ours without reference 
to social ceativity, will earn itself the quality virtuoso; but only 
through drawing, at the same time, or solely, on our capacity to be 
creative on universalistic principles by meaning to benefit others as 
much as meaning to please ourselves, will our performance and conduct 
become virtuous. 
The time has come to cast, summary fashion, a glance at the type of 
Rachmones who were considered so far, and on the issue of the multiple 
aspects of the specialisation of the functions of the "me" and the "I", 
differentially, into the Rachmones and the Pukka, respectively. 
The poor are a special class in the Pauline umbrella of blemished 
considered so far. Poverty having been a very common condition of the 
afflicted by ascription from very early times, it provides a very ready 
dimension, with a history, underlying all types of Rachmones which have 
been discerned so far. In spite of this, it is important that our 
Pauline array of the Blemished are not confused with the working class 
in Lukäcs's analysis of class society and the specialisation of the 
famous Hegelian functions of the individual's consciousness and mode of 
being pertaining to the self, into ruling class (Subject) and working 
class (Object) as it is done by Lukäcs, - although the overlap between 
those alienated from their grace in the world in Sartre's (and Paul's) 
sense, and the proletarian population, is very great. The Pauline 
umbrella of the profane is both wider regarding its numbers and narrower 
in the sense that their situation is not analysed in economic depth and 
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inclusiveness as are Lukäcs's blemished, the working class. But in the 
Lukäcsian context, the context involving the laws of socio-economics 
proper, the small and intimate, self-analytic canvas of the Pauline 
universe of discourse, that of human reality, becomes irrelevant and 
disappears (and properly so), and, conversely, in the more innerly 
analytic light of the autonomously Pauline spheres of our argument, 
Lukäcs's main concern, the gross sociologic patterns of class society 
likewise become irrelevant and disappear, and their introduction is no 
asset from the point of view of the different confines of the different 
discipline we concern ourselves with - social psychology. Luk3cs is 
jettisoned here (though he will be returned to later only to be 
jettisioned again when his widely known views inappropriately intrude 
on our properly and explicitly socialpsychologic horizons), as he is 
seen here as guilty of 'category error' and a source of some confusion 
as a result of that. His attempt to bring Hegelian variables to bear, 
with sociologically explanatory aspirations, on his model of sociologic 
class society, inappropriately reduces his study of the relations of 
production (his concern), to the socialpsychologic or micro- 
anthropologic theme we are now discussing, the dislodgement within 
agents between the "me" and the "I". What we are talking about here is 
not the system of alienation of the fruits of labour, its external 
products, but of the fact, the phenomenon, the incidence, creation, 
title to labour itself and Mastery itself in this sense, as will be 
elaborated in forthcoming parts of this argument. Labour, 'the Work', as 
it's analysed here, is both the product and the index of the self, the 
unit of the self defined in terms of its projects, engagement as such, 
its mode of being and fulfilment as such. The self, human reality - when 
chosen as the mode of one's being - is productive as its special 
hallmark, in contrast with the project of the secondary excellence of 
'cooking with the recipe book in front of one' as it were, the borrowed, 
derived knowledge and excellence which is barren, ungenerative of 
further excellence, which is parasitic on the life and the first-hand 
mode of the self in the living, engulfs it to fill its lack, a 'stick- 
up' by the authority in the name and as the side-benefit of ascription, 
as droit segnieur used to be for the feudal landlord. Goodness - being 
good - can also be approached in this secondary, studied, extortionist 
manner by the exportation, stealing of very human reality, of social 
creativity itself from it, from the self at its fulfilled and 
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fulfilling, and the possessive hogging by the mighty of this function 
and human privilege itself. What we are talking about here is not the 
relation of production, but the relations of the production of the self, 
which is perfectly meaningful though some people might think it 
unimportant. It's the Pauline or Sartrian lack in the poor (in so far as 
we comment an those) and the alienation of that as necessary part of the 
potential to fulfil themselves - it's the alienation of first-hand title 
to creating goodness, causing excellence, one's own or excellence in 
this sense in others, which we are talking about, it's the poor or 
selves of any variety which lack, and their right to transcend that as 
equal children of god or Pauline profane which is our concern, and 
should not be conflated with the system of the alienation of the goods 
only which are produced as a function and question of the division of 
labour. The 'object' the alienation of which we are concerned with, Is 
innerweltlich, though by no means unconnected with the alienation of any 
aspect of the yield of the product of and as the self, including the 
tangible and material varieties of it, though in the light of the 
dicta o{ 'my world', perceived and experienced through the rights and 
demands of the particularity of the self which produced them, the way 
Luther saw it, as will be expanded on later. The object alienated in the 
present context, that on which our attention is focussed, is the "me" 
itself, the socialpsychologic produce of the human reality-wise fertile 
ensemble of the "me" and the "I" within the infrastructure of the self, 
in the peculiar idiom of the "me" as the unified ensemble in which it 
simultaneously encompasses its threefold roots in physiologic, 
socialpsychologic and social reality, as suggested before, and as 
distinct from a narrowly sociologic grasp of that phenomenon. It's the 
alienation of the "me" as such, the divestment of its graciousness as 
experienced in the guts in psychologic reflection no less than in self- 
consciousness. An example of the alienation of the "me" as such is 
afforded in the film The Nun's Story, in the incident in which a novice 
of outstanding academic ability is ordered by a superior nun to 
deliberately fail an examination qualifying her for missionary work of a 
medical nature, as an exercise in humility, in shedding her over-average 
stature as an ego in one respect. Another example of this phenomenon is 
provided by Chekhov who describes the alienation of the ego in his play 
Uncle Vanya, in the character of the burnt-out Professor Serebryakov who 
sponges the life, scope, capabilities, material ones not excluded, of 
Sociologic Functions of the NXew-*IR Specialisation. - 11? - 
everyone in the family so as to be able to sustain an ego hiself, making 
such a demand particularly on his daughter Sonya and on Uncle Vanya who 
do all the Professor's practical chores while Serebryakov himself 
maintains the pretence of an academic output, reducing the being of 
these people to the failure of their projects as equally ambitious human 
realities as such, though in the different ways they envisage that for 
themselves. 
Poverty, then, as just touched on, affords an overriding spine to 
our Pauline gathering of Rachmones, as etymology also shows when 
synonyms in other languages for 'Rachetones' are sought. It's- 6een 
identified above as someone down in his luck who is, by implication, 
steeped in constant poverty amongst his other troubles in the face of 
which he tries to muddle along in the world. The expression is more or 
less tantamount to the English 'poor thing', and, in a different culture 
again, with the 'poverino' or 'povero' of the Italian Catholic who 
dismisses man's universal condition of being profane, touching him too, 
with a wave of his land as just part of life, whilst knowing and 
appreciating its weight as something which is everybody's lot, something 
one must come to terms with in himself and accept in all. 
"Poverty, then, even in the context of this microcosmic overview and 
classification of it, is singled out from other classes of Rachmones as 
that category of blemishedness which gives rise to the most piercing 
sense of guilt out of all other varieties of Rachmonesship, when the 
concept catches one unawares, in a passing state of unprotectedness from 
the comforts of everyday bad faith, as we had occasion to experience, 
for instance, in the face of the Ethiopean famine when the truth and 
extent of it suddenly burst into the sphere of the attention of Europe 
at the time of Live Aid - as indeed it always grabs one's conscience 
when the phenomenon emerges at its pure, in encounters of one's 
confrontation with the class of blemished who are so by virtue of their 
poverty only and nothing else, when there is no concomitaht potentially 
blemishing factor at play to mix with and hide the disgrace of this 
condition. It's very helpful to the Pukka that blemishedness can come in 
clusters of factors rendering people so on multiple accounts, as the 
Pukka is then able to treat and experience the factors outside his 
exclusive causation in rendering the poor as blemished, as primarily 
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responsible for their concomitant poverty too, and treat the fact of 
their poverty as something which has nothing to do with his him. In 
contrast, when faced in a large part of humanity with being a havenot in 
the unalloyed starkness and wretchedness of that condition as not 
causally equivocatable-away, he cannot hide his guilt. To be able to 
cope with the embarrassment of their inferiors in wealth showing 
themselves as superior in their schooling in life and in the way of 
attainment as human reality as a yield of that process, instead of 
redistributing wealth in response to that anomaly, they rather 
redistribute goodness, merit, deservingness, so that that apparent 
anomaly can right itself as a consequence without having to change the 
world and shuffle around people's actual standing in that by virtue of 
their ascribed merits. There are, in the main, three avenues along 
which appearances of goodness can be caused to be tied, on a long-term 
basis, to those agencies who are already high in the world by virtue of 
accumulated wealth, and to make that arrangement appear as justified; 
each of these avenues being one ploy of Freudian displacement or 
another. First of all, if the poor Rachmones facing him is blemished on 
multiple accounts, the Pukka will scapegoat into one or more of his 
concomitant blemishes his own acknowledgement of and sensibility to the 
man's poverty, ostensively latching on to and making a fuss about one or 
other of the accompanying factors of the man's wretchedness apart from 
his poverty, and crusading against discriminations vis-a-vis persons 
who are afflicted on account of this secondary blemish attaching to them 
(though often in the way of lipservice only, as in the case of the mad). 
Secondly, he hits hard at those groups of multiply blemished whose 
kicking on account of their accompanying blemish is popular, notably the 
criminal (with loud justification) and the blacks, particularly if 
immigrant, without bothering with the contrivance of an ideology to 
justify it. The third kind of tactics is different; positive and 
constructive in its nature rather than critical and negative. This ruse 
is that of 'help', the targets of 'help' being, with a longstanding 
tradition, the freak cases of nature's or chance's fortuity, the 
physiologically handicapped, first and foremost (though with the 
physically ill or dying often called upon to reinforce the numbers in 
this group), on whose private tragedies the Pukka homes in as the fit 
objects of his pity, and clearly not his fault... A trip to Disneyland 
for a little girl whose days are numbered, her lack dragged into the 
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open, the concomitant emotion it raises in the guts, burgled, bared an 
the scale of national publicity, an the news... The bigger, the more 
dramatic the lack helped, the better for the purposes of public 
relations. Children in their dependency, those bodily afflicted in a 
visible way, individually approached instances of bravery in the face of 
private adversity, are particularly valuable currency in the 'appearing 
good' industry, and provide an especially effective smoke-screen at a 
microsociologic scale for macrosociologic troubles on a public scale. 
Such Rachmones are sought out , their lack positively vetted so that it 
would be safe to entertain, without a bad conscience for the Pukka, then 
given a ticket, clearance for bringing it into contact with Pukka do- 
goading, deemed suitable as the object of Pukka help on public show. An 
example illuminating the stringency of the positive vetting which such 
instances of misfortunes have to pass as suitably safe and kosher in 
their connotations to be associated with, remedied by the Pukka on the 
public stage, was provided for me when one morning I was watching a TV 
programme in which nominations for awards for particularly brave 
children and youngsters were invited. I wrote in recommending a one-time 
Vietnamiese 'boat-boy', now a teenager, who's been living with his aged 
grandmother (his only surviving relative) in bed-and-breakfast places 
for the past seven years so as to save the grandmother from having to go 
to a home for the aged as she spoke no English and would not have been 
able to communicate there with anyone. While being tossed from pillar to 
post during the government's 'Costa del Dole' hysteria -a time during 
which some later hurriedly retracted legislation was passed forcing 
people on the dole to change their address all the time, the boy was a 
tower of strength to his grandmother, holding her hand and arranging, 
coping with every move of theirs. Needless to say, neither he nor I 
heard anything further on the matter. 
This ploy, that of 'helping', may be called the Big Closure; a lack 
spectacularly provided, fixed up with a "me", though not one of the 
recipient's own self. On the contrary, the glory gracing the High who is 
helping, elbows itself into the place, keeps the fulfilment of that lack 
from being fusslessly, promptly and effectively accomplished in a way 
which is most satisfactory for the small-letter ego, the autonomous, 
first-hand privacy of the person who is being helped, the 'helping' 
agencies parasitic on the phenomenon of the fulfilment of the self in 
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question by itself, for their own glory. It's the Pukka who need the 
handicapped to be good, and the handicapped are their Saviours from the 
bleakness of their horizons as people, blinkered from human reality, the 
real conditions of that human reality, and from their responsibility as 
profane to face it, like anybody else, to own up to all the duties and 
homework involved in the job of being small-letter sacred. It's not 
equivalents which exchange in the trafficking of human reality between 
Sacred and Profane. The chance and conditions of the cathartic elevation 
of successfully mending the lack as a personal feat in all, which is 
snatched by the Pukka, the low-ranking are issued by the Pukka, instead 
of and in exchange for this chance to fulfil their selves at first hand 
and do themselves proud by doing so, the sham and second-rate social and 
personal glory of fleetingly occupying the consciousness of the Pukka, 
the caretakers an their behalf of the collective consciousness, with the 
Pukka posing as the deity which has privileged access to that collective 
consciousness and is therefore the proper agency empowered to define and 
issue beneficial portions of that, for the 'closure' of the Rachmones' 
self. The Pukka, in choosing and defining what dosage and kind of "me" 
from the repertoire of actual social reality to apportion to the 
Rachmones in need, characteristically issues a "me" which is ill-fitting 
to 'close' the "I", the lack which is clamouring for fulfilment, for 
help - the 'object', the "me" offered will be different in kind from 
that which is called for and desired by the gaping "I", and therefore 
inappropriate for its satiation. The "me" offered will be one that 
doesn't help that "I", that lack, which doesn't 'answer to' that "I" 
in terms of the particular hunger which happens to plague it. The impart 
from the Pukka is a discretionary pittance, the export from the profane 
to them is human reality and the occasion for the attainment of goodness 
in the potent excellence-generating idiom and opportunities for that in 
the first person singular, which should be available to all. The 
handicapped who, of course need the money and depend an that for leading 
their lives under the circumstances which prevail, become the thrall of 
charities. In the course of my teaching I once learned 'contracted 
Braille', an advanced stage of Braille-writing which consists of sort- 
of shorthand signs and abbreviations to give quick access to the words 
and concepts which a blind person most frequently needs to communicate 
in the practical business of getting by, and was astonished to find 
that more than half of the signs were notions of Christianity. 
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The goodness-industry is big, and highly conversant with psychology, 
with Hidden Persuation thrown in in its promotion in its full armour. 
This was particularly noticeable to the discerning TV-watcher at the 
time of the concert Live Aid on BBC 1. The establishment's usual, 
studied tamperings with the strategic stimulus-pairing of the Mighty 
with their normally monopolised occasions to perform good deeds, showed 
up in sharp contrast the genuine and elementally Pauline human emotional 
origins, intonation and appeal of the concert, committedly parading the 
participants, the donors of their souls and talent to their chosen 
cause, in the full rudeness of their not positively vetted gathering 
(queers, junkies, the angry, the decadent), in the full, avalanching 
rawness and spontaneity of the concert's sentiment, and the universality 
and unconditionality of the love it generated, a modality of charity 
which perceptibly threatened the way of our familiarly controlled 
idiom of our usual involvement by design in the orthodox presentations 
of such occasions for charity. It was noticeable how Live Aid was 
carefully embedded into, and surrounded by a blanket of conventional 
broadcastings by rival charities, which were presented in great numbers 
to compete with and crowd out the concert and all it amounted to and 
represented - unbridled love and uncritical, unqualified goodness as 
human reality at first hand, in the making, not taking account of of 
what would have been expedient in terms of world politics or rational by 
'normal', instrumentally goal-directed criteria. A week of high- 
intensity transmission of programmes featuring the kind of charitable 
occasions to which we are normally treated, both preceded and followed 
the Live Aid broadcasting, in a race between Pavlov and Paul, so to 
speak. A couple of days before Live Aid, for instance, a documentary 
called Jamie was shown on the BBC. It was advertised as a programme 
about a deaf and blind little boy, to be shown, it was explained, with 
a view to the scientific means which would help to overcome his 
handicaps. I thought it would feature the child-developmental techniques 
which were applied to the famous Helen Keller, retrospectively extended 
into infancy and benefiting Jamie from the outset in life, and I 
switched on with great interest. However, nothing scientifically very 
sound or informative was said during the entire programme, which was, in 
the main, about the visit of a High Personage to Jamie's home. Jamie's 
lack, or lacks, the rich quality of life as seen and heard which was 
not to be his, this loss sensible, as it were, in the background all the 
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time, was offered the 'balm', (completely irrelevant to the nature of 
the lack, ill-fitting and metastable to that), of the presence and grace 
emanating from the extremely fulfilled self of the Very Distinguished 
Guest who was present. "She knows about Jamie", the commentator said. 
But Jamie didn't know her and little prospect was offered in the 
programme of his'ever havingthe capacity to do so. Her response to his 
lack as a "me" for Jamie, one of genuine compassion I do not doubt, 
could not be beneficially imported into his consciousness Hegelian 
fashion to come to recognise his "me", better his lot, bring solace, 
offer him a mirror of his self improved by his being known by an Other 
in love and sympathy; the lack was throbbing for us as the absence it 
was, behind his closed eyes, redundant, protruding little ears. On the 
other hand, she was getting a suntan in the borrowed light of his pieta 
- and in a sense she was washing his feet all the time, in the face of 
his real and moving deprivation, in her material irrelevance to that, 
though unbeknown to herself. Another programme, one following Live Aid 
by a few days, aiming, it seemed, to match and outdo Live Aid in the 
number of celebrities who gave it their seal of warranty by being 
involved, was the very ceremonious introduction by Esther Rantzen of a 
series on drug-addiction. It was the question "Is it the addicts' 
disillusionment in the world which causes them to take drugs, or have 
they been introduced to drugs by their friends? " (or words very much to 
this effect) which underlay and served to put into words a completely 
false and not at all mutually exclusive dichotomy as the ideologic 
kernel of the programme, Check-lists have been presented, in the way of 
preliminary research, to a number of drug-addicts, in which 
disillusionment with the world and introduction to drugs by friends 
were featured separately as alternative causes to drug-taking, and 
because more people chose the category "I was introduced to drugs by 
friends", the conclusion was drawn that disillusionment was not the 
reason for youngsters' taking drugs and that one should mistrust one's 
friends. 
Of course, the Pukka taking part in such public relations exercises, 
are probably unaware of the fully calculating, clinically and 
articulately focussed and scientifically knowing attitude and 
sophistication which pursuing their monopoly of social creativity by 
design goes hand-in-hand with - of the displacement mechanism which such 
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a campaign feeds (in which they themselves are pawns, though they may 
not know it), although their continuous business in helping the 
handpicked needy, which masks even from them the sea of other troubles 
in the world, must be psychologically very welcome and gratifying to 
them. Through caretaking, to which the Highly Placed themselves are 
subject, as just suggested, goodness is divorced from the platform of 
human excellence in the well-circumscribed radius of an active self 
generating it at first hand - with the "me"-s of Rachmoneses as they 
are, permanently attached, apportioned to them, and the privilege of 
being informed of social need and the ticket enabling people to do 
something about it donated to the Pukka, and Subject status thereby 
imputed exclusively into the Prominent Personages in the long term. 
It cannot be stressed enough that the alienation of the phenomenon 
(and of course the conditions) of goodness, excellence as human reality 
as just outlined, the process of the "me" and "I" being put asunder in 
the profane who generate this human reality in the living, with Object 
and Subject going their polarised, separate ways in the Profane and 
Pukka respectively by ascription and convention, is not the same thing 
as Lukdcs's phenomenon of the alienation of the material produce of the 
working classes, this process, in his presentation, yielding the ruling 
class and the working class as subject and object. Of course it must be 
said that there is a soft centre even in the mature Marx, which Lukäcs 
makes much of, implying that in communism there will be a metamorphosis 
in mankind producing a species psychologically liberated from 
vulnerability and sensibility to class interest and monetary advantage 
and disadvantage, with workers in the system (everybody) rising from 
their anthropologic status as object only and attaining not just 
materialistic but also anthropologic equality in their universal 
capacity as completely fulfilled selves. But the two frameworks of 
satisfaction, that of the hierarchy of human excellence and goodness 
(our topic) and, on the other hand, the stratification of society as a 
matter of social class, lower and upper, are appreciably different, and 
generically so, the two sets, dimensions of classification cutting 
across each other. The dichotomy 'first-hand capacity, mode and quality 
of productivity by way of the genre of and with recourse to human 
reality', versus sporting and sustaining a living by the pursuit and the 
boasting of a derivative and secondary type of excellence parasitic on 
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and borrowed in its substance from productivity-fertile human reality, 
is not necessarily confined to the context of the proletariat versus the 
idle rich on the arena of external affairs, (though certainly holding 
within and compatible with that relationship); the said dichotomy can 
just as clearly be detected and identified as typically holding in the 
confines of one social stratum only, the intelligentsia for instance, 
these two distinctive modalities and approaches to output and creative 
practice identifiable in the two contrasting types of scholarship, 
intellectual demeanour and fundamental choice in the Fausts as opposed 
to the Wagners of this world. 
It is certainly the working class' possibility (Sartre would say its 
imperative duty> - though typecast as Object as Lukäcs saw it, to be 
pukka in the small-letter sense, to be unapologetically fully fledged 
small-letter sacred on the plane of human reality, irrespective of and 
concurrently with its placing as a matter of the class-stratification of 
the society as it prevails and is maintained by virtue of forces of a 
political economic nature and dimensions. Conversely, it is definitely 
the ruling class' possibility to be object only in the stage management 
campaign of the goodness-industry, as just discerned, and as just 
observed - in the stage management campaign and game which allocates 
excellence and opportunity for being (by seeming) excellent, good, to 
quarters where room for such goodness is judged as safe and useful in 
the equilibration and sustenance of the present structure of the norm as 
society which and as it is the case. An example to show the non- 
identity of elevation by ascription and elevation by virtue of 
authentic human excellence, is provided by the character of Jeeves in 
P. G. Wodehouse's series of books on the theme of the exploits of this 
character, the butler, and his bumbling, fumbling, hopeless, chronically 
non-managing 'master' Bertie Wooster, the author wittily reversing the 
stereotype 'Master or Subject=ruling class, Object or Slave=employee' 
formula, with Jeeves, the butler, in class below his employer, regularly 
coming to the rescue with his presence of mind and gentlemanly know-how, 
to pick up the pieces of the situations the humanly boorish Bertie 
allowed to fall apart. Already in the magpie works of Plautus, drawn in 
part from the Greeks and in another part from the streetperforming 
forerunners of the Commedia dell'Arte, there are seeds of the comic 
topic inherent in the anomaly which derives from the noncoincidence of 
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ascribed as opposed to conceivably superior native merit, showing the 
genius servant and his dull master by ascription in tricky situations 
where the servant excels as human reality at the master's expense. 
It pays to acknowledge that the validity of the lesson in Jeeves' 
and Bertie Wooster's story - that the ascribed 'master' can be his 
ascribed 'slave's' inferior in human terms, is certainly not a one-off 
product of P. G. Wodehouse's imagination, but is broadly and commonly 
applicable to and general in quite ordinary walks of life, where its 
possibility constantly worries the Pukka, and this theme, which is 
plainly recognisable in real-life situations, is exploited in many 
other works (apart from Plautus'), particuarly dramatic ones. The big- 
letter Pukka is characteristically not content with such excellence 
which is a person's due through ascription only, and would (indeed often 
does) find it embarrassing when someone lower-ranking and ascriptionally 
more junior than himself is personally more excellent in humanly 
authentic terms, on account of the exclusively personally deserved and 
deservable virtues of human reality, and tries to prevent or avoid 
occasions for being outshone in such a manner. Fear from cognisance 
(publicly or privately) of such incongruity between his ascribed as 
opposed to humanly deserved ranking vis-a-vis the personally deserved 
humanly decorous quality displayed by other people, and the often 
conspicuously unattained worldly status of the latter, causes a lack in 
him, is something that bothers his conscience, and greater human 
excellence than his own, in others conceivably more lowly ascribed than 
himself, is something that he jealously covets. This typical lack in the 
big-letter Pukka is something which preoccupied several authors 
throughout the centuries, and this familiar skeleton in the highly 
ascribed Pukka's socialpsychologic cupboard, has become the object of 
the artistic comment of many. Goethe, for one, warns the Pukka in his 
play Faust: 
Was du vererbt van deinen Vätern hast, 
Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen. (E' 
Turning to a classsic comedy again, where this predicament and worry 
of the Pukka is well expressed, we may usefully call upon the plot of 
Beaumarchais' play The Marriage of Pigaro. In its storyline, the author 
portrays, truly to life, the character of Count Almaviva, a man highly 
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ascribed and not content to be Figaro's superior merely by virtue of 
ascription and law pertaining to property, securing him the prospect of 
the possession of Figaro's pretty and witty fiancee as a cold matter of 
droit de serj71er" He endeavours to be humanly Figaro's better too in 
winning her heart, he means to prove himself to be the smarter, the more 
excellent out of himself and his rival in wooing her, and sets Figaro up 
in a series of tricky situations to which the latter must be equal if he 
is to avoid allowing Almaviva to sleep with his bride on their wedding 
night. It is from this complexity in Almaviva's characterisation that 
stems the author's inexhaustible ingenuity and inventiveness in 
contriving ever-emerging new turns in the hilarious plot; and in the 
end, Figaro extricates himself from the traps which Almaviva set him, 
and emerges victorious an all scores, human and social; both is an 
allegorical sense, pertaining to the eventual historic victory of the 
class which Figaro represents, as anticipated by the author, as well as 
in terms of the plot of the play. But the establishing of Figaro's 
natural, socially acceptable parentage in the plot by accident, is an 
incidental feature in the play to Figaro's victory; Almaviva wasn't 
sincerely looking for legal excuses in trying to prevent Figaro's 
victory and, in the end, in concealing from himself his defeat in having 
had to give up Susanne, Figaro's bride, in the light of Figaro's newly 
found, moderately 'Pukka' parentage. Almaviva wanted Susanne - wanted to 
win her, not by the force of his and her circumstances, but as the 
better man. He and Figaro had had a relationship as human realities too 
- one of competition in man-to-man combat, not just for Susanne, but as 
one human being engaged in rivalry as a man vis-a-vis another, and it 
was in that, in the terms of human reality, that Almaviva truly, and 
most painfully lost. In the end, Almaviva remains proven as the lesser 
man, and Figaro's better as a matter of ascribed social rank only; his 
defeat doubly great because of that. 
An example of ascriptionally thwarted human reality battling for 
outlet in the world of external realities for its attested excellence, 
on a scale wider than the arena of the escapades of Jeeves, Bertie and 
their literary relatives, - an example also of the noncoincidence 
between the LukäcsiAn embrace of the working class as humanly deprived 
and the broader category 'profane by deprivation' in the world - an 
example, finally, of subject behaviour in the profane of the world we 
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live in, is provided on the plane of actual politics by the South 
African blacks' quest for economic sanctions against their self- 
appointed 'masters' in their alienated mother land, and the failure of 
the British to respond to that quest, arguing, in bad faith, that as a 
result of sanctions the blacks would become even worse off, that they 
would suffer due to sanctions in material terms sooner and more strongly 
than the whites, trying to justify their refusal to impose sanctions in 
the light of this rationale. In doing so, they display their vulgarian 
understanding and interpretation of the objective of the oppressed class 
in question, and their presumption to speak for it, taking for granted 
that nothing could be of greater motivating power for the blacks than 
wanting to improve their lot materially. What the British fail to see, 
in their caretaking arrogance of knowing the minds of the oppressed ones 
better that they do themselves, is that the South African blacks, 
bishops and shoeshine boys alike, are prepared to, want to have less in 
order to be more, so to speak, a project well-nigh meaningless or at 
least certainly hard to grasp - indeed, conveniently impossible to 
entertain at all within the framework of a Utilitarian-bred or other 
vulgarian behaviouristic grasp of rationality. The reality which 
doesn't fit inside the framework of such a rationality is that at this 
moment it's not primarily money, not the Lukäcs-entertained yields of 
labour with which the blacks in question are asking for help to be 
reunited, (a different issue), but, already reunited, as a human feat 
in all as particular persons, with the vision of themselves as citizens 
in keeping with the ideals of the collective consciousness (and bidding 
for this unification to become a fact of law), for which they 
articulately and explicitly ask for moral support in the form of 
sanctions. The British are failing the South African blacks' movement as 
they opt not to appreciate that what the blacks demand is the 
realisation of every citizen's self as equal in respect of his colour 
and creed. The British are quite happy to continue to see the blacks as 
slave, a be-not as a person which he now officially very nearly is, 
though they would allow the blacks to be less of a have-not, and they 
pretend not to understand why this consideration on their part for the 
blacks' condition is not enough. It is the project of being a citizen 
in the full sense, to which plea by the blacks the British government is 
deaf, and instead of which they offer, in their sophistry, the prospect 
of a greater degree of economic comfort to the black man, if it is 
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meaningful to entertain the notion of 'comfort' in the context of the 
present condition of the blacks, which the British are not adamant to 
change. It is this plea by the black man which the British try to get 
away with ignoring by misunderstanding it, which they take it upon 
themselves to twist with their condescending stereotyping and 
philosophical pragmatism in the most shortsighted sense of thet term, 
with the ultimate in human welfare seen by them as having access to 
material means and more material means. 
The dichotomy master/subject and slave/object, then, does not equal, 
without residue, the dichotomy 'economically privileged upper class 
versus working class', but is a different dimension from that one, in 
spite of the great phenotypical overlap between the two, and cuts across 
it. To effect economic fulfilment, reunification of the yields of labour 
with the labouring class, is one of the dimensions we wish to identify 
here, an external, macrosociologic process in the world, which is the 
pledge and undertaking at the heart of Marx's revolution. To effect 
reunification of object and subject in everyone as an intraindividual 
feat, and secure room and, if deserved, recognition for the resulting 
personal grace and dignity in the world for the individual (the second 
competing dimension that which we are talking about) is Luther's 
revolution, envisaged in a special, generically different sense which 
extends to the whole of humanity. The distinction between these two 
projects, revolutions, is very clear, though the two kinds of 
revolutions are not really pure of one another in practice - Luther's 
revolution being properly inclusive with the material reunification of 
selves with the yields in this world of one's exertions and 
productivity as a virtuous self. (It may be usefully observed here that 
Jesus' revolution before Luther was more ascetic in its demands from 
and in terms of the world, so much so that it did not envisage, claim 
and make for itself any practical structural provisions there to 
secure its furtherance and assertion in practical external terms, and 
was followed by centuries of an all-time low for the faithful - the 
population of Europe. ) Conversely and as the other side of the coin, in 
Marx's revolution the mixedness of its ideology with the criterion of 
mankind fulfilling itself in terms of selves as well as in terms of 
redistributed resources, is a little more blurred, due to the physical 
abolition of the bulk of the ruling class and the fact that the ensuing 
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ideological hegemony of the remaining working class majority, 
officially sees itself as object only, and also owing to the 
circumstance of the regular demise of the fainthearted Hegelians on the 
road to communism. As we know, this historic purification process did 
not lead to the abolition of the category 'class' in socialist society, 
where the class structure survives, though with the tables turned. The 
'continued revolution' is not continued - or has not been continued in 
the Soviet Union until very recently; in the long foregoing decades, the 
downtrodden and the deprived there continued not to get the chances, and 
the chances continued to go to to the children of the proletariat and 
peasantry of the 'current moment' in 1917, which is the ruling class - 
though this Is not the account Soviet society would give of its 
prevailing class structure, the existence of which it doesn't deny. 
However, though societies in both Eastern and Western hemispheres are 
established and static, the Luther-ean or romantic Christian project 
proves itself to be of hardy fibre, revisiting even societies which 
claim to be on the road to classlessness. This is shown, for instance, 
by to-day's form of Polish working-class Catholicism and its mission to 
support man's assertion of his ultimate say and discretion in the 
question of freedom to put towards or withdraw from society one's own 
labour. Examples for kindred, historically 'romantically' revivalistic 
trends can be pinpointed in to-day's Soviet society, too. Of course, it 
is not necessarily in the strict idiom of a recognisable religion in 
which such periods of questioning, 'nihilation', in response to and in 
the face of the ossification of the reigning dogma in the current norm 
assumes its guise and form at the point when that dogma becomes 
reactionary to the extent that it is intolerable and evident in its 
moral anomality to the masses, by the irrepressible lights of human 
reality, whose revision of the historically even older norm once brought 
that now conservative norm into being. In the context of how, in the 
Soviet Union, the dicta of human reality are elbowing for new room in 
the face of the mummified norms sprung forth in a former revolution 
generations ago and now S*perseded, at least three strands of 
movements, processes known to the West can be identified as signalling 
such an individual-oriented, institution-nihilative thawing and the 
replenishment, reassertion of the spirit of human reality in the present 
on a social scale. One of these strands is the new, partly underground 
cult of pop among the young, especially in and around Leningrad; the 
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sentiment underlying this trend coming to expression, for instance, in 
the lyrics of the lead singer of the group 'Zoopark', belting out 
'Everybody wants me to be somebody, but all I want to be is myself', to 
the screams of an army of fans. Secondly, religion in its overt and 
explicit farm as such, also came to gather significantly greater 
momentum than it had in the Soviet Union in previous decades; 
phenotypically Greek Orthodox (or Catholic, in the instance of Poland), 
these expressions of feeling and critique of vision, from the point of 
view of the perspective of the self vis-a-vis the positivity of the inorm 
as it is upheld in the reigning society, are assertions of 
'existentiell' or romantic 'religion' in a broad, special sense, 
consistent with and akin to Luther's project centuries ago, - these 
outbursts of, bids for 'alternativism' to the socially reigning idiom of 
apprehending and expressing the self, are assertions of more 
individualism-tolerant and inclusive creeds, touching society in the 
mode of its critique. To be integrally brought to bear upon society is 
an essential part of the bid of these projects: the phenomenon may be 
seen as religion at work in its 'protestant' aspect and capacity, 
religion in the phase of its nihilative, revolutionary capacity, that 
capacity, face and phase of the process of religion which the 
existentialist theologian M2cQtAarrie., in his rather Hegelian train of 
thought, identifies and discerns as periodically typical, even 
unavoidable in the Introduction of his book where he puts forward and 
pleads existentialism among other reformational responses to an over- 
institutionalised morality, as a form, a phase of periodic 
Renaissances of religious ideologies, phases of the 'romanticism' of 
attitudes, creeds, thoughts and sentiments in the process of the history 
of established Christianity. I" In this Introduction MacQuarrie 
implicitly but valuably postulates the historic process of religion as 
consisting of alternative phases of the established positivism of dogma 
and, when this becomes too restrictive for the individual's mode of 
being as such, periodically replaced by phases of its nihilation, 
romanticism, spontaneity as human reality, critique, reaction to 
established religion as encrusted into the ruling mores as the Sacred. 
In such romantic phases the human reality clamouring for room for its 
expression doesn't necessarily know itself and own itself up as 
religion. The third and final strand of the process of the now timely 
self-renewal of the established norm in the Soviet Union, is afforded by 
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the current twin- movements known as perestroika and glasnost, the two 
amounting to a programme of liberalisation from institutionalism in 
economic production and in the way of the thinking of the individual 
citizen, which pair of joint phenomena is not spontaneously 
revolutionary but which has originated from the government and which is 
only in part ideological regarding the compass of its effects, (in 
another part it is, of course, economical), but in so far as it is 
explicitly ideological in its sphere of aims, represents the shrewd and 
longsighted recognition 'from above' that the clamourings for the need 
for scope and the self-satisfaction of the standards of human reality as 
such, as socialpsychologically and in human particularity embodied in 
the individuals of a society, cannot be denied on the long term with 
political impunity, an insight issuing from political authority which 
aims, as an important side-benefit of the package of new policies in 
which it comes, to prevent this lesson eventually coming to self- 
expression in social reality in the form of spontaneous ideological 
dissent from that on a general scale, as a reaction to the scent of 
moth-balls of an old body of norms, which must follow in time if 
MacQuarrie and Hegel are to be believed, and which is already heralded 
on the plane of the factual reality of society by the two spontaneous 
movements in which human reality is claiming greater room and 
recognition in the Soviet Union, as just specified. 
Descombes postulates that history is surpassing, or has surpassed, 
the stage of class societies, 'a' with bureaucracy gradually claiming 
and assuming, in a sociologically and historically real sense, Subject 
or Master status, with its personnel network as the new elite which 
extends, in the superiority of its muscle, above the conventional ruling 
classes as well as above the sociologically oppressed ones, in a 
superordinate capacity over bath, and he implies that in their progress 
towards this new order, class societies are becoming, or have become, 
gradually irrelevant in the wake of this trend. (This insight will 
receive further comment in the last but second paragraph of the 
Conclusion in this thesis. ) Descombes' view as just expressed is 
consistent with the observations just made in the context of the Vest 
and indeed with those made with regard to the East. This new form of 
subjugation, in its idiom, is in a decisive part symbolic regarding its 
nature, and its radius of operation, rather than narrowly economical 
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in its base and conception, import and compass. Attempts to deal with 
it and try to account for it in terms of a conventional social class- 
anchored set of theoretical and crudely 'economistic' weaponry, will 
leave large gaps in explaining and appreciating the phenomenon 
completely and on its merits; the nature of stratification within it 
will not yield up its nature and content in terms of conventional 
classifications of or approaches to class, such as, for instance, that 
of the Registrar General's. The emergent Master status of the ruling 
crust has Hegelian ingredients to its superiority, and the notion 
'epistemic subject' does pertain to it in apposite ways. The two 
opposing categories within the body of society are, on the one hand, 
bureaucracy with its institutions, the 'have'-ers of human'reality 
rather than its 'do'-ers, the possessive starers of the main currency 
sustaining its order: 'intelligence' (in the political sense), in 
unsuspected depths and variegatedness of classificatory categories, 
based on principles (known only to them) of security-conscious data 
processing, and, on the other hand, we have the 'do'-ers, on the lower 
scale of society, the profane, big-letter or small, the actual 
perpetrators, producers of human reality, irrespective whether the 
ensuing, produced human reality is channelled in fact into the 
production in the practical plane of economic actuality -a category of 
people whose subjugation consists in the bureaucratic agencies with 
their self-perpetrating machineries 'having them taped'. We exist far 
this highly ascribed portion of humanity as object, object of knowledge 
and therefore of possession (the thoughts of Hegel illuminate the 
process how subjugation of selves as a function of such knowledge about 
them comes to being operative) - we come to acquire a mode of being vis- 
a-vis them which in its rank is subordinate in coercive ways to their 
mode of being as subject, which allocates a mode and quality of being to 
us in a certain qualified, dependent and passive sense in relation to 
them, with ourselves being known but us not knowing about them and even 
less actually knowing them as concrete agencies which concern themselves 
with us. Such an understanding of being object in relation to Others 
being subject, is consistent with Sartre's preoccupation too, though 
the historic way and dimension of the phenomenon we are putting forward 
here is writ large in relation to Sartre's postulation of it: in the 
sense in which we now identify the notion, we reveal ourselves in 
unknown thoroughness to the look of the new-style Masters operating from 
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behind silent windows, as Sartre described that phenomenon and 
experience in Being and Nothingness, but in our present context the 
phenomenon is blown up in reality to such proportions which justify our 
sense of paranoia in our capacity as human beings constantly checked and 
watched as object by the big-letter Look cast on us, silently, from 
behind edifices of information merchantry, state-maintained or 
commercially interested, the Sartrian confines of the experience now 
outdated, removed, extended into space itself, encompassing our 
awareness of spy-satellites, and their awareness of us, (let alone 
windows of buildings around us), the gadgetry of the agencies 'seeing 
us' without being 'seen' themselves, now extending to celestial 
dimensions. 
In contrast with the ruling classes of historic (as opposed to our 
'post-historic') society, the new, anonymous bureaucratic aristocracy is 
not idle in comparison with human reality (the mode of active being and 
sphere of operation of the oppressed), though, by definition it does not 
create that human reality in the course of its exertions; on the 
contrary, crS . 
«crt. 
"aV'e directed at constraining it, and at 
preventing the reproduction and propagation of it in practice - at 
thwarting the only possible source of output of a certain stamp and 
calibre by and as human reality. It's this very project - crusading 
against human reality and its set of ideals and scope for development - 
which the new upper crust considers as the elevated target of its 
labours; redefining the criterion of supremely worthwhile human activity 
in the process, as one which is, paradoxically, hostile, uncongenial to 
the self-generating productivity of all human reality, to creativity in 
the ordinary sense which it considers as undesirable in comparison with 
the pukka array of excellence. The novel, faceless peerage (unlike the 
old-fashioned one in the days of class societies proper) is not 
uncreative because rich, but rich because uncreative. It's ideal of 
merit and proper range of learning is typically applied rather than pure 
and research-perpetrative, with the disciplines prized and preferred for 
pursuance, law and accountancy before all others, is such as is not 
generated by human reality, but, in contrast, is functional and 
generative of ways to serve and perpetrate its awn power. It may be 
generally observed of the new ideal of excellence in its relation to 
knowledge and intellectuality (we already argued the validity of this 
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observation in the context of morality), that it is a meritocratic one 
whose ideal mode of and subscription to knowledge is secondary as a 
matter of explicit preference and chosen creed, and functionally so - 
it's a kind of affiliation to knowledge which is originality-alien, 
inbreeding, analytic and interpretative of the kind of knowledge which 
has been pioneered at first hand, feeding on the latter and itself not 
feeding it; it's a type of excellence which is so through the 
appropriation of sentinel quality from creative selves and thrived upon; 
sustaining a system where other people perform the function of 
excellence with the new Pukka sense of values borrowing and monopolising 
its glory. The difference between the two clashing ideals of excellence 
in knowledge is not a question of IQ and something quite independent of 
that; it's a matter of fundamental choice. 
Descombes' theory of the rise of the new invisible elite in 
supersession of earlier, still 'historic' societies and their 'Sacred' 
and elevated representatives so determined by virtue of social class, 
is certainly borne out by the observation that civil servants know more 
and have greater power than political party-affiliated ministers (even 
if they are Tory), with elected representatives of social classes of 
whatever hue, as it's widely known, 'carried' and informed by these 
bureaucrats. Selling, privatising institutions, concerns which are 
properly bureaucratic and facelessly institutional in the for= of the 
powers they have and wield, and converting the mode of belonging of 
those into private and capitalistic ownership, is certainly a retrogade 
step in the light of such Descombian considerations and theory of the 
chronologic stratification over time of the orders of society as they 
emerge. Descombes' vision of the new society and its impersonal genre 
in this peculiar, modern sense, is certainly born out by the way Pinter 
presents the almighty and fearsome 'caretaker' as ordinary people's 
overlord, an insight which will receive greater elaboration and 
attention anon. Further observations and examples compatible with 
Descombes' fertile notion about the new elite and its rise and 
transcendence over, or at least co-presence in our Western culture with 
our a more conventionally understood upper class, offer themselves in 
the advent in the popular media of the new glamour female, the 
policewoman as a rival contender in escapistic entertainment to and 
alongside with the jewel-bedecked heroines of the industrialist scene of 
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'Dallas' or 'Dynasty' (an historically older type of heroine), and even 
the new elite's exclusive preparation measures for 'life after death' 
may be seen as comparable, in the distribution exclusively to the 
bureaucracy of fall-out shelters, to the availability of funerals to 
Pharaohs only (comprehended as gods and the relatives of gods) as was 
the custom in ancient Egypt, the deities kitting themselves out with 
provisions in exclusiveness and separation from the common underlings, 
for their passage to the afterworld. 
In summary, the job of identifying the second sociologically 
functional way in which the specialisation, in a manner writ large, of 
subject or "I"-function into the Pukka and object or '"me" only' 
function into the Rachetones or profane, is now completed. This second 
ploy and avenue to feed, allocate, keep and channel these two functions 
of the self differentially into the ruling upper crust and to those 
typecast low respectively, is to make the definition and the stronghold 
of goodness, excellence, the exclusive privilege of the Pukka by fully 
intended and socialpsychologically sophisticatedly knowing ways. 
Moreover, it has been postulated above that the direct, first-hand 
consultation of the standards of the collective consciousness at its 
ideal (in strong counterdistinction with how that is actually realised 
and embodied in the given, reigning society and in critique of that), is 
individually available for direct intuition by all, which act of direct, 
first-hand grasp and recourse to the schemata of an ideal society 
(inclusive of the Lacanian categories of it) may be paraphrased as the 
Sartrian imperative project of the reunification of the "me" and the "I" 
and thereby the assumption in the individual of the full, properly 
hybrid self as both object and subject in all, which project has 
periodically been, is, and predictably will be at historically 
overdetermined times, the project on a mass scale of multiform 
reformational agencies, bursting into being in an upsurge of an emergent 
ideology, committedly represented and formulated by protagonists of 
the self. Such responses are expressions of the intolerance of the 
species to the total starvation and deprivation of the ordinary profane 
(most of us), of normal room for stretching oneself, exercising the 
natural scope and small-latter sacred glory for everyone in one's 
capacity as a self, and historic movements reclaiming such rights for 
the mode of being of all as individuals, are reactions to inflexibility 
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in and by the established norm in its check and control over the profane 
in experiencing, practicing and knowing its own scope for goodness 
and excellence as a socially creative self and the equal of all as such. 
The third and final way in which the separation and specialisation 
in the above grand sociologic way of the "me" and the "I" will serve in 
promoting the maintainance of the status quo as the norm which amounts 
to the established society as it is, may be identified as the purpose 
and the mechanism of riddance of the unpleasant, unseemly and 
sociologically dysfunctional schism in the selves of both the Pukka and 
the Rachmones, though on different terms - on terms which allocate, as 
just said, subject role to Pukka and object role to Rachetones, on terms, 
moreover, which will dump the stigma of the sinfulness of living with 
recourse to the schism by not surrendering subject status, firmly into 
the court of the profane only. The identification of this third 
sociologic area of effects of the differential specialisation of the 
"me" and the "I" into Pukka and Rachmones respectively, may sound rather 
psychologistic, and because of the involvement in its discussion and 
analyisis of socialpsychologic factors touching on the infrastrucure of 
the self, it foreshadows our next chapter, (which will deal with 
microsociologic paradigms of the Pukka-Rachmones relationship>, and will 
receive detailed analysis there. For the moment just two observations - 
the phenomenon just referred to (the divestment of the Rachmones of 
freedom to schismically respond to anomalies irking the self in 
society), is relevant in the context of our present macrosociologic 
consideration too, not only because the process of schism-riddance on 
different terms for the Rachmones and the Pukka Is engineered with a 
view to sustaining and does tally in a complementary way with outside 
sociologic interests, but also because (as we argued in Chapter I. ), the 
socialpsyr_hgolegic schism in the individual in the face of moral 
anomalies in society is not a primary phenomenon; it is (and, 
materialists know, it has to be) a response to and therefore secondary 
to and dependent on the grand schism in society as a stimulus which is 
capable of anomalousness as such. This schism in the stimulus (positive 
society) is the discrepancy between the content of the body of the norm 
of society as it is (the collective consciousness compromised at times, 
or much of the time, in its actuality and realisation) as opposed the 
collective consciousness in its ideality which is the possible object of 
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the intuition of any individual if he chooses to be present to that; in 
other words, between the collective consciousness at its fathomable pure 
and the generalized other, 
In contrast, the recognised (rather than denied, suppressed, 
equivocated-away) response to, acknowledgement and reflection of the 
schism in society within the individual agent, the owned-up-to witness 
of the noncoincidence between the conditions desired for the 
gratification of the "me" by the self with the "I" brought to bear upon 
the recognition of it, as distinct from the actual degree of 
gratification of the self's "me" or the lack of it in the iorld's 
actuality, is the schism, the self in a certain, complete sense. To own 
up to this self, as the schism, is a matter of fundamental choice. This 
cognised difference, noncoincidence between the ingredients of the self, 
the "me" as defined for one in actuality, versus the authentic response 
to it and desire for an alternative, more fulfilled "me" in a future and 
more ideal social actuality, with the faculty of the "I" brought to bear 
on intuiting it, may indeed be equivocated away in living and conducting 
the self, as it is in bad faith. 
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Section S. Mastery and Slavery, Writ Small. 
The self is a structure, a phenomenon which simultaneously takes 
place in two orders of reality all at once, like Z. S. Harris' phonemes, 
disjointed individual utterances of the larynx never the same in the 
actual pronunciation of two single individuals, and, on the other hand, 
concurrently participating as bricks (each of the same value of 
importance) in the syntactic structure in which those also serve, 
defined and uniformised regarding their weight in that capacity by the 
rules of grammar governing them, by the authority of the different 
overall structur of it and its set of rules sufficient unto itself as 
such, and independent in that capacity of the actual idiosyncratic vocal 
articulation of these bigamous units: one aspect of their being. 
The separate pieces of rock making up Stonehenge, likewise, are a 
collection of rough slabs with aesthetic attributes to their arrangement 
if comprehended in one way, but with a certain star pertinent to the 
worship of a group of religious followers, which annually appears in the 
focal point of this arrangement of slabs on a significant holiday, this 
collection of stones is a temple, its meaning, weight of importance and 
nature altered, transformed, this latter meaning, aspect of its being 
rubbing off on it even when that star is absent in this symbolic visual 
context during other days of the year. The Caryatids are another example 
of building bricks of structures deputising in two orders of being and 
functions all at once; objects actually holding up, structural bearers 
of the building they support when globally viewed, but, when the statues 
are appreciated separately or some considered as in particular 
relationships to single others, they can be apprehended as sustaining 
and pertaining at the same time to an aesthetic order as well as the 
first, physical one, contributing to that aesthetic order and affording 
examples of that; as indeed can be claimed about oil drums too, washed 
ashore by the sea, litter on the beaches in one of their capacities, and 
if suitably worked and played in an orchestra, objects for appreciation, 
instruments of considerable beauty in an aesthetic order. It's possible, 
(unavoidable to Sartre) for man to grasp, to live the self too as 
simultaneously occupying both of the different symbolic orders 
concurrently making demands on it, involving it: the socialpsychologic 
and the sociologic orders. In one of these contexts, in its aspect as 
routine rationality, it's continuous with the generalized other, to 
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which it contributes, of which each self is constitutive as part, so 
many Caryatids in the positive social edifice they sustain, with the 
"me" serving as Althusserian 'carrier'. In another context, in another 
capacity of the "me", it's illuminated, shot and effected with the 
particularity and subjectivity of the "I" to which it is married in its 
socialpsychologic capacity, forming with it its privately enmeshed, 
innerweltlich little ensemble which peculiarly mediates its own self- 
supporting standards as human reality, a mode of its being which ever 
affords an angle of critique on the generalized other as such and, self- 
consciously, of one's own "me" as constitutive part of that, allowing 
for a distanced reflection upon that. The self as this schism of vision 
in which it dually serves and comprehends itself, is this distance 
between the "me" as rooted In the coherent milieu of the generalized 
other on the one hand and its own critical perspective on that as an 
individual an the other. 
This dual manner of the comprehension of the "me" of itself is 
important in analysing the relationship between the differing social 
and socialpsychologic spheres of operation of the self. The "me" of 
the self, serving in both a sociologic and a socialpsychologic context, 
both does and does not make perfect contact with the social world around 
it. A simile may be helpful in appreciating this. There is a fish which 
feeds on insects on the riverbank. It has to shoot up above water level 
to catch them. As it claps its sight on the insect from under the water, 
its eye and the water surface form a little optic system, like a 
telescope, its own perspective, with a meaning only to itself and its 
kind, through which it views the insect, distorted from the 'objective' 
point of view of its food on land by the refraction of the water surface 
in relation to it. This relatively distorted aperture is the only visual 
information it has, and yet in the act of catching it, it efficiently 
compensates for that deceptive refraction, or rather uses it, and gets 
the insect every time. Similarly, the self is never comprehended as 
indistinguishably continuous with the outer, empirically 'objective' 
crust of the generalized other; it's an eddy in it, as Mead observes; 
its "me" not quite flush with it, and protruding a bit as well, like the 
top end of a telescope only just cutting a peculiar little curvature 
compared with the surface, like a water drop or a small lense, a pupil, 
a window on the world and not the world itself in a completely 
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straightforward manner; it's not the regular slice of the generalized, 
other, not of the same mould as the other "me"-s generalised into one 
continuous, predictable mode, body of conduct and way of thought which 
holds good for all, but a "me" with a certain sheen, one suggestive of 
an "I" in its hinterland on the other, hidden end of the telescope, a 
small-letter sacred "me" with a reputation as a self, of one kind or 
another. It's the self as a whole as such, the individual as sacred, 
infrastructurally organised, outstanding, individually excellent or 
notorious in the context of society - not in the sense of the big-letter 
or big-letter-imitative sacredness of a self, the externally borrowed 
elevation of the powerful by ascription or the mimicking of it by the 
unoriginal and socially uncreative, but a sort of first-person singular- 
generated, peculiarly socialpsychologic, personally authentic sacredness 
in the sense of human reality intact on its own terms. Everybody would 
like to be - can potentially be - sacred in this sense, gracefully 
autonomous as an unshortchanged amalgam of both object and subject, as 
an accomplished individual. It's the small-letter, socialpsychologic 
sacredness, the distinction of the ego, it's the hybridness, the 
synthesis, equilibration, adjustment within the person's self afforded 
by an unsurrendered "I" and a "me" personally matched, defined, managed, 
maintained according to its own lights as such, as a self: endowed with 
'grace' according to Sartre's criterion of that quality as already 
mentioned and as will be elaborated later. The 'speciallsation' into 
separate channels of the "me" and the "I" as described in the previous 
section, is intolerable to the self if authentic in its aspirations as a 
self in the sense which we now argue. The fable of El uebear 3' z Castle 
tells the story of how the will of one self for the petty possession of 
another, greater one, gradually strips that at first more outstanding, 
originally "I"-inclusive personality of its veil of remoteness in 
relation to the generalized other, it describes how such possessiveness 
robs the self of its singularity, of its privacy, of its implicitness 
for the other with a personal "I" so as to draw out and conquer this 
secrecy, complete with the "I", making its secrets as a self outward and 
explicit, baring that of its status as a self with its own, self- 
delineated stature, transforming it bit by bit into openly named 
desires, sordid in their tangibility, into the string of rendered-up 
instincts, lowly thoughts, meant or committed crimes of an expressed, 
factual past, and only that. The castle is symbolic of Bluebeard's being 
Mastery and Slavery, Vrit Small - 141 - 
as a definite, imposing self, as its own overlord within it, in the 
self-possessed, upstanding wholeness as that; its hidden, private 
possibilities, its "I" gradually uncovered, yielded up to the daylight 
as a delicate negative of a film, as his newly wedded wife Judith 
insists that all its doors be opened up, one by one, for her. With the 
last door opened, both Judith and Bluebeard die symbolically, their 
personalities, the primary structures of their selves as such, broken 
down, and with that the possibilities of being partners for one another 
in a certain socialpsychologically as opposed to sociologically 
constituted and constitutive sense, which Bluebeard had sought. The 
castle, his own self completely yielded up, its distance taken hold of, 
made public, reduced to object only, and Judith, his executor in this 
sense, herself demoted as a dignified self in the way of one with a 
human demeanour of a certain quality, unthroned as such by her own deed, 
falling from her original pedestal offered her by Bluebeard, Joins 
Bluebeard's women, failed past partners in marriage, behind the last 
door. Bluebeard murdered her, the symbolism of the story prompts, and 
she murdered Bluebeard. The myth, for Bluebeard's part, depicts a 
process similar in its meaning and mechanism to Heidegger's Neugier; 
like the moral of this story, that notion refers to the will and the 
process of razing the self from its state of wholeness to the ground, 
rendering that up to the public inspectability of das Man (Heidegger's 
contender for the notion which to Mead is the generalized other) by way 
of subjecting it to, invading it with a pervidious curiosity designed to 
secure the other as a mere abject at one's disposal (as distinct from 
interest: an authentic interpersonal attitude) and gradually 
appropriating it, taking it into the custody of a public grasp of that, 
or of any one person beholding it, claiming it from such an angle, in 
such a capacity. 
Such draining of the self of its dignified completeness with an "I", 
the reduction of that to 'object only' status, is a familiar encounter 
commonly ran across in everyday life; the artistic and symbolic account 
of it in Bluebeard's legend wrongly suggests a rarity and selectness 
of the occurrence of this process, which isn't really the case. I shall 
provide a more mundane and example of the same ploy which will have the 
ring of familiarity. At an early stage of my sojourn in this country, I 
was removed from the subculture of my fellow-national emigrants who 
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typically reside in London; my move to the provinces looked down upon at 
the time in the light of the cosmopolitanism-valuing norms of that 
subculture. I accepted the cold shoulder from my former peers in my 
former milieu (un-answered Christmas cards and other such indeces of 
that), and have gradually grown to pay no attention to it. After a while 
my family has turned into one of 'achievers', something which was, in 
contrast, valued by the standards of the subculture from which I was 
earlier separated, and this second fact, having seeped back into the 
circles of my exiled compatriots in London, came to be part of a 
conflicting, ambivalent body of opinions about us there, beginning to 
counteract to some extent the attitude, pukka there, to shun the 
provincial, and it raised interest. Twenty ve years have gone by, and 
on one occasion I telephoned, on my husband's behalf, a colleague of his 
about some important professional news concerning them both. It was the 
colleague's wife, associated with the said subculture and herself a 
former friend, who answered the telephone and who gave me what could be 
called a spiritual lumbar puncture. In shrill tones, she asked me 'blow 
by blow' about our family and fortunes, turning me inside-out as it 
were, in suddenly assumed caretakership, quizzing me of our situation, 
until the point when in the course of my 'news chronicle' she stumbled 
on an item which conveyed to her a temporary set-back in one of our 
sons' education, I believe. Her voice immediately changed to one of 
satisfaction, and she closed the conversation. 'I have no more time' she 
said 'I have to go out'. When I reminded her that the purpose of the 
call was to talk to her husband, she told me that he'd gone out in the 
course of the conversation, totally unaware, I assume, that the 'phone 
call was for him; but she achieved what she, for her part, set out to 
do: make me as an object ready for gossip: 'They are not doing so well, 
after all... ' - processing us for the consciousness and verbal 
consumption of the generalized other (of which she was the champion in 
her interrogation) as an object not so contradictory in terms of the 
mode of their entertaining us, yielding a more comfortable attitudinal 
position in their relating to us; doing well, but provincial folk, after 
all, you can tell. They didn't quite have the background... 
A few words may be usefully said here about gossip, or rather a 
Heideggerian term related to that: Gerede. It's closely connected with 
Neugier; Neugier being the instinct, the project to cut down the 
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uncomfortably free-floating, not-yet 'taped' individual to the size of 
the generalized other (das Nan in Heidegger) as we just mentioned in the 
context of the relationship of Judith and Bluebeard in the legend, with 
Gerede one of the instruments whereby this can be achieved, affected. 
Gerede is one of the Heideggerean weaponry whereby a 'closure' of the 
self (a concept put forward in Section 2. of this chapter) can be 
affected in an Other in a way that does not encourage in him, indeed 
allow for him the degree of salience of a somewhat outstanding, personal 
"me" in 'closing' his self into an autonomous sociaipsychologic 
ensemble where he could provide, accomplish a "me" on his own terms to 
match the genuine, authentic needs of an "I" whose calls the agent 
doesn't wish to compromise. Gerede is a tactics and tool for 'socking' 
a kind of ready-made closure in the idiom of the generalized other to 
the self as a sort of stereotype gag for it in the place of the medium 
of satiation it happens to genuinely desire, preventing the 'closure' of 
the self in the idiom of the unique self in its emphatic significance as 
such, protruding, in the involuntary distinction of its individuality 
as we have just suggested in cur simile of the self's perspective, its 
'telescopic lense' directed at, focussed in on the generalized other, 
breaking up the undifferentiated surface of the calm sea of the latter, 
so to speak. Gerede, in a word, is a means of inappropriate 'closure' to 
the authentic self as such. This claim calls for some elaboration. 
Man's "me", his indismissible capacity as object, as already pointed 
out, spans three categories in nature: the physiologic, the sociologic, 
and the socialpsychologic, the latter mediating, encompassing and 
complementing his being as a self. These levels of being in all of which 
the "me" properly and simultaneously has its roots, amount, of course, 
to three levels of its possible fulfilment which clamour for the kind of 
'closure' or 'feeding' appropriate to its specific in the three-fold 
diversity and medium of the self, physiologic, social and 
socialpsychologic respectively. Sartre would add a fourth level of the 
possible 'closure' of the self, higher-order even in its sophistication 
than any of the levels of the self we previously postulated. The 
Sartrian addition to the above array of the spheres of the fulfilment of 
the self, comes into play in the activity of 'pure reflection'; in this 
the hunger of the "I", or rather of its Sartrian relative: 'Being-for- 
Itself', is the exploration by consciousness, its thirst for the 
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knowledge of itself per se, and its gratification, its 'food' for 
reflection is quite simply itself, in its isolated purity, which 
candidate and peculiar medium for its 'closure' can be regarded as 
'object' in a very special sense only, as it is empty of all other 
content except itself, and which is properly called 'the reflected-an'. 
Opposite these four levels on which the "me" touches and which together 
comprise it, we see and distinguish between as many strands of the "I" 
corresponding to those positive media and means for the 'closure' of the 
self, as the hunger and capacity for these variegated and multi-tiered 
fodders to the self, each of these corresponding capacities clamouring 
to be filled in their own idiom, calling out for gratification by the 
varying, appropriate layers of the "me" specially complementing them, as 
just identified. This view of the complex of gradations of the "I" - 
physiologic hunger and thirst, sexual needs, social capacities, the 
socialpsychologic cravings of the self as such, and its undeniable 
capacity for 'pure reflection' (which perhaps is a less basic need), 
though organised into the unified notion of the "I" of the self or into 
the four-tiered possibility of 'Being-for-Itself, can be fruitfully 
analysed into its four, evolutionarily variegated gradations of lesser 
or greater sophistication, and grasped as a sort of conatus, or the 
organisation of those into the unified "I" of each self, each of these 
needs clamouring singly, as a capacity different in kind from the other 
three, for levels of 'closure' by the appropriate tiers of the "me" 
'answering to' those, and failure to offer to those, gratify those with 
a "me" homogeneous with and appropriate to those hungers, will result in 
the uncatered-for aspects of the self 'starving', being laid waste 
(notwithstanding the fact that it is only the failure of the 
gratification of physical or sexual hunger or thirst which results in 
death or extinction in the physical and literal sense. ) By 'closures' 
which are 'homogeneous' with the particular hunger or capacity capable 
of being gratified by 'fodder' complementary to its own kind, I mean 
the meeting of each of these capacities with the actual reward 
appropriate to it: sexual drive being 'answered to' with the sexual 
act, physiologic hunger satisfied with food, social needs and capacities 
satisfied by their own kind of reinforcement, praise, companionship, 
social intercourse, leisure activities and the means to be able to 
gratify, realise these particular capacities for reward. Finally, 
socialpsychologic 'closure' is peculiarly, congenially, properly, 
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fittingly and 'homogeneously' effected by the internally experienced and 
reflected-on process in 'impure' or 'psychologic reflection' upon the 
external opportunities available (or unavailable) to the "me", from the 
point of view of the capacity of these opportunities for the 
satisfaction within the self of the "I"'s peculiar hungers in operation 
(Sartre's classification), with the role of the resulting 
socialpsychologic "me" different from the sociologic one in being 
cognised, experientially savoured, (palatably or unpalatably) by the 
self in the first person singular, and, if authentic, critically 
assessed by the "I". The socialpsychologic "me" which is referred to 
here, also differs from a simpler and more schematic sociologic one in 
being relevantly brought into contact with the self's hubris-potential 
for the small-letter sacredness of each self, the "I" constantly 
probing, questioning the socialpsychologic content of the "me" as to 
its authenticity, asking whether it is a fitting, effective, 
complementary platform in the world to match its authentic lights as 
such, putting forward, projecting new "me"-s and catching up with those 
in critical transcendence over the older, past ones. This process is 
called by Mead 'the conversation of the "I" and the "me"' and, as just 
observed, 'impure' or 'psychologic' reflection by Sartre. -If gratified, 
acted upon, it may also be recognised as the project of 'doing one's 
thing', (relative to everybody's given circumstances, of course, doing 
what one must as defined by the "I"-s response to real affairs, and not 
in some abstract context. ) The reward of this process, apart from its 
yield of status and real possibilities in the world, which such conduct 
affects for better or worse ( depending both on its quality and 
success), is the concurrent, reflected-upon, intrinsic reward or 
disappointment, as the case may be, the knowledge of bringing one's 
projects to fruition or failing to do so, something whose success is 
valued and desired as an end in itself, as an accomplishment per se, in 
terms of the self: everybody's dream. The project of exercising 'pure 
reflection' and the possible interpretability compatibly with Mead's 
notion of the process of the 'conversation of the "me" and the "I" won't 
be discussed here at length, as it would divert the argument too far. 
It is important to appreciate that 'closures' may be effected at the 
'wrong' level as it were, hungers as the "I" met with levels of action 
by the "me" which are not homogeneous with that, in instances where the 
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various gradings, orders of the "I" are gratified by tiers of 
stimulation, with ranks of object-fulfilment within the self which are 
not appropriately complementary regarding their level and kind to the 
hungers of the "I" at play. A well-known 'upward mismatch' between 
orders of "I"-s and a more elevated level of the "me", is Freudian 
sublimation in which sexual drives are 'closed', 'fed', made to 'answer 
to' by social activities, performing good deeds, intellectual projects, 
by chasing accomplishments, symbolically rather than physiologically 
positive rewards. (Among the evoutionarily variegated tiers of the "I", 
Freud gave pride of place to the 'id', a low-level, physiologically 
anchored drive, as the principle form and capacity of the "I", to the 
detriment of more sophisticated and evolutionarily more reined aspects 
of the "I" which, once they appeared on the evolutionary scene with the 
advent of man, have been operating distinguishably from, and alongside 
with more primitive drives of a physiologically rooted order, as Mead's 
writings suggest. For neglecting higher-order aspects of the "I" as 
often autonomously and originally operative among motivations, and for a 
tendency to derive, sometimes inappropriately, such higher-order 
motivations from the 'id', Mead is critical of Freud). I" 
But 'downward mismatches' in the course of the fulfilment of the 
hungers of the ego are also common in everyday life - wrong, jarring, 
faulty 'closures' by virtue of satisfying with a more lowly "me" the 
higher-order clamourings of the "I"; this case is perhaps more common 
even than are 'upward mismatches'. An exaple is reasoning emotively in 
an academic argument, 'magical behaviour' in bad faith in the case of 
interpersonal conduct when reasonable wishes could be communicated in 
explicit language but are instead realised by emotional blackmail which 
impresses on others that contrary responses to one's wishes would be 
emotionally intolerable to a self; or instances when arduous exertions 
in pure reflection in the process of intellectual or artistic creation 
are replaced, either voluntarily because of their difficulty or under 
the pressure of outside expectar-io nS by socialising, by totally time- 
cur 
consuming participation in the socialpsychologic business af, everydays 
informed by 'impurely' reflective activº'tieS, forced upon one 
(particularly on agents against whose high-intellectual p racti CS there 
is a prejudice) in the name of the 'greater normalcy' of a day-to-day 
sphere of rationality, and the duties which that implies or demands; 
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often coupled with the active creation and contrivance of circumstances 
which apparently justify the inappropriateness of pure reflection for 
some. Another example of wrong or inappropriate downward 'closure' is 
overeating, through intellectual frustration, neurotic munching, 
satiating hungers as a self with food in the literal and tangible 
sense. Many more and more refined levels of 'closure', and therefore 
mismatches in the course of effecting them, may be identified; for the 
moment we just mean to show how Gerede out of the many ploys drawing the 
self into the lazy and routine levels of the being of the self, may be 
instrumental in strategically, and coercively effecting the wrong 
'closure' of the socialpsychologic authenticity-thirsty self if that be 
the colour of one's project. Especially in Gerede (and in the 
application of some other items of the Heidegger-postulated armoury 
for cutting down the outstanding self to size so as to comply with the 
standards of the generalized other, to be elaborated later), das Nan 
(or generalized other to us) and agents subscribing to the promotion of 
the self in its idiom, try to 'close' the socialpsychologic 
authenticity-aspiring individual self as other than an active 
consciousness informed by and sporting an "I", as other than a being of 
free spirit and individuality; agents enforcing the generalized other in 
other people's quest for a complete self, apportion to such would-be 
authentic selves a ready-made "me" defined by the generalized other for 
all, indiscriminately and routinely meting out to everyone a self which 
is lacking in the sheen and quality of an insisted-on 'perspective', one 
which is incomplete with, devoid of the evidence of a 'telescopic lense' 
on the undifferentiated surface of the generalized other so to speak, 
forcibly offering instead, in the idiom of the generalized other, a "me" 
without such a sheen, a stereotype, a socially rather than 
socialpsychclogically conceived and conducted cut-out of a personality. 
Graham Greene's book Travels with My Aunt tells the story how a bank 
manager, retired after a regular sort of a way of life in 
shelteredness from passionate personal commitments of any kind, a life 
ordered throughout by total predictability, under the sudden prevalence 
in his life of his newly discovered, intensely living 'aunt', embarks 
with her on a course of adventurous encounters which he then comes to 
adopt as his new way of life. 'It was as though I had escaped from an 
open prison' Graham Greene writes in the character of his main hero, 
'had been snatched away, provided with a rope ladder and a waiting car, 
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into my aunt's world, the world of the unexpected character and the 
unforeseen event... I can remember very little of the vision preceding 
the prison house: it must have faded away very early 'into the light of 
the common day'... and (I) thought of my aunt, that she, for one never 
allowed the vision to fade. Perhaps a sense of morality is the sad 
compensation we learn to enjoy like a remission for good conduct. ' " °' 
The way in which Gerede (meaning small-talk or gossip in German) 
'processes' a self to become the object of a 'closure' in oneself or in 
others on such terms - the terms of 'the light of the common day', the 
terms of the generalized other - is throwing the self, one's own or 
that of another, the bait of idle chat critical and intolerant of the 
object on the receiving end of small-talk if not found corroborative 
with the standards of the generalized other. The way in which the 
generalized other gets to work on the offendingly obtrusive self in this 
process, consists both of robbing the small-talkers, and possibly 
authentic others who may be roped into such conversations, of precious 
time in which a true human project could be effectively and productively 
exercised the while, and also, as the by-product of the typical topics 
of such conversations which characteristically concern themselves with 
food (exchanging recipes e. g. ), people's sexual affairs, past and 
present failures and most particularly death, or at least illness 
which deputises for death as a topic in a minimalised or partial way, 
such talk has the effect of constantly dragging both the talkers and the 
person who is the object of such talk, down to the 'earth' of the 
generalized other as the maximum horizon for any self, and also to the 
earth in which we are all to become 'ashes' and 'dust', pretending that 
it is that which we must be during our lifetimes too, and finally to the 
symbolic earthly levels of our exercising our bodily functions, such 
talk keeping us all within these minimalised spheres of the modes of 
being supporting our consciousness. Gerede is this capacity, performs 
and possessively maintains, hugs and claims room and territory for 
and perpetrates what may be conveniently called 'bullshit', a relative 
of the Sartrian 'viscous' as the vehicle and 'substance' of antivalue. 
The way how talk of illness and death fulfils this function is 
evocatively described by Sartre. "" The preoccupation with food is 
also a contribution in as important way to the 'death' of the person 
who is the object of such conversation, in two senses: firstly, it 
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enforces an inappropriate level of the 'closure' of the self who may 
aspire to exercise a more spiritually taxing, demanding and engaged 
"me", by taking its place and elbowing that out of existence; and 
secondly, this topic is also complementary and contributive to the 
'eating', consumption, devouring in a symbolic sense <as is illness) of 
the individual who is the target of Gerede, to gratify the violent 
hunger of the talkers as sociologic beings, and more often than not, 
also as thwarted, socialpsychologic beings who are vacuo uS as such, 
ever and irrepressibly, for having and being selves themselves, which 
arduous project, however, they themselves will undertake to embark on 
in authentic ways. There is a tradition in twentieth-century European 
drama which depicts food and the household routines of eating, as the 
vehicle of the function of this process of personal or interpersonal 
devouring. Strindberg was the first, to my knowledge, to introduce the 
figure of the Cook as the coercive forcer of the human spirit and the 
possibility of the higher-order projects of the characters he portrayed 
in his plays, to be satiated, replaced by food and ousted by rigorously 
adhered-to eating routines. Prokofiev's opera The Love of Three Oranges 
affords a second example of a fearsome cook, a towering giant monster, 
sang by a bass in drag, who constantly interjects 'herself' and puts 
'herself' in the way of the characters' fairy-tale pilgrimage to 
realising themselves and their dreams. Simon Grey's much newer comedy, 
Ciose of Play can also be enlisted in the dramatic tradition which 
utilises the same vision and makes this very point by similar means; in 
this play the pursuit of the characters depicted of the job of ironing 
out their lives, is constantly interrupted and made impossible by 
reminders and enforcement of mealtimes. 
The victim of such Gerede, willing or otherwise, becomes 'closed' in 
his capacity as a socialpsychologic consciousness at the level of the 
generalized other, his self levelled out in continuity with that, 
decapitated of its excellence or his aspirations for it, his being 
desirous of 'doing his thing', stuffed instead with the fodder of the 
generalized other's forcibly gesturing him to be, as a self, the same 
as, homogeneous with the generalized other, and will be, as a 
consequence, defined, outlined, judged in fact as being the banal "me" 
only which is apportioned to all in the name of and by the power of the 
consensus of others - unauthentic others - as "me"-s only by choice, 
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and in corroboration with that social and socialpsychologically 
unauthentic continuum which this consensus (the generalized other) 
affords. Once the free project of life in authenticity in openness and 
sensitivity to and inclusiveness of an "I", is 'closed' by this outward 
definition and medium by the convention of reigning expectations by the 
champions of the latter, that is what one is, a "me" only of the sort 
which is most convenient, and cast accordingly, by one's milieu (unless 
re-converted to be open and receptive to the vision again, like Graham 
Greene's hero) 112' which will inform one, Hegelian fashion, of one's 
"me" in the world of facts by way of the mirror for one in other 
people's eyes, by way of public consciousness, the frame of reference 
carved out for one, limiting the proper sphere of one's acts. That's it; 
the self is 'closed' in the real terms of the generalized other. One's 
lack is saturated with the retrograde object, the matt finish of a "me" 
of one's past, already uncovered, forcibly socked to one as one's lot as 
a self, to identify with - and also 'closed' as a consumer who must eat 
as well as be eaten, as somebody who is eventually condemned to death 
anyway and is already living partial gradations of his death during his 
lifetime, and in the shadow of that death; and any future "me"-s in the 
light of one's continued loyalty to the "I" are possible as one's 
freedom in open nihilation of that limited "me" typecast for one - ('I 
have begun in immoral freedom', Graham Greene's 'hero' writes rejoicing 
in his newly discovered way of life), or if such an overt conversion is 
not available to one owing to circumstances, one may elect to live in 
one's newly found freedom in an inner, Aristotelean sense merely: it 
must not be forgotten that one's course of conduct within such confines 
at least, the choice of such a future "me" as far as one's own self is 
concerned, is possible, important and eminently meaningful. 
The fibre of bullshit, the medium of Sartre's viscous, antivalue, 
the coherent continuum of the generalized other at its unauthentic (for 
it is possible for it to be authentic too, as will be subsequently 
argued) is the poor man's "We", spirit of seriousness. It's the 
subscription to the values of the Serious by those who would be but have 
no ascribed title to perpetrate that in first-hand authorship; it's the 
spirit of worship of the generalized other in the form in which it 
usurps, takes the place of society's norms (ideally tantamount to the 
collective consciousness), degrading those into the norm of the given 
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society, soiled by and transcribed into a morally compromised social 
actuality, affording a sham collective consciousness which is elevated 
by the existing ideology which serves the bureaucrat (the nouvt3ux 
aristocrat) and which the bureaucrat serves, to the status of 
sacredness, with religious weight, and handed down to the rachmones, 
profane, to worship. It's the approved mode of the Rachmones'assumption 
of himself in the solemn object status as typecast, by the force of the 
given, coercive norm, contaminated by a morally anomalous actuality, but 
declared and operative as Sacred. Its tone, accordingly, is mundane, 
banal and, importantly, judgemental, as is the 'We' proper which it 
imitates, in strict counterdistinction to the simple and spontaneous 
authentic interpersonality which is inherent in human reality, as Mead 
and Bultmann discern; with the unauthentic interpersonal values 
preoccupying Heidegger the degradation of those. MacQuarrie ('`", 
interpreter both of Heidegger and of Bultmann, discerns how the values 
of human reality at its interpersonal, informing both individuals and 
the community at its Pauline authentic, turn and gel in the alternative, 
humanly depersonalised, sham medium of das Man (tantamount to our 
Reneralized other when unauthentically chosen), into devices serving 
personal laziness and interpersonal possession as symbolised, for 
instance, by Bluebeard's and Judith's story. The discreet virtues of 
ordinary human decency between intending small-letter sacred, come to 
acquire in this process of their degradation a second meaning and sphere 
of efficacy in the medium proper to their unauthentic bastardisation: 
das Man, at variance with their original soil and their thriving in that 
as human reality in the process of the continuous and spontaneous 
upsurge of that mode of being, affording of that system of virtues a 
mirage, a magician's trick projection, an upside-down, shadow body of 
those properly un-SOfcounscious attributes, medium of giving in 
interpersonal traffic, which is downlifting in its experience and actual 
operation and effects, onto the level of this phoney, sham, 
judgementally trigger-happy "I" of power over one another, a toolkit for 
mastery. Heidegger's analysis and description identifies, lists and 
treats some key notions in this degraded level of interpersonal double- 
talk, though in his treatment it is only the unauthentic projection of 
these attributes of interpersonal conduct which receive all the 
limelight. His gallery of these ruses for interpersonal domination is 
useful in illuminating familiar patterns of those in our everydays, and 
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more can be added to his collection of exhibits. To list just a few of 
these notions of interpersonal being and conduct - the cement of 
sympathy in their authentic employment between people and, in sharp 
contrast, the instruments of coercive domination over others in the 
das Nan manufacturing process as the meant effect of their unauthentic 
application, we can start with mentioning Gerede again, the false 
reflection of its unspoilt alternative in the armoury of human reality: 
'conversation', a basic tool and vehicle for the sustainance of 
authentic 'Being-for-Others', to use Sartrian jargon for a moment to 
denote a process most profoundly and extensively treated by Mead and 
Bultmann. As Mead expounds it, 'conversation' or its near-synonym: 
symbolic interaction, amarbaia a the nat4r4a. 4reg4 At tjjsa'$ far 
own being as such as well as for its being for others, the "me"-s which 
are being exchanged in the course of it, directly and aptly filling 
man's constant, axiomatic social, interpersonal need (a primary capacity 
in all), the communicating self's "me" which is being put forward in the 
course of the 'conversation' reflecting back upon itself in the process 
of the constant feedback in the response to and appreciation of that 
"me" in the other's eye, further bath formulating that "me" in the 
communicating ego and fulfilling and maintaintn$ 'at-the- Same bn e-'tle 
Other as a self whose hunger as a social being is also being filled by 
the voluntary and free gift of his partner's "me" in this 
'conversation'. The speech of which Mead's 'conversation' consists is 
personal and authentically borne of the self exercising, knowing and 
meaning itself as such, subjectively conductive and conducive, rather 
than preventative of that, as is Gerede. Among other originally 
authentic notions of interpersonal traffic which the mode of das Nan 
turns into their unauthentic, watered-down or rather methylated-down 
facsimilies for interpersonal use of a lowlier kind, we may list 
'interest' (unmistakably sincere and interpersonally concerned when 
experienced at its genuine), whose ill-meaning and sham likeness and 
substitute is the already familiar Neugier'. Love, in this process of 
the unauthentic transformation of tools of interpersonality, becomes 
fussing in this process of unauthenticisation - it turns into 
sentimentality, the offer of a brotherhood which is intolerant of 
individual differences, rejecting, thrusting, as if pus, any assertion 
and show of such out of its body. Care, in Heidegger's presentation, 
emerges as transformed from the plentiful, ungrudging and voluntary 
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giving from the psychological time of the duration of one's own life, to 
another who depends on this personal help; the Heidegger-identified 
unauthentic counterpart of the notion of care shows itself, in 
contrast, as a tool for interpersonal possession again, and will 
operate in its effect as a contrivance far the domination of the Other, 
made possible by the recipient's temporary weakness, diminished powers 
and the varying degrees of his exposure (through his need) to his 
'caretaker'. The entire collection of all these ruses for the domination 
of the one exposed to unauthentic interpersonality on the receiving end, 
originates from and consists in the instrumentality of human traffic 
and practice of relating, in the terminology of Heidegger. This 
instrumentality, as opposed to the possibility of interpersonal 
authenticity, means the construing of the Other opposite us (and of 
ourselves too, as will be seen in a minute) as object only, as someone 
without 'grace' in Sartre's sense, lacking the dignity of being with an 
"I"; it consists of tactically affecting a position and actively 
conceiving of and exploiting it as one of permanent weakness and 
dependency for the Other relative to us as an ego regarding its power - 
it means the setting up and the prolonged presentation, perpetration 
and justification of such an interpersonal situation as something 
morally desirable and approved, as sanctified by the dicta and 
maintained under the guise of the bastardised body of genuine 
interpersonal virtues as just identified, altruistic on the face of it, 
but a device, in fact, for the use of the Other as instrument in our own 
project of psychologic advancement and perhaps advancement in the world. 
The fact that in this process the Other who is meant to be subjugated is 
envisaged by the 'dominant' partner as someone without a dignified, "I"- 
inclusive, autonomous self, relative to him, an the long term, as Slave, 
doesn't mean that the subjugator will necessarily want to live a life 
in which the "I", his possibility of being 'Master' will be actively 
and imaginatively utilised just because he secured that chance for 
himself; his interpersonal 'victory' doesn't automatically entail that 
the potential for having the upper hand as gained in this unauthentic 
relationship, will in most cases be exercised by the winner with 
recourse to a truly outstanding "I", as Subject, even within the self- 
centred confines of his own ego. More often than not the chance for 
'mastery' emerging from the practices of unauthentic interpersonality, 
is grasped as the privilege of being outsize and supremely obscene 
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Object among lowlier and more modest ones, it will result in the 
apprehension of the self, not as 'master' by way of conspicuous active 
reliance on the mature "I" in conduct, but in keeping with the more 
primitive understanding of sentinel-capacity out of the two possible 
ways in which outstanding human stature relative to that of others, 
can, according to Mead, (as already commented on in Section 2) be 
approached, achieved and purported; these two alternative routes to 
conspicuous excellence being an enhanced 'sameness' or else 
'difference' compared with others. In such projects of Heideggerean 
unauthentic interpersonal 'mastery', instrumentality, the excellence of 
the 'conqueror' is typically envisaged and grasped as supreme 
'sameness', purely social object-status in all, with oneself seen as a 
more prominently mighty and zealous social object in a narrow and 
vulgarian sense than others whom we mean to so define, with mediocrity 
(one's own included) raised to a pedestal: the project of outshining the 
mediocrity of all and glittering as the most supreme champion of that, 
a process insightfully and richly rendered in Sartre's gntisemi. e and 
La--w in his description of the antisemite's psyche. Subject-potential is 
seen by the winner in this Heidegger-identified interpersonal play as a 
chance for being object extraordinaire, a sociologically higher-ranking 
object than others with power for the subjugation of them, rather than 
as a chance for the liberation in anthropologic equality of composite 
selves, each sovereign and hybrid 'object' illuminated as such, in 
part at least, by an "I", one's own self included among others as one 
with duties as well as rights - as a self apprehended, as are others, 
as properly complete with both a "me" and an "I": the resulting 
authentic quality of brotherhood being Bultmann's strong preoccupation. 
Of course the generalized other at its unauthentic, as just described at 
length, is the same crowd (or indeed the same individual) as Paul's 
authentic redifinition and grasp of that crowd, or any member of it, as 
known and intuited by him on authentic interpersonal occasions - it is 
the same population as that living and knowing itself interpersonally as 
small-letter profane at its authentic, or small-letter sacred, which is 
the same thing - authenticity as human reality, or alternatively, 
unauthenticity, being every person's, and every crowd's, genuine 
competing possibilities, and the chosen framework of values, whichever 
of these two contrasting styles of conduct is opted for, will cause a 
homogeneity and gelling within each of these alternative sets of ethical 
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notions, these concepts touching on interpersonal conduct, as just 
listed, cohering as whole systems of behaviour and consciousness in 
either the case of the overriding authenticity or unauthenticity of 
their use. The unauthentic out of these two alternatively resulting 
frameworks of interpersonal conduct, Sartre's antivalue, if plunged for, 
will be as strongly held as can be the authentic one, and solemnly 
adhered to, albeit in bad faith, but purported no less committedly for 
that, than would be an authentic code of interpersonality. My former 
friend who quizzed me over the telephone about my family and our 
standing, meant me no harm (in terms of the ideology informing her 
conduct at least) by exposing me, preparing me for the Look of the 
generalized other which latently had designs on us for several years. 
Through her processing me ready for Gerede, she held out, offered me the 
possibility of my, our, acceptance into the society in which I belonged 
by the force of cultural expectations, by virtue of my background - on 
certain qualified terms of course, because of our still being provincial 
as well as an account of my having shown, over the years, my spiritual 
independence from that community and its judgement - so as to plausibly 
and 'deservedly' fit us into a niche within its body ready and waiting 
for us to be melted into, shedding in the process our veil of secrecy 
that attached to us during our years of seclusion from that environment. 
She lifted out, removed the stop in and for myself of my own, my 
personally and independently defined and developed "me" for 'closing' 
myself as an adequate and autonomous Sartrian Being-for-Itself, an 
individual managing without the spiritual crutch of my 'natural' 
subcultural generalized other which is properly and naturally available 
to me in the world, deflating in her act my being and that of my 
family, of any "I" in us over and above that 'proper' communal culture 
defining us in readymade terms, and filling, satiating her awn self as 
self-appointed 'master' over that stature which was newly allotted, 
offered by her for us, taking us into her self the while and making us 
hers through the nourishment of information, the stuff and means of 
interpersonal power in the process of the abuse of generously offered 
human reality in the act of donating one's "me" in authentic 
interpersonality, normally benignly surrendered as well as received in 
the course of authentic conversation - that which, however, can be 
falsely and tactically appropriated in Neugier and further and totally 
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consumed in Gerede, with a view to gaining overlordship over the person 
who is the object of the 'conversation'. 
On a sociologic scale, this process finds an echo in the insatiable 
data hoarding by the new, bureaucratic elite and its polarization, 
suction of subject status into itself and ejecting, releasing object 
status into the profane subordinate to it. Both these processes, 
Heideggerean socialpsychologic unauthentic interpersonality and the 
systematic 'specialisation' of subject status on a grand scale into the 
bureaucratic elite and object status into the profane of the world, 
have the power, in comparable ways, of subjugating the self of the other 
in the way of instrumentally having, possessing him instead of co-being 
with him in interpersonal 'transparency' (to mingle Sartrian jargon with 
a Heideggerean one for a moment), as Bluebeard's story con)UrQ forth on 
the micro-anthropologic scale, or, in the case of sociologic 
'specialisation' in the practice of the anthropologic abuse of the 
larger part of humanity, in sharp contrast with a democracy which would 
not be hypocritical, which would not render the greatest part of 
humanity, ourselves, as data-fodder, Slave in a very sircn5, real and 
meaningful Hegelian sense. The activity of the new elite in this 
context, may be seen as Gerede writ large. Its calling is to reduce, 
make null, the schism in society which, if it is allowed to remain 
articulated, explicit, will disturb; and, by implication, reduce the 
schism in the individual too, albeit the schism in his consciousness is 
the individual's key tool enabling him to appreciate the schism in 
society and to respond to it as an individual. In the main, its aim is 
to reduce that schism in its big-letter aspect in the world, though on 
different terms for ascribed Sacred and Profane, channelling Subject 
status into the Sacred and object status into the Profane, as already 
described. 
This section, which comparatively considered the systematically 
differing schism-reduction for Master and Slave an two planes: as writ 
large in society as such, and as writ small within socialpsychologic 
confines, touches on the borders of both macrosociology and 
microsociology, and would therefore have been equally legitimately, 
conveniently and naturally discussed as the first section in the 
following chapter.. 
CHAPTER III. 157 - 
THE SCHISM AS A MICROSOCIOLOGIC MATTER. 
Section L Being and Having. The Caretaker, 
The structure of the "me" and the "I" drawn into, engaged in 
relation to each other, this inner architecture of the perspective of 
the self, not foresworn, maintained by the person on its own terms as a 
self, at an angle with the generalized other, critical of, 
noncoincidental with that, a vantage point upon itself from the 
generalized other without surrendering one's private perspective an 
that, is the schism as a microsociologic and socialpsychologic matter; a 
close relative of hubris. Hubris is articulated anomie, or schism, one's 
being, or ever-ready potential for being at variance as a self with 
the generalized other if one's individual conscience inforts one of the 
need for that, it's the project of the maintainance of the familiarity 
with this condition of consciousness and choosing it as a call to 
transcend, better it, if necessary, act upon it, as a function of an 
intrinsic bidding for its own sake and as an end in itself. The schism 
as a microsociologic or socialpsychologic matter in this sense, is sin. 
As already said, it is the socialpsychologic, individually experienced 
inside of Durkheim's notion of the pooled anomie of statistics, the 
mechanism in consciousness experientially underlying that blanket, that 
'whole cloth' of anomie grasped as a sociologic phenomenon as is by 
Durkheim (and for which it is at times appreciated by Sartre), it's the 
small-letter projection of anomie, a process, the hobbly course within 
the self of the "me" always falling short in its actual realisation in 
the world of the demands of the "I" an it, and of the self creating 
newer and newer "me"-s to match those demands, to ground them in 
positive reality outside, with the "me" therefore always in a cognised 
and slippery disjointment with the generaiized other if authentic. 
Sartre claims this is always the case but we may choose to be blind to 
it in bad faith. In authenticity, the course of the small-letter schism 
as consciousness, is always tied up with the ever-imperfect but 
ceaseless project of the self always catching up in the world with its 
condition of socialpsycholic equilibration, with satisfaction as a 
consciousness always ahead of it, always deluding it; the schism 
provides and animates the course of the ego always thrusting itself 
ahead of its given condition in its constant adjustment-tropism; the 
process ever titillating the agent's consciousness so that it never 
quite knows, experiences the notion of 'enough' as a completely 
satisfactory and satisfied self. It's akin with Freud's Angst, 
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Kierkegaard's angest, the more modern psychologist's 'anxiety'. And yet 
this schism, this rupture, this relation of transcendence between the 
"I"'s hungers, projects, terms, and its given platform of realisation in 
the Sartrian existing, the "me"'s foothold in the self, quite simply 
equals the self, as Sartre points out, and is nothing other than the 
condition and process - this process - of being one. Already Freud 
implied, and a string of psychological studies since him made his thesis 
better explored and more explicit, that it is only in extreme conditions 
of schism, distancedness between the needs of the "I" and the self's 
sense of the attainment and adequate satiation with those needs in the 
world, that anxiety is burdensome, untenable, amounts to unbearable and 
unequivocal anguish, gets out of the reins of normalcy. Such degrees of 
anxiety which were discovered in psychologic study as conducive and the 
prerequisite of any achievement, are on the same continuum: that of 
anxiety. Even normal levels of achievement are possible only with 
considerable - better still, with high levels of anxiety, and constant 
lack of achievement, with all other things equal, usually and 
characteristically goes hand in hand with insufficient levels of drive, 
anxiety. You can only attain to be a person of a certain quality on your 
own merit at the price of some anguish, mixed with a sensation of the 
risk and thrill of the engagement, the pushing of the self nearer its 
creative limits, with the delighted-in experience and more important: 
anticipation of the occasional bringing together of a "me" an the "i"'s 
terms with the pay-off of its project in the world, of actually winning 
in the mode, currency and medium, of human reality. The schism, anomie, 
ingest is a pregnant, fertile process, the only one generative of itself 
in the terms of this currency: human reality, of labour, of pain, of 
labour pain through which mode of approach alone the self is productive, 
creative, an achieving one by the criterion of being fulfilled, salient, 
fully fledged as a self; not quite a run-of-the mill one, perhaps 
somewhat problematic, with a "me" of participation, a "me" of the 
constant renewal of itself and its condition, one with the lustre of a 
self-realised, self-acknowledged "I" leaving its stamp on the self of 
its engager, one with an "I" which is integral to and suggestive of a 
self of a certain sort and not equal to the "I" of the outward 
ostentation of an outsize "me" with greater than average power, on which 
we commented an the last pages of the last section. The attestable 
distinction, gloss finish of the self in its condition of the frank 
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acknowledgement of and active recourse to its schism which gives it any 
dynamic powers it may have as a self, is indeed other in kind as well as 
to appearances than the distinction as supreme object lent by 
subscription to the second-hand, Pukka-imitative ideals of the 
generalized other as just observed on the tail end of the last section. 
Neither is it interchangeable with the equally phoney "I" of the really 
powerful Pukka so ascribed in the actual terms of the world, the quality 
of their serious and typically bombastic "I" congealing among them in a 
"We" as a total phenomenon - the distinctive quality of the authentic 
self which is ready to own up to its schism, sharply differing from that 
of the coercive ascribed Masters who hold and can withhold, blow as part 
of their sphere of duty, one's dignity-constitutive secrecy and 
socialpsychologic autonomy of the self in the profane, us, in a manner 
writ large in sociologic dimensions. 
It is this, such selves, selves with such a creatively potent and 
authentic, first-hand sociaipsychologically distinguished, endowed and 
articulate, personal "me", which those high by ascription covet and mean 
to have. In reality, they are engaged in the self-defeating undertaking 
of acquiring such selves, the selves of 'doers' and not of 'have-ers' 
which they themselves are, but without recourse to and being stigmatised 
with the label of sin, a reputation as sinners; they would themselves 
like to have the mark and quality of first-hand selves which come from 
engaging one's very being as sounding boards to sonatas of doubt and 
daring which they would themselves like to be able to play rather than 
buy tickets to as paying audience, but without themselves screechingly 
probing into this possibility as a step towards attempting to be bold 
virtuosos, staking themselves the while in the exertion and risks that 
go with such a prize. They would like to secure such an outstanding self 
and its genuine glory for themselves, but by the power of legislation, 
by the allocation of such selves to them by legislative, ascriptive 
ways. It is the "I" of the achiever on account of creative attributes 
generated in the first person singular which they would like to be 
with, and not the polite, baptised, seedless substitute for that which 
they can manage to lay claim to and enforce and proclaim as the mark of 
social (not socialpsychologic) distinction and standards; the kind of 
excellence which alone they can have. Nobody wants to be an outstanding 
"me" merely by virtue of having bought or fixed his way to it. In the 
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Hungary of my childhood, only a few children were able to own a 
football, and an interpersonal notion and syndrome called 'he owns the 
ball' developed among bunches of children amongst whom there was only 
one person who had a football to go around among the rest of the 
players. (I believe this notion has found a place in the language use 
of this culture too. ) The expression 'he owns the ball' is expressive of 
the interpersonal conspiracy in which out of a sense of diplomacy 
'master' status in the sense of personally deserved excellence is 
tactfully feigned, politely allowed to attach, to someone 'master' in 
the inferior and personally unauthentic sense of superordination by 
virtue of mere privileged 'having' (in the case of these groups of 
children, through owning a football), so as to secure for-the real 
champs a slice of the conditions for playing the game. In practice, 
this meant that when children got together to play football, it was 
accepted that the owner of the ball had a say in doubtful decisions, 
which inevitably went in his favour; he was, moreover, never to be made 
feel a complete washout as a player even if he was one; to do so was 
somehow felt unethical and most certainly unexpedient, in view of the 
fact that the possibility of the next match depended on the owner of the 
ball wanting to play, and the continued psychological incentive for 
participation for him had to be taken care of. 
Everybody has 'schism' as his original possibility as a human being; 
this is simply consciousness and the structure of consciousness, as 
Sartre discerned and demonstrated, though in most of us this condition 
of consciousness is not as cultivated as it is in him. The tolerance of 
the schism (particularly when the distance between the claims and 
capacities of the "i" in their Sartrian absoluteness and the chances for 
a "me" for the gratification of those in the world is very great), is 
psychologically or socialpsychologically difficult for all, though 
authentic, and for selves which are Sacred because so ascribed, the 
schism (a threat to these conditions of sacredness in the world) is seen 
as intolerable both in the Sacred and the Profane, as a question 
touching on the entire style of conduct, and also as a matter of the 
concrete socialpsychologic consequences which result, follow from it. 
Decrying, as the average and typical Sacred does, recourse to the anomic 
mechanism of the furtherance of the self in ever-ready fundamental 
questioning (without which a mind of a certain stamp, artistic or 
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scientific, simply isn't possible), with the universal need and call for 
a socialpsychologically authentic, "I"-affected, self-supporting and 
self-propagative "me" waved aside, forgone, they are in the desperate 
straits of having a schism, permanently locked, in everlasting 
stagnation, between an "I" fully operative with all its hungers and 
claims, and the 'ceiling' of their selves in a realised "me" relative to 
that, inflexibly and immutably fixed in that "me" in the world which 
money can buy, which a free pass in the established network of 
opportunities there can fix, and which is the only type of "me" they all 
will have, by choice. Contrasting with the psychologically or rather 
socialpsychologically authentic "me" of the innerly propelled, 
spontaneous kind, the plastic, perpetual mechanism of the ceaseless 
transcendence of the self of itself to ever-newer, self-identified 
horizons by its own standards in the process of anomie, stands the 
mechanism of the maintainance of the superior standing of the 
ascriptionally high, furthered by the kinetics of schism-intolerance, by 
a Heideggerean system of socialpsychologocally unauthentic ruses (as 
elaborated in the last section) operating to interpersonally offload 
that schism and its demands and psychological consequences to another on 
the terms of mastery, subject, winner status for one's own self, and 
slavery, instrumentality for the other. The workings of this process 
which produces, maintains and feeds, to the convenience of the Pukka, 
"I"-appropriative or Master status to those originally and incidentally 
so ascribed, and 'object', Slave, instrument status for those 
incidentally and originally ascribed as Profane, are seldom explicitly 
articulated by the Pukka in the mode of frankness and openness either 
vis-a-vis the Rachmones, or even vis-a-vis himself, but this process and 
its socialpsychologically and socially favourable outcome for the Pukka 
is commonly justified by the latter as the proper reward of the Pukka's 
long-standing and typical ascription-abidance, by virtue of his 
fundamental choice, according to which he laid aside the project, the 
generic modality, pursuit, title and route to excellence which can be 
gained only by reliance an the authentic, pulsating medium of human 
reality in the living; this elected unquestioning ascription-abidance by 
the Pukka presented and understood by him as the quintessense of virtue. 
The Masters by ascription typically pretend that excellence is properly 
earned, not by a participatory exertion of overcoming the schism, not by 
riding that schism an the crest of the act in the process of actively 
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being the self, but by virtue of possessing another's self, by virtue of 
sustaining a self by way of having selves and the glory of their 
excellence, proffering instead of the twentyfour-carat virtue of the 
productive self by the hallmark of that very productivity, an 
alternative and fake code of excellence of the ascriptionally privileged 
which ostentatiously boasts 'I am what I have'. Selves as a whole, the 
privilege of their realisation, crowning culmination in, alive with, 
effused into accomplished and accomplishing "me"-s, are imbibed by such 
colonising, unauthentic selves, taken into them whilst extinguished in, 
sucked out of others, scrambled, the "I" and the "me" thereby put 
asunder in those who were originally productive of the self to be 
appropriated, the attainment of a dignified "me" which is complete with 
and indicative of an underlying "I", made the condition, in the case of 
the less privileged, of qualified access to such a "me" in those 
socially not destined to be endowed with a self of the first order. The 
ensemble of "me" and "I" is unmade, responsibilities, discretion, 
immediate perceptibility of, presence to the collective consciousness 
as directly intuited, interpreted, sensed at first hand, is disallowed, 
ungranted to the lowly ascribed, and the system of rights tallying with 
those in the world (the "me" which is there for them) assumed, defined 
for them and access to it apportioned to them by the Pukka in mean 
measure. Pinter's notion 'the caretaker' can now be introduced: in his 
play bearing that title, set in contemporary times, its action renders 
the pilgrimage, never to be accomplished, of a tramp to 'Sidcup' which, 
in spite of its apparently specific name, is a mysterious terminus where 
certificates, information, the facts relating to all persons, including 
his person, such as his name, his place of birth, his place of 
residence: a home, the job he is to do, in short: his identity as a 
whole person, as a small-letter sacred self, to be issued to him on 
arrival, is kept by nondescript, unspecific, unnamed administrative 
agencies in unbridgeable, unapproacheable separateness, alienation from 
him, where his person, defined by all these attributes to it, is made by 
these barely fathomable agencies, the object of care, in the 
Heideggerean, instrumental sense, but writ large in relation to that 
rendition. 
(Another allegory of the 'caretaker's' undertaking, practice in its 
operation: the process of his creaming off the most sublime and personal 
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aspects of selves for their own use of them by standing in their way as 
selves on their journey, in prayer, in the act of commending themselves 
to the gods, the representatives of the collective consciousness at its 
purely and ideally Sacred, in their hope of the'fulfilment and 
maintainance of those selves as a result of this project, is parodied 
in Aristophanes' play The Clouds, in which Socrates is depicted as 
suspended in a basket between heaven and earth, intercepting the 
sacrifices of mortals directed to the gods, and collecting tax, customs 
duty for letting through the 'incense', the medium of their worship, 
their prayers, offerings. ) 
Pinter's 'mortal', profane hero, marks, bides his time, stagnantly, 
indefinitely, in a half-way house to 'Sidcup', with lodgers of longer 
standing as such than himself, fellow-pilgrims, fellow-tramps, fellow 
traveller folk in a variegated system of accession to degrees of title 
to room, rights as egos on the road of progression towards a name, an 
Eigentlichkeit, to increasing grades of strength through being in situ, 
which is indicated by the varying title to and exercise of aggression. 
His quest for an identity is oriented to uncovering, finding, meeting, 
re-acquiring his self from the authorities with the power of issuing 
that to him at the point of his destination, but they are invisible, 
unfathomable, faceless. So is the landlord of the half-way house of his 
stay; absent and anonymous. The highest authority that is visible to him 
is the caretaker in loco the landlord, his identity also unstable, his 
name in the course of the plot constantly changing, his role handed on 
from person to person, the only knower, mediator, purveyor of the 
inscrutable rules pertaining to staying or moving on: the arbiter of 
duties to be rendered in exchange for shares in rights. (This is the 
currency the caretaker earns and the tenant pays: the rent is not 
tendered in money. ) The 'caretaker' of Pinter's plot, both the changing 
chain of characters assuming that office and the concept, is an allegory 
of a schedule, a regime of strength as derived from, as drawn into 
ownership, requisition and tenure of the conditions of the realisation 
of the self, of selves. It renders the code of reference of the project 
of being individually somewhat outstanding, of attaining status as a 
self, not by virtue of the productivity of it, not through any 
generating and giving, though this is the appearance, but by holding, 
withholding, and grudgingly letting those of lower ascription have 
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morsels of that personal identity, properly unique to all, which already 
is rightfully theirs and has been theirs from their births as human 
reality, as selves with possibilities, selves with the ghost, hope, 
conception, cognisance of the self which is the very own of each as 
ideally fulfilled, as a self with a future which is in part of one's own 
making. 
It has already been observed in Section 2. of the previous chapter 
that in the constantly staged charade on the media of the association 
of high personages with spectacular moments of the realisation of the 
selves of the 'less fortunate', creating the impression that such 
moments of bliss for the rachmones could exclusively and properly 
emanate only from those Up High, the Pukka's practice of the prevention 
and interception of the private and autonomous ways, means and methods 
of the fulfilment of ordinary people's lacking selves, is a meant and 
tactical policy which is functional for reinforcing the stability of the 
reigning system in macrosociologic ways and dimensions over and above 
the socialpsychologic gratification inherent in it for those who 
systematically, nay, professionally, fulfil this duty of apparent 
giving. Another, distant but related echo of the same phenomenon, that 
of the institutionally functional interception of the autonomous 
fulfilment of the self for the sake of the furtherance of an established 
social structure will also be identified here, though scaled down in 
this second context to the dimensions of the family. This second, 
related use of the socially tactical frustration of the fulfilment of 
the sphere of duties and operation of individual selves, can be 
observed in the extended family, with censorious, measured access 
granted in a partial and socially circumscribed and qualified manner to 
the junior woman to her children and other areas of responsibilities in 
the family by the senior woman, now aged, who would otherwise be unable 
to support herself in any sense of the word, particularly not in the 
socialpsychologic sense of being an autonomous self herself, which she 
wasn't brought up to be when she was a junior woman, with her parasitic 
being on the junior woman as the number one matriarch, the 'caretaker' 
of the sanctity and functioning of the extended family, protected by the 
appeal and aura of the ascribed sacredness of the grandmother stereotype 
attaching to her, and the resulting pattern of a lifetime's cycle of 
socially functional insufficiency for women as selves and the eventual 
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pay-off of this condition in the coercive grandmother-role, handed down 
as the legacy of the junior woman as something to which she will 
graduate when she is a grandmother, when life has beaten her too and all 
the go and quality as an individual have gone out of her, so that the 
arrangement may serve to support her as a person, lend, secure for her 
fulfilment and the semblance of dignity as a self. 
What the caretaker-ethics, norm, style for conducting the self 
fuels, maintains, and which Pinter's play symbolises, is a scale of 
merit in which the provenness, order of one's elevation as a person is 
asserted by the overwhelming extent of the hold over and the meanness of 
the measure in granting room to another person's self, in which the 
height of and the title to office is indicated by the heaviness of 
manner to subordinates, harshness of being, greatness of the push of 
oversight, in which, respect to those more menially ascribed is missing 
as a necessary feature of the relationship (though there may be a love 
of a Sartre-depicted, unauthentic sort), and in which that which is good 
for one who is in the 'caretaker's' 'care' is indicated by the firmness 
with which that 'good' is sat upon and judiciously given out by the 
'caretaker'. The caretakers provide protection to the selves in their 
care in the same way as that is proverbially apportioned and granted by 
the mafia 'godfather'. This approach to high personal ranking, to 
caretaking, has appeal to the naive, the immature. The other day I came 
across records of the notorious training ship 'Clio', t" moored off the 
shores of Bangor in the last century: a part educational, part 
corrective community for the young (though some boys were committed 
there by virtue of poverty alone, because their parents couldn't care 
for them), where eleven to sixteen-year-olds were kept under such 
repressive rule by an autocratic headmaster that the pity felt for them 
by the public was remembered even in this century; the people of Bangor 
were giving sixpences to the elegant naval cadets when they went ashore 
during a visit there between the two wars, in remembrance of the 
training 9ýtp boys who used to occasionally go ashore there, several 
decades before. Many of the original boys on the Clio, on completing 
their service there, have subsequently sent letters of gratitude to this 
man. Selves who are superordinate by ascription, who are in the position 
of the privileged syphoning off of the "I" or Subject function for 
themselves in the process of the 'specialisation', distribution, 
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allocation of "I"-s for the Pukka, "me"-s for the Rachmanes (as 
described in Section 2. of the last chapter), the ascriptionally 
privileged, are engaged in a kind of reverse anomie of accession above 
other selves by exclusion, the exclusion of some (or rather, of most) 
from dignified, creative human reality status, rather than by constantly 
creating such a status for themselves in the process of ceaselessly 
exercising socialpsychologically earned and expressed, first-hand human 
excellence. Those "I"-appropriating and hogging Pukka who cultivate 
(instead of authentic means of self-betterment in taxing and self- 
referential anomie) this exercise of the anthropologic keeping up with 
the Joneses, their sense of excellence deriving from the external index 
of who can show greater say and power in having other selves at their 
disposal, in their caretaking jurisdiction, as expressed in the 
hierarchy of the various 'honours lists' of ascribed merit in the world 
as already allocated, have the sadness of the absence of a pliant, 
flexible, creation-responsive and sensitive, productive and generative 
"me" of a dynamic self of their own, of having to be content, in their 
kind of socialpsychologic process and method of overcoming the schism, 
with always being, instead of 'better than' so and so (or even their own 
former selves), forever merely 'better off than'. They can never have 
the mark of that self which comes from the daring of a disciple of 
Descartes or from being thrown willy-nilly to insights of the profundity 
of the doubt of the generalized other so that he can manage on the 
scraps of what the generalized other throws him as a self after he has 
been judged by that at the end of each of his projects in which he will 
forever engage, or cope with the burdensome individual privilege of 
standing up to newly discovered peaks of their selves which such 
projects may bring them in the race for one's self; they must forever 
forego the lot, truly distinguishing but psychologically considerably 
consuming, of one who solves the task of schism-management which we all 
have to do, as a self that feeds on licking its wounds, on his own resin 
as a self. Their schisms never resolved into the momentary glorious 
synthesis between "me" and "I" as an ever exigent self, but frozen into 
the unbridgeable and painful gap (which is in us all as anemic sinners) 
between all they would be and all they can have; what these selves 
hunger for, what they mean to get out of the caretaking project, is the 
"me" of a shining, salient, unique ego, so as to be this kind of a self 
with a certain stamp, a first-hand, personal one, the product carrying 
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the trade mark of a schism owned up to and managed, offered up, 
constantly mined, delved into, drawn on. They legislate the schism away 
as the mark of deviance in the face of the established norm in that 
generalized other which is the case in the world, but lay claim to 
imparting into themselves the natural privilege of one sucessfully 
resolved, kept up, open, constantly reaped. What they want, what they 
have their eyes ambivalently clapped on, a thorn in the flesh as 
ascribed Sacred but their anal attitude to selves vacu6a , eager 
for 
it, is a jewel of a self; not their own, terminating directly, without a 
seam, in the generalized other, flush with that, a barren desert of a 
synthesis with an "I" served up on a plate and tailor made to fit its 
field of gratification in the world, and, conversely, a world tailor 
made to fit the demands of their "I", but a self with knobs on as such, 
at a noticeable tangent to, distinction in relation to, the sea of the 
generalized other as the reigning norm, with the brand name of a 
socialpsychologically outstanding "me" suggestive of an authentic "I", 
with a depth, a will of its own, stating itself as a humanity, as human 
reality of its own making and limits. The Queen's "me" often states 
itself, emerges as such a "me": employing, as she has done, for 
instance, a homosexual in the highest rank in her personal security 
team and reluctant to dismiss him after years of impeccable service in 
spite of pressure from public opinion, until the generalized other 
showed its superior muscle and got them both, forcefully removing the 
man from his job and checking the Queen's freedom to exercise her 
judgement as a person as prompted to her by a personal "I" in her 
capacity as a human reality. Such an authentic self is that of an 
artist, an actor, its "me" a spectacular assumption of its convention- 
deviant inner resources, a flagrant individual perspective on the 
generalized other, a prism on its surface, showing that up, a schism of 
which he is not only unashamed but able to make a living of; or a 
Diogenes, in his barrel for a home and with his spirit occupying an 
elaborate structure, edifice of thought, and claiming a universe for its 
accommodation - together with the army of the nameless followers and 
amataeur successors of his kind as a self; or unruly children who are 
heard as well as seen, or hitch-hikers on holiday abroad who know better 
how to have a good time than the tycoon, a Citizen Kane lost for ways of 
enlivening his spirit and way of life wherever he goes. It's the sheen 
of a self, fresh, unlooked at, private like Bluebeard's, king of the 
Being and Having. The Caretaker. - 168 - 
castle of an autonomous soul, it is selves with such sheen which the 
voracious Pukka means to absorb, draw into his collection, gallery of 
hijacked and hogged selves, 'take internally' so as to be with it; but, 
regardless of the numbers of the selves he engulfed he can only have 
these selves, he cannot fuel, maintain a qualitatively improved more 
authentic one of his own by virtue of his administrative overlordship, 
gluttonous caretakership vis-a-vis those, because he rejects the avenue 
along which that can be gained, as a matter of his fundamental choice. 
His plan to obtain, incorporate into himself the target self chosen for 
his absorption, like that of the sadist in Sartre's description, is 
doomed to failure. Either the self of the other as object only, that 
which his caretaking produces, is one not worth having any more after 
its conquest, or it is not succesfully owned - the Hegelian mirror image 
as his feedback regarding himself in the Other's eyes which he hungers 
for as the prop and basis for his own self, will show up his self, his 
being as a sham, secondary one 'made in Hong-Kong' as it were, and the 
project of taking into himself the selves of his fixation will continue 
to elude him. He will quote figures in the way of conversation during 
social get-togethers, when others exchange, air their genuine common 
interests, their observations about the world and its ways, their 
learning; he will display his knowledge of a great number of facts about 
places, buildings, things of tourist interest, items suited for or taken 
from books of records, percentages of production. This type, if he 
happens to be a teacher, will relish telling his fellow-spirits how he 
got the better of a little blighter at school, These manifestations of 
this type of degraded but gregarious "i"-s are all hymns of having, sung 
in their own praise - delivered with the chilling lustre of a self lent 
by the attitude 'See all the things I have? ' - the stiff, starched, 
forbidding uprightness of a bastardised Protestant ethics advertising, 
asserting the self of its subscribers by the dictum 'I am what I have'. 
But they are not content with the resulting graceless, hapless, smile- 
less lustre of the self - they covet the warm, unmanufactured and 
spontaneous, first-hand sheen of a cottage-craft, home-produced one, 
boasting unselfconsciously: 'See all the things I am, and all that I 
did? ' - and it's such a self that they mean to have for themselves by 
appropriation, in the name, by the dicta and according to the yardstick 
of ascribed merit in the world; a self-defeating, hopeless undertaking 
in this, the battle, the competition of these two conflicting tactics, 
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authentic and unauthentic, producing first-rate and second-rate 
excellence, the competing possibilities for the being of consciousness, 
producing a distinction between those, basically (to rely on a Shavian 
classification for a moment), who 'can', and those who, tragically, 
'can't'. It is this division within mankind reflecting and telling of 
the differing alternative modes of one's fundamental choice as one's 
mode of conduct, to which Kenneth Tynan referred when he classified the 
population of the world into gypsies and accountants; a fundamental 
rift, perhaps the greatest there is, the rift between those who go about 
in the world by 'doing' because they can (wanting to be able to 'do' 
being a necessary prerequisite to their constant and characteristic 
display of in fact being able), and those, on the other hand, who don't 
attempt a lifestyle of 'doing', of conducting themselves as such selves 
whichcan, will and must carry themselves in their everydays as such 
first-hand and ever-productive egos with a trademark as such, but 
purchase instead or freeze the personal assets in others capable of 
producing and carrying a 24 carat proof self. The 'accountant', as a 
classificatory category, decries the project of excelling in the gift of 
continuous and authentic social creativity, producible exclusively in 
the idiom and medium of the self only; he crusades against the 'gypsy's' 
fundamental choice of constantly engaging, putting into play the 
dynamism within the self's infrastructure, actively consulting the 
personal "I" in critique of the status and quality of the "me" and the 
extent to which that is achieved or allowed leeway to exercise in the 
world its authentic lights, and creating and if need be fight for newer 
"me"-s to fit in reality one's ideal of a "me" called out by the "I". 
This process amounts to, affords that privileged process which alone the 
self can secure for itself, and for other selves, licence to carry out 
one's project of self-production and self-betterment, each according to 
their talent, and the produced and productive self is absolute in every 
case, whether spectacularly limelighted or quite unobtrusive in its 
scope and nature. A new classification of Pukka and Rachmones has now 
become possible to add to the ascribed types, paradigms and 
manifestations of the relationship identified in the last chapter; this 
time the fundamental division between these two halves of mankind is 
made on the basis of the psychologic, or rather socialpsychologic 
attributes which are differentially at work within the selves of these 
two opposing camps in mankind respectively, as a matter of the 
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fundamental choice which fuels and maintains their different status as 
sacred and profane, rather than the distinction obtaining by virtue of 
macrosociologic features attaching to the reasons for the chasm between 
them, as was the case in the last chapter. 
Table 4. 
Accountants 
The 'have-ers'. Caretakers by 
way of interception of fulfilment 
of other selves, hold-up of those, 
like the gods, caretakers in 
Clouds; cultivation of second-rate, 
derivative virtues. 
Qy4L! 5j&. a 
Resolvers of schism, angest, 
personal anomie, by getting 
it by the horn, coping with 
it authentically, perpetrat- 
ing, thriving*on it as 
though an a bacterial 
culture; their element, as 
the method whereby to handle 
their schism, anomie: every 
self's lot. 
Table 5. 
Gentlemen. Players. 
In illuminating the distinction between the Gypsy's approach and the 
Accountant/Gentleman's different approach to the project of attaining 
what to each of these anthropologic classes, differentially and 
respectively, amounts to excellence, I am reminded of Ramuz's 'book' to 
Stravinsky's The Soldier's Tale, a piece 'to be read, played and 
danced'; 12" a legend illuminating in rich symbolism the progress 
through life and the alternative quality of that as gained in the 
shadow of our choice in adopting one or the other of the above 
identified, competing modes of the overriding style of our 
consciousness - that through which we may acquire a sense of morality by 
virtue of being selves - ourselves - and that kind of elevation, on the 
other side, which we may try to attach to ourselves by way of having, 
owning other selves. 
The soldier is on his way home on leave, carefree, penniless, 
stretching his legs on the wayside, full of the prospect of seeing his 
girl and his mother again, idly rummaging through his things in his 
knapsack, fingering the fiddle he has bought for a few pence. The Devil 
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passes by, disguised as an old man (to look more and more like the Devil ", 
in his conventional guise as the action progresses). He asks for the 
violin; the soldier refuses, but is finally persuaded to swap his 
fiddle, so cheap to have bought, for a book which will make him rich, 
with 'bank notes, bearer bonds, gold... collateral... market quotations' 
(readable in the Devil's book a few days before they are actually 
published), and on top of that, his promise to go with the Devil to his 
place for three days. With the three days gone, the Devil takes back 
the soldier to his village. It transpires that the 'three days' spent 
with the Devil were three years; he has lost during that time that which 
he has been for hiL; girl, for his mother, for folks: himself as he was 
for them, their knowledge of him: the basis for his self, -his identity, 
if Hegel is to be believed. No-one recognises him, not even his mother, 
and his girl is now married with children. 'They all take me for a 
ghost, I am dead among the living. ' It's ambiguous whether his death was 
real, 'antic', or symbolic of a new existence without a soul, lacking 
the aura and foundation for one, in the sense of his having attained a 
new style of existence, one without exigency, spirit, without 'life' in 
a certain sense. He sets off on the road again with his book, the gift 
of the Devil. First he is a trader, a 'peddler of wares' and then he 
finds himself an to greater things; it turns out that, in possession of 
the book, he can't go wrong in business and grows unbelievably rich, but 
equally unhappy, and wishes to be able to shed everything he has, longs 
to exchange the book for his old way of life, for the things that made 
him happy. The Devil appears to him again, still disguised as an old 
man, a 'poor peddler' himself, begging the soldier to buy one of his 
bric-a-bracs. The soldier reaches for money to give him as a goodwill 
gesture, but the Devil forces him to accept the items he had brought for 
him in exchange for the alms: the things he brought the soldier for sale 
turn out to be the contents of the soldier's old knapsack: a mirror, a 
picture of his girl, all meaningless now; and finally, the fiddle. The 
soldier's eyes light up at the sight of the fiddle, but the fiddle 
won't play for him; the proof of the rightful ownership of the fiddle is 
that one can play it. The soldier throws the violin back to the Devil 
and tears up the book: he has neither now, he has nothing in both senses 
of the term, neither the burden of the Devil's gift and with that an 
unfailing winning streak yielding him meaningless plenty, nor his own 
authentic gift to be able to tease out a tune from his violin; but the 
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double negative of being without both, ' does not in itself bring him 
what he yearns for: the recovery of that life which he surrendered to 
the Devil in the first place. To attain his freedom of old in the sense 
of the Sartrian potent double negative of disowning the dearth of life 
with 'having' as its keynote which the Devil bestowed on him, he must 
unmake his original deal with the Devil, reverse that in an inverse 
contract, in a ceremony of comparable symbolic meaning and totality, in 
deed, in depth, absolutely. There is a kindred notion in Sartre's play 
The Vicious Circle: even 'after death', when damned, the rebuilding of 
the structure of trust (authentic love) between people is forever open, 
there remains an avenue to salvation. The soldier sets out on the road 
again with the aim of purging himself of the Devil's gift With the 
ensuing kind of life and regaining his own. He hears tell of the 
princess of the land ailing; he who restores her to health gains her 
hand. 'Doctoring? ' the soldier muses, 'Just think... a girl to call your 
own, after so many years alone. ' The Devil appears again, reminding the 
soldier that his original gift is not yet his own. The Devil performs 
virtuoso, empty flourishes on the ', olin. 'I have my methods! I, not 
you. ' he calls. The soldier sees this as his moment to recover all that 
the Devil had taken from him. His plan is to challenge the Devil in a 
game of cards. The Devil is sure to win, and the soldier means to 'lose 
back' to him the zero being of what he has become as a man, everything - 
lose back to the Devil his present which still clings to the soldier's 
being in the idiom of 'having', and gain all that which he'd rather be: 
himself. As they play, the bad faith which was the Devil's gift seeps 
back into the Devil's personage; the soldier's trick will be done when 
everything he possessed is gained back by the Devil to the last penny. 
It's a case of 'loser wins'. Once the Devil starts playing, he is 
'turned on', he is an the 'automatic pilot' of the exclusively 
empirically homed-in, goal-directed bad faith of his kind, he cannot 
help but win back all the soldier stakes, and win again. Raking off all 
that can be had is the Devil's element, he is condemned to it: this is 
the only meaning which 'winning' has for him. The course of the game is 
a crescendo of winning in the differing senses which the term has for 
the two players: the Devil is more and more 'sent' as his 'victory' of 
ripping off the soldier is more and more total, not noticing that life 
is increasingly going out of him the while; he starts tottering, losing 
his breath, whilst the soldier raises the stakes more and more wildly, 
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and as the pile of coins and notes in front of him diminishes, he lives 
more and more. In the end the Devil dies and the soldier takes the 
violin off him. The Devil's death, again, is ambiguous; he dies in both 
senses, actual and symbolic, but soldier and narrator are both aware 
that the limits of the Devil's kind of life reach beyond one death and 
that therefore his demise will not be lasting. The narrator warns: the 
Devil will be back. 
The soldier plays the violin to the princess and she is cured. He 
wins her; they 'tango', 'waltz' and 'ragtime', but the Devil is also 
there. He threatens: '... this realm of yours is not so great. If once 
its frontiers be passed Then you'll be in my power at last: ', and both 
he and his princess would be lost; the princess back in bed again. The 
Devil foretells that the soldier won't know what's enough. It's not, of 
course, his rightful happiness with the princess that he must not have 
enough of; 'one happy thing is every happy thing'; human reality is of 
'whole cloth' too, like Durkheim's anomie. There is therefore no end to 
the happiness of a life conducted according to the rules of human 
reality; but the soldier is to fall nevertheless because he will finally 
want something of the Devil's kind; have something that he has 
undeserved. He allows the princess to persuade him to take her back, 
introduce her to his folks, to add his past, lost happiness to his 
present one, to own that too, after all, to own that which he has 
deservedly lost, from which it was his due to be thrust; he can't leave 
the fruits of his old failure alone and wants to turn them into a 
positive thing for himself, a feather in his cap. They start off on 
their way to his village. On its frontiers they are to part. The Devil 
suddenly strikes up a tune an the violin 'Leading the way as the soldier 
follows him, and the princess 'a little way behind', is never to arrive 
into the sight of the audience. 
In contemporary, twentieth-century literature, as in New Testament 
times, the preoccupation with, the positing of two gods is clearly 
discernible. One could be called the Absentee Landlord, the other 
perhaps 'Godot', with Becket. The former is conceived of and worshipped, 
characteristically, in terms of having, the second entertained, in 
strong counterdistinction with the first, chiefly by existentialists - 
all, it may be said, but most notably perhaps in this context by Tillich 
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and by Bultmann: God as hypothesised, cultivated, pursued, conduced in 
and through the mode of one's being, conducted by one's life in the 
living. Both are absent, rather than palpable to the senses, concepts, 
frames of reference to, keynotes of conduct; but while the Absentee 
Landlord is followed with a view to securing him and is conceptualised 
as, corroborated by and reinforced in terms of things in that which is 
here, permanent objects, massive, solid, substantive, whether literally 
tangible or the lattice, corpus of established practices, relations, the 
positive architecture of institutions in which society positively 
consists - the God as conceived of according to the latter, Becket-ian, 
existentialist, transilient modality, tradition, is never there to hand, 
is always fathomable as ahead in time, an informant, point'd'appui 
untransformably and constantly in the future; to be 'waited for', «' 
contact with whom is in the medium and mode of exigency, orientation 
towards it, transmitted, served, witnessed in the idiom of direct, 
particular personalness, experienced, sought per se, for itself, for the 
self, and in terms of it. Bultmann traces back the latter, empathic, 
internalised, life-perpetrated, first-hand grasp of God to the 'spark' 
of the Gnostics whose influence he identifies and asserts as one 
component in the upsurge of Christianity as protest, anti-established 
order or 'romantic', individual-assertive, revolutionary mass-movement 
as it was at its advent; the 'spark', the soul in each conceived of at 
this time as so many spin-offs of God as light which are 'inclosed in 
man and represent his innermost self' as a bit of god-likeness, creator, 
emanating capacity in one, towards which man as spark is drawn and with 
which he finally unites. C4' This innerweltlich or microcosmic or 
innerly contained and dynamic grasp of God - diachronic, so to speak, 
non-substantial, energial in its conception - is characteristic of 
Christianity's subsequent structure-nihilative and reactive phases and 
Renaissances, (Christianity, like all life-processes, however general 
and wide-spanning in their prevalence, periodically renewing itself in 
its phases of Romanticism at times of the decadence of its structured 
form of established positivity in the world, as already argued in 
Section 2 of the previous chapter and as Hegel would agree. Examples of 
such structure-nihilative phases of Christianity offer themselves in the 
instances of the Reformation, then, in more modern times, in the 
assertion of the spirit rather than of the established form of any 
religion by the flower-power movement, then again in the civil rights 
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movement of Martin Luther King in the United States, or the 
existentialist religious upsurge earlier this century predominantly in 
Europe, and finally as such a nihilative spiritual phase shows itself in 
the present day in the way in which the status quo-critical, officially 
oppressed (or at least discouraged) authentic spirit asserts itself in 
the face of the reigning, powerful bureaucracy, during the current phase 
of the decline of class-societies. This modern-day spiritual dissent 
takes various forms as a dissenting response to the emerging, new 
bureaucratic order both in the East and in the West, which range from 
Rastafarianism from below to a wave of speaking out against the inhuman 
ethical anomalies of the established regime from the highest quarters of 
the Churches in the West, through a religious renewal in Poland and the 
Soviet Union, and in other forms of the advocating of the personal, 
militant authenticity of the self, of particular selves and their human 
rights as such vis-a-vis the restraining, ossified norm of the 
establishment wherever that is the case. The intellectual movements 
which may be classified among present-day manifestations of spirit 
engagad in the nihilation of its institutional oppression in many places 
of the communist and also of the capitalist world, don't necessarily see 
themselves as Christian, but their aims amount to projects which are 
consistent and compatible with Paul and with the promotion of his 
outlook regarding man and man's call, of which the medium and aim of 
Live Aid was just one example. ) In contrast, the Absentee Landlord as a 
frame of unauthentic reference in approaching God is intuited and cued 
in outwardly referential, spatial rather than existentiell terms and 
analogy - in terms of substantial, established facticity in a now to 
which we are anchored in terms of ownership, such as that of Pinter's 
'house', conceptualised, grasped in terms of belonging to the Absentee 
Landlord, (though he is not manifestly there), through which he can be 
posited, interpreted, 'read', fathomed in terms of property; a God of 
stagnation, of structural positivity, grasped and operative as a 
permanent erection of the literally or symbolically solid kind in the 
established world; a world which one minds on his behalf. This God of 
established positivity, tangible or socially symbolic, is sustained, 
transacted through a morality of possession. According to the code of 
this God, virtue, distinction consists in the caretaking of his world 
within a system of various gradations of status, with one's rank defined 
by way of seniority in a framework of selves who are charged with 
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preserving the things in it, and engaged in the ongoing process of 
practicing and enforcing loyalty that is owing to one who has shares in 
this world, justified by the worship of this God of things and rightful 
belongings. Virtue by the dicta of this God consists in looking after 
the furniture and the fixtures in this God's world, Pinter's 'house', 
making sure they are not damaged, that they are kept in good order, 
ideally even beyond 'reasonable wear', in Parmenidean perpetuity. The 
'enjoyment' which is the yield of the two differing approaches to the 
worship of God, is again an ambiguous word which has a Big-letter and a 
small-letter meaning; a process in the small-letter sense, fluid, 
immediate, subjective, born and conveyed in personalness - its other, 
Big-letter meaning legally connotative, spatially referential, 
experienced as the just deserts of a meritorious tenant who earns his 
right to the enjoyment of the premises, a territorially assertive 
attitude, the pride of the cock of the portion of the walk allotted to 
one, paid for; its yield, reward expressed, brought forth, indicated by 
the things one rightfully has as held by and purported, say, in the 
established Puritanic morals of the present. Our family recently went 
through a very stressful period of dispute concerning our right to live 
in a house we built ourselves, and in the course of it we learnt to know 
a whole new vocabulary, frame of human reference and code of virtue. 'A 
good man with plenty of clout' was someone whose favours it was a good 
idea to seek, whereas someone who has already been 'got at' by agencies 
rival to us, was to be avoided like poison. Moments of weakness, 
suggestions in one party of temporary openness to liability in one sense 
or another, are the cue to making a move in relation to such a 
relatively unprotected person, to do him down in the course of the race 
with the other party, in the process of wriggling up the rungs of 
privilegedness, either of the kind which meet the eye or which are 
secondarily useful in the sense of being the actual means to attaining 
those. Such conduct is thought as both right and rational. Constructive 
liaisons between people within this frame of reference take the form of 
tacit blackmail, with favours needed from one party withheld until and 
unless a return favour or equivalent remuneration of some kind is agreed 
on (often tacitly, by implication only), understood, clearly implied, 
secured. 'I employ this person because I like his work' is seen as 
something suspect because of the lack of the clarity of ulterior, 
tangibly goal-directed motivation underneath it all to make that 
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comprehensible, with a more transparent, nepotistic or otherwise 
society-wise instrumental rationale secretly underlying the act of 
giving someone a break naturally suspected, probed for. Giving effective 
help to someone when it is needed just because 'they are friends' is 
seen as dishonourable, inexplicable and unplaceable within the framework 
of the exchange of finely calculated, directly or indirectly tangible 
'equivalents' - indicative of unfairness, morally not up to scratch, 
disrespectful of those whose assistance in their ego-assertion is 
possessively and exclusively earmarked by the Jacob's ladder of ascribed 
succession and rankings of meritoriousness, such as their being family 
or being advancedly placed in the queue of ascension by the powerful 
dicta of some other set of established social hierarchy. . 
The spontaneous 'romantic' virtues of being a 'gypsy' who can and 
will cast projects in the style of selves such as manually building 
one's own house helped by friends, can and indeed was in our case, met 
with such an expression and elaborate counterproject of violent legalism 
launched by a community of already established property-owners, offended 
by the affrontery of such settling behaviour, and reverently informed by 
the code of selling and buying as opposed to making and creating, that 
the success either of our project or their counterproject came to mean 
and entail the total destruction of the other, together with the selves 
which the two clashing campaigns promoted, stood for. It was either to 
end literally in the razing to the ground of our house which was all we 
had, or alternatively the humiliation, symbolic destruction of our 
objectors as local people with clout, and the saga of our building the 
house turned into a display of the strength of a mafia called on to sort 
us out whose breadth and depth of actin radius we never suspected. There 
is a Hungarian poem by Janos Arany called The Rig tingale'which tells 
the allegoric story of this songbird settling on the fence between the 
properties of two farmers, its beautiful song plunging the two men into 
ever more bitter hatred, demoralisation and financial ruin in the legal 
battle and indulgence in the bribery of the sheriff in the competition 
to decide which out of the two men the nightingale was singing for. In 
the end the two farmers openly approach the sheriff asking outright 
'Which of us is the bird singing for? ' The sheriff slaps his own pocket 
with money jingling in it and declares: 'It's singing for me. ' The poem 
symbolically juxtaposes the bird, vagrant little musician, akin in its 
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conception to the music-making gypsy being of the hero of The Soldier's 
Tale, realiser of his talent as a splinter, spin-off, spark of a Gnostic 
diachronic understanding of a God at its creative, as creator, in the 
sense in which we are a bit of gcd as it were in the exertion of our 
creative talents ('mere' social creativity included) as we are bid to do 
in the biblical parable, over against and in counterdistinction with the 
caretakers of the established order, tin gods as owners, hogging not 
only their bought piece of nature, made sacred and sanctioned, to their 
understanding, by fence-pegging but standing for all who hog and all 
that is being hogged by like-spirited agents in the service of an ethics 
of immutable ownership, bits of god by way of 'having', securing, buying 
for themselves God (the Absentee Landlord, in truth) and owning shares 
in him, reducing everything to property, longing to hag and thereby 
destroy everything that does not yet figure in their property deeds, 
such as a bird and its song, careful that no uncharted spark should 
intrude in the world which they intuit as the pegged-out space it 
occupies, including the life furnishing that, with a preservation order 
an it all as far as they are concerned. The term 'deed' which just 
cropped up, offers itself for inclusion in our collection of words with 
a dual, opposite pair of meanings as a function of being grasped as big- 
letter or small-letter. 'Deed' in the more usual sense means the act, 
stands for human reality whose unit the act is, as accomplished in 
exertion in and by the self, a spark of the energial 'godhead', 
according to the Gnostics-originated understanding: a slice of life. In 
the context 'property deed', however, the term has sprouted legalistic 
roots, standing for the proof of a share in the world which is 
Officially so sanctioned, so rubberstamped to make it an accomplished 
fact of ascribed ownership, a unit, circumference of a self as defined 
by its acquired possession, one's 'godliness', mode of divine being, 
consisting of, experienced, amounting, rather than a slice of life, to a 
slice of inertia. 
The question of the relationship between the self who is spark, 
social creator, and what he should and/or does own in terms of the 
security as a self anchored in the world in the way of property and 
other worldly privilege, is a longstanding preoccupation of ethics. The 
early Christians saw an absolute chasm between the two; they were by 
definition poor, absolutely so, having to give up their property, often 
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their lives, to follow the spirit and the choice of life of Paul, as 
self-confessed profane aspiring to a truer future as a self, and did not 
see god as a kind of positivity which could be in part theirs in terms 
of the various forms of the external being of society, of this world, 
contained within nature in the here-and-now. They did indeed entertain 
the positivity of God who was to see them right in terms of the positive 
rewards, in the end, of their efforts and exertions in life, but removed 
outside from this world in space and time, His kingdom a facticity 
outside nature and beyond life. In their lifetime they encountered 
earthly riches in their absolute alienation from a life authentic in 
Paul's sense, and maintained a strong, mutually exclusive dualism 
between the God in heaven propagated by true, authentic conduct in life, 
and the god of gold in this world worshipped in bad faith, Mammon, the 
false god whose reverence went hand-in-hand with the persecution of the 
socially blemished at their colourful Pauline. It was Luther who first 
coherently brought together in an ideology of autenticity, God who is 
personally promoted in and with the being of all in everyday conduct 
(without compromising the call of a life of personal authenticity as a 
divine duty in Paul's revolutionary sense), and the God to be had, to 
be earned in terms of riches in this world, as the consolidation in 
tangible ways of God as spark, conducted, 'been', created and creative 
in our own selves, with the world of the here-and-now conceived as the 
proper arena of its rewards, the positivity of that seen as the scene of 
the just deserts of authenticity as human reality propagated by the deed 
in the context of the external actuality of the world; the pearl 
secreted by one's project as a self seen as rightfully the self's own. 
The 'house' with its symbolism in keeping with Pinter's cosmology (as 
rendered in his play which we are currently entertaining) could be 
likened, consistently with Luther, to that, say, of a snail, the by- 
product of the occupant's very life, therefore itself sacred, because 
earned, produced, in inseparatibility from the self. There are two ways 
to occupy the 'house' symbolic for the world and its idiom of having; 
one is to match one's being to it in subservience as a self to the terms 
and rules of tenancy as given in remoteness from the self and its 
comprehension, the other is to match the house to one's self, to emanate 
the self's tenure in and of the house, from one's being as such. The 
first of these grasps, of these attitudes to the relationship of what we 
are as human reality and the room and instrumentality for it in the 
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world on which our being as selves impinges, what we have the right to 
have, is that which Pinter describes, one's place in the 'tangible' 
universe derived, according to his rendition, from the removed, 
personally incomprehensible, unchallengable, immutable property laws of 
the Absentee Landlord, in one's pilgrimage towards the allocation to one 
of his self. Contrastingly, in the second type of approach to the 
'house', the 'house' can be had, or rather: creatively 'been' as an 
extension of the lived and living, authentically deserving, productive 
"me", creatively affording one psychological space, much is the same way 
as Sartre regards a walking stick which is being used as an extension of 
the body, of Being-for-Itself. Of course, this is not to simplistically 
imply in Luther, or in the young Marx who is greatly preoccupied with a 
highly kindred 'problematic', that one has to manually build the house 
he lives in to be deserving of it; with the division of labour in 
operation, it suffices if one has earned with one's creativity exerted 
in any manner, one's right to his share in nature's riches. Nor does 
such an approach to having, the Lutherian one, imply to Luther's 
disciples that by building a house manually, the need for property deeds 
and other legal prerequisites to erecting a home can be waived, 
dispensed with, in establishing the right to its ownership. The contrast 
of the two attitudes to occupying a house as just outlined, is, to 
'romantic' Protestantism, not so much a question of its ownership as 
rather one of fundamental choice colouring one's attitude to living in 
it; one or the other attitude to occupying the house can be assumed 
quite irrespective of whether one owns the house, rents it or squats in 
it, like Pinter's tramp. As in the young Marx, what you have and what 
you are, your metal as productive human reality which brought forth your 
share in the world, come together in Luther; to him too, you have first- 
hand title to what you have earned, the wealth you produced. He brought 
what we call here earned excellence as human reality, to bear by virtue 
of one's earning it through his work, upon man's rightful share in the 
world, in a one-to-one relationship of what he is as god, spark, and 
what he has to show for it in terms of his share in nature, also of God, 
the domain of God, also God. The god within man, whose existence he 
maintains, is in a special, organic relationship with man's standing and 
endowment in the world, making his being as the inner god of creativity, 
'slice of life', rightfully and sacredly inclusive of what he is in the 
world in terms of having, as a 'slice', section of 'inertia' there, the 
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riches of the world coming alive through an undercarriage of human 
reality in the process through which man deserves his share in that, by 
virtue of his work. This God of Luther, this in-itself-for-itself in 
this world, is meaningful and coherent, notwithstanding the common and 
widespread alienation between the god one is 'inside' and the reward one 
has for his exertions as that here on earth: the god which one 
righteously has, in actuality. The concept of god as an alloy of these 
two aspects of it, as entertained by Luther, this in-itself-for-itself 
in this world, remains coherent and meaningful regardless, as an ideal, 
here on earth, which should be effected. The new cosmology of Luther, 
materialistically somewhat more inclusive than that of Paul, comes from 
bringing the two gods of the New Testament, the true one of being and 
the false one of having, integrally together as ideally unified in the 
lot of each in the world (as well as in the world after), the ideal norm 
conceived in the context of the here-and-now. This ideal in-itself-for- 
itself god is meaningfully the social 'ought', a standard which 
persists, which strikes a chord in consciousness and as a norm in a 
special, ideal way, and if it is dislodged in the world, if what people 
have is unsupported by the undercarriage of self-produced human reality 
to justify it as such, it is offensive in the light of this ideal 
standard. The unity of this in-itself-for-itself god of one's everydays 
is intuited as the God which should be, even when the external yields of 
a 'true' man's exertions in the way of having are alienated and grace 
someone other rather than him who deserved the tangible fruits of the 
Work, by virtue of the self engaged, employed at its active, in the 
ideal alloy of the "I", one's capacity, talent, endowment, need as such, 
and a decent "me" to fit it in the world. The Gcd of gold is sacred by 
virtue of man as the spark having applied himself to bring it forth, 
illuminating it by his creativity in the first person singular; an 
original relationship, properly at one and not separate, not different 
from Paul's god of the authenticity of being, except when one's having 
is alienated from this unity. Gold, when this unity prevails, is sacred 
and money is sacred because secreted, produced, sustained as human 
reality by man's constructively applied talent. Gold has to be honestly 
'made'; the alchemist, fixing his way to getting rich by producing gold 
through his ingenious substitute mode of bringing it forth, alternative 
to nature's, would not have morally earned the gold gained through this 
shortcut to it, nor the title and elevation of being among the 
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distinguished in the world as measured by outward means, even if he had 
succeeded in his cynically materialism-motivated experiments to produce 
gold from lead, from 'tin'; the resulting gold crowning their endeavour 
would have remained sham in a strong ethical sense; and the project of 
those who acquired, who own 'gold', riches and the ensuing elevation in 
society without having exerted themselves along the proper avenues to 
that by Luther's and the young Marx's criteria to give it the shine of 
the yield of a productive self, would have produced merely tin gods, as 
does an adherence in the modern bureaucrat, to his code, solemnly 
chosen, of a moral standing rooted in ascription, in which the creative 
productivity of the self as such does not, characteristically and as a 
fundamental feature of the kind of meritoriousness it upholds, play any 
part. 'Gold', if earned in Luther's sense, stands for, its worth is 
definitive of our very life; a conception of money which came to be 
identified in our own experience through an example in recent times of 
its emanation at its most direct, dramatic and enhanced, when we were 
invited to pledge money by telephone whilst watching Live Aid, in a very 
special and unique rite. It was from us, from and of our lives to the 
lives of the starving that we have given a 'blood-transfusion' or 
rather 'life-transfusion', a symbolic as well as actual transference of 
the fruits of our selves, of our work as such, expressed and 
crystallised in money. It was simply the gift of ourselves (in unison 
with the selves of the artists who donated their own, spectacular gifts 
gratis), which was at the heart of the total experience of participating 
in the broadcast in the spirit of the artists' invitation of us to do 
so; it was our response, in a unification of our selves both with those 
of the artists and those of the starving, to the plea of both these 
communities of human reality, each making their claim in different 
senses on our authentic compassion, one community lacking and the other 
abundant in their ability to produce life in every sense of the word, 
that the symbolic "me", expressed in pledged money, of one and a half 
billion viewers, was poored, pooled into the act of giving both 
symbolic and tangible tokens and 'shares' of that communal "me" in the 
project of saving, creating lives in a mammoth instance of social 
creativity. The implication that the misappropriation of money as the 
currency of authenticity, representative of the donor's "me" is sinful 
in a profound sense, was also effectively highlighted in our experience 
during Live Aid, when it transpired that forged tickets and imitation 
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Live Aid T-shirts were being sold before and at the concert, not for the 
sake of swelling the profits meant for the starving, but for obtaining 
private gain; with the small-letter sacred money, representative of our 
very being, rechannelled, diverted, stolen from the human destination 
where we meant that to go. It's only such money, alienated, divorced 
from the self who earned it and at whose disposal it rightfully is, as 
well as from the selves for whom it is explicitly meant by its producer, 
that it is Mammon-money, sinful in the most individually concrete, 
personal and socialpsychologically meaningful way. 
It's time that the big-letter and small-letter duality of the 
synonyms 'talent', 'gift', 'ability' were explored, emphasised and 
identified, both in the first sense, as rooted in human reality in the 
small-letter understanding as a capacity and the process of its 
exercise, and in the second way, in their big-letter meaning and sense, 
as expressed in the self's anchorage in money as made (or not made) by 
its user, and in what it buys, or fails to buy, for the self of its 
maker (or appropriator) to gratify the calls of the "I", the system of 
the conditions of the realisation of that in the inert universe of 
facticity connecting with the world as and for the "me". All these 
terms, - talent, gift and ability - are ambiguous. This is perhaps not 
readily seen in the case of 'ability' as it is used in the expression 
'each according to his ability', lea7ing unclear whether the 
contribution from the self is demanded in terms of what it has the 
inner capacity or outer means to produce. 'Talent' (as well as its other 
two synonyms), in our small-letter sense, is capacity for excellence as 
expressed in worldly ways, with the compelling implication that it 
should be realised on the arena of external actuality in a "me" in the 
world, with a longstanding tradition of being grasped thus, as will be 
further argued. The "me", it must be borne in mind, is the occasion, tool 
and medium to consolidate the self in the world as one must. The "I", 
as already suggested in Section 3 of the previous chapter, is seen here 
as a variegated system of capacities, vacuums, appetites for its 
manifaceted 'being'; the "me" may be said, in its equally many 
gradations, to be the platform and the instrument in the mode of having 
in the world to correspond to the calls of the "I". Some of the shades 
and tiers of the "I" have been identified in the relevant paragraphs in 
Secion 3 of the foregoing chapter. A similarly graded inventory of the 
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"me" can also be afforded by the pooled interpretation of the works on 
that subject matter of the many students of that concept. What is the 
"me"? It is the repertoire of man's big-letter Ability, man's capacity 
as object in three strata in nature, as already hinted. To Mead, the 
"me" is the citizen. This is the sociologic radius, tier of its being; 
it's the public patform of the self which goes to vote, which has a name 
to carry on in society, which has, or fails to have, a standing, a 
reputation in the community. Sartre pays hardly any attention to this 
layer of the being of the "me". However, he has a great deal to say of 
the other two strata of nature in which our "me" figures as object. To 
his understanding, the "me", his 'existing' as the overt facet of the 
self, is richly illuminated from the point of view of the'self itself 
in a socialpsychologic light, particularly in the context of Being-for- 
Others, in which light our "me" and Sartre's synonymous notions for it 
emerge as the basis for our overt personality, as that (and with it the 
socialpsychologic being of our self) is immediately indicated for us in 
the Other's cognisance, definition, 'constitution' of us as a person, 
for which we recognise ourselves as reflected in the Other, providing 
the basis for the socialpsychologic tier of the positive being of the 
self as we learn to know that. This product, the personality, the 
socialpsychologic aspect and radius of the "me", Mead and Sartre agree, 
is both the prerequisite and the index of the success of the process of 
our producing and conducting a graceful self (or our significant failure 
to do so), a managing self, one telling of its active conjunction with 
an operative : socialpsychologic "I", evidencing, or significantly failing 
to do so, the presence of an "I" constantly and typically drawn on as 
the hallmark of the fully engaged active socialpsychologic quality of 
the self. The other tier of the "me" (the third in Our invelitoory' on 
which Sartre's thought system is very informative, is the physiologic 
one. From Sartre's work (not so much from Mead's), the description of 
the lodgement of the "me" in the biologic startum of nature emerges 
richly and systmatically rendered as one locus of the being of the "me", 
or rather, to be true to Sartre's usage, of the 'body' rather than the 
"me", in its engagement with the "I", which in his thesaurus is 
interchangeable in its meaning with 'Being-for-Itself', the self, with a 
multiplicity of extra aspects afforded by him within these confines of 
the concept, with significant bearing on the socialpsychologic aspect 
of the self's reality, too. As purely physiologic, biologic object, the 
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"me" or 'body' and its functioning is the proper concern, first and 
foremost, of the doctor; the being of the self in this, its 
evolutionarily most lowly radius of its operation, is of course the 
necessary precondition of its participation, being in the higher-order 
areas of realities on which it impinges, simply by virtue of the fact 
that without the physiologic foundation of its being it would simply 
lack antic life. But the body at its physiological is the precondition 
for the realisation of one's small-letter talents at a higher-order 
level of the operation of the self in many other respects and senses 
too; a good singing voice, an athletic physique or dexterous hands being 
obvious examples of modalities of the 'having' of the self included in 
the "me", as contained in the human body itself and as the'prerequisite 
of the project of 'being' one's gift, or, in less fanciful language, all 
these above mentioned forms of physiological endowment may be 
prerequisites, in crudely bodily ways, to the morally consequential 
project and determination of one to cultivate, maintain, keep going, 
conduct a creative self if one's aspiration for putting one's talents to 
use happens to be in the area of music, sport, or the pursuit of some 
type of manual craftsmanship. One's looks are also part of the 
repertoire of one's original gifts in the repertoire of one's "me", 
which can be enhanced or worsened by the quality of the attitudes of the 
"I" to the possibility and practice of keeping that up or neglecting 
it. But the 'body', as Sartre discerns it, is rarely experienced and 
rarely serves as physiologic object only in the context of the self. The 
complete array of its needs (always in operation) for satisfying its 
hungers in the many ways in which they make their presence known to 
consciousness, constantly brings sociologic and socialpsychologic 
factors and modalities to bear on its modes of existence, prevalence. In 
the course of the gratification of its sexual drives and in its 
occupation of psychological as opposed to merely physically taken up 
space`', the "I" is organically involved, and so is the composite, "I"- 
inclusive self of the Other who is touched in one's relation to bim, the 
ensuing interpersonal paradigms of the self involving complex inter-and 
intraindividual patterns of "me"-s and "I"-s, an example of which was 
already analysed in the context of Maupassant's short story in Section 2 
of the last chapter. The 'body' in Sartre which, in its usual sense is 
hybrid with the "I" and is of a socialpsychologic order, is the "me" at 
its living over and above the merely antic sense of that word. Whether 
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we examine the process of its intake of food, the physiologic as well as 
the psychologic ways of its occupation of space, or its spreading itself 
in the symbolic 'house' as part of its universe on earth which we 
described a few pages ago, this last grasp of the life-project of a self 
is unavoidably touched by ecuunomic factors and conditions, involving 
and affecting the self as such in terms of its having in the worldly 
idiom; the young Marx's concern. He as well as Luther, and some 
followers of Marx who didn't jettison Hegel fron their works, such as 
Lukäcs, Erich Fromm or Karen Horney, definitely saw the terrain of 
economics as the question of the rightful, personally either deserved or 
undeserved distribution of the tangible wealth of the world in 
conjunction with the self and its moral deserts, and the way in which 
that effects the life of individual as well as groups of people as the 
proper object of the analysis both of economics and of the self, as an 
area which is certainly and properly inclusive in their understanding of 
people's "me"-s, so to speak: with economic factors in one's fulfilment 
as a self made part and condition by these authors of the self's grace 
(Sartre), 'health' (Fromm and Horney), the self's fulfilment in terms of 
material factors to be rightfully apprehended, according to them, as 
part of the "me" which it is our high duty to bring forth in reality for 
ourselves as an expression and yield of our talents put to use, and our 
decent fulfilment in respect of the economic factors determining our 
"me"-s in exchange for our exertions in those is subject to the command 
(as are our other small-letter capacities for the indulgence of the self 
properly waiting for gratification): 'Do justice to your talents'. These 
workers, as well as Mead, brought the raw material of the world within 
the umbrella of man's socialpsychologic "me" as a necessary object for 
the latter in the idiom of the self, and through their interpretation, 
the material universe of this earth became 'humanised', softened, 
adapted for and by its use for the purposes of human reality, changing 
its genre to become a socialpsychologically consequential part of, area 
for the "me"; not claiming, of course, that this approach to the world's 
material content affords the sole mode of its being, but merely, and in 
implicitly (or in Sartre's case explicitly) dualistic fashion that such 
an aspect of its apprehension, side by side with its being in its crude 
'In-Itself' physical modality, independent as such of human reality in 
the first instance and in every sense prior to that, can at the same 
time be realistically seen as a necessary and meaningful part and the 
Being and Having. The Caretaker. - 187 - 
natural arena for the self, organic to that and endemic to its being and 
fulfilment, and that in this context it's properly part of the 
socialpsychologically grasped "me" too. 
Mead humanises nature itself, most notably in his rendition of the 
so-called 'conversation' between the civil engineer who is about to 
erect a construction, and the landscape which is to be thereby 
transformed, directly addressing the rock Formation opposite him to which 
he proposes to cast a bridge, 'taking the role' of that in the idiom of 
human reality; the landscape thus addressed, becoming party to his 
relationship with that humanly conceived, and an extension, addition to 
his "me", as did Sartre's walking-stick, as already mentioned. 
Heidegger's contribution of the use of others in instrumentality to 
the self-realisation of the aggressor self, with other selves 
considered and treated as less than human compared to his own, demoted 
to a thing, is a useful addition to the repertoire of external facticity 
(though not of a physical type in this context but of a socially and 
socialpsychologically positive order) which can be subordinated by the 
self as a given, external resource, one that can be made, possessively, 
a prop, an aid, a means in satisfying the clamouring needs of the "I" 
and thereby making other "me"-s 'fair game' to the extension of one's 
own "me", in the course of colonising and converting the environment to 
a subjectively effected mode of that for the purposes of the self's 
own realisation, much in the same way as the raw material of nature can 
be conceived and treated thus. It's a pity, however, and a limitation in 
Heidegger, that he postulated the availability of other "me"-s for the 
extension of the "me" of one's own in furthering one's realisation as a 
self in the world, merely in the context of such interpersonal and 
mastery-desirous personal unauthenticity of the self's intensions and 
deeds. Mead's theory of symbolic interaction is a valuable 
supplementation of the pessimistic exclusivess of Heidegger's 
conception of embracing other "me"-s in one's own and drawing on those 
in the realisation of the ego, as a function, in Mead's rendering (in 
counterdistinction with Heidegger), of the explicit will on the other's 
part to donate, lend his "me" for the benefit of the fulfilment of 
another's lacking "I" in interpersonal projects, fitting a personal "me" 
to someone else's "I" with the consent of, nay, as a matter of the 
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authorship of this project by the agent whose "me" will be 
interpersonally used. An example of such an interpersonally and 
personally authentic engagement of two cross-personally supportive 
"me"-s in response to the complementary needs of the "I"-s in two 
participants, has already received detailed comment in our former 
analysis of the plot of a Maupassant short story. 
- 
In conclusion, in the course of the preceding train of thought, the 
"me" as that aspect of the self which makes contact with the world in 
the mode of its unavoidable having it and aspects of it for the use of 
the self, emerges in appreciable depths and breadths of dimensions, 
displaying a matey factored array of the areas of empirical benefits and 
access to them which make up that "me". This array is comprised by the 
human body, the psychologic, or socialpsychologic personality (there is 
no difference between the two in Mead), the generalized other and 
interpersonality In good faith or bad, the citizen in the self with its 
rights, its access to the worldly network of its rightful opportunities 
and equipment for the realisation of its small-letter talents and 
capacities and its ensuing needs as a self in terms of those, complete 
with the space it occupies in the Newtonian universe as psychologically 
conceived by it, and also with the natural as well as manufactured 
resources and economic factors in the world which are owing to the self 
in fitting measure to its positive exertions in the modality of human 
reality; all these areas at the disposal of the self in the "me" 
figuring as tiers of the latter in the modality, in their ensemble, of 
its dynamic, enlivened, personalised ha vind. 
The "me" and the "I" are redefined by such a classification of the 
"me" in particular as a finely graded, organised collection of the modes 
of its having in so many ways, to fit, to fuse with, to fittingly meet 
in the realised self with the equally discriminately variegated kinds of 
talents, needs and capacities of the "I" complementary, in every 
instance, to the specific tiers of the "me" (the "I'lls analytically 
discerned layers specified in Section 3 of the last chapter). Both these 
clusters of components, those making up the "me" and those making up the 
"I", are necessary conditions for the active being of the self as such, 
with only the two together with a view to their complementary 
realisation sufficient for truly representing and comprising it. Xan as 
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a self, as socialpsychologic actuality, as a personality, as a "me" 
hybrid with the "I", as 'body' in Sartre's sense, is defined by its 
realised mileage in relation and its appropriateness to its gasoline it 
was filled up with from the outset as given in the "I" as its potential 
talent, its cluster of capacities and needs he could act upon truly to 
its gifts in freedom, this array of specific talents being, to romantic 
Christianity, something with precise extents as well as limits, 
bookkept faithfully in heaven. The 'parable of the talents' is already 
an example of the grasp of human life, human reality, as the total (or 
rather as the ratio, at the end of the day), of the gifts one comes into 
the world with and the extent to which one realises those in the 
actuality of his life as lived -a grasp and evaluation of a life 
according to which of its many gifts one has realised or, in contrast, 
which one has made nothing of, and to what extent one has cashed in or, 
alternatively, wasted one's talents, with any deficit in the utilisation 
of one's original package of gifts as shown in the final reckoning, seen 
as something to be called to answer for as part of oneself laid waste, 
something that will be put towards in its evaluation as a self as that 
on account of which one will be found wanting; the unrealised original 
gifts of one conceived as that part of one which is conspicuous in its 
absence and so in a certain inverted Sartrian sense, which also is, 
which figures as that which one has nothing to return to one's maker for 
the loan of, the realisation of which one has been fully entrusted with, 
put in charge of as one's own caretaker. One is answerable for having 
shortchanged oneself in the realisation of any of these two clusters of 
the components of the self, the mesh of the original talents as the "I" 
and that of the "me" of our cashing those in in actuality, and being 
made responsible for not having done justice to either the expressed 
"me" or to the expressable "I" if one or the other be the case - either 
for the sin of bad faith in living as a mere citizen only who enjoys his 
rights shouldering none of his responsibilities which are cut out for 
one by the "I", or conversely, for living with insufficient care for 
one's external platform in reality for doing one's bit as the "I" - the 
neglected aspects of the self coming back, in the final analysis, in any 
of these two events, into the total picture and experience in life as 
something one fell down on. Crime and Punishment can be read as the 
rendition of the case when a life is lived with the "me" waved aside, 
the project of drawing on and gratifying the "I" only in one's mode of 
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conducting the self, ending, by necessity, in failure. The Soldier's 
Tale and Chamisso's somewhat similar Peter Schlemiel can be read as 
renditions of the opposite lopsided project; lacking in an opposite way 
to that of Raskolnikov's undertaking in Crime and Punishment, is the 
project of living a life in which the "I" is jettisoned. The rdsumd of 
The Soldier's Tale has already been put forward, but Chamisso's story 
with a kindred moral to that may be usefully commented on here. 
Schlemiel, the 'hero' of Chamisso's story, has sold his shadow to the 
Devil in return for a magic purse which never runs empty of gold coins; 
but he becomes so unhappy without his shadow that he wants to go back on 
his deal with the Devil. This cannot be done at this stage without 
trading in his soul in exchange for his shadow, which Schlemiel is 
prepared to do, does, and is relieved. The shadow, in this nineteenth- 
century parable, stands, I think, for the substanceless, darker side of 
the self in its Sartrian freedom, akin to Bachelard's realm of the night 
for man, its possibility for questioning in Cartesian depths, its 
'being' as capacity for critique, as one's ability and vehicle for 
pursuing the God of the romantics in hubris, angest, recognising that 
God by criteria discovered at first hand as a self, through its 
hallmark as the god of human reality judged by standards intuited in the 
first person singular. The shadow which Schlemiel gained back, to my 
understanding, symbolises that avenue along which he can yet 
authentically gain back, earn his soul; I see the shadow as that lively 
nothingness to which his not yet realised portion of his possibilities 
in life amount, and its loss as the deprivation of his self of the 
ability to dispose over that, to yet alter his life with the use of that 
in a positive manner in creative acts, to still improve, reduce that 
sense of the insufficiency of the self regarding itself which the 
presence of that 'shadow' creates in the course of one's living, as 
critique, feedback by a personal morality; I understand that shadow as 
that live-wire nothingness, as the privilege and duty of the self to 
conduct itself consequentially in the first-hand conduct in the 
possession of its talents is understood in the biblical parable of the 
talents an my reading of that as just outlined; it amounts to the lack 
in his life derived from knowing that one still hasn't fulfilled the 
promise for which one yet sees himself as a self, complete with one's 
projects as such, as the remainder of one's course of life in which one 
feels one can still make good; Schlemiel's self and his life, like 
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everybody else's, is complete only with his shadow, in terms of which he 
can still attain the kind of excellence that is not ascribed, which his 
tangible Talents without the support of his surrendered active "I" 
behind it couldn't buy. Without that, he finds, his life cannot be 
sustained, and he trades in his soul, with a view to still earning it. 
Chamisso's story shows how having is meaningless and untrue to being 
without the undercarriage of an exigent human reality sustaining it. But 
man must also have so as to be true to himself, he has to have in the 
varied idiom and complex configurations and stratification of his 
personal having as the "me" in the world, so as to simply be in the 
first place, in the physiologic sense, and to have the instrumentality 
of his milieu, human or inert, to mediate, to carry to their expression, 
externalisation his small-letter, personal gifts. Stock is taken by the 
critique of the "I", sizing, reckoning up what there is in the world as 
a not-yet realised "me" for itself, not in the detached, calculating way 
of the miser, but as an inner process in an ever unified creative 
ensemble with the "me" which is the case for it in actuality, relating 
its being and operation to that in the authentic adjustment or 
maladjustment of the self (in case the claims of the critical "I" cannot 
be authentically done justice to in the world as expressed in the 
present through the position and the place of the "me" there. ) 
The individual's freedom to create, and, in contrast, the extent 
of his proneness to the frustration and the alienation of his talent, is 
of course decisively determined by the measure and the modality of the 
crude facticity of its dependence on external instrumentality needed and 
available for expressing his talent, by the circumstance, for instance, 
whether he needs a Stradivarius, or a cast to direct, to realise his 
talent or, alternaltively, whether all he needs is a voice, his bare 
hands or a pen and paper for making his small-letter gift happen as bid. 
To some thinkers the desirability of a perfect match between one's 
'lack' in its readiness to be expressed, and the attainment in a "me" of 
its fitting, justified concomitant area corresponding and belongig to 
that 'lack' in the world by rights, for attaining a self of an 
outstanding quality as such, is equivocal, and they entertain the notion 
of the 'coefficient of adversity' as conceivably beneficial to the 
creative process and the quality of its output in the creation, as do 
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Sartre and Mead, with the phenomenon of deprivation in the world 
recognised as often enticing, inspiring the inventiveness of the self 
and serving, stimulating a capacity to enhance creative output in depth. 
The example of the oildrum first littering the beaches and then turned 
into the mediator of, instrument for the expression of musical talent, 
can be called upon again in this context. So can be the case of 
Beethoven, of whom many say that on having gone deaf, his work acquired 
even greater, almost unique profundity and complexity, evidently 
benefiting by the circumstance of its limits of expression and 
sensitivity no longer being constrained by the confines of feedback in 
actual terms. Gorky certainly feared, in an important sense, the 
prospect of the consolidation and satiation, in positivistic ways, of 
his project of championing a system of greater social justice, in the 
historic moment when the society he fought for came to pass in political 
actuality, fretful that the rich psychological and financial 
remuneration which would await him in the new society would put an end 
to, dry up his creative motivation fuelled by his sense of injustice in 
his early work. It was true of him what Philip Larkin said about 
himself: 'deprivation is to me as daffodils were to Wordsworth', and in 
anticipation of the loss of his elemental ability to create 
masterpieces, no longer propelled by his strongly felt dedication to 
putting class injustice in society right, he changed his name from 
Peshkov to Gorky, meaning 'bitter', as a psychologic measure to prevent 
the possible death of his 'spark' and a reminder to himself as an "I" 
of the need to further apply himself as a writer, as an artist, as one 
drawing as the hallmark of his profession on the subjective "I". 
Unfortunately for him, with the progressive successes in the 
establishment of the new regime and of his own standing in that, his 
writing deteriorated in spite of his precautionary pen-name and his 
fears became justified; only to inspire in one an even greater 
admiration for a Tolstoy, a Shaw or an Albinoni whose abundant positive 
endowment in worldly terms did not get in the way of the sustenance of 
their artistic and human projects, the quality of their creativity. 
It cannot be emphasised enough that for the active being of the self 
with justice done to it as such, both man's anchorage in the web of its 
having in the world as a self as the condition and occasion for its 
positive, In-Itself 'being' as such, and his being in another idiom, as 
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a consciousness, as a 'lack' in the way of the equally intricate web 
defining its small-letter capacities as its "I", are vitally necessary. 
This point is particularly important to make in the Hegel-embracing 
context of this argument. Whilst utilising Hegel's insight of the 
meaningfulness, coherence and indismissibility of the "I", the faculty 
of inspiration as one half of the phenomenon of the self as discerned 
here, we turn from the reductionism of his phenomenology. He reduced 
matter to spirit, and in turn, did not see that at its 'concretised', as 
the society of his understanding, the spirit dynamically operative for 
or against that must be different in kind and medium from that society 
itself, by necessity; relegating his work to the puristic confines of a 
monism - the philosophically idealistic one - (the other possibility of 
a monism is afforded, of course, by vulgar behaviourism in this context 
and other narrowly empiricistic psychologies and social psychologies 
which nominate the "me" alone as the sole constituent of the self and 
dismiss the "i" from the infrastructure of the self as illusory). Either 
of these reductionisms leads as surely as the other to the separation of 
its proponents from the dualism of twentieth-century anthropologists who 
integrate, realistically, as we see it, both Hegel's 'subject' (the 
close relative of our "I" in this context) and the "me" or 'object' of 
the psychologic empiricists; causing the self to emerge as integrally 
and necessarily complete with both "me" and "I" in the constant 
interrelation of the two, avoiding both the possibilities of 'the twin 
confusion of "mechanistic materialism" and the idealism of 
consciousness', to borrow an Althusserean turn of phrase in support of 
our current train of thought. "" 
The union of the "me" and the "I" emerges after the above argument 
as paraphrased to mean the union of the 'being' and the having of the 
self, to refer to that of the totality of its small-letter and big- 
letter talents, the thesaurus of its gifts, abilities as capacity, and 
the big-letter sphere of its ability as expressed in the world and 
through the world. The particular gifts we came into the world with, be 
that visual originality, facility with words, aptitude for spacial 
construction, or just a capacity to conduct our way in life in active 
personal and interpersonal authenticity as selves, all come together 
with the "me" acting upon these original abilities, bringing its 
equipment in the universe of facts, actively to bear on that, the "me" 
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and the "I" meeting in the realisation, the justification of both in one 
another in the act. It's this mutual actualisation, 'fusion' between the 
statement of the "I", whosever, and the appropriate range of actuality 
of the "me" in the hierarchy of its repertoire in the world, complete 
with the 'generalized' and particular 'other', which Mead means by 
social creativity. 'Als ich kann', Jan van Eyck painted in small letters 
on his fine portrait of the 'Man in a Turban'. 'Johannes Eyck fuit hic', 
he spelt out on his painting in the Arnolfini marriage. These were 
statements of the "I", a little display of voiced hubris, with the 
accomplished work the fitting, evidenced "me" to do justice to it, a 
mirror of and witness to its being executed by that in a final, 
definitive way as a self. It is important to bear in mind,. to refer, 
once again, in some detail, to Mead's and Paul's insight that social 
creativity is not necessarily confined to putting very outstanding 
talents into play. Being with other people in the arena for personal, 
inventive and authentic interpersonality of one's everydays, with the 
possibility of intricate configurations of "me"-s and "I"-s uniting 
within ourselves and between people, also ranks, to the minds of both 
these moralists, as one aspect of social creativity, as an item, a 
particular gift in the repertoire of gifts, in its own right; more than 
that (again, as already touched on), Mead and Paul both postulate this 
particular gift - that of social creativity - as a necessary general 
undercurrent, a broader, universal dimension underlying all instances of 
excellence in any medium of talent as a potentially morally creative one 
between people, one's 'parametric' audience (to draw on statistical 
jargon for a moment), or better still, one's audience as humanity 
envisaged in the particularity of each to whom the socially creative act 
extends, one' i "I" r--r eative of its "e. " , and recipr ü+c. "ally, one" a 
"me" to 
fit the aspirations and responses of the "I" of that audience, 
extendable to the whole of mankind, for which we are responsible, a 
position, to be stressed again, with consequential implications for the 
scientist's ethics. 
'The gift' emerges through Marcel Nauss's work, as argued and 
discerned in his famous anthropologic study of that title, as an 
autonomous 'universe of discourse', 'problematic' of its own, one with 
which Mead's Mind, Self and Society strikes a kindred chord, possibly in 
independence of Nauss. What is the gift to the minds of these authors? 
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It's simply the self. (' 413" Mauss studied and analysed 'in the field' 
the underlying meaning to the custom of making gifts at the 
socialpsychologically significant elevation of that phenomenon, 
interpreting that as symbolic for the entire self of the one who gives. 
The gift, the portion of our having we part with to give to another, is 
representative of us, stands for the totality of what we are as selves, 
the object of our gift illuminated by the fact that we brought it forth, 
either directly and literally as in the case of potlatch which we 
actually prepare and whose consumption is the symbolic offering for the 
taking of ourselves into the other in the sense perhaps in which this 
act is the distant echo of the host in the Holy Communion, or it is our 
produce in the non-literal sense, as something we acquired-in the 
special and particular idiom of our and then the other owning it in 
personalness, through our abilty which enabled us to muster it by our 
own effort, our own gift, and expressive as that of us, to and for the 
other. It's the union of the duality of our being and having as selves, 
the "me" brought to life, to meaning, made hybrid by being underscored, 
validated by the "I", by its will as such as the basis for our 
endowment to give, the totality of our small-letter gifts, capacities 
as the "I" endorsed, made overt in the "me", yielding an expressed 
statement of ourselves complete with both "me" and "I", these two 
components of our selves gelled together in the act of giving that; 
amounting to a sample of our life as the active, hybrid "me" standing 
for our life itself, be that in the enhanced, big-letter idiom with 
which Mauss concerned himself or as life emanated and conducted in quite 
small ways, the silent talent for instance of applying ourselves 
interpersonally, for others and for ourselves in social creativity, as 
a continuous process. The gift is simply what we are, one's standing, 
expressed talent, beauty or lack of it, youth or old age, freshness or 
wisdom; it's whatever he who gives makes himself for the other. There 
is, then, an ideal unity in the gift between the totality of the talents 
of the self, its capacity to be socially creative in any particular 
medium of his endowment with talent as an "I" on the one hand, and the 
realisation of those talents in the "me" of whose produce the fibre of 
the gift is in a significantly meaningful sense, put into play as one's 
life, a produce as one's life enlivened by the "I" which wants to make 
the gift. If there is an essential non-coincidence, misproportion, 
mismatch, lack of correspondence between the "me" in whose idiom the 
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gift is expressed to overt appearances and the "I" authentically 
endorsing the gift, either through a flaw in the the spirit in which it 
is given or a flaw in the entitlement of the giver to make the gift as 
something personally deserved by himself, in the respect that the gift 
and what it represents hasn't been brought forth by the giver himself in 
the first place, in whatever indirect a sense, then the gift is in bad 
faith. In the absence of this ideal accord between the being (apparent 
and representative "me") and the meaning of the gift (the "I" in the 
spirit of giving), the "me" presenting that to appearances and the "I" 
tacit; y underscoring that, may be irrevocably alienated, effecting the 
occasion of making the gift and its entitlement both to rightfully 
mediate the self of the giver and its proper efficacy to benefit the 
recipient. A striking example of such an anomaly at the heart of a gift 
is afforded in Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. After Juliet's choice to 
risk death rather than be forced into a marriage by her parents in 
which she must forego her true love, her parents, in their remorse, vow 
to erect a golden statue of her. This gift of Juliet's likeness, a body, 
so to speak, in separation, alienation from, without the substratum, of 
human reality, living, pulsating life to support it, produce it, in 
spite of its being made of gold (or perhaps because of that), is 
offensive to Juliet, to what she could and should have been: herself, 
and which she blatantly and evidently isn't: living human reality. The 
statue is a phoney fascimile of her, devoid of her spirit. With her 
death into which she was in a real sense thrust by her parents' ways, 
her small-letter gift as life became channelled astray into this false, 
substitute gift, into the solidity of a body of gold alien to and other 
than her gift as life, lacking in that life and in the animation, anima 
that she should have been with. The statue is, inappropriately, a body- 
only in this sense, and therefore obscene by Sartre's criterion `° ', the 
opposite of its grace at its lived, at its animated. The small-letter, 
unostentatious gift that Juliet simply was, was her life first and 
foremost, her grace, freshness, being, love for Romeo, it was her social 
creativity for him, capacity, in real terms, at its personally fulfilled 
and fulfilled in their interpersonality, to be human reality. It was 
this which the statue was meant, erected, hopelessly, to replace, a 
pathetic gesture, an impotent sacrifice, with the false god of having 
only, the Absentee Landlord, to address itself to, its gold fibre 
refracting with gaping nothingness in its most barren sense instead of 
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the true, full being of its recipient, a memento of everlasting death 
instead of temporal life as the gift, this presentation cruelly 
shortchanging not only Juliet as the gift herself, but also the parents, 
with no-one to give it to in a real sense in their repentance. Had she 
lived, there would have been no need for the statue; she would have then 
had the gift in the authentic sense, that of being it, as the hybrid of 
the spark as the hallmark of the life of a person which lives in 
actuality here on earth. 
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Section 2. The Turnstile. The Social Uncreativity of the Pukka.. 
The tactical sidetracking of social creativity in ways which are 
dysfunctional to the socially creative process and to the self mediating 
that, but functional, corroborative to and supportive of the upkeep of 
the reigning norm: society itself, has been given ample room in 
foregoing parts of this thesis, particularly in Section 2. of the 
previous chapter. In this process, our overlords (who are mainly the 
bureaucrats, according Descombes, in our already partially post- 
historic times), systematically syphon away, cream off the real 
excellence generated at first hand by others whose production the Pukka 
intercept as the ascribed caretakers of that, for their own use, to 
maintain the seeming superiority of the We, the subject-status of the 
Pukka in the ideological network through which this practice operates, 
so that through their membership in that We they can shine with the aura 
of creativeness whose privilege is monopolised by them in this 
alienative way. In previous accounts of this topic here the example of 
Aristophanes' comedy The Clouds was cited, in which Socrates is featured 
as floating in a basket between heaven and earth, the plot depicting how 
the smoke of the sacrifices to the gods by mortals, (symbolic for the 
surrender by the mortals of their being as human reality to the divine 
realm of the collective consciousness at its ideal), is intercepted by a 
'caretaker' of those godly agencies, so perceived by the worshippers, 
with toll collected, in a serious and consequential sense underneath 
the comic facade of the play, for the further passage of human reality 
thus volunteered and exerted, meant for their sacred destination, the 
object of their worship, at Olympian heights. 
The preceding trains of thought in this thesis entertaining this 
phenomenon were dedicated to the macrosociologic aspects of this 
process; they described how the so-called 'specialisation' of 'subject' 
function into society's ascribed Sacred and 'object'-function into the 
profane served the status quo, the existing norm in which society at its 
actual consists. Now a new example illuminating this process will be 
called on, one which allows to show this process with a socialpsychologic 
bias, throwing light an the microsociologic ramifications of this 
phenomenon and its socialpsychologic consequentiality for the 
individual. This example is provided by a fable by Kafka, quoted by 
Sartre. "01 According to this story, a merchant who needs to plead his 
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case at some unspecified higher agency where he arrived at the end of 
his pilgrimage, is barred entry to that destination by a guard at the 
gate, and he dies in the process of waiting for being admitted. He 
learns just before his death, the story goes, that the gate was made 
just for him, and Sartre goes on in interpreting the story to suggest 
that we all make our own 'gates' on the road to realising ourselves in 
our life project. This observation is not to mean, of course, that the 
obstacles as social reality against which man runs up on his journey in 
this sense are illusory, but that it is in our power and making as human 
realities and that it is our duty to ourselves as such, to pass by its 
vetoes to our being as such if those vetoes consisting in hostile 
caretaking forces pitted against our self-realisation are malign and 
unjustified, and that with our passivity in the face of the guards of 
the agencies with whom our identity as selves rests, we endorse the 
reality of those often unjustified bars to our true possibilities simply 
as ourselves. The point that the 'gate' was specially made for us also 
conveys in a metaphoric way that such gates stand there in personalness 
for us, in a socialpsychologically significant idiom (in addition to the 
reality of those 'gates' as a matter of social facticity), that what is 
often denied us by those 'gates', concerns something that we are in our 
capacities as particular selves, that it is human reality itself which- 
is in such instances claimed, taken from us by this interception, and 
that it is by way of our insistence on that, on ourselves as human 
reality, that we may overcome, supersede this hold-up; finally, the 
fable certainly implies that we are responsible for those 'gates' once 
we perceive them. The tall required is our life, ontic in the case of 
Kafka's story as well as ontologic, the expiration of that in Kafka's 
symbolicity standing also for the end of our life as socialpsychologic 
reality as well as the physiologic one which this story ostensibly 
describes, it also refers to the end of our lives as a fully fledged 
socialpsychologic "me", active, exigent, sovereign as such. Its message, 
bidding us to disregard, when appropriate, the 'gate' barring us from 
ourselves in the world, to push the guard aside, is the message of 
Luther's revolution too, one that does not cease to be of topical 
significance to us in this day and age - the modern little parable of 
Kafka's also akin with Pinter's notion of the 'caretaker' on which we 
dwelt in some detail in the previous Section; and we find that our 
notion of 'the caretaker' introduced by us there, can be expressively 
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extended by the introduction of a synonym of it in the light of Kafka's 
and Aristophanes' stories; this synonym to the 'caretaker' being t 
tollcollector, the customs and excise personnel, taking our excellence 
in its originally produced, first-hand form, in exchange for our dues as 
such a self whose distinguishing attributes as such we are made to shed 
when not ascriptionally qualifying for its retention, with a ticket of 
clearance as a compliant, troublefree social object. Kafka's and 
Sartre's 'gate', Aristophanes' suspended 'basket', Pinter's half-way 
house to 'Sidcup', may all be understood as that turnstyle at which our 
pilgrimage to our identity kept from us by society, our very selves are 
being claimed, forcibly metamorphosed, taken and paid off by a chip 
entitling us to participation as dependable social 'bearers' and only 
that in the overt arena of the external, actual social scene of our 
gratification as selves. This turnstyle may be possible to envisage, in 
a mechanistic vein, as a turning point on the conveyor belt, or rather 
conveyor chain, ongoing process and mechanism which is operative in the 
differential processing of our selves as object only if profane and 
subject only if highly ascribed as Sacred, (this process of the social 
'specialisaton' of selves already commented on at length in Section 2 in 
the previous chapter). In that part of the thesis, the notion that it's 
not equivalents which are being exchanged in this transaction, has been 
touched on, a notion which may beneficially be extended here to allow 
for enlarging on the socialpsychelogic aspect of this extortion of our 
selves by the Pukka, in exchange for the authenticity-destructive 
currency of a pat on the shoulder for being obedient and satisfactorily 
vetted mere social 'carriers', "me"-s without an "I", as approved for 
the profane, these incidents seriously shortchanging us as the dignified 
and autonomous people who we could otherwise be, complete with an "I"; 
though the label we earn concurrently as 'good' citizens, is made to 
seem as worthwhile and fair payment in exchange for the gem that we part 
with as human reality at this stage. Because of this nature of the 
exchange, seemingly fair but in fact depriving us of our very human 
status in the full sense, that process of sham give-and-take which is 
now being analysed here, reminds me of the phenomenon in Althusser's 
treatment of the apparently mysterious production of surplus value at 
the Pukka's disposal (comparable, in our context, with the inexhaustible 
production of subject-status to the Pukka with all its privileged 
The Turnstile. The Social Uncreativity of the Pukka. -201- 
benefits), in relation to which the phenomenon under our microscope now, 
may be seen as this Althusserian phenomenon, writ small. 
Althusser, like ourselves here, reveals labour as limitless and 
energial rather than thing-like in its kind, and generically different, 
like our human reality which is given up at the 'turnstile', from 
anything - any thing, including the money that is being paid out in 
wages - that can be in principle satisfactorily exchanged, by measures 
of fairness, for that meanly and sparingly issued share in the things 
which the Pukka unjustifiably has, and which is given us, the lowly 
ascribed, in exchange for our labour: the supreme currency of human 
reality, which is the contribution of the socially low-ranking. The 
prize we, the socially undignified, gain in this exchange, is a 
qualified place and subservient role and opportunities in the economic 
system institutionalising the exploitation of the workforce in 
Althusser's case, and moral approval by humanly false measures from 
highly ascribed but humanly unauthentic quarters and designs on us as 
human reality, in our case. Althusser ridicules the scientifically and 
morally deceptive and (to borrow Sartre's word), 'metastable' logic, 
rationale, ideology at the heart of us being thus cheated out of our 
rights duly earned by our labour for the pittance we get for that in 
unfair exchange (wages in Althusser's case and the label of good 
citizenship in ours), and he likens the ideology which is the outcome 
and the justification of this dishonest economic practice, to a yellow 
logarithm, the semantic absurdity of this expression demonstrative of 
the generic incompatibility, in both the spheres of interest we examine 
here, Althusser's and ours, between that medium which. we give 
(ourselves, nothing less, in our case) and the vulgar and life- 
alienated, cold and external medium, the tool of masking the unfairness 
of the exchange, the vehicle therefore of false value, which we are 
given in the way of a pay-off for our labour, based on the utilisation 
of the difficulty of analysing apart the surface structure of 
productivity and rewards (the only frame of reference for those to 
appearances), and the deep structure of productiveness and its own kind 
of reward as human reality, imperatively ours too, which underlies the 
workings of the surface structure in its externality, and is, in an 
important part, a condition of that. This conflation between the two 
kinds of currencies for our remuneration, tangible or surface and 
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socialpsychologic or deep, both properly ours, as encountered on the 
threshold of this transaction, an the borders of two categories (that of 
human reality and social reality in our case). In Althusser's case it is 
the economic system and the relations of production which he identifies, 
on a macrosociologic scale, as the two terms whose proneness to 
'metastability' and to therefore being conflated with each other so as 
to give the appearance of the monistic homogeneity in economic terms of 
both these two generically different ingredients which participate in 
the creation of profit, with those in the driving seat utilising the 
ensuing apparent but false reducibility to appearances of labour to the 
worth of the amenities produced, enabling those to hijack the labour of 
the lowly ascribed in exchange for paying them wages, gaining, in the 
process, a surplus profit from the draining of that empirically 
undemonstrable source: labour (which, however, in truth, is the 
inexhaustable fountainhead of more and more production and which is in 
its characteristic endlesness at the disposal of those ascriptionally 
high up in the class society. ) The two currencies that exchange at the 
predominantly socialpsychologic 'turnstile' which we now consider, are 
just as incomparable, differ in kind and weight, jar to quite the same 
extent, as do the terms which are of interest to Althusser. Within our 
present, scaled-down, socialpsychologic confines of presenting a kindred 
occurrence, the terms which are unjustifiably and forcibly exchanged in 
such a transaction, are a person's produce as life, as human reality 
itself on the one hand taken in this 'hold-up' from us by the Pukka, 
either in blindness to (through bad faith) or in explicit and cynical 
awareness of the 'metastability' of the deal, and, on the other hand, 
the token chip we gain in exchange entitling us to participation in 
society as mere sociologic "me"-s, the resulting sham mark of 
distinction to a self falsely appearing as the crowning achievement of 
our creativeness and excellence as human realities, which latter 
endowment, in reality, we lose, and which chip cannot ordinarily be 
cashed in ever again for fully fledged human reality status as a person, 
for a mode of individual being as first-hand human excellence, Huxleyan 
Alpha-status as an individual. The chip can only buy the citizenly 
virtue of swallowing one's loss of oneself as such a being, and the 
sense of impotence in the wake of such an unconsoling reward for the 
loss of our fully fledged selves, In trying to do something to right 
this great wrong befalling us. The only legitimately available avenue to 
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coming to terms with such injustice may be, and often is, the project of 
resorting to bad faith encouraged for our adoption, by assuming a way 
of life based on the denial of the fact that we, the rank-and-file 
Rachmones have the possibility of being fully fledged selves ourselves. 
Many of Chekhov's and Ibsen's plays provide an example of how people 
ascriptionally lower ranking than those solemnly appointed by the dicta 
of tradition, are being shortchanged, exploited in their very being as 
productive human realities at this 'turnstile' as writ small, how they 
are on the receiving end of a philosophical practice and rationale 
similar in its moral and logical incoherence by authentic standards to 
Althusser's 'yellow logarithm' and stripped of their socialpsychologic 
elevation as fully small-letter sacred as a result, in the context and 
internal confines which are scaled down to the bounds of 'my world' and 
the family in comparison to the Althusserian broad social canvas where 
this 'yellow logarithm' operates, to his mind. Ibsen's play The Wild 
Duck, for instance, may be read as a rendition of the process in which 
the authoritarian family and its upholders sap and in the end altogether 
take away the antic as well as antologic life of the most exposed in the 
family so as to shine with it themselves; the heavy father, for 
instance, allowing little Hedvig, whose failing sight must be caringly 
spared, help with his paperwork in the face of medical warning, and the 
ungenerosity and hypocricy of her 'elders and betters' weighing on her 
in other respects too, eventually causing her to commit suicide. Ibsen 
wrote to a friend, with reference to this play: It 'doesn't touch on 
political or social problems... It takes place entirely within family 
life; (but) I daresay it will arouse some discussion. ' 
The simile of the conveyor belt employed above to illuminate the 
process of the differential production of 'Subject'-status in the Pukka 
and 'object'-status in the Rachetones, may be further exploited here to 
illustrate the fact that the process in question is a two-phase one, in 
which the two phases involved are simultaneous. One phase consists of 
the 'conveyor belt' taking the being of the 'gypsy', the active, 
creative self past the tollgate, the 'turnstile' where this creative 
self is gestured to shed itself as such, in the way of tax, as it were, 
whilst, as a twin occurrence, the 'underside' of that 'belt' rolls back 
to us, or with us, at the same stroke, on its way back from the 
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processor, harvester, on the borders of socialpsychologic and social 
realities, making the Pukka on the far side from us over the chasm, as 
Subject, and depositing us on this side, on its way back, as Rachetones 
in the world and bidding our self to be object only. The fact that the 
twin phases constituting this process are simultaneous is an important 
one, for it helps to avoid, in envisaging this process, a philosophical 
idealism - (absurdly purporting the primacy of the engagement of selves 
in this process, as the fountainheads of the "I", which "I", assumed by 
the Pukka, fuels, produces and maintains society, Hegelian fashion, 
through some kind of 'positivisation' of itself), and it also helps us 
to avoid a crude philosophical materialism (purporting the primacy of 
society, grasped as supreme, higher-than-human 'object' in'its external, 
positive form , Durkheimian fashion, as causative of 
that merely social 
"me" in us which we, the profane, the members of the brotherhood of the 
socially oppressed, are bid to be as the exhaustive radius of our being 
as selves): each of these monistic philosophic positions denying either 
the role of society as 'object' (as in idealism) or denying us, the 
profane, as partly subject as selves (as in a crude materialism). The 
truth, as we see it, is in the recognition that the process currently 
discussed is socialpsychologic in its making which doesn't touch or 
effect the positive collective consciousness in its pure form (objective 
and fact-like, the way Durkheim sees it); it involves society in its 
existing (as distinct from ideal) state, as corrupted by the human 
element of its representation, but which process, for all its 
socialpsychological constitution, is not seen in a philosophically 
idealistic way, but with the two currently discussed phases operative in 
it (object-production in the Rachetones or 'gypsy' and subject-production 
in the ascribed Pukka), seen as concurrent and on a par with each other, 
both as a matter of temporality and as a question of causality. The twin 
phases constituting the process currently discussed (those of human 
reality producing the Pukka as Subject and, on the other hand, state 
bureaucracy producing us as Object), are seen as coincidental in time 
and as causes, with both these phases the condition of one another, and 
with neither phase primary or secondary in any respect. The two parts of 
the process, incomplete by themselves, gel together as complementary, 
as one symbiotic Laingian operation writ large, the specialised creation 
by us of the Pukka as Subject (in our unauthenticity of assuming 
ourselves as object only as typecast); our endorsing, in other words, of 
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the bureaucratic Masters in our order, with their ascribed monopoly as 
excellent selves, makes us Object at the same instance in the concurrent 
and complementary specialisation of ourselves this side of the chasm, 
ranking us among 'players' rather than 'Gentlemen', so to speak. While 
refuting Hegel's idealism which consists of his purporting that the 
Subject-component appropriated by the Pukka ossifies in and affords the 
fibre of society (the Durkheimian collective consciousness in the 
terminology of this thesis), we welcome and mean to utilise his insight 
which we claim, with Hegel, to hold in sacialpsychologic confines of any 
kind (our own present one included), that each self creates the Other in 
a potent Pygmalionic way, by way of defining the "me"-component of the 
Other's self, though in our present sphere of interest this Hegelian 
insight applies in mass (but even so still socialpsychologic) 
dimensions. We say that, in our present context, the Pukka create the 
Profane, and the Profane create the Pukka to a decisive extent. There 
are important lessons to be learnt from the contention, first of all, 
that the Rachmones creates the Pukka. There are two ways in which we, 
the lowly ascribed in society, are free to 'create' him. Firstly, we may 
authentically and correctly 'create', define the Pukka in the militantly 
non-conformist way of unique individual selves, showing the Pukka up as 
half-a-self in his interpersonal attitudes touching us, as Subject-only 
in comparison with our own partly profane self, which is complete with 
the productive "me" and the critical "I", unlike that of the uncreative 
Pukka. The other, alternative attitude for us profane to the Pukka's 
attempt to create us as object only, is playing the game on the Pukka's 
terms, that is unauthentically as individuals. In this latter case we, 
the Rachmones, will 'constitute', create the Pukka for the 'good 
person', and the exclusive custodian of the 'good' of society, for which 
the Pukka sees himself, accepting his sham understanding of his kind of 
'good', twisting affairs in the world so as to corroborate his higher 
than profane human deservingness for which he puts in an exclusive 
claim, by accepting and performing our object only role which the Pukka 
has issued ourselves with. Our Object status, in turn, is created by the 
comprehension of us by Pukka standards as devoid, and functionally so, 
of the gleam of a constructive, and imaginative "I", as people who are 
not fellow-"I"-s to the Pukka, without the recognition of ourselves as 
agents and perpetrators of social creativity, of ourselves, at first 
hand; though when utilising this Hegelian insight, the socialpsychologic 
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limits within which it holds, must always be remembered. This original 
Hegelian notion, and its working, are well described in Shakespeare's 
Winter's Tale, for instance, in a speech by Polixenes, when he first 
meets Camillo when Camillo has just been made privy to Polixenes' 
falling from favour with Leontes, king of the land. 
Polixenes: Good Camillo, 
Your changed complexions are to me a mirror 
Which shows me mine changed too; for I must be 
A party to this alteration, finding 
Myself thus alter'd with it. 
I'll 
In our present context, we consider this Hegelian mechanism in mass 
(though still socialpsychologic) dimensions. The Pukka, to our 
contention, typically 'creates' the Rachmones as Object by regularly 
conditioning him through relating to and informing the Rachmones 
regarding himself, in terms of the Rachmones' stereotype. The Rachmones 
is approached in the two dimensionality of the body of prejudices 
defining him to the crude perceiver as a person. The Pukka are 
Pygmalions of social uncreativity; uncreativity as human reality, that 
is, human reality being the only original source of creation, as said 
before; as spark. They create us as object only in their unimaginative, 
pedestrian image of the profane as such. Plato observed that doctors, 
who have the power to create health, have, by the same token, the power 
to create unhealth, illness, and this can be seen as applicable, or 
analogous to the present sccialpsychologic context, to the creation of 
the self of the Other which is to be constituted as fulfilled or 
unfulfilled; particularly when utilising Karen Horney's medically 
analogous definition of the 'healthy' self which equals, to her, the 
wholeness of the self in the autonomy of its full Gestalt, defined and 
experienced as such; its ill health consisting in its incoherence in 
experience, in its being apprehended by itself as scrambled up, the sum 
of its parts, no more, robbed of small-letter sacred status as the 'king 
of the castle' of one's own universe: 'my world'. The division made by 
the differential typecasting for the big-letter Pukka and the profane 
respectively, as just outlined, and the 'shackles' (Horney's term), the 
Kafka-ian bars, the interception of the furtherance of our being as 
human reality by 'guards' in society's positive medium as a matter of 
ascription, forbidding the Blemished any transgression into its monopoly 
of privilegedness, sacredness in the big-letter sense of the word, is by 
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no means illusory. 'Guards' in such a context are found in abundance in 
many fields and ranks of the social spectrum - not just among industrial 
bosses, as Lukäcs would have it, but among quite low-ranking 
bureaucrats, social workers, teachers, the medical caretakers of the 
mentally ill and of other kinds of disadvantaged, and even among just 
plain citizens who unquestioningly abide by the divisive morality of the 
Pukka, reserving big-letter Rachmones status for the rachmones, and 
privileged, Subject-only status for the Pukka, on the long term. 
Of course, it is the possibility of the Pukka - whether of the very 
high-ranking or the rank-and-file type, to construe the Rachmones in his 
charge or simply in his experience, in authenticity to both the 
Rachmones he encounters and to himself. The road to such authenticity in 
cross-personal situations between a Kierkegaardian authentic caretaker 
('steward', in his language), is, as it is for all of us, the avenue of 
social creativity. A description of social creativity has elready been 
advanced in Section 2. of the last chapter, together with an example to 
illustrate such an interpersonal, socially creative act: that of the 
wetnurse and the soldier in 'Maupassant's short story, and it has been 
established there that social creativity in its cross-personal form 
shows itself and is characterised by occasioning acts that are conducive 
to the realisation of one's own self in the full sense and that of 
another, or of several others, in instance when the "me"-s to complement 
"I"-s are located in different selves, and when these cross-personally 
subsisting "me"-s and "I"-s are made to connect in the act of one 
agent's lending his "me" or his "I" to other selves who have an 
insufficiency of one or the other of these components of the self, so 
that another self can come to fruition as such, do justice to itself in 
its project, in the act of its expression, engagement. I feel that in 
this context, further examples of cross-personal social creativity would 
usefully complement the previously advanced example, that depicted in 
Maupassant's short story. 
A second such example is provided by the project of the famous Joey 
Deacon, the spastic author unable to speak intelligibly or write, who 
produced a stunning authobiography at the twilight of his life. It was 
the "I" as well as the "me" of his human environment which was plunged 
into operation in setting up the project of two people apart from Deacon 
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applying themselves as the tools, by their own choice, of Joey 
expressing himself, making intelligible his extraordinarily developed, 
expressive and sensitive "I" which inhabited his handicapped body, 
without anybody realising it, for years; and both his "I" and his "me" 
attained spectacular horizons in the realisation of this project of his 
self through the resulting team-act of multi-personal social creativity 
in producing his splendid book, endowing Joey's, the 'Rachmones', whole 
self with the aura of dignity of small-letter sacredness in which mode 
this man was capable of sustaining his self, unbeknown to anyone, over 
decades. His closest friend, a spastic himself, imaginatively developed 
ears to understand Joey's impaired speech, which made sense to no-one 
else, and the nursing staff engaged both their "I"-s and "me"-s in 
comparable creativeness in giving Joey and his friend credence and 
endless time in setting into motion a three-fold interpersonal chain in 
the act of writing Joey's book, one human 'link' in this 'chain' (his 
friend) translating his speech, and another, able-bodied person (a 
nurse, figuring here as an authentic caretaker, to which status his 
spastic friend also graduated in this situation), committing Joey's 
thoughts, mediated by his friend's speech, to the typewriter. This 
intricate configuration of complementary "me"-s and"I"-s between three 
selves, this threefold instance of social creativity, elevated Joey to 
the authorship of his fine book, Tongue Tied; his friend and the nurse 
bringing Joey to full life as a "me" in one stratum and idiom of the 
operation and existence of a "me", that of human reality of a first-hand 
quality, as surely and meaningfully as the legendary Pygmalion has 
endowed the raw material which he sculpted in human shape, with 
physiologic life, by illuminating it with the vision of the "I", a 
meaning and reading of the Greek myth which Shaw also utilised in his 
play Pygmalion, drawing on the metaphoric power of the Greek legend to 
express, stand for the bringing of someone to full life, so to speak, as 
human reality, building up the "me" of a person to its due and meant 
potential in whom this hallmark of the self at its highest and most 
deserved, was kept down, concealed by circumstances of her birth, in a 
project of interpersonal social creativity, launched with the aim of the 
realisation of this talent explicitly in mind. 
Another example of social creativity which enabled someone to do 
justice to his self by virtue of the loan of the "me"-s of others, is 
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provided by the underground train driver Chris Hughes who became 
International Mastermind in 1983. He and his colleagues (authentic 
Others who unwittingly and unselfconsciously employed themselves as his 
socially creative caretakers), informally reorganised shiftwork between 
themselves to cover for Hughes during the preliminary heats of that 
competition if the time of those didn't tally with Hughes' free periods 
from work, so that he could attend them. When Hughes eventually won the 
title, he received a warning from his place of work, with threats of he 
sack 'next time'. 'This is the work of petty pen-pushers' he said to the 
press with admirable clarity of insight. The wording of the warning 
betrayed to him that his fortunes both in the heats and within London 
Transport were monitored and unorthodox shift arrangements noted in the 
course of the previous six months. 112' The warning was a response by 
his ascribed superiors - unauthentic caretakers in their conception of 
themselves vis-a-vis Hughes as Pukka in a stereotype sense - to the 
successcý his project, it was sent to him at the point when that came to 
a head and called for comment, when a word of congratulations would have 
been in order and was in the place of that. It was expressive of the 
rejection, by his unauthentic caretakers by ascription, of Hughes' 
display and accomplishment as a "me" of genuine personal excellence, 
knocking a hole in the monopoly of the more outstanding excellence ever 
and properly reserved for his superiors, as far as they were concerned, 
by virtue of their high place in the ascribed pecking-order which held 
at his place of work along the pyramid of job-seniorities established by 
long-standing tradition between blue-collar staff and white. Hughes' 
sacrilegeous behaviour in showing such human excellence which would have 
done any of his superiors proud, went in the face of the traditional 
reservation of greater superiority at all times for the established 
meritocracy, the bureaucratic elite over the 'rude mechanicals' at his 
place of work, serving as the root cause and the stimulus for his severe 
punishment. The success of his project seemed an outrageous challenge in 
the face of human value-differentiation properly and traditionally 
obtaining in that ascriptive order, and the reply-gesture by the company 
was one of his symbolic excommunication from London Transport, taking 
the form of his threatened deprivation of his work and livelihood there. 
The above train of thought leads to the introduction here of the 
notion of the Referee. 
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The Referee is a Hegelian concept. He is the author of references of 
children who leave or change schools, of students going into the world 
or passing on to fields of higher education, of employees who have or 
want to go into other jobs. The Referee quite simply 'states' these 
people on such occasions. The contents of the reference is the summary 
of a person, a personality, a self, as the Pukka, or some Pukka, have 
judged him, sized him up, composed, 'constituted' him. Hegel described 
the small-letter aspect and dimension only of this concept; but to our 
understanding, the notion stands for the authorship by the Other, the 
Sacred or some particular Sacred, of our "me", the "me" of the profane, 
the "me" of the charge of the Pukka's caretakership, in one significant 
milestone in our lives in relation to which the reference-is issued and 
also, eventually, on the long term in our subsequent lifecourse which 
the reference affects, effectively defining the factual, 
socialpsychologically overt being of the self, both in the context of 
the social world as that is ascribed (a new dimension to the notion), 
and in relation to oneself, (Hegel's sole concern). In this process the 
Other (in our case the Pukka), dishing out to the recipient, the 
Profane, the externally objective mirror image of the agent who is being 
defined by the Pukka as a "me", in the mean manner and measure in which 
that "me" is construed in relation to us by the Pukka; the resulting 
"me" thus constructed, bouncing back upon the Rachmones, yielding quite 
simply what he is as a socialpsychologic (in our case also social) 
object, contents as a self. To our understanding, the Referee, as he 
yields us in his definition of us from his ascribed Pukka heights, 
affords the force fuelling the phenomenon of the constitution of the 
self at society's Kafka-ian turnstyle of one's debut on the public 
scene; the Reference-issuing Pukka, or string of Pukkas, are the 
source of the making, production, definition of us at our socially 
elevated or unelevated, depending both on their manner of constituting 
us as well as on our chosen attitude towards these 'guards' at the 
turnstyles of our lives, as an inner matter for ourselves. The Pukka, in 
such instances, is the Appointed, Highly Ascribed Other with whom lies 
the discretion of creating our being as people in the world in one way 
or another, either as object only or alternatively, as a budding or 
fully fledged self grasped and presented by the Referee as a fellow- 
small letter sacred, small-letter Pukka, complete with an "I" same as 
the Referee; he defines us, in one manner or another, as that ego in the 
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shape of which we will quite simply exist in society. The Reference, 
construed in such a big-letter way, is the socially, not just 
sociaipsychologically, consequential statement of the self being judged 
on the podium of the world, it's the dowry of one as an effective "me" 
in society, either of a blemished hue or as a one-of-us Pukka, in terms 
of which one enters the social world, the effect of the Reference 
extending to the whole course of one's lifetime. 
It's a very consequential issue how the Referee goes about, 
approaches the job of giving his Reference in this big-letter manner and 
context. In giving it, in defining the being of his 'charge', both to 
himself and quite as importantly to others, to future Pukkas in the 
life of the 'charge' to whom the Reference refers, the issuing Pukka as 
our Referee (for that's what he is when he gives us a passport, 
entitling us in one way or another to opportunities of one sort or 
another, lowly or prestigeous, in the world), exercises his own 
fundamental choice in the respect of establishing the Other, (us, in his 
charge), whether this is explicitly known to him or not. At the time of 
the introduction of the '11+' just before the 1944 Education Act, when 
secondary school selection was still based on the teacher's Reference, a 
useful and revealing term came to the fore in referring to the two ways 
in which the Referee (in this case the schoolteacher) can approach the 
job of giving his reference. The term which became fashionable then was 
the 'halo effect', operative or unoperative, as the case may be, in his 
writing the reference. It was at the advent of the 1944 Education Act 
that the Referee's power to saturate the reference with a 'halo', so to 
speak, in relation to the child about whom the Reference was issued, or, 
alternatively, his power to withhold that from a reference, became 
recognised as an important issue. It was then that the limelight was 
directed at the consequentiality of his giving a reference implicative 
of a licence, as far as the he was concerned, for his 'charge' to be a 
potential "I" as well as a "me" in the make-up in his self as his future 
possibility, or, alternatively, his key placement to thwart and withhold 
such a humanly decorous classification from children not approved of by 
him. At this time the problem of these two modes of giving a reference, 
with the 'halo' usually reserved for the middle-class child and the type 
lacking in such a 'halo' to the working-class one, was recognised as the 
cornerstone issue and force in differentially channelling children into 
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the secondary school system, with one type of secondary educational 
institution, the Grammar School, reserved for the ones judged by the 
teacher to be blessed with a higher degree of excellence, and the second 
type of school, the Secondary Modern School, reserved for those judged 
to be endowed with a lesser degree of excellence; resulting, prior to 
the Act, in a sieving process which is of special interest in the 
context of our current argument too, as we see one of these types of 
references or the other, as reflecting the teacher's ability as well as 
human stature in being either perceptive and responsive, or deaf and 
blind, to the young working-class 'charge's' authenticity and potential 
for authenticity as a human being, and consequently his success or 
failure to grant potential and room for authenticity in the self of all 
children as the proper due of all; an act of choice on the Referee's 
part which defines, at the same stroke, the Referee himself too, not 
just his reference, as authentic or unauthentic. A reference affected 
by, conceived with the halo effect at work in it - why not be 
academically inelegant - is one composed with love. It's the definition 
of the self which is grasped and advanced as a complete Gestalt, in the 
spirit of respect to the academic's or employer's 'charge' as human 
reality: more than the sum of its parts, more than a bundle of 
individual attributes haphazardly and not coherently conceived in 
grasping and describing the self of the ego to whom the Reference 
refers, irrespective of whether the factual truthfulness of the data on 
which the Reference is based (to which factual correctness the 
unauthentic Referee often adheres, in seeming honesty, no less than the 
authentic Referee), are factually overwhelmingly favourable or not. It 
should be-realised that a mere faithfulness to recorded data does not in 
itself make a Reference authentic; indeed, the ideal of the factual 
sparseness of a Reference usually yields an unauthentic one, 
particularly in the case of children. To the Sartrian (though net to the 
engineers of the 1944 Education Act), it is the Reference with the 'halo 
effect' which qualifies the Reference for authenticity, it is the 
Reference complete with the 'halo effect' which gives the Referee's 
charge his due as a human reality, present and future, and it is 
furthermore this type of Reference which produces the 'objective' mode 
of giving a reference for Sartre's money, compared with the slavish and 
meagre empiricism-prompted objectivity of drafting a Reference which has 
regard for the factual achievements only in describing the human quality 
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(always, ideally, inclusive of the 'charge's' potential) of the person 
about whom the Reference it written. It is the more authentic Reference 
by our definition of that, the type putting into play the 'halo 
effect', which alone has the potential and power to recognise in a Chris 
Hughes, underground train-driver and International Mastermind in 1983, 
as the schoolchild and eventually the employee who potentially has it in 
him to achieve such a feat, if the performance of that be realistically 
inherent in his personality, the identification of which talent is the 
Referee's duty. 
The Reference will not graduate to one conceived in the 'love', in 
the appropriate sense, of him to whom it refers, (the love; in other 
words, which is seen, experienced and meant by the Referee as the due of 
a deserving fellow human being who is apprehended as a potential equal 
in the present or future to the Referee), and will not therefore become 
an authentic one, by the Referee composing it in the tone of unauthentic 
love, by way of slipping into the reference solemnly emotive words in a 
kindly tone, which make the Referee himself appear as a Good Man, but 
which projects his 'charge' about whom the Reference is written as his 
inferior, or potential inferior in the case of school-references, as one 
who has his anthropologic classification as Rachmanes, cut out for him 
with reference to both the present and the future, due to some less than 
optimal ascriptional feature attaching to his person or background, 
causing the Referee to comprehend him as object only in relation to him 
on the long term, whilst apprehending himself as big-letter Sacred in 
sanctimonious personal superiority over his 'charge'. An authentic 
reference is not necessarily very different in its merely empirical 
content, as already remarked, from an unauthentic one; it's based on, 
contains the same information regarding the 'charge's' past 
achievements, qualities, examination or test results etc., as does the 
unauthentic reference. It is merely made authentic by its optimism and 
long-sightedness in stating the fullness of its content with the 
'charge's' potential, not yet fully assumed "I", not yet fully developed 
talent, as well as his "me" conceived of at its merely inert. It deploys 
the Referee's imaginative objectivity in identifying the potential in 
his 'charge', particularly when young but also in cases where the 
'charge' is fully matured in years, to make good at the optimum level 
as the whole person he is; it's made authentic by the Referee's well- 
The Turnstile. The Social IIncreativity of the Pukka. - 214 - 
founded faith in children, all children in the ordinary way, to have it 
in them to forge ahead when motivated, by virtue of the motivation- 
generative power of the knowledge of being backed up by the good opinion 
of a respected senior authority, and a supporting fellow human being at 
that, fuelled by the power which a good reference can give to a self as 
his potentials are gradually solidified in the practice of everydays 
into successes, big ones or small, in one's biography, curriculum vitae, 
as the fruits of the potentials of the Referee's 'charge' are gradually 
entered into the frame of reference of the effective outside world in 
significant moments as well as in the mundane contexts of the history of 
one's continuous lifetime. The quality which shines through such an 
authentic reference as warmth is not the product of a stylistic 
artifice, and its meant and sympathetic authenticity extending to the 
child certainly need not be made explicit in emotional terms at all for 
it to remain committedly authentic; it's interpersonally constructive 
qualities and eventually effects are merely the natural reflection of 
the 'charge' conceived in the Referee's own spontaneous authenticity in 
his capacity as an urofficious, small-letter pukka, testifying, in a 
Pygmalionic manner, to the being, quality of the Other about whom the 
reference is written, as a 'Like small-letter pukka, 
particularly when his Reference is issued with regard to 
schoolchildren. The overall, positive hue of a Reference, whether it 
refers to children or fully grown adults, is not, of course, effected by 
the projection of unrealistically favourable qualities regarding the 
Referee's `charge', but comes about effortlessly as a function and 
because of the human totality in which the Referee grasps the Other in 
a holistic, humanly authentic fundamental choice, both of himself and of 
his 'charge' as he does so. 
The alternative mode of the Referee's discharging his duty as such, 
is that of the unauthentic Reference, issued by the Referee in his 
chosen capacity as Subject only, as the rightful creator, constitutor, 
definer of the Other, his 'charge', as object only, across the Chasm, 
the upkeep of which chasm between Sacred and Profane he sees as his 
solemn duty as an ardent Sacred himself, vis-a-vis a poor schoolchild 
or, say, a released prisoner - conceiving of his own job as Referee in 
the heartfelt unlove, or, worse still, the more powerfully subjugating 
unauthentic love in his exercise of tolerance, of an ever-qualified 
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nature, of the Different-from-himself: his 'charge'. The manner whereby 
the Reference projects the Other, the Referee's 'charge', 
unauthentically, is through the conception and presentation of the self 
of the latter by the Referee as merely an itinerary, a receptacle of 
facts, missing him as a person altogether, through a basic and sincere 
inability on the part of the Reference-issuing Pukka to see him as such. 
The unauthenticity of such an empirically sterile or self-indulgently 
and sentimentally condescending presentation of a person prevails, 
operates, consists in a stronger way than merely in putting the Pukka's 
'charge' over incompletely, insufficiently, in conveying him as a 
person: the effect of a reference illuminated by such an unauthentic 
choice both of the giver of the Reference and of him to whom his 
Reference refers, is that it constitutes the person referred to as 
completely, inertly and effectively object only. Any favourable feature, 
merit in the person commented on - for instance, that he is talented - 
will be stated as one of the many fragments defining him as a self of 
the object only breed, as something inorganically, inexplicably, alienly 
attached to the bundle of facts he is otherwise seen as - not as an axis 
uniting, organising him into what he really and wholly is as human 
reality, as a self, by Sartre's and Karen Horney's criterion. This 
approach on the Referee's part will yield a reference which is realistic 
and objective, or rather objectivistic, in the degraded sense, as 
detached from the possibility of an ego potentially of a certain stamp, 
and a unique one as such. 
The way the 1944 Education act resolved the problem of the injustice 
of the monopoly, on the teacher's part, of laying down the course and 
quality of the further passage in education of the children in his 
charge as their Referee, and of his typical practice in exercising that 
by extending the 'halo effect' to middle class children only and 
withholding that from working-class ones, was to opt for the narrow 
empiricistic rationale underlying the '11+', plumping for the method in 
the making or breaking children at the age of eleven, of judging them on 
the evidence of a battery of tests and that alone, with their qualities 
as pupils to be marked and in the process fatefully classified by 
examiners who had personally no knowledge of the children, the pupils' 
results on these tests establishing, defining the children for the 
future, on the basis of a sham equality of a democracy of atoms. As is 
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well known, the '11+' didn't work; working class children still tended 
to perform less well on this crucial test than did middle-class ones. 
The reason for this, it seems to me, is the inappropriateness and 
inapplicability of this degraded understanding of the objectivity of the 
tests to decide the academic classification and fate of the children, 
and together with these factors their human fate in general which is 
manifoldly affected in adulthood in ways which importantly follow from 
their type of secondary schooling. The '11+' was introduced as a result 
of the teachers not having had it in them, in the first place, to love 
the working-class child sufficiently, either at the age of eleven or 
before or after, to see the working-class child, to grasp him, to create 
him as a quality of consciousness which is complete with a" halo' , so to 
speak, the way they had it in them to create the middle-class child. 
They didn't manage to view, relate and address themselves, as a 
longstanding state of affairs, to the working-class child's present and 
particularly his future, to his not yet realised potential as a first- 
class human reality, which is universal in all and which the teacher is 
particularly well placed to bring out all children from the outset. The 
need for the '11+' reflected the effects of the average teacher excusing 
himself, an the long term, from having to be a good teacher to all, his 
art of teaching being the strongest seductive power in luring any child 
into liking a subject and doing well in it through self-motivation, 
developed and reinforced by the teacher in rewarding and encouraging his 
educational successes, in small ways or big throughout the entire course 
of his schooling, which is the most potent precondition of the child's 
clinching, conquering an academic area. At the heart of the problem 
which the '11+' was called into being to remedy, was the teacher's 
consistently applied relative parsimony in extending the 'halo effect', 
in the course of practicing his art, to the less well-spoken, less well- 
clad, less polite working-class child, blemished in these ways from the 
moment of his birth, as a longstanding matter of his attitude, lack of 
love it may be said, towards such a 'charge' of his. It is this truth - 
that of the systemating evading by the teacher, in his dealing with the 
working-class child, of his first duty of the empathic and imaginative 
teaching of all children - that the continued poorer results of working- 
class children, 'll+' or no '11+', was the objective index of, rather 
than of the untenable and wrong dogma and foolish hope, entertained by 
the authors of the '11+', that by the removal of the 'halo effect' from 
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all children's academic assessment, objectivity will be served and 
attained; that the banning of the 'halo effect' from a single, though 
fateful moment in his assessments, will set right the injustices 
following from the 'halo effect's' differential availability to children 
with different backgrounds, which accompanies them throughout 
educational lifetimes. 
It might be fruitful to consider here the dual meaning of the notion 
of expectations. In their small-letter capacity, expectations act as the 
major instrument and condition of our socially creative imagination in 
bringing out the best in people in Pygmalionic constructivity, apart 
from the time, of course, which we must be prepared to put into the 
project of realising the Other, with our "I" left open for him to verify 
himself as a self against a fellow-fulfilled self in and for us, so as 
to remain alert to his real potential as such. Expectations are usually 
credited with acting as the instruments of summoning the forces of 
inertia in the mode of and by the generalized other to keep down 
individual excellence in unlikely candidates for such by conventional 
standards, or indeed even in likely ones, which is the way in which 
Sartre entertained them, and they do indeed perform this constraining 
role in reality to a great degree, in cases where expectations are 
interpersonally unauthentic. But at their humanly and interpersonally 
sensitive, constructive and authentic, expectations have the power to 
create the other to his own authentic limits as a "me", ever and 
properly hybrid and complete with his own "I", and are, indeed, a 
necessary condition for that. Expectations, then, emerge with a dual 
meaning, as a question of their being interpersonally authentic or 
unauthentic in the light of the potentials of the "I" (the "I" in such a 
context importantly at play in both the socially creative and the 
socially created selves) - the expression 'expectations' emerging in 
this context, the way the terms 'life', 'trust', 'deed' etc. have done 
in our formerly discussed trains of thought. In one sense, expectations 
are the levelling shackles to the individual as such, the way Sartre 
sees them, and in the other sense, when originating from the trusting 
and personal Other, stimulating and necessary for the bringing about of 
the fullness of the self of the one on the receiving end of the 
expectations - absolutely indispensible if a child is ever to do justice 
to himself. It goes without saying that expectations, even in the 
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latter sense, at their constructively interpersonal, must be congenial 
and complementary to the self of the Other to which they are extended, 
tailor-made to it, the qualities of its capacities imaginatively watched 
for; in helping to realise them, constant nudging in insensitivity to 
the limits and kinds of the small-letter capacities of the one to be 
reared, is just as harmful as the denial of leeway to those potentials. 
This process, that of listening for, keeping open one's consciousness 
for the other's specific needs as a "me", is not a strenuous and 
unnatural effort but a normal and relaxed one, the fussless by-product 
of one's fundamental choice vis-a-vis the Other and the implications of 
the authentic outcome of that choice for oneself, bidding the self of 
the helper, of the authentic 'caretaker', to apply himself-to developing 
the self of the Other in the spirit of the recognition and respect of 
the needs and gifts of the self precisely as they are found in the 
Other, and not ours. It's significant that the product in the above 
example of a three-fold cross-personal project to bring out Joey 
Deacon's self-expression, was his autobiography and not something which 
was imposed on him by the egos of those who made themselves available to 
him in the project of realising his self. Of course, it is impractical 
for the teacher to devote as much ego-constructive 'love', care and 
individual attention to the materially and spiritually disadvantaged in 
his or her class as Joey Deacon's 'caretakers' were able to lavish on 
Joe, in classrooms with forty or fifty children (as was the case in the 
'forties and 'fifties when the 1944 Education Act was expected to remedy 
the chronically different attainment of middle-class and working-class 
children respectively, and which classroom conditions are still to be 
found to-day); but this fact does not do away with the imperative that 
such an authentically empathic, individually creative and imaginative 
approach by the teacher to the education of every child in his or her 
care should constantly inform him or her as an Ideal - an ideal which 
does not hold in some airy-fairy Utopia, but which is constantly 
operative in his or her work and realised in the most practical ways 
available, in the everydays of his or her professional activities. 
The concept of the Referee, in the context both of the child to be 
brought up and in that of fully developed adults, emerges and ties in 
with the classification of the forms, paradigms of the Pukka-Rachmones 
relationship in the world advanced before, and allows us to draw up two 
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further diagrams expressing new aspects of this relationship. In the 
first of these the position of the child versus the agencies responsible 
for and involved in his upbringing: parents, teachers, foster parents, 
employees of one kind or another of the social services who may be 
effectively involved in the child's early history, figure as the 
'Sacred' term opposite the child, who is grasped as profane, not yet 
socialised, with the rift consequentially separating these two opposite 
anthropologic groups consisting, basically, in the generation gap with 
all the ascriptive trappings going hand-in-hand with it. The second 
diagram. prompted here by the introduction of the Referee, depicts the 
dividing chasm as the concomitant of the separation in external, but 
also in innerly effective ways, between the employer and employee. 
Again, employers, as the ascriptively senior party, have real and 
effective Pygmalionic powers, as Referees, the References issued by them 
potentially deciding the tenor of how the next employer or perhaps all 
future employers of the person referred to in the Reference, (if he has 
the bad luck of hitting on unauthentic employers or the representatives 
of them all through his working lifetime), will relate to, effectively 
and lastingly classify the employee in question as either a Rachmones or 
a pukka himself. It must be stressed here that the focus employed here 
for viewing the employer-employee relationship is not identical with and 
carries no connotations of a class-ideology based on affairs in the 
state of the relations of production, which is an important facet in 
Lukdcs's treatment of the lasting and fateful chasm between capitalists 
as Subject and the typical ascription of members of the proletariat as 
Object, importantly operative in capitalism. One reason why a confusion 
between Lukäcs's political-economically in-depth approach to the 
division between the diametrically opposite classes of humanity which we 
now treat (the employer-employee dyad, that is) should be avoided, is 
that the classes of the humanly oppressed with which we concern 
ourselves here are wider and more inclusive than Lukäcs's working class; 
and a second reason for stressing the difference between the two 
approaches to the employer-employee relationship, Lukäcs's and ours, is 
that this thesis, unlike Lukäcs, concentrates primarily an the 
socialpsychologic workings and effects implied by the 'problematic' 
currently treated here. This thesis concerns itself with the presence 
and socialpsychologic consequentiality of the schism at work in the 
consciousness of the ascriptionally subordinate party in this 
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relationship, the employee, and with his option to choose himself, so 
to speak, in the face of his greater human exposure and vulnerability 
than that of the Pukka in this relationship; with his ensuing choice 
resulting in the socialpsychologically dual possibility of his personal 
authenticity or unauthenticity, in the face of his humanly lower-ranking 
typecasting in the situation, both of which possibilities are open to 
him. This thesis views the employee in his capacity as profane, and 
concerns itself with the possible schism in his consciousness, if that 
justifiably obtains in view of his situation; this schismic vision 
caused in him by the cognised discrepancy, discontinuity in his 
consciousness between his private, critical, authentic 'perspective' on 
his lowly notch marked out for him by the area of work which he is to 
perform, this critical view of his situation illuminated by a more ideal 
self which he may harbour, and by the more ambitious area of activity 
that his ideal self would be justified in sustaining, on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the hard-and-fast nature of the ascribed quality 
of-his placement and the classification of his self in the world in 
actuality, from which he cannot escape, which must remain his lot, 
together with all the prejudices pertaining to his lowly ascription in 
his job, as the underground train-driver Chris Hughes, in our earlier 
example, experienced to his expense. It is, consequentially, up to him 
whether to authentically sustain a sense of his 'ideal self' in the 
definition of himself either when a one-off Reference is issued to him 
on a special occasion, when wanting to change his job, for instance, or 
as a continued state of affairs touching his human status at work on 
the long term - and relate to his predicament in critique of his own 
situation, as well as implicitly or . xplicitiy assuming a sense of 
responsibility for the schism on a similar account in all who are 
subjected to a comparably frustrating definition and scope for their 
selves at their place of work. He may, of course, alternatively choose 
to sweep under the carpet, in had faith, the dictates and his sense of a 
more self-fulfillingly deployed 'ideal self' than his reference and 
classification as a quality of work-force, conceived without a 'halo', 
will allow. Grasping this phenomenon in socialpsychologic terms rather 
than social ones, as did Lukdcs, entails that we direct our spotlight in 
concerning ourselves with this phenomenon, on the concrete 
interpersonality that obtains and operates in human terms between the 
one issuing the Reference and the one to whom it refers, or at least 
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grant consequential room to such as uc"ialpsycholo i aspsc. t in the 
operation of the phenomenon we now describe, and put down the 
commonness, if not universality, of such a Reference systematically 
doing injustice and disallowing a more favourable tenor to creep into it 
as the Rachmones employee progresses in his life, to the typicality of a 
humanly unauthentic consciousness in those who are in the driving seat 
in such situations. (The qualification may be usefully made here that in 
cases when a work-reference is being penned, the author of the Reference 
is often not the employer himself, but, particularly if the employer is 
a large firm or institution, the job of issuing the Reference is often 
done, with glee, by a bureaucrat representing the employer), We put 
down the predictability of a poor, qualified, humanly enslaving 
Reference that is typically issued with regard to one who has once been 
apprehended as Profane and not Pukka, to the popular and seductive 
appeal to those who are in a position of relative ascriptional heights 
compared to the Rachmones implicated, of the opportunity to exercise and 
assert their sccialpsychologic power and relatively greater degree of 
ascribed goodness and excellence, and with that to the wish on the part 
of the Referee to perpetrate the already existing ascriptional 
structure, in which the Referee and his kind have a superior place 
relative to the reference-seeking Rachmones and his kind, as a long-term 
arrangement. 
To summarise these two new groups in our typology of forms of the 
Pukka-Rachmones paradigm, we will now present these in diagrammatic 
form. 
Table 1 5. 
Sacred, Pukka 
Parent, guardian, teacher, 
fostering agencies, social 
services 
Tatle 7" 
Pukka 
Employer, work-referee 
Profane 
child 
employee 
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The concept of the employer-employee relationhip, and the differing 
socialpsychologic as opposed to sociologic grasp of that, brings the 
argument to the notion of the Work, particularly the socialpsychologic 
aspect of that, different from the better-known concept of labour in the 
Marxist, or Althusserian sense, and differing also from the sociologic 
dimensions of positing that notion in the Marxist way. The Work is a 
notion connected by indelible ties to social creativity or creativity 
as human reality (all instances of which are social as their 
precondition and regarding their potential significance, to Mead's 
understanding). The Work (a long-standing preoccupation of French 
philosophy), is the end product, the overt output of creativity as human 
reality, of the activation of the "me" and the "I" to bear. on each other 
in the act, whether in the personal or interpersonal compass of the 
actio radius of selves. It's the dialogue between the "me" and the "I" 
committed to paper or to the spoken word or expressed in terms of any 
artistic or scientific medium or in a craft or simply in realised 
effective overt conduct. It's the application and expression of the "I" 
in the "me", the evidence of life in the socialpsychologic sense. The 
Work as seen here is the natural product by and in the idiom of the 
self, the touchstone of that as productive as such. Van Eyck's Work is 
'Man in a Turban', for instance, Joey Deacon's Work is the enjoyable 
quality of his life which he attained and his autobiography giving an 
account of that, Hughes' Work is driving the train, engaging in 
intellectual games, sharing his high spirit and spirit of inventiveness 
with his human work environment, as the character Hawkeye does in the 
television serial MAZ' . The nature and reward of the ', fork is of its own 
kind, the quality of that serving as the feedback to and for the process 
of socialpsychologic creativity; its prevalence and reward may be 
thought of apart from the economic system. The focus in describing the 
Work as we understand it here is not on the material product of it in 
abstraction from the total human context of its production, of which the 
tangible produce, fruits, are a part, in the sense in which this was the 
case for Luther, as commented an in the latter half of the preceding 
Section where the external yield of our productivity were seen as one 
organic factor in the repertoire which comprises the many possible 
forms and facets of the self's socialpsychologically rightful and 
personally relevant modes of having, earn in the course of its being as 
a self and the application of that in the Work, in work. This 
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subjectively inclusive angle on the possible socialpsychologic modes of 
having is not to deny meaningfulness and relevance to the study of the 
systematically differential modes of having for the reigning and the 
oppressed classes respectively as a function of gross sociological 
patterns and the forces of the relations of production which Marx and 
the discipline of political economics concern themselves with; we merely 
wish to observe that our socialpsychologic angle on the modes and 
ethical justification, or otherwise, of having as defined by 
subjectively inclusive criteria, which we entertain alongside with 
Luther and which we would now like to examine in the context of the Work 
within our range of interest, is also meaningful and important, though 
in a socialpsychologic context in the main. Moreover, we would like to 
make the point that without a socialpsychological angle on the process 
of production as a goal, self-rewarding per se to a great extent, the 
job of the study of the phenomenon of work would be left predominantly 
to empiricistic economists and behaviourist psychologists homed in on 
outwardly anchored, empirical goal-directedness as the sole psychologic 
motivator of the phenomenon of the Work, leaving this phenomenon only 
partially rendered and the scope of its study unrealistically 
impoverished, from a socialpsychologic point of view at least. 
The Work to us in this context (whatever the lessons of the 
Marxists' analyses of the phenomenon kindred to this, writ large), is 
both the yield and the reward of human reality as an end in itself as 
such: it is the privilege of work as such, of being productive as human 
reality. To be productive is an anthropologic feature and hallmark; it's 
a reward in itself, remunerative in terms of its own currency. Saussure 
was the first to postulate the semiotic function with which we identify 
the intrinsic and self-pollenating reward mechanism which underlies, 
teleologically, it could be said, as a function whose aim is justified 
and exhausted in its own process and in the service of its own end, the 
axiomatic human exploit of productivity, work as such, continuously in 
operation at the root of human reality, an irreducible motivation 
firing the process of the self, of human reality as such. This faculty 
causes children to play (including games of social creativity such as 
'house', doctors and nurses), without any reinforcement other than that 
of its own kind inherent in the game, the process of the play a function 
which clamours to be gratified per se, a by-product of simply being homo 
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sapiens, the intelligent animal; a faculty which the behaviourists deny 
(because it contradicts an orthodox learning theory which is entertained 
by crude social psychologists as exhaustively encompassing all human 
behaviour, with external reinforcement, in a primary or secondary sense, 
envisaged by them as the sole motivator of all human activity) and which 
Piaget, in contrast with crude behaviourists, recognised as an important 
universal human faculty from early childhood, a prerequisite of and 
concomitant to cognitive behaviour at all ages, making that notion a 
cornerstone in his oeuvre. Perhaps the great area of embarrassment to 
behaviourist psychology, the rats in Hymovich's experiments which 
delight in performing tasks irrespective of being or not being 
externally rewarded, once they got the hang of them, may be seen as 
pointing in prehuman life to the rudiments of this function. 'Work 
ennobles', the Hungarian proverb holds, compatibly with Protestant 
standards. This little axiom is usually treated with derision, partly 
because in turn-of-the-century times it was usually uttered by those who 
did no work, and due in another part to the stronghold of behaviourism 
and pragmatism informing in predominant ways psychologic thinking in 
both hemispheres, East and West, resulting in trends in both reigning 
socialscientific systems of thought which disallow its meaningfulness. 
But, with the mass unemployment of our day and the first revolutionary 
impact of the silicon chip still not exhausted in its social 
consequences but heralding more unemployment to come, its meaningfulness 
is vindicated in several ways. The psychological and social scourge 
which the systematically induced redundancy of the creative spirit is 
proving to be in our society, shows itself in its displacement into 
deviant activities and functions, with the crime rate and the incidence 
of depression in individuals rising in suggestive correlation with the 
rate of the loss of work opportunuties. Moreover, both experience 'in 
the field' and a growth in relevant socialscientific research have 
gradually uncovered the fact that in spite of the recipience"of dole, 
social security and various allowances by the unemployed, yielding in an 
overwhelming incidence of cases a regular source of subsistance which is 
not significantly lower than the wages of the lowest paid workers, it is 
nevertheless work which the unemployed would typically opt for rather 
than redundancy with all its 'unearned benefits'. Sociologically 
speaking, the unavailability of the privilege of work in a society 
ideologically governed, by the definition of a dutiful citizen as 
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productive in and of society, it's the norm itself, Protestant work 
ethics, that very ideology in terms of which the world makes sense to 
the culture, which is being pulled from under people's feet, society's 
very content as the norm, its being, stability consisting in the self- 
definitive powers of the coherence of that, as Durkheim showed, which is 
fundamentally threatened by unemploym2- t striking people en mass 
unpredictibly, regardless of skill and other aspects of individual worth 
making someone viable as willing labour forcer and the phenomenon of 
financial remuneration often unlinked to performance in the experience 
of those who rank lowest in the way of class, both these practices 
feeding the core of a blatant contradiction, not to say crisis, by the 
very standards of the reigning ideology, at the heart of the norm 
governing our day. This circumstance makes nonsense of the attempts by 
the authorities to wash their hands of the rising incidence of the 
various aspects and indices of the social anomie which Durkheim studied 
a century ago, particularly the rise in the crime rate which has already 
been passingly referred to, hiding behind the rationale that some of the 
offenders are not unemployed; sophistry based on category error, 
disallowing the 'being' and self-contained efficacy of the norm, the 
collective consciousness, an actin radius of its own at which it 
operates as 'whole cloth', whether satisfactorily or anomically, but 
independently, in either case, of the need for a one-to-one 
justification of its own prevalence and ways in terms of the individual 
psychological motivation of people whose behaviour goes to make up 
demographic statistics in obedience to sociologic laws. What we witness, 
in our time, on a sociologic scale, is the mass prevalence of human 
reality frustrated in its own, special, self-rewarding terms, on a 
massive scale; an anthropologic matter. It's the gift itself, capacity 
for social creativity as the Work of those affected by unemployment, 
which goes a-begging. After years of moral conditioning in the 
education system as a result of which people learnt to define their 
worth as selves in the coincidence of the application of oneself as an 
individual with the contribution through one's work to a society calling 
for that, to see the terminus of one's life-project as causative of, 
contributive to the flourishing of the country, society's prosperity 
going hand-in-hand with one's own, now all of a sudden, with the 
practice of drawing unemployment benefit and other allowances by which 
one can somehow make ends meet, this traditional stimulus-pairing 
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between one's own welfare and society's welfare falls apart for the 
individual. There is suddenly a surprise in store for the sceptic who 
thought the little proverb 'work ennobles' as emotional nonsense. With 
the severance of outlets for social creativity by way of the redundancy 
of many, in the absence for them of opportuninies to contribute with 
their work towards the progress and flourishing of society, an appetite 
for work is nevertheless retained by the unemployed - showing that the 
raison d'etre for the need for industriousness as human reality is not 
exhausted as far as the individual is concerned with the cessation of 
its validation in and usefulness for society; there remains a residue of 
a motivation for wanting to work as an end per se after being declared 
useless and superfluous for and in the course of promcting'the social 
aspects of production. Rationalisations, manipulations informed by the 
narrow single-disciplinary, empiricistic economics on which the 
government relies, contemptuous of interdisciplinary links and any 
connectedness with the relations of production, does not manage to make 
the factor of workforce vanish without a trace after cutting it back, 
and does not explain the problems stemming from its lingering on in a 
sociologically important and demanding way after its official 
pronouncement and branding as redundant. The human factor, human 
reality, utilised, engaged, channelled in the production process so far, 
shows itself, proves its continued, now problematic prevalence, in a 
Sartrian sort of double negative, as an invisible need that has not been 
noticed so far but which hangs about now like Banquo's ghost when it 
fails to be extinguished after its being waved aside to appearances, 
which clamours for recognition, calls for being channelled again, as 
something which has been hurt, abused, something which did not go away 
Just because shown tha door, something still prevalent as dissatisfied, 
unfulfilled now, gone awry in relation to what it properly is: human 
reality, axiomatically, properly productive as such, and as something to 
be now reckoned with, a problem. Where did it come from? What is it? 
There is a general failure to grasp the act of the Work as a natural 
right to satisfy the hunger for it in the "I" as something not 
completely validated by its usefulness to society and something more and 
other than what has been paid for, or paid off, in the way of the wages 
or even a substantial golden handshake that is being offered in exchange 
for it, this financial remuneration for it wrongly seen as the sole be- 
all and end-all for the ultimate objective at the terminus of man's 
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hunger or rather thirst for work, and there is a general puzzlement in 
the face of the phenomenon now that this thirst, this force, is not 
extinguished when finally paid for, or even in cases in which it is 
continued to be paid for. The will to work continues to show itself as 
an inexhaustible hunger for its accomplishment on its own terms, as a 
socialpsychologic and not economics-restricted issue, a statement of 
itself as human reality which will not reduce because dismissed by 
economists, which is indismissible because an indelible capacity and 
medium for realising and perpetuating itself as human reality, 
concurrently and tautologically with the Work, informed and validated by 
standards of human reality by definition and in terms of its own 
autonomy as such. The point that the being of the self as'its 
contribution, its Work, is something meaningful as such which it is at 
the self's, its producer's discretion, which the self is free to put 
towards, or alternatively withhold from society and which choice on the 
individual's part is of consequence to society, is strongly made and 
illustrated in the film The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner, in 
the main character in it. The film treats the topic of an outstanding 
talent (excellence in athletics in the instance of the hero of the 
film), in someone who is firmly ascribed as Blemished, a boy committed 
to borstal, whose ego is being dressed down in every moment of his life 
there, through the fact quite simply of his being there. An opportunity, 
a chance to participate in a race, is arranged for him, which will. allow 
him to do justice to his unique gift in a big way for all to see. In the 
course of the race, he has a massive lead all the way; but he stops just 
before the goal post, allowing others to reach it before him. It was his 
own gift over which he assumed discretion, disposal, power of decision 
as to whether to surrender it, allow it to flow into the delta of 
society, so to speak, or keep it from that; and he chooses not to let 
society shine with a phoney, half-hearted liberalism in which light he 
felt it would appear had he allowed it to give him an award, had he won 
according to the rules of its game. It could be said that he committed 
suicide, an act of martyrdom, not in an ontic but certainly an ontologic 
sense, caused the unfulfilment of his self, as the creator of his own 
Work as such, brought off a bloody revolution in the confines of 'my 
world', refused the possibility of accomplishing himself as human 
reality in the qualified potential confines of his self in the world 
which would have awaited there for him, on established society's terms; 
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decrying his reward as Talent, announced in a big-letter way, refusing a 
medal, choosing not to assimilate the offered extent and degree of the 
acknowledgement of his excellence as an ego, in protest against and in 
remembrance of his deprivation of that through a lifetime, since 
childhood, and to militantly assimilate instead his standing for the 
rest of his life as a self which will continue to be defined, marked 
even after this event with ifs and buts in the world, his "me" still 
stripped there for good of small-letter sacred status there, 
declassified as a fully fledged unit of social creativity. 
It's the Work, socialpsychologic life itself as the self's Produce, 
which is alienated in our society, not just its tangible yields about 
which the mature Marx was concerned; an occurrence, a subject matter 
which is apart, distinguishable from and outside the science treating 
the alienation of the economic fruits of labour only. What is happening 
on an increasing scale, is the alienation of the privilege of 
productiveness as human reality itself, in the sense in which 
Salieri tried to alienate the Work and life 
(both on the antic and ontologic level) of Mozart, as Pushkin depicted 
in his play Ito-art and Salieri, with the story re-told by Peter Shaffer; 
as the architect Solness alienated the work of his son throughout a 
lifetime, putting his own signature to his son's designs, as portrayed 
in Ibsen's play The -Raster 
Builder. In spite of the Hegelian makings of 
this process of alienation, relevant first and foremost to the 
individual in his capacity as such, this phenomenon is attaining 
dimensions which touch on our progress towards a post-historic society 
itself, due to the systematic growth of its prevalence as a concomitant 
and by-product of the silicon-chip revolution. The process which is 
referred to here is the tendency of present society for only the 
ascriptionally high-ranking bureaucrats to have work, 'productivity', 
going with the pretence that they shine with the privilege, the apparent 
endowmnent with the ability and deservingness which only work can lend, 
sporting a self whose condition and hallmark is work and leaving the 
unemployed and the unsatisfactorily employed out in the cold to appear 
as humanly second-rate because of their forced unproductivity compared 
with them, a process which is now beginning to claim the attention and 
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recognition even of those who were at first inclined to view the phrase 
'work ennobles' with some derision. What is happening in our society is 
the systematic alienation from people of the exercise of, and seemingly 
also the potential for, creativity (a) through the removal of 
opportunities for realising the selves of those whose work is not in 
demand, their gift pouring into nothing like Onan's seed, the way Joey 
Deacon's "me" would have gone had he not been able to express it, an 
energy, human capacity gushing down the overflow; and (b) through the 
Pukkas' channelling away out of commission the frustrated capacity for 
work of those who haven't got the opportunity to bring that to fruition, 
in the devisive sidetracking of social creativity in ways which are 
dysfunctional to the socially creative process, but functional to the 
status quo as it is, by way of the ruse of the Pukka elevating their 
secondrateness and uncreativity of spirit, to the status of the ideal of 
human quality, and feeding the resulting, phoney core of morals informed 
by this twisted shift in desirable gifts (and with it the sense of worth 
of their own selves cheated into being), by robbing the self of the 
Rachmones of his very self as the mediator and source of human 
excellence, already extensively described in former parts of this 
thesis. 
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Section 3. The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object. 
The concept of the Fall may be usefully introduced here. In our 
sense, the Fall is the event in which one is either relegated Profane 
through an accident in his life, or processed from birth as object in 
the above described ongoing mechanism and process of the 
'specialisation' of the ascribed Pukka as subject and the effective 
attribution of profane status, by the same stroke, to the rest of us, 
either as a matter of ascription or by virtue of our professed 
fundamental choice as Gypsies rather than Accountants, and our 
concomittant graduation, by society's dicta and terms of reference, to 
Players as opposed to Gentlemen. All the above identified classes or 
rather genres of Rachmones, in juxtaposition to the Pukka: Type I, the 
poor and the maimed, Type II, the criminal and the mad, Type III, Type 
IV and so on, right down to the paradigm of us as so many walking 
collections of processed and processable data rather than small-letter 
sacred persons within the private actio radius of our selves, as fodder, 
in other words, into the electronic hardware, mastered and handled by 
the pundits of the bureaucratic order in our subjugation to it, are 
fallen, in the sense that we, the profane are the ones gestured to be 
objects only as our proper lot in the world as a matter, in the final 
analysis, of our ascription there, coupled, importantly, with the 
socialpsychologic assumption and bid to our consciousnesses to be Slave, 
so to speak. Mark Medoff, the playwright, in the plot of his successful 
play rendering the world of the main character Sarah, a deaf young woman 
and her friends, fellow-passengers as deaf in a hearing world, puts the 
socialpsychologic condition of those on the receiving end of being the 
profane in such a sense, very well indeed in his choice of title for the 
play: Children of a Lesser God; the action of the play depicting how 
Sarah and the sharers of her 'blemish', fight their object status in 
their socialpsychologic authenticity, by privately not denouncing their 
title to and the conception of themselves as children as the fully 
dignified god of everyone as potential selves, by refusing to be persons 
with diminished scopes as selves whose affairs have to be managed on 
their behalf, by insisting an a place under the sun equal to anybody 
else's. Being Fallen is being thrust from the comforting, Parmenidean 
paradise of the collective consciousness and from all the ascribed gleam 
of being ostensibly part of that as a person of standing in the world (a 
remunerative experience regardless whether such a standing in the world 
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as small-letter sacred is in every case authentically deserved or 
otherwise), on account of offending the reigning standards of the 
collective consciousness with one's blemish of whatever genus out of the 
large repertoire of ways of being profane, identified earlier - and 
being condemned either to meekly surrendering oneself to society's 
compulsory stereotype casting of one as one type of Rachmones or 
another, object only in any case, existing as and accepting this lean 
and socialpsychologically lifeless social role as the exhaustive 
definition of one's self in and for the sake of the smooth running of 
society, in the mode of one's unauthenticity as an individual; or, 
alternatively, if authentic, one is being forced to conduct oneself in 
the face of one's own Fall by carrying the cross of an awareness of and 
constant recourse to the schism which consists in the cognition and 
acknowledgement of the rift between one's position as a consciousness 
which continues to insist on the free being of itself as exactly that in 
one's capacity as an ego which is partially an "I", an the one hand, 
and, on the other, the blemishedness of one's actual "me" in society as 
now stereotyped, its experience differing from the sensation of the 
fuller "me" of the self as privately entertained, both as an inner, 
socialpsychologic matter and regarding its altered, diminished radius of 
outward chances in the world as those now are. 
There are, in the light of this train of thought, basically two 
ways of handling one's fall, of being fallen - the common condition of 
everyone except the select minority of the humanly unauthentic Ascribed 
Sacred. One can respond to the bid to be object only in one's area of 
fuctioning, either as a 'doormat' or alternatively, as a 'fallen 
angel'. In opting for being 'doormat' out of one's above defined two- 
way choice of responding to society's forceful invitation to us to be 
object only within its body and nothing more as a self, one volunteers 
for and leads a life as exactly that consenting object and nothing else 
which is 'gestured' for us to be. In partial contrast, being 'fallen 
angel' in personal authenticity in the face of one's Fall involves, 
likewise, the acceptance of the social and socialpsychologic fact of 
the Fall (and doesn't go with an unrealistic denial of that either as 
far as our affairs in the world or as far as our psychologic attitude to 
ourselves is concerned). This latter mode of choice of oneself in the 
face of being fallen is not insensible of or oblivious to one's own 
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public image as a "me" cutting a figure in the world which singles one 
out by virtue of the insignia of one's blemish - such as worn clothes, a 
bent demeanour, physical imperfection perhaps, but it is an awareness of 
all these aspects of the consequences of the Fall in the world, without, 
however, surrendering one's responsiveness to the lights of the 
standards and promptings of human reality as a fountainhead further 
informing one's conduct and seen as relevant to one's future attitudes. 
The project of being 'fallen angel' goes with the continued insistance 
on conceiving one's own self as a unique accident and not something 
indistinguishably absorbed into the body of the generalized other as 
forcibly gestured to the fallen, and it entails being still engaged in 
the project of sticking to the practice of the relating of-one's 
consciousness to the generalized other and our own position within that, 
in the critique of both, from the authentic perspective retained by the 
self for the purpose of its continued awareness of both these proper 
objects for one's consciousness, namely the generalized other and one's 
somewhat differentiated and personalised, socialpsychologic "me" within 
that context. However, both the chances for and the quality of one's 
continued uniqueness and distinction as a self sui generis over against 
the otherwise inert and undifferentiated texture of the generalized 
other. (inviting the self at all times into its individually, personally 
unauthentic surrender and union with that), are considerably altered 
after the Fall, even when the fallen self opts to resist the generalized 
other's enticement of it into such a personally authentic union with 
itself. The little protruberance, the bubble of the self always hybrid 
(it authentic) with the "I", which distinguished the self's being from 
the generalized other, is now burst. The self, once discontiiiü 0 0S with 
the generalized other in a manner in which one's relative elevation as a 
somewhet outstanding self in relation to it, conceiving of itself and 
cutting a figure to outward onlookers as a distinctive little 
protrusion over and above the generalized other, has now been burst open, 
is a pockmark on it, its formerly outstanding little "I"-inclusive 
bybridness, small-letter sacredness, hubris, private little eddy, sussed 
out, unveiled, exposed, rubberstamped as illegitimate; the 
socialpsychologically complete "me", the telling index of an active "I" 
in its personal hinterland, for which it once perceived itself, and the 
grace that went with that, are pushed out of its reach. It's a 
disconstituted self, yet it must make good in the world, though it now 
The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object. - 233 - 
hasn't quite got the means to do so. The social world, proclaimed by the 
social norm as the equivalent, by definition, of the 'good', is, of 
course, the arena of its acts, but this arena is distanced from it now, 
in practical terms. The self is informed that there is a shift in his 
experience of himself in authenticity as the familiar and hopefully 
loved Number One, which it used to be, on the one hand, and on the 
other, the continued incoming signals of that 'good', which does not now 
include him. He himself still chooses to carry on consulting and drawing 
from the standards of the ideality of the collective consciousness in 
his maintainance of a first-hand liaison with it, the voice of the 
social ideals still calling to him in keeping with the standards of the 
ideal, (though not actual) collective consciousness directly gained by 
him in his intuition of it, which are not rendered out of commission as 
a private matter, just because he passed the point of the 'turnstile' on 
our metaphoric conveyor belt where the "me"-s and "I"-s are 
differentially sorted, bringing the "I"-s in the way of the Pukka, and 
processing him, as Profane, as object only, as described at the end of 
the last Section. But it is forcefully gestured to him that it is no 
longer his place to practice such social critique which, if 
constructive, originates in this active process of consultation with 
the ideal schemata of the collective consciousness. He must also learn 
that what have seemed as his dearest and most appreciated virtues before 
the Fall, or, if he was barn as already fallen, (into poverty or with a 
physical handicap, for instance), those virtues which would have been 
appropriate to him in the eye of public opinion without his fall, do not 
appropriately grace him any longer and, more than that, are often 
perceived as faults in him. Charm in him, all right in those certified 
as Pukka, is seen in him, particularly if a criminal fallen or the 
recipient of charities due to his poverty, as something to be suspected; 
being clever is said about him with overtones of disapproval; unexpected 
liveliness, unaffected spontaneity, conduct in continued confidence, is 
easily labelled 'hyperactivity' in the mentally ill, and continued 
insistance on oneself as the authentic, fully fledged self which one 
doesn't wish to surrender and refuses to have defined in terms of 
society's typecasting of it, is readily judged, in all classes and sorts 
of Rachmones, as a chip on his shoulder. The possibility of the 
rehabilitation of the Fallen following his Fall will be contemplated by 
the Pukka who is now ascribing him as blemished, and by the generalized 
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other which usually mimicks, in unauthenticity, the Pukka and his 
morality and makes itself in the wake of that; moreover, not only will 
the Pukka and the generalized other allow for the rehabilitation of the 
Fallen, but they will positively insist on that after a seemly lapse of 
time following his punishment, hospitalisation or whatever form the 
aftermath of the event of the Fall of the agent takes; but the 
rehabilitation in the aforementioned, personally unauthentic terms, as 
'doormat', which is expected of the fallen, and often enforced with moral 
heaviness, is envisaged for the fallen by the Pukka on the terms which 
he, the Pukka upholds in the form of the established norm on the terms 
and on behalf of which he practices his role as caretaker. The Profane, 
whether so ascribed from the beginning of his life or as a'function of 
the more recently encountered event of his Fall, is compulsorily 
gestured to make his self continuous with and indistinguishable from his 
role as Rachmones and nothing more, as typecast for him by the Pukka and 
the generalized other, exactly by the dicta of public morals which hold 
for him, in mending the attitudinal discontinuity on the surface of the 
generalized other which the event of the Fall of his self caused and 
will continue to cause there without the public apology on the part of 
the fallen agent on account of his former fall and in his attitude to 
that; he is gestured, in other words, to make himself continuous in his 
ego as object only, in keeping precisely with the dictates of the 
generalized other's official attitude to him, on account of whichever 
from of blemishedness this humanly lowly ascription may hold for him. 
Should such a Profane assume himself as a rehabilitated self in keeping 
with the way which we described as 'fallen angel' rather than 'doormat, 
he will not be considered as suitably rehabilitated and will be openly 
hated or at best, his continued charming, graceful behaviour (by 
Sartre's standards), construed as arrogance. If, on the other hand, the 
tallen agent gives in to the grand gesture of society for him to be 
object only after his fall, obeying established society's call summoning 
him to learn his new, redefined area of the being of his self, he will 
be at best the object of an ostentatious pity of an unauthentic kind (to 
be distinguished from authentic pity which we advance to a self in 
difficulty with whom we identify as potentially our equal) -a kind of 
pity which is the tool of the Pukka's further and long-standing 
superiority vis-a-vis the Fallen, serving as the instrument of the 
Pukka's self-indulgent sympathy feeding his own ego, a sublimation and 
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substitution of his hate towards the Fallen which resembles love, but is 
not truly and authentically that, for it is an unauthentic love reserved 
for those who have once been construed by the Pukka as Untouchable, an 
attitude which the Pukka hasn't got the imagination and personally 
generous authenticity to give up on the Fallen's actual or possibly 
successful and therefore, by definition, desirable human rehabilitation 
on humanly authentic terms, not as object only, will therefore fail to 
be able to accept the Fallen and truly accept the Fallen as a result of 
delivering both himself as someone humanly authentic and the Fallen 
opposite him on the same terms, as both small-letter sacred. This 
ostentatious pity is the Pukka's attitude to someone whom he ought to, 
but hasn't got it in him to love, strongly contrasts'with the authentic 
pity born by genuine love which, unlike the Pukka's attitude to the 
'rehabilitated' Fallen, is always discreet, personal and empathic, that 
is to say, goes with putting ourselves in the place of the other who is 
pitied, 'taking the role' of the other in his plight, and not merely 
sizing him up from the outside, so as to emotionally pigeon-hole him. 
Examples for these two, alternatively operative modalities of 
assuming one's self after one's Fall, (doormat or fallen angel, that 
is), abound in literature. One such exaple in which these alternative 
possibilities are explicitly opened up to an agent and offered for his 
choice, in the character of the Little Monk in Brecht's The Life of 
Galileo. A meek, consenting cog in the service of the Inquisition, 
the Little Monk is confronted by Galilei (standing, to Brecht's 
interpretation, for the new-type, commonsense, practical, politically 
conscious scientist - albeit in the end he compromised himself in the 
latter capacity - who was rightly identified by the political machinery 
of the feudalistic, medieval ity-uphol ding and enforcing Inquisition as a 
heretic in its face). Galilei unfolds for the Little Monk his 
opportunity to make the fundamental choice as a consciousness, between 
the part he may continue to play as 'doormat', such a project resulting 
in his laying waste the light of his personal authenticity, as well as 
his moral probity as a scientist, in the course of carrying out his 
spiritual practice as a priest, and, on the other hand, of choosing his 
spirit as a force and opportunity to enlighten, awake others to the 
truth about the suppression of scientific truth and also the oppression 
of the little individual such as himself by the regime, and claiming in 
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the light of that truth the rightful place under the sun both for 
himself as a unique and authentic consciousness and for the 
consciousnesses of all who are socially his kind, as well as insisting 
on a better quality of life for himself and for the human environment 
which he may influence as a human reality in the course of carrying out 
his calling. By his choice to assume himself as the object only which 
is bid by the established religion which he serves, for his assimilation 
in regarding himself, in the manner he in fact chooses to conduct 
himself, he becomes the instrument of injustice which is reigning in the 
world as it is. By this manner of the choice of himself, he comes to 
shortchange both himself and his longsuffering plebeian forebears and 
contemporaries of their happiness as people and their fulfilment on the 
actual arena of given society. The dialogue between Galilei and the 
Little Monk implicitly uncovers the guilt which the Little Monk 
perpetrates in his everyday life by preaching a creed which is satisfied 
with displacing into life after death the rewards and the gratification 
of the clamouring need of his kind to accomplish themselves as human 
beings both in overt and covert terms, in exchange for their sufferings 
and exertions in everyday life, forswearing thereby the benefits of 
people's status as graceful and gracious beings rightfully earned by 
them here on earth. 
Another example of the consequences and the workings of the 
unauthentic choice of one's self as object only, showing graphically 
how the socially 'Sacred' prevailing order 'successfully' conditions 
the ascribed profane to adopt that role and classification as the 
modality of his, or rather her self, in keeping with the bidding to the 
Fallen to lead a life as doormat, object only, is provided (not from the 
repertoire of literature this time but from the realm of real-life 
experience) by my friend Sybil. A young widow with a history of personal 
inadequacy from childhood, mother of a small daughter, on behalf of whom 
some money is being handled by some charitable trustees (making 
instalments of that available to her at times of crises), her life has 
become a string of incidents of disaster. Moving in circles of drug 
addicts, her home and scanty belongings were regularly exposed to being 
burgled. She reported these events to the trustees among whom there was 
a great upheaval at such times. They visited her to comfort her, and 
invited her to tea at their homes, something she thoroughly enjoyed; and 
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she was given on such occasions sums from her money, too. She identified 
as the way of the betterment of her lot (for in the ordinary way she was 
extremely bored and unhappy), the course of becoming an ostensibly more 
and more compliant object true to expectations of her: she came to be 
the part of the Rachmones more and more totally, treating herself to the 
financial and social reinforcement available to her from the trustees at 
the times of dramatic misfortunes which befell her with increasing 
regularity. The Pukka involved were also psychologically greatly 
reinforced at such instances in their capacities as the 'good', shining 
in the part of caring caretakers which was their personal stake in being 
involved in the whole undertaking, and Sybil always treated them grandly 
to the experience of being the rescuers of injured innocence, or rather 
a powerless, subordinated psyche slighted, by wholeheartedly being the 
part of helpless object deserving to be given an occasional break, 
performing the part cast for her as doormat to a :. She considered it 
worth her while to shed all her belongings from time to time in return 
for the treat that was occasionally to be hers in the course of the 
string of disasters to which her life amounted, carrying her being as 
Rachetones to professional heights. She simply adopted being object only 
as the meaning of her life, her meant 'sincerity' in playing the part 
shining through with the convincing powers of the truth and pleasing, 
satisfying the Pukka. However, her money was waning and her progress in 
the world, which the trustees undertook on the face of it to promote, 
made no progress at all. They approached me for advice about how this 
state of affairs could be remedied. I suggested that the pattern of the 
'reinforcement schedule' to which they subjected her (rewarding her for 
her failures, that is), was reversed, that is to say, that they should 
start making instalments of her money available to her and fuss over her 
after certain periods of incident free and good management as a reward 
for those, rather than regularly rewarding her in multiple ways for her 
occasions of crises. My suggestion was treated as heartless and cynical 
because of the hardnosed psychologically scientific principle at the 
back of it, and her conditioning in the former manner to her eternal 
Rachmones status carried on, completing for her the course of 
behaviouristic training as social object only which has been started for 
her from early childhood, making her, by virtue of the force of that, 
destined to be obedient Fallen Rachmones to the end of her life. 
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The authentic way, in contrast, of relating to one's object status, 
fallenness in terms of the collective consciousness as it is in the 
world - in other words, the attitude of shouldering one's brandedness 
there as Profane without the denunciation of the "I" as organic part and 
continued informant of one's future conduct as a self in the face of 
society's gesturing to one to make do without that, certainly does not 
mean that one can, unrealistically, deny that one's self as the fallen 
object which society has decreed that one should be, is the case in the 
real sense of society's positive facticity - it does not mean, in other 
words, that even in authenticity (that is to say, with the "I" insisted 
on in leading one's life) one wants to or indeed can pretend, with any 
hope of success and effectiveness, that one can dissociate' oneself from, 
wash one's hands of the external definition of one in one's future 
conduct as the fallen object for which one has been ascribed if that be 
the case. One important message of Paul's anthropology as reinterpreted 
by Bultmann for the twentieth-century use and edification for 
existentialist moralistic thought, is that it is precisely in our state 
of our inevitable fallenness as object, and in the attitude of facing of 
that, that our authenticity as human reality lies. True, in Paul's sense 
of this message, it is our fallenness, sinfulness in the eye of God, in 
other words in our relation to the ideality rather than to the actuality 
of the collective consciousness (if we want to extend, stretch our 
understanding of God into Durkheimian directions) that we must reckon 
with our fallenness as 'object', 'body' in the world as a condition of 
our authenticity as human beings, but even so, Bultmann's and later 
MacQuarrie's attempts to bring to a common denominator a narrow 
individualistic understanding of our selves and condition as 'body' in 
Paul's sense with our profane state as members in the 'body of society' 
(soma Christou), an additional, social dimension of our axiomatic 
profaneness emerges compatibly with Paul's teachings, on top of Paul's 
declaration of our universal fallenness as a necessary by-product of the 
carnal, physiologic aspect of our selves. It is certainly in keeping 
both with Paul's ethics and with that of twentieth-century 
existentialists, that we must own up to, shoulder our responsibility as 
profane, as object in a social context too, however authentically and 
full of divine pretentions we may circumscribe the actio radius of our 
selves in the context of and over against society and its norms as they 
are; indeed, the more authentic we want to be, the more we must 
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acknowledge and assume the 'object' ingredient, the "me", which is part 
of our selves. The important issue in assuming our object status in 
society, inevitable for all, deciding our authenticity or 
unauthenticity, is the quality and modality of our assuming ourselves as 
object, which is up to our free choice: it's the question whether we see 
ourselves as quite object, that is to say as a self to whom being object 
as well as an un-denounced "I", (which we must be at all times as a 
condition of our personal authenticity), is a welcome completion of the 
authenticity, scope, dignity and power of our selves, not so much a 
stigma but a privilege and an opportunity to actually do something about 
the lot and quality of our own selves and that of others in internally 
and externally positively consequential ways, or, alternatively, 
whether we choose to see ourselves as object only, as mere object, as 
established society gestures us to be, opting of our own will to tackle 
the inevitable aspect of the being of our selves as object, on account 
of which we feel guilty and ashamed in our nakedness as such if so 
ascribed, by penitently and meekly jettisoning our individual 
sovereignty as a self and spiritual armoury as such which lies in the 
retention of the "I" in addition to being a "me", and as a result of our 
so doing, our latter-style, unauthentic choice of ourselves consists in 
regarding ourselves and acting as unquestioning, uncritical and willing 
matter-of-course conscripts in the prevailing social norm's ceaseless 
crusade in suppressing in us, the profane, the "I", in severing us 
profane from that "I" in ourselves, as the safest and most effective 
ruse by society for perpetrating its own self-preservation and continued 
being in the norm as it happens to be in its present states of affairs. 
In the previous sentence we hinted that our attempt, project and 
bid to be authentic as opposed to unauthentic object out of the two 
possible ways of assuming ourselves as such (in our choice to be, in 
other words, quite object as opposed to being object only), we must own 
up, as a condition of our own authenticity, to our responsibility in 
being party, not only to our successes and failures in grappling with 
and resisting society's automatic and axiomatic attempts to relegate us, 
the profane by ascription, as object only, which we must resist as a 
condition of our own 'grace' (in Sartre's sense at least, already 
multiply defined in former parts of our argument), but we must also see 
ourselves as responsible, if we aspire to authenticity as selves, for 
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our participation in, through the endorsing with our attitudes, the 
relegation, demotion, utilisation, branding of the Other, (any other) as 
object only, whether that goes an in small ways or big ones; we become, 
through our passivity in the face of that occurrence, wittingly or 
unwittingly, party to society's practice of curbing other people's 
horizons and the processing of them as not whole selves, as slighted 
small-letter sacred, as hurt, diminished, lessened human realities, are 
forcibly and humiliatingly gestured to be object only. We all have it in 
us to respond to the phenomenon of mass "I"-deprivation as did Jesus, 
the paragon of authenticity in this sense, the critic of the social 
world at its individual ego-curbing coerciveness to millions, the 
crucified champion of the spiritually complete wholeness of the selves 
of all: we can share with him both the attitude and potency to be the 
champion of complete children-of-god status for all, even in relation to 
those who are ascribed profane (or rather, particularly to those) in the 
way we conduct ourselves towards those, and we are able to respond, like 
Jesus, in egalitarian empathy, to the woundedness of those authentics 
who are exposed to the crucifying experience of being deprived in real 
social terms of a full human status complete with an autonomous, "I"- 
inclusive ego and treated, handled accordingly; we are all equipped with 
the capacity of putting ourselves in the place of the spiritually and 
human dignity-wise maimed, severed and punished as though they were us 
and feel in accord with them their pieta in this deprivation. Our 
Jesus-potential in both these senses is 'continuously distributed in the 
population', to use the statistician's terminology. Mead claims we are 
able to share concepts, language signs and cope with and perpetrate the 
being of our social consciousness in language, by virtue of the 
shareability of people's responses to them: they mean the same to 
everyone in a sense near enough to allow them to be universally 
illuminated with function, being, the entire repertoire of language 
signs amounting to the content of the "me". But we are also able to 
respond, in comparable ways but in a negative sense, to respond to the 
shortchangedness in some as selves consisting in denial of the 
acknowledgement and lee-way to the "I", their deprivation in this sense 
of a potential and status as small-letter sacred in socially and, 
importantly, socialpsychologically positive terms, as socialpsychologic 
"me"-s, as human realities. We have the capacity to share the response 
to each other as divine, and consequently also as selves rendered less 
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than divine, as originally endowed and later cheated out of one's 
encodedness to respond at first hand to the paramountly ideal social and 
anthropologic values for all in the collective consciousness at its 
unadulterated by the reigning norm at its given, and in the face of the 
states of affairs of the corruption of that in that given norm. We are 
all sensitive and responsive, regarding our potentials, to our state, 
and of the state and fate of people like us, in having been once or 
twice cut down to size as object only in the course of our occasional 
projects aimed at drawing from the fountain of those ideal values to 
which the self complete with an "I" and such a self alone has recourse, 
we have all experienced being clamped down on for voicing pur lights, 
acting in the name of such greater than officially ordered assumptions 
of our selves. We all have the potential (to paraphrase that which has 
just been said) to 'take the role' in the Meadean sense of the term of 
this frustrated Jesus-potential in us all, of the authentic hurt, cut 
down in the world; but this awareness and capacity needs to be tempered 
in everyday experience (for it is commonly to be called on and easily 
activated in the quite undramatic business of our ordinary social 
intercourse), for the protection of the sanity of the self and in 
courtesy to the Other to whom we could constantly or very often relate 
in such intense terms as a fellow-"I", otherwise the perception of 
ourselves and others in this manner would be psychologically untenable 
to the long term. Still, our potential for summoning our authenticity in 
this manner in principle, in socialpsychologically attentuated ways at 
least, is an important one in this context. 
We have distinguished above between the authentic and the 
unauthentic ways available to us in shouldering, acknowledging, relating 
to our sociaipsychologic object status as profane when we are so 
regarded as a matter of the accepted view of us. We can respond to the 
outside definition of us as object in the above sense (to recapitulate) 
either unauthentically, by accepting ourselves as that mere object which 
we are gestured to be, or alternatively, we may respond, in 
socialpsychologic authenticity, by summoning ourselves as inevitably but 
unapologetically object as selves with our additional light as an "I" as 
also part of our selves brought to bear protestingly on the forceful 
calling on us by society to make our socialpsychologic "me"-s 
continuous with the fibre of the generalized other with no other 
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socialpsychologic function retained in sustaining the mode of our being 
as individuals. A finer classification of our modes of being as 
consciousnesses in response to society's gesturing to us to be mere 
objects when profanely ascribed in some sense, may be yielded when we 
look at the two possible ways that obtain for us within the authentic 
modality of conduct if that is what we deviantly plunge for in the face 
of the bidding by convention that we should regard ourselves as object 
only in view of our blemish in society on one of the formerly identified 
scores of our being Rachetones or another. 
There are two ways of living up to the dictates of authenticity in 
critique of our humanly unworthy relegation to mere object status, in 
instances when we consequentially retain a worthier vision of our place 
in the collective consciousness, (if not in the actuality of that for 
us), to which social ideality we remain perceptive and open. One way of 
tackling the ways of society and particularly its restrictions to our 
authenticity because of our status as fallen in terms of its norms; as 
those prevail, is the course of overtly and directly pleading our case 
to the world as the personal witness in relation to as critics of the 
existing world which we see ourselves as when slighted in the above 
manner as a full ego. In this case we are openly and explicitly 
crusading for the emancipation of the blemished of our kind and of our 
own selves in particular; the only course for our authenticity in the 
project of the emancipation of our selves which Mead allows for. This is 
the course which the protagonist heroes of Grete -k tragedies have 
caosen (or the deaf activist colleagues of Sarah in Medoff's play, to 
draw on the example of a hero not from the ranks of royalty and the 
nobility surrounding it, but enlisting the project, in unsurrendered 
authenticity, of someone who has to constantly summon that militant 
project of authenticity in everyday life. ) But the bleakness of this 
project, that of the explicit plea, fight for the vindication of one's 
somewhat deviant stance as an individual for inclusion in a better, 
future generalized other (here on earth, of course), arguing publicly 
for our acceptance of what we uncompromisingly are as selves, blemished 
in the eyes of the public or not, makes great demands and only a few 
follow that course. The second road to personal authenticity in relating 
to our object status (an inevitable reality for all of us in society in 
the sense just described above) - is doing the job of quietly and 
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privately getting by in the world, shouldering our object only status as 
ascribed, though illuminated, as a private affair, with the lights of a 
retained "I", without bidding for the alterations of affairs in the 
world, with our self as the sole audience to this feat, owning up to 
the schism to which this socialpsychologic undertaking amounts in 
relation to our lot as object only in the world as typecast, and making 
one's way as human reality as gracefully as one can, but within the 
confines of that which can realistically be done with the appreciation 
of our placement, positioning as selves in the world as ascribed, and 
ever appreciative of the fact that we must sanely earn our supper there, 
which is not easily granted to schismic consciousnesses. This second, 
secretly authentic strategy to responding to one's relegation to be 
object only with one's greater dignity as a self retained as a matter of 
private freedom and opinion in the face of such ascription, can merely 
yield socialpsychologic authenticity and not a concurrent social one as 
well, as can the big-letter project of the socially irate heretic openly 
taking on the world for its unjust cruelty to those lowly ascribed in a 
manner unjustifiable by the lights of human reality, as just commented 
on. The small-letter authenticity of the second course of action is of 
a different order than the big-letter Authenticty of the outspoken 
activists of the cause of the acceptance of the slighted egos of the 
various sorts of 'fallen' in the world. In counterdistinction with our 
earlier preoccupation with the big-letter Authenticity of Aristotelean 
dramatic heroes and their latter-day heirs in publicly championing the 
cause of the emancipation of themselves and their kind, our spotlight is 
now on the mundane and smooth managers of the schism as a day-to-day 
matter, rather than on the public arena of the martyr's or dramatic 
hero's transcendence of that as a socially overt act of constructive and 
bold 'social surrealism'. The kind of schism-managers we want to 
consider now are the quiet getter-byers with the schism in ordinary 
life, those who don't want to relinquish their being as somewhat 
dignified selves in ordinary ways just because a bit blemished here and 
there - not beautiful, not successful, not indigenous, not one of the 
religious mainstream, one's reputation a bit tarnished, a bit sinful 
too, caught once or twice dishabille or smiling foolishly into the 
candid camera which captured him in real life, having done the wrong 
thing; the abjectly poor who don't want to give up their minimum claim 
to the semblance of gracious living and don't have it in them to be wise 
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ascetIcS when removed from the means of leading such a somewhat better 
than ascribed life in realistic terms, such as Jingle in The Pickwick 
Papers, or those who have been branded blemished with a little bit of 
hutspeh still left in them, trying to go the way, advance to themselves 
the 'kingdom come' in which they anticipate themselves as with a bit of 
grace, so that they can have a little bit of that already here on earth. 
Our 'follow-spot' falls now on those who go down, or perhaps up 
(depending on the way we look at it), fighting in a small way, as 
persons, no less, no more, who make a bid in the secret of their privacy 
to be autonomous masters of their destiny in the freedom of which 
consists every man's divinity; an those who want to claim the fruits of 
their being divine sparks and try their hands at ways of being so, those 
who would like to shout 'als ich kann' as did, figuratively speaking, 
van Eyck when he added this phrase to one of his masterpieces, but have 
no paintbrush enabling them to show it, who want to say 'I am sacred' 
though this is not strictly true regarding their manner of ascription in 
actuality; and who therefore 'advance the truth' a bit; on those who 
would like to be the crickets in Aesop's fable as a manner of their 
zundamental choice, as did the librettist Ramuz's hero of The Soldier's 
Tare which Stravinsky set to music, but their violins have been taken 
away. The small-letter fallen, socialpsychologically authentic pursuers 
of the project of being a somebody illicitly, in spite of carrying 
society's stamp 'damaged goods', 'seconds' as regards their real states 
of affairs in the world with such a label on account of some Blemish or 
another subliminally but effectively stuck to them, those who have not 
been caught at and therefore keep trying to swing a two-star motel 
accomodation for themselves on the road to their identity instead of 
the leak House hostelling the profane under the regime of the 
Caretaker, to stick to the symbolicity of Pinter's play of that title. 
Those possibly not yet 'nailed', not yet solemnly identified as Fallen 
by ascription, but clandestinely able to retain some measure of personal 
authenticity and the dues of such a person in the world, though this is 
beyond their legitimate means, are, and have been by long standing, a 
favourite topic of folklore, mostly of an urban variety. The topic and 
character of Billy Liar is of this ilk, the little crook immortalised in 
early Soviet literature in Ilf-Petrov's Ostap Bender, the legendary 
Columbo, champion of a socially silent, greater excellence than that of 
the arrogant, ascribed Pukka villain whom his business brings him face 
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to face with, parading his dirty raincoat and always getting the posh 
crook who talks down to him to begin with, before outwitted and got by 
Columbo, according to the recipe to which the scenarios of the episodes 
are written, or 
Sveik, 
getting the better of his superior officers, set 
apart from them as second class by ascription and at the same time 
protected as a free spirit by his certificate of lunacy; those, in a 
word, who are authentic enough in themselves to take the hate and/or the 
ostentatious pity of the highly ascribed without openly protesting 
against those attitudes, managing, at the same time to be that secretly 
small-letter sacred person, as far as they are concerned, who they are 
to themselves. 
The above examples, all taken from literature, illustrate the 
paradigm of schism-management in which the part of 'object' has 
irretrievably been ascribed to one by society's cold, externally 
positive standards, but the agent so ascribed (while playing his part as 
problemfree object only to outward appearances so as not to ruffle 
external affairs as those exist writ large), wholeheartedly rejects, in 
individual authenticity, his typecasting as a personal matter regarding 
the state or his consciousness in the socialpsychologic order of its 
being, (unlike Sybil who totally accepted that stereotyping in the way 
she led her life as object only as ascribed in the sincerest of bad 
faith). But the literary nature of the examples we just put forward for 
the illumination of this paradigm, would wrongly imply that this 
sociaipsycholgically authentic manner of the choice of oneself as 
ccachmones is an esoteric contrivance on the part of these symbolistic 
commentators on the anomaly and futility of society's oppression of 
human reality in the dynamism which makes that what it is, upheld, in 
every case, by these high-spirited pirates in society. (Columbo's 
reading differs in this sense from the other literary examples just 
given in that it is not the collective consciousness at its ideal, but 
society at its actual, which his personally more glittering performance 
as a human reality than would normally be expected of someone so poor 
and unassuming, goes to serve). This particular paradigm of the 
socialpsychologically authentic being of the self in the face of the 
veto to it by officialdom and stereotype convention, is a familiar 
occurrence in everyday life too, and I will now summon further examples 
to support this view. My auntie Googey emerged from the Second World War 
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as a widow, her husband, editor of the Jewish Review, having been a 
casualty in the holocaust. After a period of mourning, Auntie Googey 
started wondering how to pull herself up by her shoestrings and make a 
go of her life again. She came upon the idea of going around collecting 
subscriptions from her husband's former clientelle, notwithstanding the 
fact that there was no paper now to sell - because none produced. 'Let's 
put on our Rachnones toilette', she said to her daughter, formerly a 
journalist on the paper, and they went to 'work', calling on the houses 
of and collecting subscription from former readers, dressed suitably and 
heartrendingly for the purpose. This dramatic charade as Rachmones for 
the sake of appearances, however, prevailed strictly in hours of 
business only. In private and after 'work' they appeared well-dressed 
and were their usual selves. At first their customers were a little 
surprised by their approach, but later got used to it and the money was 
ready for the two ladies every time the subscriptions were due. Each 
year they went to a holiday resort where they had a good time and gave 
others a good time too, out of the kindness of their hearts. There they 
met their clientelle who were pleased to see them in good circumstances 
and felt they had helped their respected friend the late editor to 
provide for his loved ones in a style they have grown accustomed to and 
which he would have wanted them to have. Another example of the project 
of committed, small-letter personal authenticity in the face of the 
ways of the norm which interfered with and violated it by forcing it 
into the straightjacket of its conventional ways and forms, is provided 
by my friends Eva and Paul S., brother and sister. Following their 
flight to the West after the collapse of the Hungarian Uprising, they 
lived for a while, as we have done, as refugees in Vienna. They 
registered there as members of every religion, and every day collected a 
great number of luncheon vouchers solely available from the headquarters 
of such denominational institutions, not only as a means to feed 
tnemselves, but also to distribute among their fellow-refugees who had 
scruples about pretending to belong to a denomination in order to fill 
their stomachs: Robin Hoods of the principles of conscience. 
Many paradigms of ordinary-life ways of schism-management may be 
identified, some personally authentic, some not. The most common of 
these is ordinary bad faith in Sartre's sense, personally unauthentic, 
of course, an attitude of consciousness which rids itself of the schism 
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yielded by a dislodgement between its intuition of its ideally rightful 
place in society in the light of the establishment-critical "I", and, on 
the other hand, its contradictory experience of itself, unduly 
disadvanteged in the actuality of the social world, not by manipulating 
affairs in the world a little to fit the greater-than-ordered claims of 
the authentic "I", but by jettisoning that "I" and with it its intuition 
of the self at its more socially deserving than actually happens to be 
its lot. We have already provided examples of this paradigm in our 
reference to Brecht's Little Monk and my friend Sybil. We have also 
given a few examples of the mundane variety of the paradigm of 
consciousness which will soon emerge below defined as the 'ideal lie', 
in the instances of Sveik, Ostap Bender, my auntie Googey and Paul and 
Eva S. (Though Auntie Googey's case doesn't fit exactly the 
socialpsychologic model of the 'ideal lie', not even as that pertains in 
its writ-small, small-letter confines, because she eventually made 
herself believe that her strategy in getting round the prospect of her 
abject poverty which would have been her lot without her rather singular 
ploy, was morally right. Her case is one which 'represents 
intermediaries between falsehood and bad faith', in Sartre's 
°' words. ) 
` 
The project of perpetrating the 'ideal lie' at its pure and 
classical, does not need to enlist a rationale for pretending on the 
'ideal liar's' part that he is morally right and good by conventional 
standards whilst carrying out his projects in personal, but not social, 
authenticity. 'The liar intends to deceive' Sartre writes, 'and he does 
not seek to hide this intention from himself, nor to disguise the 
translucency of his consciousness; on the contrary, he has recourse to 
it when there is a question of deciding secondary behaviour. It 
explicitly exercises a regulatory control over all attitudes. ' I'll The 
ideal liar's consciousness, Sartre explains, is one of critique, 
'cynically... affirming truth within himself'; translucent, freed from 
the opacity of beliefs in, from the engagement, givenness of himself to 
the positive, factitious being of society; unobscured by any regard to 
an identification with that; a consciousness uncluttered by any degree 
of adoption, acceptance of positive states of affairs in the world - his 
disregard for the facticity of the world inclusive of his clearly 
intended dismissal of the norm which is there to punitively respond to 
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his kind of negative consciousness; a consciousness at the same time 
which coolly intends to reap the benefits of the world through his 
pretence of being someone with a respectable social standing there 
whilst knowing that he has no title to that by the dicta of the norm, 
with this project of double dealing quite explicit in front of himself. 
We have already considered forms of the project of the 'ideal lie' as 
that is pursued within a strictly socialpsychologic compass, as that 
project pertains writ small, not touching explicitly on existing 
sociologic dimensions, with an intentionally consequential negative, 
critical attitude towards that, as an important part of the project. 
The small-letter ways of perpetrating the 'ideal lie' was illuminated 
above through the examples of Bender, Sveik, Paul and Eva b., and so on. 
Now we will mention Don Giovanni and his project, who, as a 
consciousness, in contrast with the small-time adherers to conduct in 
the mode of this ideal lying, is one of an explicitly and actively 
motivating contempt towards the world, and whose project in the spirit 
of the ideal lie is consequential in a meant way to society as such; 
whose project as the ideal lie takes on dimensions in the way both of 
its underlying attitude and in the way of its effect on society which 
are writ large in comparison with the projects of the abovementioned 
mere amateur muddlers, illicit swingers for themselves of the 
opportunities in life. Don Giovanni's project is a heretical denial of 
the life - even of the elevated death, equated, in the symbolism of the 
dramatic plot, to the immutable norm as signified in the stone statue on 
the Brave, of the Commander who epitomizes, even through his memory, the 
being of society itself. Don Giovanni's project has a great deal in 
common with what's known as Derrida's game, as reviewed by Descombes in 
his book Modern French Philosophy. Oblivious, by choice, as is Don 
Giovanni, to the collective consciousness at its ideal, which informs 
the personal standards of the social innovator (in contrast with Don 
Giovanni and Derrida's player) in his project of taking to task society 
as it is at its corrupt given in the name of personal authenticity, 
Derrida's game-playing agent, as Descombes lucidly summarises his type 
of consciousness, fights 'a very close contest against a formidable 
Master' (we may view this Master as the omniscient and ever-relentless 
enforcer of the social norm, the ideality and actuality of which is all 
rolled into one for Derrida, as it is for Sartre - the Master an 
artificial construct in Derrida who has no place for a God as society's 
The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object. -249 - 
positivity with which some of Durkheim's followers equate the unbridled 
human reality-alien collective consciousness at its pure and uncorrupted 
- hence the need for postulating such a Master), which Master, Descombes 
goes on to explain, 'we might think certain to win the game with rules 
he himself has fixed. Derrida opts to play a double game (in the sense 
as a 'double agent' serves two sides), feigning obedience to the 
tyrannical system of rules while simultaneously laying traps for it in 
the forms of problems which it is at a loss to settle. ' " 6' These 
problems, to our reading, are projects of fixing and contriving lee-way 
for and opportunity to shine as an individual consciousness unfettered 
by the Master's rules, for the sake of doing so; without, however, 
violating to overt appearances the Master's rules for keeping the 
maverick individual consciousness taking him on in the way of sport in 
this manner. For the sake of the seeming perfection of the agent's 
outward conduct, he makes himself an expert of the rules of the Master, 
assimilating and playing flawlessly the game of outward society's 
perpetration according to the dictates of the Master's rules, 
'committing knowingly the fault' of professing, the way empiricists do, 
the hegemony of social facticity as the proper and sole informant and 
referent for our conduct, (careful not to commit himself to 'positivist 
naivete' the while). 'But this will have to be', Descombes writes, 
'irreproachably done, or else the Master will win the game against a bad 
player, whereas Derrida means to be a double player - his intentions 
bad, but his moves impeccable'; '''l in the same way as the intention to 
lusciously partake in the tangible fruits of the positivity of the 
worla available to the adherer to the mundane norm, forms part of Don 
Giovanni's project as a consciousness which, in truth, challenges, in 
limitless self-seeking, society's rules as such as an end in itself. 
We can look at Don Giovanni's project, analytically as a paradigm of 
schism-riddance and management, of which we wish to outline here a 
sociaipsychologic typology. Looked at through such an aperture, we may 
pinpoint Don Giovanni's project as the opposite of that of bad faith. 
He deals with the schism - that yielded by man's simultaneous and 
indismissable presence in his consciousness of both modes of being - 
social and socialpsychological, collective and private - not by 
jettisoning the private aspect, claims and spheres of his consciousness 
without a trace, as do those who are in bad faith, but by ridding his 
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spheres of loyalty of, serving his marching orders without any scruples 
to, his allegience to the social aspect of his consciousness; firing 
from that everything towards which he may have interpersonal duties in 
his capacity as an individual, riding on, being carried by his set of 
interests, lights as a self and that alone, with complete and self- 
deception-free identification with it, scoring in the meantime on the 
empirical level of the world. The project of reaping all available 
empirical gains in life is also the aim of the man in bad faith, but in 
going about this aim he pretends that he is morally deserving of those 
by dedicating his being one hundred per cent and uncritically to the 
norm, with his characteristic abstention from ever bringing his lights 
as a person to bear on the way in which he goes through life giving his 
conduct the air of selflessness and the justification in front of 
himself of his right to the spoils that he can secure for himself in the 
world. The man in bad faith cultivates a lifelong marriage between his 
own self-interest and things, ideologies, states of affairs in the 
reigning regime as they are, with the distinction between the discrete 
nature of the two participants in this marriage within his 
consciousness, self-seeking (rather than self-realisation in his case) 
on the one hand and social good on the other hand fudged, obscured, made 
'metastable' even in front of himself, until he manages to put an 
'equai. s' sign as far as he is concerned in his own conscience between 
these two. The project of bad faith thus never results in social 
creativity, does not yield the worldly transcendence of the norm by 
itself nudged to do so by the actively deployed, less anomalous lights 
prompted by axiomatic insights of individual, and (in stronger cases of 
reform, small ones or big), by universally pertaining socialpsychologic 
standards of human good, good by the first principles of human reality 
meaningful and pertinent to all, even in case the ruling norm in the 
world is blatantly corrupt and unjustifiable by truly obtaining and not 
fictitious human as well as ideally collective standards. 
But Don Giovanni's project, which is on our dissecting table at the 
moment, differs not only from the totally unauthentic project of bad 
faith, which is based on dishonest conduct both regarding the 
socialpsychologically private and the social makings of consciousness 
(in relation to which the Don Giovanni project it is partially 
authentic, in the respect of its boldly meant and undisguised 
The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object. -251 - 
socialpsychologic deployment at least, whose aim is always explicit and 
clear), but it also differs from the project of the social pioneer who 
aims, as does Don Giovanni, to affect affairs in the world to suit his 
own lights as an individual who is, authentically, both an "I" and an 
effective object in the world as a self, but in whose case, unlike in 
that of Don Giovanni, conduct as an individual and the championing of 
his own lights as human reality in the first person singular takes its 
source from, is informed by, and is organically and fatefully tied up 
with the lights of the collective consciousness and our other primary 
social schemata at their ideal, to which all of us are axiomatically 
and naturally sensible as consciousnesses, as shown both by Durkheim's 
work in a the context of society and by Lacan, for instance, in the 
context of the family, to name but two social scientists whose oeuvres 
are relevant to our current train of thought. Don Giovanni's project, 
then, is not authentic in a both socialpsychologically and socially 
expansive and total way, as are the horizons of the the consciousness of 
the social pioneer, who has recourse to the lights of the ideality of 
the social schemata with the presence to which in effortless ways we are 
born, and who takes on the current norm at significant times as the 
enemy to both individual and social authenticity, with a view to 
righting and transcending it in both individually and, in the final 
analysis, socially positive ways, in the terms of external actuality, as 
car Yý18 ur'rý1 Cc71 
do the Aristote 
lea 
Ahe? oes, for instance. Sartre does not entertain at 
any point the difference, though it is quite meaningful, between the 
project of the 'ideal liar', our Don Giovanni, and that of the real-life 
Aristotelean-type heroes of past and present days, for which latter-type 
paradigm of consciousness there is no room in his thought-system, 
neglecting thereby in his typology of socialpsychological schism- 
management and transcendence, the all-round authentic innovator whose 
humanly authentic hubris (well-placed arrogance, hailed by Sartre as the 
indismissible accessory to authenticity) is publicly voiced against the 
norm of established society in the name (importantly) of the dicta of 
the collective consciousness as his operative presence to the social 
ought as distinct from the social is, which illuminates his own 
sensibility to the authentic individual and social truth, in the 
coincidence of the two, and with an indelible tie between the two in his 
consciousness. Sartre leaves unexplored the mode of the consciousness of 
the agent's possible presence to the ideal of society as susceptible to 
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his intuition, in negative response to the given norm in the world of 
our Socrates, Prometheus, Jesus, of Sarah and her fellow-freedom- 
fighters on behalf of the deaf, whose project is, in big ways or small, 
the transcendence of society by itself at the same stroke as it is that 
of the transcendence of the individual over given society clamouring to 
the authentic for alteration in totally authentic ways, both socially 
and individually speaking. The social pioneer wants to found a better 
society by way of the emancipation of his deviant, because humanly more 
complete and inclusive, lights, with an amended generalized other 
tolerant of those lights optimistically enlisted and envisaged, whilst 
Don Giovanni's project, similarly authentic, as far as its 
individuality-assumption is concerned, is entirely self-seeking and 
negative in its attitude to the social world, present or future, actual 
or ideal. Sartre's failure to distinguish between these two qualities of 
the individual's transcendence towards individually freer and truer 
horizons in opposition to society at its given, one informed and the 
other uninformed by the ideality of the collective consciousness, is the 
result of the circumstance that he doesn't systematically discriminate 
between the collective consciousness - God as society to him 41a' on the 
one hand, and the corrupted form of that, its actuality as the 
established norm which in its practices may be unacceptable both to 
one's personal sense of authenticity and to a superior ideal of social 
reality in one fell swoop, on the other hand; and this is seen as a 
shortcoming in Sartre, an insuffic%en cat which prevents him from 
identifying, as we do, the make-up of the consciousness of the social 
pioneer whose self-assertive lights take their source from his committed 
intuition of the collective consciousness at its ideal, as a separate 
paradigm from that of the Don Giovannis, as a separate paradigm in the 
thesaurus of the schism-managing and schism-transcending tactics of 
consciousness. 
Finally, in listing ways and types of schism-management, two further 
paradigms of that may be still recognised. One of these is big-letter 
Bad Faith - bad faith in the heavy Christian sense as that was known in 
New Testament times and later as a target to Luther's Reformation, which 
can be extended so as to be identifiable in more modern and other than 
religious contexts, as a phenomenon and tactics for psychologically 
resolving 'the schism' between our appreciation of our self in our own 
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experience, as that ideally could be on the one hand and as it is in its 
present psychologically appreciable givenness, that schism with which we 
are all lumbered in our moments, or prolongued spans of authenticity. 
This paradigm of Bad Faith, in contrast with its small-letter variety 
and counterpart, has macrosociologically strongly effective 
consequences, as it refers to the resolution of the schism, that is to 
say, the sense of personal dislodgement between the 'goodness' or 
otherwise of the "me" as it has been ascfl%e in the actuality of the 
world, and, on the other side, as introspectively experienced as a 
personal matter, not in the Rachmones, to whom we so far turned our 
attention in examining ways of schism-management, but in the Pukka who 
is in a position to manipulate the outward social world as one locus for 
the fulfilment of the "I" in his self in a "me", when that doesn't tally 
with his deserts judged by himself as socialpsychologic object, which he 
is, whether he likes it or not, at the innerly informed plane of the 
being of the self. The ploy of the Big-letter Pukka who finds himself in 
the predicament of his prestigeously ascribed "me" in the world not 
being supported and endorsed by a personally worthy self as expressed in 
his sense of the socialpsychologic "me", which is not to his personal 
satisfaction in his moments of authenticity, resembles the small-letter 
bad faith of the little man, in that it is not his personal moral 
standards of his conduct and consciousness which he will summon, engage 
and constantly better in socialpsychologically real ways for greater 
authenticity and deservingness as a person, but he will pretend that his 
personal moral lights are up to scratch because they sustain, coincide 
with, endorse the social norm as it is which to him equals 'the good', 
which goes with denying that the world and the social standards in that 
as those prevail, need, call for reform and alterations in small ways or 
big, by the individual's authentic lights, and accepts and adopts the 
outward norm as it is, as the touchstone and justification of his place 
as a deserving individual under its sun. But there is greater room and 
opportunity for the Pukka in bad faith than there is for the small man 
in small-letter bad faith to falsify the world and justify his 
deservingness in the outward evidence of that as the outsize, socially 
arrogant "I" of his self (one which he gained by ascription rather than 
on account of his outstanding psychologic endowment and engagement and 
which is therefore personally unauthentic), which "I" he needn't 
denounce by external necessity, as must the powerless little man, to be 
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able to say that the world and his place in it as a deserving and worthy 
ego effectively match, in a morally seemly manner. The man in small- 
letter bad faith gets rid of the "I" because it gets in the way of his 
successfully transcending his schism in the world which he hasn't the 
power to alter. The "I" of the man in big-letter Bad Faith is morally 
wanting in the face of anomalous affairs in the world on account of his 
pledge, as a matter of his fundamental choice, not to concern himself 
with righting those affairs in a morally really satisfactory way, which 
is the pledge of the little man in bad faith too. But the "I" of the man 
in big-letter Bad Faith, even though unauthentic in socialpsychologic 
terms, is not wanting in dignity and elevation in outward,, socially 
ascribed ways, as does the self of the little man in bad faith, and our 
Pukka will therefore insist on retaining and justifying his highly 
ascribed "I"-status by influencing the facticity of the world, not in a 
socially progressive way of course as does the social innovator, but in 
a reactionary one, one that causes the corroboration of his "I" by the 
standards of the world as it is, so that his conduct may continually 
appear as socialpsychologically, morally seemly as justified in the 
outward signs of his adherence to the reigning norm, suitably stage- 
managed by him, which will underscore to appearances that his oversize 
self sporting an "I" which is a mammoth one in its unauthenticity, is 
morally good, better than the "I"-inclusive self of those who really are 
excellent as human realities but who are more lowly ascribed. We have 
extensively reviewed the tactics to which this project has recource, 
chiefly in Section 2 of Chapter 2 and in the previous section, and we 
provided several examples throughout Chapters 2 and 3 to illuminate the 
nature of this project, some of which we will now recall. This ploy is 
the sapping, monopolising, by design and as a systematic state of 
affairs, the very being of selves as such, the process manifesting 
itself in the waning of the ontologic life, sometimes coupled with that 
on the antic one, of the gifted, the productive: it's the robbing the 
life of the Gypsy by the Accountant; what we are talking about now is 
the appropriation of the goodness, excellence of the original in the 
face of the already established and therefore highly ascribed, in any 
area of the establishment, as happened in the well-known example of 
Mozart and Salieri, as was the case with the novice whom a senior nun 
bade to fail an examination, as was depicted in the plot of Ibsen's Wild 
Duck where lives are claimed so that the meaning of the life of the 
The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object. -255 - 
parasitic head of the family who is past it in terms of output, may be 
sustained; the project and practice also of Solness in Ibsen's play The. 
Master Builder who put his name to his son-in-law's architectural 
designs throughout a great part of his working lifetime, or, at a 
macrosociologic level, the publicity campaign conducted in Bad Faith, 
cynically employing the tools of social science, chiefly behaviouristic 
psychology, in an endeavour to attach goodness and the conditions of 
goodness, the sheen of human excellence, by systematic associative 
pairing of the much publicised, outward display of such excellence by 
the suitably ascribed, and away from those afflicated in some sense, 
whose exertions produced the conditions of the show of such excellence, 
goodness by the Pukka. The project of big-letter Bad Faith differs from 
the formerly listed paradigms of schism-management, including small- 
letter bad faith, not only in the depth of badness in which the 
individual's commitment to exert itself, in whatever cause, public or 
private, is meaningly twisted, extorted, misused and channelled away 
from the human reality-wise and social ideality-wise fertile, in the 
Pukka ploy of schism-reduction in the world inside and outside the 
consciousnesses of agents, but also supremely bad in that the project 
currently under our microscope is conceivably, indeed often, over and 
above being a project serving individuals, greedy for an excellent self, 
is also perpetrated as an active function of and on the scale of 
organised society. 
Finally, in enlisting, identifying paradigms of schism-management, 
we should account for a special case of the possible matches and 
mismatches between the capacity and deployment of the "me" as social 
'carrier' by choice in Althusser's sense, and the "me"'s alternative 
capacity to be a personally becoming psychologic index of an authentic 
'my world', of the socialpsychologically active self as such - the 
constellation of these two simultaneous capacities of the socially 
and/or socialosychologically engaged "me" affording to consciousness, at 
all times, implicitly at least, the schism: the concurrence and non- 
identity, in other words, between these two autonomous radia and 
operations of consciousness (the socially and spcialpsychologically 
summoned aspects of the "me", that is), in cases where that 
consciousness authentically assumes itself as both socialpsychologically 
and socially active. This 'schizophrenic' awareness of one's "me" as 
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potentially social as well as potentially socialpsychologic, is 
occasionally acute and explicit and directly, readily recognisable in 
experience, in moments of significant choice, without philosophic 
artificiality or sophistication, though at other times this concurrence 
in consciousness of the social and socialpsychologic capacities of the 
"me" may be unactivated in their simultaneity and dormant, but even so 
yielding to discrimination between these two aspects of and calls on the 
"me" in and by consciousness, prone to recognition as distinguishable in 
introspection. This final paradigm of the relative positions between 
these two terms, between these two modalities of the "me" it could be 
said, is their coincidence in significant moments as well 4s in the 
tacit concurrency of the two in the course of leading one's ordinary 
life; it is the experince of these two modalities of the "me" in 
consciousness propping up each other. It is important to see that in 
this position, that of their coincidence, these two modes of being for 
the "me" in consciousness do not collapse into one another with one or 
the other disappearing without a trace, but these two stata of the being 
of the "me" in consciousness remain intact in their sovereity and 
operate as specially, markedly, mutually supportive, enhancing, 
reinforcing of each other, whether in one dramatic moment of the 
paramount significance of both in a situation calling for the 
consequential witness of these or in the quiet perpetuity of the 
sustained existence in consciousness of the two. The case in which 
society in the world is underscored by the socialpsychologically 
experienced and constituted, personally authentic lights of the 
individual, when the summoning of the lights of the self engaged in the 
service of and as the gift of the individual self to the system and 
cause of an existing norm or a norm in the making, recognised and chosen 
as worthy in its own authenticity for the support of the self as such. 
The gift of the self as such to the society thus chosen, shines on such 
occasions with a social as well as socialpsychologic significance, as 
does a signature on a petition. This paradigm, that of the coincidence 
between the shouldered socially as well as socialpsychologically chosen 
and summoned "me" is called 'elective assumption' by Sartre. (The notion 
received detailed treatment in the Introduction here). Sartrian elective 
assumption, this paradigm of the weighty coincidence by personally and 
socially consequential choice of a psychologically authentic "me" and a 
socially authentic one too, the resolution in their coincidence of the 
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distinctness between the agent's significantly summoned up self in the 
name of its personally held authentic standards on the one hand and the 
choice of a society which is recognised as meeting the ideals of human 
authenticity for all on the other hand, must not be confused with the 
coincidence in consciousness between the personal "me" and the existing 
norm, which is effected, in bad faith, by the jettisoning of one's 
discriminatory faculties both as a self and as a socially uncritical 
'carrier' of, citizen in, the reigning society regardless of its 
anomalous moral quality and attributes. It would be preposterous to 
equate Lord Byron's project of joining one of the Greek wars of 
independence in an outstanding act of elective assumption, with the bad 
faith of the mercenary for whom neither the horizons of andauthentic 
self nor the need for a society worth fighting for by the standards of 
the collective consciousness in its ideality which authentically informs 
the social situation supported, figures as relevant when he undertakes 
to become a soldier. There is a consequential difference between the 
exalted coincidence of the two levels at which the "me" figures in 
consciousness - the index of human reality and the significant choice of 
a good society, that is, which is the case in elective assumption - the 
coincidence, in other words, of the personal "me" as a potential 
socialpsychologic commentator, positively or negatively, on affairs in 
the world and the "me" which is socially deployed as 'carrier' in 
external social actuality, and, in sharp counterdistinction, the project 
of collapsing both these two frames of reference for the being of the 
"me" into a nought, as it is in bad faith; and these two paradigms of 
the coincidence between the socialpsychologic aspect of the "me" and its 
society-supporting role and deployment, are usefully distinguished from 
one another, and postulated as separate, nay, in certain key ways 
opposite methods of schism-management. 
in summarising our understanding of the Fall, we must pay more 
attention than we have done so far to the big-letter variety of that 
concept, focussing in on the type of Fallenness which, as distinct from 
small-letter fallenness, has been publicly caught, identified, and 
introduced onto public records (though in our present, post-historic 
days which Descombes claims we are living, the personalities and 
biographies even of the publicly passive, everyday profane are the 
objects of data-storing and therefore amenable to vetting, judgement and 
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classification by officials without their ever knowing of it). Even so, 
for us to be big-letter Profane, big-letter Fallen, it is necessary that 
(unlike the small-letter, publicly inconspicuous fallen), our trespasses 
and spiritual insubordinations in the face of the Pukka norm, our acts 
of retaining, in small ways or big, the schism in our consciousness as 
individuals in our way of relating to what is preordained for us as 
profane and therefore properly mere objects, be made public in the eyes 
of the other profane too, unfurled to the generalized other, publicly 
brough to daylight, either by our schisms detected (thought-crimes or 
actual crimes), or by our publicly volunteering the private schism of 
our consciousness, at a variance with the norm of the generalized other 
(in 'coming out' as the type of profane we are on account öf one or the 
other of the above identified multiplicity of possible grounds - 
politics, religion, etc, and the norm craved by us at a variance with 
the generalized other as that is in the present). When the Fall is 
public in this way, it graduates in a once-for-all manner to a social 
fact; a hard-and fast one as such in the Durkheimian sense, from the 
point of view both of society and as the the socialpsychologic reality 
defining the personality, the "me" of a self, which in the Fallen is 
constituted as a mere object only, one deprived of an "I" and all that 
being with an "I" entails in a self, in the eye of the ultimate Other: 
the generalized other. At this moment we are gestured, as already 
touched on, to be object only, as a social imperative, in the face of 
which definition of our selves, our protestation of our small-letter 
sacred personal self as we used to see itahd maybe still do, doesn't 
wash in the least. There is no return to and no room in the ascribed 
compass of excellence, big-letter sacredness and the proper spheres in 
society for the Fallen, something which applies in such absoluteness 
particularly to the Type II Blemished, and it graces the self, the 
sanity and sense of realism in one who is thus afflicted, to accept 
this fact; it is on condition that he acknowledges and accepts himself 
as Profane as a matter of fact that he is socialpsychologically 
authentic, and he must come to terms with that in the duty to further 
manage himself in the world, even if he does so in active personal 
authenticity (which possibility, although not approved by society, does 
not altogether drop out of his repertoire of conduct as an individual 
matter, but which project as a person now incorporates the realistic 
recognition of his fallenness to both the public and private definitions 
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of the "me". ) As far as the public definition of his self, demoted to 
object only is concerned, (and he must make a note of this 
classification of himself if he is to apply his conduct relevantly to 
the future in the context of which he may remain personally authentic in 
an Aristotelean sort of freedom), he and the issue on account of which 
his Fall occurred, cut a steretype to public consciousness as object 
only, experiencible to himself and to others as a passport, or better 
still, prison-photograph-like fascimile of the human reality for which 
he knew, or knows himself, condemned by the norm and by the generalized 
other to be typecast for good as Profane, as was the character of Jean 
Valjean in Les Xiserables who could only lead a life as an, intensely 
good public figure at the cost of successfully hiding his past. When 
discovered as Blemished, one's Fall is total and not piecemeal; we tend 
to be either Sacred or Profane in society, with no real middle-course 
in-between. Our being in society as either Fallen or the One of Us of 
the Pukka, rests an a sensitive and delicate balance, a razor's edge. 
Two literary works exploiting the theme of what a fickle thing small- 
letter, or even big-letter Sacredness really is in the face of the 
generalized other, and how one's blemish publicly espied thrusts a 
person from among the Good and, conversely, how the disappearance of the 
Blemish establishes him in the bosom of the public as Sacred, are 
O'ileiii's play The Iceman Gometh and Britten's opera Albert Herring, 
whose hero metamorphoses at a stroke from a saint into quite a lad. 
It is important to see, then, that the Fall of the agent, if not a 
successrul fugitive from his past, remains the case in this big-letter 
manner in society; as a social fact it becomes very real in an 
externally objective way, as well as an internally objective one 
(subjective to anyone else apart from Sartre). Even in case the big- 
letter Fallen will be emancipated with his lot changed in an altered, 
aajusted world, the Blemish which is the object and the form of the 
Fall, even if eventually transcended in response to crusading in public 
for its acceptance, will continue to figure exactly as that deviance in 
the face of the former generalized other which was made good in the new 
one; it is precisely that on account of which the once publicly fallen 
agent superseded himself in society. 
The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object. - 260 - 
However, it should be appreciated that the wound both in the 
generalized other, offended by the Fallen self's deviant consciousness, 
and particularly as that wound obtains, socialpsychologically, within 
the discovered deviant's acutely schismic self, its "me" ascribed as a 
Pariah but still experienced as totally humanly aspiring self, in the 
name of oneself and of all one's kind as similarly Fallen (the Jesus- 
potential in a small way of the particular Fallen 'in hand' and of all 
those whose selves are similarly dislodged as a stereotypically, less 
than fully humanly ascribed Profane but a privately surviving, fully 
fledged self), is, in a sense, his strength, as well as his Achilles' 
heel, his vulnerability; his standing as a person, if authentic, amounts 
now to a statement, a rude presence of his Blemish in the community. 
Hurt by society, demoted from small-letter sacred status, he, and that 
on account of which he is Fallen, amounts to an issue, his issue, in the 
world - and as an ambassador there of his kind, he has a certain power. 
The possibility of the existentialism of his consciousness (implicit in 
most cases), his Aristotelean feat (if authentic, of course), of being 
free in an inner sense in the face of his Blemish, locked out on account 
of it from social paradise, but still an aspiring total consciousness 
outside that, becomes a calling in life; he is, at the point of his 
Fall, (as we already observed), free to choose whether his insistance on 
himself as a continued human reality rather than his stereotype, is or 
is not surrendered as gestured; whether to donate himself as the mere 
abject which he has now been made, to mend with his demoted, purely 
object being the gap which his deviant, critical magnifying glass of his 
perspective directed at and focussing on the generaized other, burnt in 
the fibre of actual society, in the fibre of the generalized other, or, 
alternatively, to Look Back in Anger and see, call on and address 
himself to the anthropologically universal and personally compulsory 
object standing of those who have so relegated him, to identify those as 
objects too in their capacity as selves, a mode of their being which 
they can try to hide, but cannot successfully wave aside in a very real, 
socialpsychologically obtaining sense. 
The concept of Looking Back in Anger - having been Looked at first 
by society at the moment of one's being rendered, decreed, ascribed 
Object coincidentally with one's big-letter Fall, may be grasped, 
apprehended as the event of the Sartrian Look, writ large. Being 
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arrested, maybe in actual terms too but certainly in the sense in which 
the Sartrian Look arrests the self in a socialpsychologically 
debilitating and real way, the moving, animated realisation of the 
screenplay, so to speak, of the process of conducting one's life, 
stopped, frozen at the 'cinematographic frame' of one's big-letter Fall 
in society, which defines one's self from that moment onwards as big- 
letter Profane, forever, by public deed, being caught, identified red- 
handed, either as a result of being detected or by way of one's 
volunteering oneself as one of the Fallen, constitutes one as big-letter 
Object, not merely to the Other, as it is the case with the Sartrian 
Look, but Object, Slave, in the eyes of the generalized other; human 
reality photographed, captured, showed up to eternity as illicit, less- 
than-sacred in external ways, by the standards of that. The individual 
has the power to Look Back in a sense, to 'arrest' by his own 'look' the 
ascribed Pukka, and show him up in the light of human reality, as the 
executioner of that in an ontologic though not in most cases in an ontic 
sense. An example, in ordinary life, of my having Looked Back on the 
High and Mighty, in response to their having cast the snare of their 
arresting Look as invisible subject upon me, comes readily to my mind. 
Whilst an undergraduate, I was once in crucial need of a relatively 
small private grant. The address of a grant-giving organisation was 
given to me, to which I applied in an understated letter, being at pains 
whilst writing it to make my request as brief and dignified as possible. 
Unbeknown to me, the Trustees of the charity to which I turned, were 
people known to me personally, who, I knew, were of the opinion that 
wanting a degree involved an arrogant bid on my part in relation to the 
lowly niche in which they saw me on the scale of the ranking of the 
Lachmones and the Pukka in this world. I received a reply to my letter: 
it requested a second, long and detailed letter from me, explaining the 
grounds on which I needed the grant in great detail, supporting my 
request with as many aspects and justifications of my qualifying for a 
private grant as I could muster up; in a word, they asked me for a 
begging letter, one that made me an Object in their eyes on account of 
as many aspects of the hardness of my situation, as many personal 
reasons qualifying me for help, as I could think of. I wrote such a 
letter and was made a grant. Years later the volume called Directory of 
Grant-Making Trusts appeared: a list of charities in which all such 
organisations, trusts, were obliged to publicise their existence, 
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assets, policies, directorial personnel. On leafing it through, I 
stumbled on the charity to which I have formerly turned, and was able to 
put a face to the people who led me such a dance, who humiliated me, 
watched me 'through the keyhole' (to turn to the Sartrian description of 
how the 'Look' operates), unseen by me, as I was undressing, so to 
speak, baring myself to the limits of what was humanly decent, and even 
beyond that point, to their Look, as Rachmones, as Object. But the 
moment that I was able to 'see' them too, their anonymity blown by the 
inclusion of their Trust in the publication in question, their awn, 
undignified pose of being bent over in front of the 'door', peeping, 
burgling me 'through the keyhole' of my being to some extent a subject, 
also became revealed. They stripped me naked of my dignity as a self of 
a certain human standing, but I, too, Looked: - Looked Back in Anger. I 
judged them for the colour of their sport, and was retrospectively glad 
of the money they gave me, detaching them, and my gratitude, from it as 
an emotional issue, and freed myself as a human reality of a certain, 
rather than a zero, gradation as such, as they would have made me, and 
would have succeeded in making me, had I not exercised (once I knew who 
they were and what they had been about) the function of my own "I", 
passing its own judgement, as far as I was concerned, of the situation 
and the definition of myself as a self. The project of the anorexic 
child (according to one medical reading of the internal, psychologic 
makings at the back of that), is another example of the effectiveness of 
the socialisation-wise, ascriptionally lower and humanly slighted 
party's power to make his or her statement, attitude as a fundamental 
choice in the face of the institutionally stronger and tradition-wise 
more highly sanctioned human surroundings, his or her elders and 
'betters' in the family who are in a position of strength there by the 
dicta of the external, reigning norm, though his or her choice of 
attitude vis-a-vis those differs somewhat from the case of my choice of 
myself and my stance vis-a-vis the donors of my small grant, in the 
respect that my ensuing moral freedom and personal independence of the 
agents abusing their position as Pukka in relation to me as Object was 
consequential within the confines of 'my world' only, whereas the 
anorexic child's protest against his or her lack of happiness as a self 
in the family is outwardly, interpersonally effective too. Through 
aiming to denounce his or her life, the anorexic child's project is a 
weapon affecting those who fail to make him or her happy and adjusted in 
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that it deprives his or her parents too of her life, and at the same 
stroke of their life as well in a sense, in so far that the child and 
his or her love are a significant part of their being, in the sense that 
his or her life, the representation, product and biologic as well as 
social continuity in the child which his or her being brings to them, 
will be foiled as a function of the child's withdrawal of his or her 
being from them. All individual cases of martyrdom, similarly, are 
endowed with social as well as socialpsychologic meaning and 
effectiveness in this way. Cases of martyrdom are innerly and outwardly 
effective and socially constructive on the long term in that the 
dissenting being, and the withdrawal or threat of withdrawal of the 
agent's being in a total way, amount to a witness to the insult by and 
failure of society to grant dignity and leeway to the full human reality 
to the ambassador of one or another group of humanity clamouring for 
the realisation of the dignity of their kind by the ideal lights of a 
better collective consciousness of which the martyr is a member and 
representative (maybe the sole member and herald at the time of his 
martyrdom), and a potent and socially as well as socialpsychologically 
consequential protest against the not sufficiently tolerant actual norm 
in the world; with the wound which the protesting, schismic self is in 
the body of society as well as his own individual consciousness, and 
his insistance of that both in the social and in his socialpsychologic 
spheres is a condition of society's transcendence of itself in the 
respect of the martyr's cause. 
The modern-day heretic may occasionally find himself on a 
crossroads presented to him by his need to respond in an overtly and 
publicly weighty way, (whether he wants his project to figure in such a 
publicly big-letter way or not), to society's lowly ascription of him 
and of his retrospectively justified cause and motivation which moved 
him to act in the first place as the critic and deconstructor, enemy of 
the established norm as that subsists, in his pursuit of his project 
which originally resulted in his Fall in a prologued way. Nowadays the 
heretic and the issue which his project vitally touches upon, is no 
longer punishable, even in extreme cases of the socially temporarily 
deconstructiveness of his conduct, by ontic death; he bodily survives 
his ontologic 'execution' to which his Fall amounts, affecting him as a 
person on the social and socialpsychologic levels of his being in the 
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public eye, and therefore it may conceivably be the case that his 
vindication as the martyrdom, comes to him in his lifetime, rather than 
after his death, as was often the case with the current norm-nihilative 
pioneers and champions of human reality in the face of the quality of 
the reigning order coercive to the authenticity of the consciousness of 
individuals and the dictates of the standards of their being and witness 
as such. This moment in the martyr's life may come in a small, merely 
socialpsychologically consequential ways, though it may of course come 
in a big way as well, in case the pioneer's original issue has touched 
upon the mode of the being of society itself. Such instances may come 
when the 'heretic's' schism is made good as a valid, indeed 
forwardlooking way to see the world, or when he simply shows and proves 
himself as a worthy, autonomous, dignified self in the face of his 
former, institutional ascription as blemished, when the Pukka's feeling 
of pity (the vehicle of disguised hate and sham love in reality, his 
coping mechanism while retaining his image of 'goodness' vis-a-vis the 
ascribed Rachmones), clearly transpires as inappropriate as a response 
to him, as something which obviously is no longer in place. It is in 
such moments of choice in which the vindicated heretic is called upon to 
respond in his capacity as an enhancedly socialpsychologically or even 
socially elevated person in relation to a society or merely a community 
which is embarrassed by its former symbolic but nevertheless effective 
excommunication of him, in a small way or big, from the generalized 
other, following the recognition on a general scale that this body of 
opinion has shed from its corpus a person as outstanding as he is shown 
to be in the moment of the rehabilitation of his cause and his conduct, 
ana that this is the person who has been branded, decreed, made as less 
than small-letter sacred, humiliated as a self. The former 'heretic', in 
such moments, finds, however discreetly and anonymously he wishes to 
apply ana figure as a self, that he has the power, which will come into 
operation whether he likes it or not, to 'arrest' the Pukka who so 
treated him, and that as the by-product, however unintended, of his 
rehabilitation as a self and as the kind of the Blemished for whom his 
project spoke too, it is his former executioners' turn to be Looked At, 
to be made as less than small-letter sacred in the public eye, and that 
it is to a great extent at the vindicated heretic's discretion, whether 
he likes it or not, to allow the psychologically cap-in-hand Pukka 
(which he now is as a result of his espied failure in human terms), 
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continued future as big-letter Sacred, or alternatively dish out to him 
a dollop of ontologic oblivion in return for his former humanly 
unbecoming, primitive, outwardly arrogant but inwardly slavish 
trig happiness in Arresting, branding him in the first place, in an 
act of the Pukka's effective deconstruction, consequential 
disconstitution both in his human and official capacity. The weighty 
choice whether or not to put his repaired self (a renewed authority as 
human reality) at the Pukka's disposal so as to even out with it the 
discontinuity caused by his withholding his self and his blessing from 
the Pukka now discovered as the offending agency, from this ascribed 
representative of the reigning norm (and consequently from the reigning 
norm itself), is really his. Having performed the duty, by the dictates 
of human reality, of having brought off his project, and having 
victoriously survived his Fall in an ontologic sense too in addition to 
his antic survival of that, a double-edged situation arises, in which 
his forgiveness will be sought by society, though appearances will be 
typically manipulated so that it should seem that the act of the 
forgiveness for which the Pukka clamours as a human being aspiring to 
greater authenticity as such than that of which he himself has shown 
himself to be when he branded the fallen Rachmones, as well as in social 
terms (for he needs to be delivered of his hate, a sentiment 
psychologcally taxing, which he feels in the face of the former 
Blemished, as well as being delivered of his shame as a loser). The 
rehabilitation of the victorious authentic will be typically stage- 
managed so that it should seem that he needs forgiveness for formerly 
ruffled things in the fibre of society. Such a pretence may attach to 
the simplest and most everyday instances of the morally victorious and 
rehabilitated agent formerly ousted from the paradise of the blameless 
champions of the , generalized other; 
I once knew a young man in Hungary 
whose parents have disinherited him and driven him out of his home when 
he decided to go on, after the successful completion of his secondary 
schooling, into higher education, rather than find a job or a paid 
apprenticeship so as to be able to contribute to the family income 
staightaway. Having eventually obtained a decent degree, the family sent 
him word: as long as he was able to fit into the family pattern (i. e. 
was willing to make financial contributions to the household on the 
father's terms), he was welcome back to the family and 'all was to be 
forgiven'. In such and similar instances, the vindicated Blemished must 
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make up his mind whether the Pukka's reciprocal rehabilitation by him is 
really in his own interest bearing in mind his revised situation, 
presenting him with the world as his oyster if he conducts himself 
wisely and jealously of his newly regained freedom, and he must also 
weigh up the effects of any forgiveness extended to the Pukka upon 
society as that is and, importantly, as it could be or ought to be, not 
losing sight of the fact that in reality it is really the Pukka whose 
being is in moral jeopardy as a result of the rehabilitatioin of the 
formerly Blemished, as the proclaimed paragon, by the rules of 
ascription, of human excellence and also as the effective caretaker of 
the society in the idiom of the external being and power of that, whose 
project and existence as the promoter of both these functions, society's 
actual as well as moral superiority, which needs to be saved by being 
underscored by the once Fallen individual's O. K. as a man as well as the 
champion of his cause. To illuminate an instance of such an occurrence, 
in a more macrosocialogically constituted and effective context than the 
example of the young self-made graduate just given above, a moment of 
Charles Chaplin's life will be called upon here. Banned, on account of 
his political stance, from the States, his adopted home, he went on, in 
exile, in isolation and lonely defiance, to engage his consciousness, 
through his work, with its convictions, human lights unaltered, 
irrespective of his Fall. Deprived, in the MacCarthian purge, publicly, 
of his small-letter sacredness, officially endorsed elevation as a 
person as well as the representative of his views, and demoted to 
Offending Object as a public matter, he chose the modality of his 
consciousness in response to his new social typecasting as 'Angel', 
calbeit a Fallen one), rather than 'Doormat', the latter human status 
being the punishment gestured for him - which, had he accepted that 
choice of himself as was 'gestured', would have strengthened the 
established norm which had so 'blemished' him. Exiled in externally 
oojective terms, he postulated, indeed successfully farmed a better 
society by his own lights of Sartrian internal objectivity, of which he 
was the fully sacred, although sole member. When he has proven himself, 
through his continued work and the quality of that, and as a human 
reality (survived intact), when he was seen to continue his original 
project successfully, on his own terms, and the target of his attitude 
of critique, MacCarthy's regime, was eventually shown up as morally 
wanting by his intellectual and artistic project as well as by the 
The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object. - 267- 
projects of spirits kindred to his in their own personal witness in 
authenticity, he was suddenly faced by the choice of whether or not to 
return to the States where an ostentatious state invitation and reception 
awaited him. His decision was consequential both from the point of view 
of the integrity of his own perspective, individual self, and from the 
point of view of the public effect of his choice, of the possibility to 
exercise his forgiveness, carrying with itself the condoning of the 
society which banned him and his fellow-spirits from the possibiity of 
carrying on in freedom the exercise of their lights as human realities. 
He decided to accept the hand which once tried to crush him, and not to 
bite it back in return. It was the Sacred (as his example accentuates), 
which needed the endorsement of its own being, by Chaplin's 'profane' 
one; it was the 'gods' who needed man. Of course, he was perfectly free 
not to accept the V. I. P. invitation by his farmer judges, and thus 
perpetrate, effect in their being, the continued wound which heir moral 
Fall (an account of Chaplin's own, unjustified, former one) caused in 
the image and social fibre which the erring Pukka upheld, concurrently 
with insisting on and using as a weapon his own wound as the state of 
the dislodged self which his former ontologic 'executioners' effected. 
First blemished and then rehabilitated as a self with a small-letter 
pukka outward image and public standing as such in his society, he would 
nave been free to prevent the use of his self for being fitted back into 
the gap of this fibre which his protest against that created, free not 
to lena his being for patching that up. 
We nave come to a point where a distinction between the project of 
the political socialist and that of the Pauline, personally authentic 
'romantic' Christian are usefully distinguished from one another once 
again. The first difference consists, of course, in the fact that the 
classical Marxist revolutionary envisages and recognises as imperative 
the emancipation in the overt affairs in the world (of which aim the 
romantic Christian's crusade for the rights and righteousness of the 
big-letter Profane is inclusive), for the poor only, out of the entire 
repertoire of the classes of Rachmones which have been identified so far 
in the thesis; whereas the 'romantic' Christian extends his claim for 
full human status in this world as well as in the world after, to all 
classes of Blemished which have been listed so far, certainly to the 
personally authentic in all these various types of Rachetones. The second 
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very profound difference between the Marxist revolutionary and the 
Pauline champion of human as well as, ideally, social-actuality-wise 
implicative egalitarianism regarding all those who are big-letter and 
small-letter profane in the world (including, in the absoluteness of the 
Pauline doctrine, all of humanity), is that romantic, even revolutionary 
Christianity concerns itself in a very serious way, with the human 
emancipation as a moral matter (salvation, in Paul's language), of all 
the personally authentic, even if they are highly ascribed in the 
context of the reigning superstructure of society (the bureaucrat in the 
instance of the post-historic society of our present day and certainly 
of the future, to whose paramount superiority of power in the external 
world of our present society Descombes has drawn our attention); and the 
'romantic' Christian sees it as a necessity that everyone in the world, 
whether ascribed highly or lowly, should graduate to such 
sacialpsychologic elevation as a person in this manner. In cases where 
the 'caretaker' by ascription, in high office, does recognise the need, 
as a matter of and as the indismissable ingredient in his personally 
authentic choice of himself as human reality, and conducts himself in 
the course of carrying out of his office truly to the lights and 
individually authentic standards of human reality which he considers as 
binding for himself too, there isn't a problem for the 'romantic' 
Christian; he passes the Pukka as a saved and morally, humanly deserving 
individual and one entitled to his office if he, as a self, follows and 
aaheres to a conduct of such personal authenticity. (Naturally, those 
Pukka who pay lipservice only to the moral ideal, binding for them too, 
of being a righteous Christian in this personally authentic sense, and 
hope to qualify for personally righteous status by formally, routinely 
sticking, in appearances, to the upkeep of the external dictates of any 
organised religion without appreciating the Pauline message bidding for 
all the adoption of the meant lights of personal authenticity which the 
highly ascribed must pursue too, doesn't impress the 'romantic' 
Christian; indeed, he sees such Pukka as the paramount targets of his 
moral fight to affect autheticity in this world as well as in the next 
for all, and, if he is in his right mind, doesn't entertain the need of 
saving those. The same contempt applies, as far as the champion of human 
reality is concerned, to those highly ascribed who profess that regard 
and claim for human reality and the observance of its standards are not 
a necessary ingredient in the manner in which he carries out his 
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office. ) Kierkegaard certainly entertains the paradigm of consciousness 
of 'the good steward' in whom personal authenticity and elevation of 
office coincide, and he acknowledges the need for such a steward, as 
well as the desirability that such a person, and such a person alone, 
should be in a position of government, in both big-letter and small- 
letter ways in the world. "'I 
Thus, the 'romantic' Christian, unlike the Marxist revolutionary, 
must face and cater for the eventuality that the unauthentic Pukka, once 
abusive of his socialpsychologic, as well as social power to subjugate 
the Profane, may grasp the moral error of his former conduct at the 
moment when he is vanquished and uncovered as one erring and desirous of 
forgiveness by the one formerly relegated as object only, in moments of 
the emancipation and successful human rehabilitation of the latter 
agent; a situation which is trickier to handle for the established moral 
order-nihilative Pauline authentic. It is the mendicant brother's 
difficult call and duty to help the Pukka formerly erring in this manner 
through the eyes of the proverbial needle, if the latter voices this 
wish on his part, on his way to the ideality of heaven, though not 
necessarily, but possibly (as far as the 'romantic' Christian is 
concerned), also to the continuity of his high place in the actuality of 
the prevailing social hierarchy of the world, the underpinning of which 
external hierarachy by matching personal moral standards of authenticity 
in the 'caretaker', the 'romantic' Christian sees as necessary, at least 
as an ideal. The Christian, unlike the Marxist revolutionary, is called 
on to give a thought to the Pukka who, as a result of his retrospective 
insight discovering him to himself too as the author of a great 
injustice by the tenets of human reality (and also by the tenets of 
collective consciousness in its ideality), desires, after committing the 
crime of effectively doing down a socially, or at least 
socialpsychologically outstandingly authentic person, to be redeemed as 
a human reality in the doubly emancipatory event of forgiveness by the 
undeservedly slighted agent - emancipatory to the forgiving party, the 
formerly Fallen, in the terms of the actuality of the social world and 
also in his capacity as a proven authority as human reality, and 
socialpsychologically emancipatory to the Pukka who was once the 
executioner of the unjustly slighted man's life at the symbolic, social 
and socialpsychologic level of that. Of course, the once wrongly 
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Blemished must be judicious and scrupulously discriminatory in the 
granting of such forgiveness; he must not fall victim to any naivete 
regarding the Pukka's voiced determination to be converted to more 
personally authentic lights in his future conduct, and he must judge 
whether this momentary determination on the Pukka's part to revise his 
standing vis-a-vis the former Blemished and his kind, is merely a ruse 
for overcoming the temporary embarrassment of his being defeated in the 
public eye by the victorious formerly Blemished, or whether his remorse 
runs deep in a way which will consequentially alter his attitude towards 
the profane with whom the Pukka now discovered the need for and the 
glory of being on a par as a human being, in his privately authentic 
capacity. The Christian champion of personal authenticity must give even 
the bad caretaker a chance to be a person, (quite that in the fullness 
of his self as object too, as one of the socialpsychologically profane, 
for which we must all recognise ourselves as a condition of our 
personal authenticity as a fellow-harajan), if that's what he really 
wants; when he is asked for forgiveness, implicitly or explicitly, by 
his former executioner, from the echelons of the High Ascription of the 
latter, so that even the Pukka may pass in the future as a human 
reality at which test he failed beforehand, the already emancipated 
agent must make sure, as a condition of his own further double 
authenticity, as both a socially and socialpsychologically 
discriminating "me", that his forgiveness is given, exchanged, with 
both parties conceived and involved as whole selves, fully-fledged 
'children of god', himself certainly no less than that and granting the 
Pukka full status as such if the former Rachetones judges that as 
deserved on the Pukka's part, in other words, he should see that his 
forgiveness is not granted in the spirit of his creeping as obedient 
object only, nor should he forgive the Pukka half-heartedly and 
continue to see him in continued enmity on the forgiver's part, as the 
two-dimensional Subject-template only for which the Pukka has made, 
defined himself in the past of his own volition, and which type of self 
the authentic Rachmones, so ascribed in the world, must despise and 
fight against on account of that unauthentically operating as only half 
a self; the Subject-half. But, it should be stressed that the agent 
whose forgiveness is sought in such a moment, must also judge, as has 
already been touched upon, on the basis of his knowledge and moral 
sizing up, estimation of the Other who has unjustly branded him in the 
The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object. - 271 - 
first place, whether the Pukka in question has it in him to be an equal 
human being, whether he is to be trusted as a human reality and 
entrusted with a person's ensuing quality and potential as that, or 
whether he is likely to use the vindicated formerly Fallen person's re- 
giving himself to him, in the full dignity which the moral victor has 
now regained, and his advancement to the Pukka the cathartic union 
between two human beings, for reoffending against the Blemished and his 
kind, and for the further sustenance and promotion thereby of the 
symbiotic and establishment-assertive practice and machinery of the 
rigid and specialised ascription of object only status to the Profane 
and exclusively allowing the members of the caretaker stratum in our 
bureaucratic society, to have and have room to be Subject-inclusive 
selves, a mechanism in society which has been extensively reviewed in 
Section 2 in Chapter 2 and in the last Section, for instance. It cannot 
be stressed enough that the touching and humanly authentic event (for 
which the authentic Christian must cater) in which the formerly and 
erroneously demeaned and now rehabilitated 'offender' makes the formerly 
erring Pukka privy to the spirit, tone and privilege of a small-letter, 
human, personally 'salient' social intercourse in his endeavour to grant 
him a chance to be with the grace of an authentic fellow-harajan as a 
condition of the remorseful Pukka's 'radical conversion', must never 
make room for or become confused in practice with the foolish mistake of 
giving the Pukka a chance to get out of his embarrassing situation as 
'loser' for all to see, in terms of his continued human unauthenticity 
which is deadly to the free spirit and authentic project whereby the 
formerly blemished Rachetones could, and can, successfully exonerate 
himseli, and which may develop, due to the lack of the sufficiently 
shrewd judiciousless of the Rachmones, into an instrument in the Pukka's 
hand for adding to the Rachmones'already damning file as profane, as a 
matter of his own fundamental choice, and therefore undesirable in the 
eyes and terms of the already established society. Such a use, on the 
Pukka's part, of the insights advanced by the Rachmones in the spirit of 
personal intimacy, with a view to adding, through this source, to the 
doing down of the person whose attributes as an individual are of 
interest to a paranoiac establishrrer1t (potentially all of us), belongs 
to the lowest type of treachery that exists in the universe of human 
reality, but is nevertheless a favoured ruse by the police in their 
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security-data-collecting work in more countries in the world than one 
cares to imagine. 
To summmarise the foregoing point, the rehabilitated Blemished must 
be strongly aware of the real socialpsychologic power he has at the 
moment of his own emancipation in the public eye, to grant or withhold 
his forgiveness as an unauthentic agency from the Pukka and all that he 
stood or stands for, in the context of the cause of which the 
rehabilitated former Fallen showed himself as the champion; he must know 
the consequentiality of his further attitude to the Pukka, and his real 
possibility, which is in the power of all of us, to 'create', 
Pygmalionic fashion, (this universal human faculty having received 
detailed comment in the previous Section and will be further entertained 
at length in the forthcoming one), to 'constitute' the self of the 
'Other' as either a socialpsychologically curtailed stereotype whom it 
is the authentic's duty to hate and fight, or, alternatively, whether he 
construes and therefore makes and handles him, and in so doing sets the 
standards for others (even the generalized other) to handle him, as a 
socialpsychologcally dignified self which assumes, and is rightly 
entitled to assume, the mode of the being of his individual 
consciousness as both object and subject, a "me" as well as an "I", thus 
endowed with the honour of being a fully fledged self, small-letter 
sacred as a person by the authentic standards of the profane dictates of 
human reality, too; and if he is 'found wanting' as a potentially viable 
and fully fledged authentic human reality in the estimation of the 
formerly Blemished, if the latter judges the Pukka's remorse for 
formerly offending human reality, as tactical or skin-deep, forgiveness 
must be withheld from him. It is at the discretion of and the effective 
possibility of the once condemned person at the instance of his public 
emancipation to exercise this Pygmalionic faculty towards the agency 
which once slighted, blemished his person on account of the cause whith 
which he identified, and to exercise this faculty, the 'creation', 
definition of the self of the formerly erring Pukka, in either a 
positive way or a punitively negative one, as Charles Chaplin was once 
in a position to do, as just observed. Jesus, in his passive 
resistance, 'created' Pontius Pilate irretrievably for what we now know 
him for, just as surely and effectively as he 'created' himself for whom 
The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object. - 273 - 
we now know him through his project as Absolute Authenticity, the 
touchstone of human reality at its ultimate. 
However, such moments of the public emancipation of the profanely 
ascribed, big-letter or small, is rare in actuality, and the big or 
small-letter 'fallen angel', a Fallen authentic human reality is seldom 
in a position to choose or refuse to claim his place again among the 
socially Sacred as a public matter, though to hypothetically exercise 
such a choice on his part as a private consciousness, attitude, is 
certainly of interest both to himself, and his private choice in this 
respect a matter of consequence in the eye of the Establishment, and the 
basis of its attitude towards him. The Fall'of the 
profane separates him, on a long-term basis, whether discarded Angel or 
newly created Doormat, from the Sacred, he is as a matter or hard-and- 
fast social fact, fundamentally set apart from, is firmly on the other 
side of the great chasm in society, opposite to the Sacred; and, as 
already observed, it commends his sense of realism and even his human 
stature, as viewed from both the angle of the public and of his self, to 
continue to identify himself with those of his kind who have not (yet) 
been emancipated. For those decreed as publicly Blemished, it is 
inappropriate, either by the authentic dictates of the standards of his 
self or of those of society, to attempt to rise again into the ranks of 
big-letter Pukka; it must be recognised that both the individual and 
society now must accept after the formerly free agent's fall, to be 
Fallen to one another. This is what Jeremy Thorpe did not see, which he 
learnt too late. Formerly the Liberal leader, he was exposed (some say 
by manipulation on the part of his political opponents), to a trial, 
reviewed and broadcast all over the world, on the charge of having 
conspired to kill a former homosexual lover. He naively thought that on 
his name being cleared by the court which acquitted him on the charge of 
conspiring to murder, it was still a continued possibility for him to 
make a comeback into public life at a level of some social 
responsibility and elevation. He did not see that 'in view' of his 
other, private deviance, also publicly aired during his trial, he had to 
assume and keep to his mould as fallen, no longer unblemished, as cast 
for him by the generalized other. He applied, subsequently to his trial, 
for the leadership of Amnesty International, a morally very worthwhile 
as well as prestigeous organisation, and was forced to withdraw from 
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taking up his new appointment at the helm of this institution, due to 
public pressure; showing him up, for a second time, as a loser in the 
public eye, notwithstanding the fact that in view of his own political 
victimisation, it may be said that he was singularly qualified for 
heading an organisation which was formed for the saving of the political 
victims of societies morally reprehensible in their treatment of its 
martyrs, from unjustified punishment and torture. 
Another example, from the world of drama, of a Fallen victim of 
society and its norms, making inappropriately, indeed unauthentically 
(which was not the case with Jeremy Thorpe), a bold bid to continue her 
life among the big-letter, ascribed Sacred, who would have readily put 
her to death had they grown wise to her trespass for which she was only 
partly to blame, is provided by the character of Abigail Williams in 
Arthur Miller's play The Crucible. In the puritanic social surrounds of 
the Founding Fathers of the New England of her day, she was a victim 
(clearly enough for us to see but not so in the eyes of her community), 
of an adulterous relationship between herself and a married man. She was 
authentic in seeing that the public attitude to the unspoken blemish of 
her conduct, potentially marking, blemishing her, if it came out, a 
wicked adulteress, was hypocritical and unjustly threatening and 
hurtful, and she was also right in appreciating the danger in which her 
secret had placed her in real social and individual terms. But she was 
wrong and unauthentic in choosing, as the ploy for the overcoming, the 
resolving of the schism, the deviance of her conduct in relation to the 
public norm, by opting in the mode of her future conduct for the methods 
and the spirit of the self-same religious hypocrisy which threatened 
her, for propping up, by her own chosen subsequent behaviour, the big- 
letter Bad Faith of the world which she rightly condemned as matter 
private to her, by joining 'Them' when she realised she couldn't beat 
'Them'. She was wrong and unauthentic in attempting to transcend her 
undiscovered blemish in society, and the possibility of her punishment 
on account of that, by contriving to be appointed as the first among the 
Ascribed Judges, and was just as unspeakably evil as those who would 
have been her judges for her social trespass, or even more so, for 
claiming in her newly assumed position among those, the death of the 
small-letter profane in her community whom she exposed to her harsh and 
unjust society for nothing more than being human, small-letter profane 
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in their choice of themselves as a way of life and conduct, in the eye 
of a paranoiac establishment suspicious towards those who led a quiet 
and private life in partial seclusion from the political machinery of 
it, and critical of that machinery when its representatives demanded 
that society's simple profane accept its sickly twisted truth about 
themselves and their way of life, and interfered with their rights and 
witness to being authentic; each and every one of Abigail's victims 
formally less blameworthy as qualities of human reality as profane than 
she has been herself. She would have done much better, and been more 
authentic, had she packed her things and left the community which 
threatened her, as she eventually did. 
The Engineer and the Fixer. - 27 6- 
Section 4. The Engineer and the Fixer. 
The exposition which the notion of the Fall received in the previous 
Section, enables the argument to further develop its former 
preoccupation with social creativity, which in past considerations of it 
culminated in the notion of the Referee. Two further concepts may be 
added now to that former notion to beneficially complement it. These new 
concepts are the Engineer and the Fixer. 
The Engineer is a Meadean notion. 1*20) It refers to a self 
explicitly engaged in social creativity, to the activity of one who 
affects, by virtue of his inner fundamental choice (a matter of his 
attitude) and consequently in the typical mode of his overt conduct, the 
raising of the level of being, the production of other selves; it refers 
to one who helps other selves to being fulfilled in terms of the "I"-s 
of their own selves, (the "I" referring here to the other's needs, 
insights, potentials to be such a completely fulfilled self), and at 
the same time engages his own "I", his vision, thought, will, in the 
project of the betterment of another's "me", overt self, by lending the 
Other the relevant aspect of his own "me"), in complex interpersonal 
and cross-personal 'fusions' of "me"-s and "I"-s, as this possibility 
was described before, early in Chapter 2 Section 2, for instance, or 
towards the end of Section 1 in Chapter 3. In postulating the notion of 
the Engineer, Mead outlines a type of person and the attitude into which 
his praxis coheres, as a practical, intelligent and concrete 
application-biased one, as opposed to an airy-fairily benevolent, self- 
inuulgently generally muddling and unauthentically or at least 
thoughtlessly, routinely do-goading one. He enlists the phenomenon of 
team-work among the most outstanding of all examples in which the 
multiple realisation of "me"-s and "I"-s across one's own self as well 
as between persons takes place, including in pride of place those cases 
where the agent's single "I" may effect a better, fuller 
socialpsychologic "me" in a multitude of other persons, not necessarily 
known to him, such as in the practice, say, of a professional social 
worker or a gifted social innovator with great and universal insight 
into the future. In such instances, he writes, the (social) Engineer 
carries around a blue-print with him, as it were, analogously with the 
mechanical engineer who designs a machine, at the designing stage of it, 
when the machine, the tool for the envisaged job, Work, does not yet 
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exist - it has merely been conceived and formulated into a plan at the 
drawing board. The Engineer in the social context, has taken the 
attitude of the Other or of Others, that of just one or many, his "I" in 
empathy with the "I", of all, cognising, taking into himself, 
assimilating as a self their needs and hopes, and shares in the "I" of 
all in this sense, his own capacity as a self. The genre, the medium of 
the Work that lies ahead when the (social) Engineer plans his blueprint, 
is the socialpsychologic 'fusion' between his "me" (which he will make 
available to the Other as his response to the need for that of the 
Others as "I"-s>, carefully listening to those "I"-s, putting into 
practice this interpersonal 'fusion' desired by Others in the form of 
his output as human reality, in specific accord with the demand calling 
for that gift of himself as a self. Actively effecting this 'fusion' by 
way of his socialpsychologic creativity in which his own self is 
organically instumental, by choice, in the realisation of the Other 
selves involved, is highly cathartic, as already remarked, for the 
Engineer as an "I" as well as a "me", and if the Engineer's blueprint is 
authentic in the sense that his gift and skill as social creativity fits 
the need of other selves as identified by him, its moment of the 
effective 'fusion' of his "me" and the "I"-s of the others calling for 
that, will also be cathartic for the others touched by the coming to 
fruition of the Engineer's plan. Again, as also outlined before, this 
Work of bringing about, in practice, such 'fusions' between formerly 
lacking "l"-s, truncated possibilities as selves, with concrete "me"-s 
which satisfy, 'answer to' them, is the only source of goodness (whose 
definition is 'excellence at social creativity'), which is generated in 
the course of the irrepressible process and upsurging medium of human 
reality, that raw stratum of the being of the self and of the 
generalized other in the world, which quite simply amounts to (or 
asserts its presence and operation in consciousness as perceptibly and 
significantly failing to satisfactorily amount to) human reality, either 
in one's heightened awareness of one's frustrated realistic potential 
for one's fulfilment as such, or in the sensation of actually being 
fulfilled, in terms of such goodness. It should be appreciated that this 
human reality may also be maintained and consist in the cognised 
frustrated desire for this goodness, for the product and peculiar medium 
of human reality at its fulfilled, that is, in instances when one's 
hopes for this kind of fulfilment, for the prospect of such a 'fusion' 
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between one's lacking "I" and a "me", one's own or that of another, to 
'answer to' that lacking "I", are unrealistic, the external conditions 
for it absent. When an interpersonal event of this manner comes about 
(through the happy and effective meeting in social and/or 
socialpsychologic actuality, between the Engineer's entire self, as both 
an empathic, interpersonally sensitive and imaginative "I" and an 
interpersonally available and effective "me", on the one hand, and the 
"I" of the candidate for a similarly complete and fulfilled self whom 
the Engineer helps to become just that by way of the loan of his "me", 
on the other hand, the participants are party, as already observed, to a 
privileged, heightened reward of a socialpsychologic nature, which holds 
for the Engineer himself, as well as for the self of the Other 
successfully fulfilled, and which, on top of being personaly reinforcing 
to both the helper and the helped, is also reinforcing to the medium of 
human reality itself, which obtains in and consist of the process of 
social creativity. This process, human reality in its emergence, is 
experienced, when fulfilled, as bulging, being in the making, bursting 
into being as such, as 'salient' in the sense outlined in the 
Introduction, in relation to and over and above the 
sociaipsychoiogically routine, everyday being and experience and 
engagement of one's consciousness in relation to others in the 
generalized other, affecting and productive of personally authentic 
human reality in the particualr concreteness of that medium. As already 
touchea on at some length, early in Chapter 2, Section 2, and again 
tcwaras the end of Section 1, Chapter 3, for instance, aptitude in 
social creativity in the Engineer's sense, (excellence at which equals 
goodness, to our understanding), is one branch, one form, one 
manifestation of the entire array of 'gifts', is one kind of talent 
among the full thesaurus and armoury of talents which someone can 
conceivably be endowed with - but at the same time, it's that gift which 
underlies all other particular talents, as a unifying dimension at the 
back of all of them, at least potentially and ideally, both in the sense 
that social creativity often informs great works of art and other forms 
of creativity, and through the possibility and effect which 
productivity in all other forms of creative medium may and usually does 
have on social reality in the constant creation of the latter, by virtue 
of the change and development in outlooks, artistic or scientific, which 
the cultivation, the deployment of any form of first-hand creativity 
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produces in society; a phenomenon with which Mead vitally concerns 
himself. In this sense, Mead says with Lenin (though Lenin only 
suggested this in the context of the artistically creative), that the 
practitioners, realisers, deployers of their creative talents, are 
'engineers of the soul'; their own souls, obviously, but at the same 
time, and consequentially, also of the souls of others. 
The concept and involvement of the Engineer doesn't exclusively 
apply to major instances of cross-personal acts of social creativity 
affecting a multiplicity of people; it includes, at its minimum, the 
complementary gift of "me"-s and "I"-s between two people,, the Engineer 
and another, indeed, possibly, two Engineers, as we showed, discerned in 
the example of the wetnurse and the soldier in Maupassant's story in 
Chapter 2, Section 2. To recapitulate, once more, some other previous 
examples illuminating some of the various paradigms of social 
creativity, 'Engineering' which can take place between and involve 
various numbers of people in the 'Engineering' act, (also figuring 
chiefly in Chapter 2, Section 2), we may once again call on examples of 
somewhat different, bigger than a merely dual cluster of people between 
whom social creativity, 'Engineering' can be, and has been exercised. 
One was the example of how a three-person team became operative in the 
writing of the book Tongue Tied by its highly physically disabled author 
Joey Deacon. In another of our past examples we analysed how Bob 
Geldot's vision of people in richer countries saved people in Third 
world from famine, his novel idea for financially helping the latter 
having been put to realisation first in Band Aid, then in Live Aid and 
then in Sport Aid, so many instances of a mammoth-scale social 
creativity, touching billions. In fact, any good idea, prompted to the 
Engineer's "I", to his responsiveness to other selves in need of 
'bodies' (Sartre's synonym for the operative self), realised "me"-s, in 
the physiologic or social, as well as a conceivably socialpsychological 
sense, (depending on the nature of the demand impinging on the 
Engineer's empathic and responsive "I" and calling for the 
compassionate donation of his "me"), can be suitably enlisted here as an 
example of 'Engineering'. Such examples abound; one such is afforded by 
the launching of an appeal, in the course of the last decade, for the 
donation of one's organs after his death, for transplant into patients 
in need of these organs. The "I" of the one who first thought of this, 
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reflects one of an Engineer in its inspiration to creatively put 
forward, put into being such a 'blueprint', so to speak, but the donors 
who decide to positively respond to this call, are also 'Engineers, in 
the sense that they activate their "I"-s to make their "me"-s, in the 
idiom of the physiologic aspect of that, available to others who are in 
need of their 'bodies' in this literal sense - in the act of giving 
their very antic "me"-s to someone else so that the Other may be created 
and maintained as a living self in spite of a terminal illness; with the 
pledge of oneself for this purpose (expressed by carrying a donor card) 
being made in one's lifetime, and the reception of this gift of one's 
"me" for its use by another, coming into effect, fruition, maturation, 
alter the death of the 'Engineer', the creator by means of the lending 
of his self, or some aspect of that, to another. Another example of 
'Engineering' in quite a mundane context, is the simple initiative and 
undertaking involved in organising a baby-sitting circle so that the 
opportunity for the enjoyment of the full compass of the activities of 
the parents as adults outside the family context, may be from time to 
time extended to every adult in the circle, with the chance of breaking 
the strictly house and family-oriented routine of the participating 
parents, taken in turn; this imaginative idea and practical arrangement 
also amounting to an interpersonally constructive project and therefore 
to one at 'social Engineering'. Teaching, imparting one's knowledge to 
schoolchildren, or parenthood, the project of rearing, socialising 
children within the family, afford yet newer examples of 'social 
Engineering' at its most common, in the context of our simple everydays. 
The Fixer, in sharp contrast, may be said to be the Engineer of the 
unauthenticity of human reality. An ascriptionally high-ranking 
unauthentic Pukka may be found, in many instances, by the 'drawing 
board', engaged in the 'Engineering' of the 'blueprint' of a large-scale 
project touching and effecting the egos of many, often millions, just as 
can the authentic expert of social creativity, Mead's professional 
social worker, the Engineer in the sense in which his understanding of 
the latter concept most strongly and most typically applies in his 
usage. In other words, the Fixer, like the authentic Engineer, may be 
found to be engaged in the orchestrating of the dramatic, or quiet and 
discreet meeting of the "me" and the "I", as the case may be, both 
interpersonally and cross-personally, knowingly, meaningly and 
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tactically effecting patterns of the 'fusion' between the ideal 
aspiration of selves as "I"-s with the actual opportunities as "me"-s in 
those whom he is in a position to either realise or frustrate as full 
selves, towards whom he feels he has a calling to oversee, dispose. The 
Pukka casting himself in the role of Subject only, his own "me" is 
uninvolved in the process in which he and his kind (toward which he is 
morally loyal), ever emerge as pure "I", while, +n contrast, the 
Rachetones finds himself systematically and lastingly cast as Object only 
at the end of the Pukka's baton, this so-called 'specialisation' of the 
Pukka as Subject and the Rachetones as Object, having received ample 
comment and analysis towards the end of Section 2 of this chapter, for 
instance. The Fixer's 'blueprint' will be conceived in keeping with the 
promptings of the preservation of the normative status quo as it is, 
which ideal morally informs the Pukka in question, reserving for him and 
for his kind the privilege of excellence, not just by virtue of 
ascription but also in seemingly human terms, with the aim of continuing 
to arrange differentially the opportunities for being so (humanly 
excellent, that is), for those for whom it is proper, by his lights, to 
be excellent and, coversely, keeping excellence and chances for 
excellence from those for whom it isn't proper to be so. His benefit 
drawn from his manner of 'Engineering' in this way, is dual. One aspect 
of his gain is social - it consists in his success in keeping the 
superior moral hue that goes with being apparently excellent, (the kind 
of morality to which he himself committedly subscribes), in the Pukka 
camp in the world, this continued and strategic allocation of 'goodness' 
to the Pukka ideologically justifying, to appearances, by seemingly 
human standards too, the keeping of high offices for himself and for 
others like him. The second area of the benefit in store for him as the 
result of his performance of the job of his 'engineering', or rather 
'fixing', is sociaipsychological; as the 'caretaker', in which capacity 
he functions whilst fixing, in this manner, suspended between heaven and 
earth, as it were, as was Socrates in Aristophanes's comedy, he is in a 
position to cream off, collect in the way of toll, the 
socialpsychologically elemental and spiritually reinforcing reward that 
goes with the successful effecting of instances of the 'fusion' between 
"me"-s and "I"-s in others, though in his case this potential for and 
experience of the elation inherent in affecting such 'fusions', is 
bastardised into the personal satisfaction which is inherent in the 
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enjoyment of socialpsychologic power over the selves of the Others who 
are being 'created' of the Other according to the 'creator's moral 
lights, authentic in the case of the Engineer and unauthentic for the 
Fixer; monopolising and appropriating for himself the act, and its 
socialpsychologic benefit of being actively involved, as a function of 
one's choice and will, in social creativity (which in the Fixer's case 
is of a sham kind), reserving for himself the glory that lies in 
inventing, engineering the fulfilment of selves, this privileged 
activity shrouding him in a cloud and experience of goodness, a 
heightened one at that, which lies in the exclusiveness of the loaning 
to him the monopoly of the exercise of such 'engineering', without 
himself having to make the effort of being excellent, outstanding as a 
self, by the measure of personally authentic merit justified, maintained 
and earned at first hand, in contrast with the Engineer's seemingly 
similar activity in which the latter is prepared to personally stake 
and engage his creative beliefs and himself in the process. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that the Fixer is often quite as 
morally motivated as is the Engineer in 'drawing up his blueprint' for 
such social en$iheering, and putting it into practice. However, the 
Fixer's moral motivation and the efforts he exerts in carrying it out 
in practice, have opposite roots and effects to the authentic engagement 
of the 'Engineer', in that the Engineer's project is morally informed 
by the lights of human reality in its purity as such, whilst the Fixer 
draws the strength of his moral position, if he claims to have recourse 
to such, from the Absentee Landlord. Consequently, the Engineer carries 
out his project in the exclusive framework and medium of the ever- 
emerging novel, creative upsurge of human reality and realities as such 
whica is caused by his practice, the merit of the case in which he is 
invaived judged by him without justificatory recourse to the worldly 
ciassiticasion as Sacred or Profane of the agent who is being 'created' 
by him as humanly excellent. The morality of the Fixer, in contrast, is 
directed towards the ideal of, and has its effects, accordingly, in the 
keeping of all those who are already differentially ascribed in the 
world as ascriptionally Sacred or Profane, in their allotted places on 
either side of the chasm separating mankind in these ascriptional ways, 
both the ascribed Sacred and the ascribed Profane firmly fixed in their 
appropriate niches as those obtain in the existing normative order as 
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that is, which morally maintains the Fixer in his elevated position and 
which the Fixer morally maintains. 
This general and overriding moral givennes, dedication to the 
immutability of society on the part of the Fixer, on principle, does 
not, of course, mean that he is not active, in the the mode of his 
carrying out his office, in very concrete and practical ways. One range 
of his activities is positive: he is busily engaged in fixing 
opportunities for his own kind, right from the beginning of the 
educational process, with the allocation of chances to a Pukka 
fledgeling often cynically divorced from the real talents required in 
the job and from the real ability or qualification of the Pukka's 
protege to be equal to them, and in other cases, if the Pukka has to 
play the game according to the rules, with apparent respect for the 
ethical propriety in the allocation of jobs on a basis of personal merit 
in the applicant justifying the appointment, the Pukka gives the 
opportunities, in the spirit of the semblance of fairness, to his kind 
again, whose typically and constantly favourable achievement pedigrees 
have been systematically shaped throughout their education by the 
benefit of the 'halo effect' privilegedly, attaching to them throughout 
and at every milestone of their educational assessments and other 
stages of their progression in life. The old boy network, connections, 
are enlisted, mobilised on such occasions, with the Good Reference for 
'One of Us' launched into operation. 
The other area of the Pukka's practical engagement in fixing 
opportunities differentially for his kind and for others, is entirely 
negative (for it is that aspect of the phenomenon which touches the 
Rachetones whose ego is being socially and socialpsychologically 
manufactured in this 'specialisation' process so that he typically and 
strategically shouldn't be equal to the chances that obtain and are 
available in the world), and comes to the fore when the distribution of 
excellence as established in the world, in which system of ranking the 
Fixer and like Pukkas get the lion's share in the morally as well as 
materially remunerative laurels available there, becomes threatened, 
when the stability of the order so fixed may conceivably be upset. 
There are, basically, three ways in which this can come about: one is if 
a Rachmones is about to rise above his station as ascribed by virtue of 
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his outstanding human excellence, the second when a formerly Sacred has 
Fallen and the circumstances now threaten that he will become Blemished 
and as a consequence a compensatory rearrangement of that part of the 
norm and the little structure in the world in which his former 
Sacredness was effective, becomes necessary. The third case arises when 
the Pukka in his ascribed heavens, makes a mistake, a consequential 
error of judgement regarding a small-letter profane (who is also a 
small-letter sacred, as we have observed before), making him into big- 
letter Profane, one to be properly discriminated against, and this error 
on the ascribed Pukka's part becomes manifest in the public eye, when, 
in other words, the Pukka has been proved wrong in his unjustly 
slighting a profane in human and/or factual terms, for all to see, with 
the Pukka himself 'Looked at': (for the meaning of this last turn of 
phrase see the end of the last Section). This third case is conveniently 
referred to as the Cock-up. 
it is dangerous to allow a show of goodness, exellence in just anyone 
run its natural course, for that may suggest the appropriateness of the 
rearrangement of grades of deservingness as those exist in the pyramid 
of the reigning ascriptional system of ascendancy, social and by 
implication moral, particularly if the reigning norm is informed by 
Protestant Ethics, as is ours, according to which everyone's standing in 
the world is seen as the index of their just deserts in the light of 
their personal worth and talent. Any of the above three types of upsets 
carries the implication that a redistribution and reclassification in 
the social standing of a Sacred who is implicated by a publicly espied 
anomaly, witnessed discord between his socially ascribed and personal 
worth, has become necessary, so as to bring the offending Sacred's 
placement in the system of the moral and ascriptional pigeon-holing of 
people in society, into line with his evidenced fallability, and to 
embarrassingly having to introduce the undeservedly slighted, unjustly 
branaed big-letter Profane, into the heavens of the morally intact and 
the humanly excellent. 
in discussing the three abovementioned ways of an effective upset in 
the socially functional equilibrium between ascriptional and human 
excellence or those in the Sacred crust of society, on the seeming 
accord between which two indices of merit, our reigning ideology (an 
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the face of it) insists, we shall take the case of the recent Fall of 
the former Pukka first. The recently Fallen Pukka and the already 
Blemished profane will be treated here in one package, for their recent 
positions in society are similar from the moment of their official Fall. 
There is a small discrepancy in their cases, which consists in the fact 
that there will be a high degree of feverish fixing by the fellow-Pukkas 
of the once Sacred Pukka who is threatened by the prospect of the Fall, 
to manipulate appearances so as to avoid the social branding of their 
colleague, up to the last minute of his Fall. But once the former Pukka 
has been unavoidably Fallen by the disclosure to the public of his moral 
error or misdeed, his former fellow-Pukkas will come to learn to relate 
to their formerly Sacred colleague in dependable bad faith. An 
adjustment in the CV of their former equal will be effected, the 
formerly warm tone of the Reference relating to him will metamorphose 
into an inert fact-sheet, in the mode of which the born Rachmones's CV 
is normally grasped from the moment 'go', causing the Fallen Pukka to be 
reduced, as is the born Rachmones, to a bundle of attributes, a thing, a 
strange being to whom some praisewothy features, due to which he so far 
qualified to a Sacred status, inexplicably attach, and he will be 
viewed, as a consequence, as is the born Rachmones with a disturbingly 
high show of personal endowment, as something oddly astounding, like a 
cactus which can, say, write essays. His past will come to be 
reinterpreted and fundamentally reorganised, so that doubt, suspicions 
and dishonourable qualities will be cast on aspects of his past which 
were formerly grasped as fully favourable. Telephone calls will precede 
him before interviews, warning fellow-Pukkas approached by the newly 
Fallen for a job, of the dodginess now of his classification, a practice 
which will also be normally put into play in relation to a former 
Rachmones who is about to rise. He is now on the wrong side of the chasm 
separating the Sacred and the Profane, not 'only just', not piecemeal, 
but in an all-or-nothing way, as a function of his simply and social- 
factually being, by necessity, either Fallen or not, his susceptibility 
to being rigidly and totally classified from one moment to the other as 
wholly Blemished, (or in the event of his clearing as wholly Sacred), in 
the make-or-break manner in which such firm moral pigeon-holing occurs 
in the eye of the generalized other, as already illuminated through our 
former examples of the hero of O'Neill's play The Iceman Cometh and 
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that of Britten's opera Albert Herring, commented on towards the end of 
our last Section. 
But in time, no actual telephoning needs to be involved on the 
Pukka's part to let his own kind in social and socialpsychologic power 
know how the Rachmones in need of a job or a higher educational 
opportunity is to be 'properly' treated, by Pukka lights. After a while 
in the course of the progression of the life of the Already Blemished in 
the world, the Rachmones in question will come to telegraph simply by 
the overriding external socialpsychologic modality of his "me", telling 
of a long period of his anthropologically lower typecasting, the way in 
which it is appropriate for the Pukka to relate to him. The visible 
ensemble of the socialpsychologic insignia of the blemished status 
attaching to him: a broken deportment, lack of grace, the signalled 
likelihood of his being of a certain political affiliation, a tangible 
record of poor mental health in the past, a CV marred by a criminal 
act; or merely a foreign accent, or the colour of the Rachmones's skin, 
will prompt to the Pukka the underlying tone in which to properly 
apprehend the Rachmones facing him, in his capacity as a Referee, as an 
employer, as a teacher, or simply as a person vis-a-vis the Fallen. The 
stubbornly obtaining tendency for the Rachmones to be systematically 
kept aown, opportunity after opportunity, does not necessarily indicate 
a hysterical string of telephone-calls, external activities to affect a 
curoing of the Rachmones's chances, the way in which such frantic 
'fixing' typically occurs shortly after the instance of the Blemished's 
recent fall. When his Blemish has become both socially and 
sociaipsychologically established, no single telephone receiver needs to 
be lifted to follow the Rachmones's path for the fixing, the conspiracy 
to seep him apart from chances of a certain calibre in the world, to 
remain operational. When the Rachmones turns up on an interview, he 
elicits the response of the Pukka as a socialpsychologic stimulus, a 
"me" plain to see as that of a Rachmones, the hot-lines between the 
Fukkas are activated in a merely covert and symbolic way, the push- 
buttons of their telephones breaking into an implicit little dance 
iaacabre for the Rachmones' chances, in the mind only, without such 
hotlines being actually handled; the buttons become animated in an 
imaginary, but for that not illusory way in the Pukka's mind, like the 
keys of a pianola, as it were, touching on the nerves telepathically of 
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all the Pukkas whom the Rachmones encounters, spelling out to the 
salient Pukka in the Rachmones's current experience the warning of the 
former's past colleagues of the Pukka in his life: 'This guy is not one 
of us'. The continuance of the conspiracy to keep the Rachetones separate 
from real chances, is assured by the way the Pukkas' minds work, 
precoded and ever informed by the Absentee Landlord. The stimulus which 
the "me" of the Rachetones eventually grows to present to the Pukka as 
oftentime doormat, and automatically activates in the Pukka the 
stereotype response: 'Wipe your feet on me'. Man is a judging animal, by 
definition; if he is morally stimulated, he will morally respond. As has 
already been observed in Chapter I., man's freedom, according to Mead's 
insightful etiologic criterion, consists, in contrast with the 
psychologically determined behaviour of animals, in his ability to 
suspend, delay, or altogether forego responding in such a mechanistic 
fashion on coming face-to-face with a stimulus. A morality that 
processes and practices the lack of choice, one which claims the 
unavoidability of responding in the face of a stimulus, particularly a 
moral one, as stereotypically gestured, is a very primitive one, by 
Meadian measures. It is man's real possibility, and the hallmark of his 
higher refinement and greater sophistication as a human being and as a 
judge as such, to respond to everyone, including the Rachmones, by 
taking into account, in relating to him, the totality and complexity of 
both his personality and his situation, the need for and appropriateness 
of which discrimination applies, by definition, to the case of everyone 
to whom one responds and vis-a-vis whom he acts, whether in big and 
consequential ways or small and inconsequential ones. This careful and 
sensitive discrimination in forming one's opinion and acting in relation 
to a person - any person, is a precondition of one's conducting 
themselves interpersonally in the constructiveness of human reality, in 
which type of conduct lies any person's Pygmalionic power to grace his 
fellow-man with his freedom in apprehending him, and indeed, to exercise 
and gain his own, at the same stroke. 
Finally, the situation of the Cock-up, when the unfair slighting of 
the Rachmones by the Pukka doesn't go publicly undetected, is both a 
little acre complex and a little pore serious than the siaple and 
matter-of-course case in which this exercise (the doing down of the 
Rachmones in the service of maintaining bad faith and the allocation, 
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'specialisation' of the dignity of an "I"-inclusive self to the Pukka 
and a more lowly, "I"-deprived self to the Rachmonese, goes without a 
hitch. Normally the practice of the prevention of the Rachmones's 
chances in the 'specialisation' process is smoothly and successfully 
camouflaged by the current norm, it can be effectively hidden behind 
the reigning ideology which is equipped to justify that. But the 
situation of the Cock-up or threatened Cock-up is more serious and 
dramatic than the normal process of the tacit running down of the 
Rachmones in the service of the established social norm and its 
guardians, because when the Pukka is seen to err (and when this 
occurrence becomes difficult for lila to cover up with his usual bad 
faith both as an external issue and as an internal moral matter for 
himself), he is the representative of the Sacred norm, and as a 
consequence he is in greater trouble in every sense, inner and outer, 
than the Rachmones when the latter, already rubber-stamped as second 
class goods, falls short as an agency of outstanding excellence. Indeed, 
the show and standing of personal excellence on the Rachmones's part is 
properly expected to be a diminished one, and when he nevertheless 
demonstrates such in its full glory, this causes a disturbance in the 
prevailing moral pecking order which differentially obtains for the 
Rachmones and the Pukka respectively, it interferes with the prevailing 
ranging of goodness in the world as sustained by traditional values. The 
phenomenon of the Cock-up is also more complex than the smoothly running 
course of normal bad faith rendering the Rachmones as object only and 
therefore second-class citizen, in that a multitude of remedial measures 
have to be deployed to cover up the Cock-up, precisely on account of its 
greater seriousness. The first and most usual of these ploys is to shift 
the responsibility for the upheaval onto the Rachmones whom the Cock-up 
adversely affects, and his Reference which has so far agreeably 
established him as either a harmless and well-meaning object only or, 
even more favourably, as a small-letter sacred, gifted, worthwhile and 
altogether pukka self, gets quickly re-written, yielding a CV or a 
Reference doctored in such a way as to suggest that the Rachmones's 
recent fall or misfortune as a result of his unjustifiable and 
unreasonable treatment as big-letter Profane at the hand of the Pukka, 
was always on the cards. 
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Secondly (not unrelated to the first ploy as just outlined), an 
ideology is invented according to which the disadvantage with which the 
Rachmones has been unfairly lumbered as a result of the current issue 
unjustifiably pinning him down as Profane, was what he deserved, for 
reasons that obtain concurrently with the present issue in hand. If the 
Rachmones can be construed as problematic on any other account than the 
present query attaching to his and blemishing him as Rachmones on dodgy 
and questionable grounds, these side-issues will be summoned and with 
them a pretence that the misfortune which is about to befall him, is due 
to, or at least is justifiable in the light of these secondary issues. 
If this doesn't work or is not enough to put right appearances which 
point to the Pukka as unjust, and it is not too late for tie opportunity 
to be salvaged for the Rachmones, he will get it, usually on qualified 
terms to retrospectively justify the to-do initially surrounding and 
calling into question his right to be granted the opportunity in 
question, unless the Rachmones is able enough to stand up for himself 
and fend off the damning qualifications in his 'Reference', whether that 
already exists on his file or its official filing is still in limbo. 
Furthermore, there will be attempts to whitewash the erring Pukka - 
minutes and such like, records regarding the newly Fallen which mark, on 
an official level, his progress leading up to the Cock-up wrongfully 
branding him, will be retrospectively fixed, and any unpleasentness that 
arose due to the Pukka mishandling the situation will be put down to a 
'misunderstanding', an 'honest mistake' as the Americans are fond of 
calling it. If, however, the Pukka's error cannot be backpaddled on and 
the Rachmones's aimed-for opportunity is irretrievably lost, other forms 
of frenzied fixing will come into operation to put the Pukka's ensuing 
moral unseemliness right. Ideologic justifications of why the Cock-up 
occurred will be persistently resorted to again. The quasi-"I" of the 
'caring' Pukka: the We-concept (described in Chapter I) whose calling is 
to support, from its heavens, the profane, will be summoned in the form 
of ostensive fussing; forms of compensations will be offered, in acts of 
tokenism, for the demonstration of the Pukka as an untiring conscience 
for and on behalf of the Less Fortunate, the volunteering of such tokens 
and concessions operative till the problem is out of the Pukka's hair. 
Inferior conscience-moneys to keep the Rachmones quiet, either in the 
literal sense of a small sum or in the metaphoric sense of something of 
practical value in the pursuit of benefits of tangible worth, will be 
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'benignly' held out with the pretence that this is more than a fit 
reward to grace the Rachmanes in his unjustifiably disappointing 
situation. The Rachmones will then be in a position of forgiving or not, 
accepting or not such positive gobbets of the Pukka's conscience to 
help him along on the road to his betterment, now somewhat set back: he 
is free to Look Back in Anger or not to do so, a situation already 
reviewed in the last Section; he can indeed choose to permanently 'Look 
Back' at him and be a hundred per cent winner as a moral feat, 
particularly if he eventually becomes a 'winner' in positive terms too 
on an alternative route to his acknowledged excellence. Alternatively, 
he may apt, or be in a position to have to accept the conscience- 
smarties or rather saccharin-pellets at the end of the maze which he 
successfully ran, like an experimental albino-rat, so to speak, only to 
find that the real reinforcement at the goal was displaced, and accept 
the inferior reward, selling out the strength of his moral standing 
vis-a-vis the Pukka, and either obediently comply with 1S typecasting as 
doormat in the future or retain, cultivate the while the notion of his 
self in its whole deservingness and freedom as such in which the truth 
of his own intact stature as a self in his situation remains well- 
) 
defined within him as a private matter, as in a Sveik or a Columba or 
my auntie Googey, and carry on, in the secrecy, perhaps exclusiveness of 
his awn consciousness, his pilgrimage towards a tenable place under the 
sun in the world in which proper justice is done to him in keeping with 
his own expectations of himself, fumbling, on the brink of 
successfulness as a self, along the road in his 'dirty raincoat', 
'Rachmones toilette', or with his certificate of lunacy as the cue to 
his classification as profane in the world in terms of his outward 
circumstances, for a little longer, or indefinitely; his human stature 
in its fullness remaining a private accomplishment, amounting to a 
personal freedom, though merely within Aristotelean confines of it. 
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Section 5. and 6mall-letter Risrhtea Obie 
In foregoing arguments regarding the agent's capacity for and 
exercise of 'fundamental choice' - his opting, in other words, to either 
be socialpsychologically authentic through perpetrating his conduct and 
sustaining his consciousness in keeping with the dicta of human reality 
or, alternatively, to be socialpsychologically unauthentic and 
consequently conduct his consciousness in unquestioning, axiomatic moral 
loyalty to the established norm as that subsists in the world as 
society, attention has been given to both the socialpsychologic and, 
(predominantly in Chapter 2. ), to the sociologic consequences of this 
fundamental choice of one's self and its overriding modality of conduct. 
What still needs to be brought out with greater weight than it has been 
before, is that, as an important ramification of this area of the 
thesis, both the socialpsychologically authentic and unauthentic modes 
of conduct, are moral regarding their genus, both in their 
extra-individ4ai operation as the outward norm, and in their 
intra-individual operation, in their capacity, in other words, as the 
'private' conviction, strength and feeling of the agent, with which 
these two contrasting and conflicting frameworks of morality, 
alternatively propelling and keeping up the self, are adhered to as a 
personal matter once one or the other is adopted (for one or the other 
is inevitably subscribed to whether this is explicit in the mind of the 
agent or not. ) 
The socialpsychologically unauthentic manner of the choice of one's 
consciousness which is dedicated to the upkeep and stability of society, 
rain or shine, amounts to and operates as a coherent frame of moral 
reference, no less than (though different from) what we may call small- 
letter or socialpsychologically authentic righteousness made up by an 
also coherent set of beliefs informing personal conduct. Viewing the 
morality of unquestioning norm-abidance from a sociological angle, it 
will show itself as, society-wise, positive and corroborative in its 
effects, going hand-in-hand with a socialpsychologic sense of goodness 
and righteousness (although diametrically opposite to its rival set of 
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values. that of human reality, and in a relationship of personal bad 
faith to the latter). The unquestioningly society-supporting, personally 
unauthentic mode of choosing ourselves and our morality, draws its moral 
justification and applicability as a framework of individual conduct, 
with a fluency, from that autonomous set of values which is in any 
situation and at any time intuitable and recognisable as functional for 
the upkeep of the moral status quo, and which are just as easily, 
readily and immediately ascertainable and derivable from a socially 
given and dedicated source of moral framework as is a 
socialpsychologically authentic conduct from the equally coherent set of 
dicta of human reality. Descriptions of the process and consequences of 
a socialpsychologically authentic fountainhead and choice of conduct 
have already been advanced in previous parts of the thesis; at this 
point an evocative rendition of the moral whose virtues are drawn from 
an unquestioning ascription-abidance and acceptance, will be offered 
here, taken from Shakespeare's play The Winter's Tale. In this play, the 
author highlights the nature of a socialpsychologically unauthentic 
sense of goodness which emanates from an exclusively ascription-abiding 
morality in its extreme form, by giving these words to Leontes, the 
despotic ruler of the fictiotious realm of 'Sicilia', in reply to a 
courtier's desperate appeal to him to abandon the senseless destruction 
of his own queen and son in an attack of paranoiac jealousy, unfoundedly 
implicating his wife as an adulteress. 
Leontes: 
....................... Why, what need we 
Commune with you of this, but rather follow 
Our forceful instigation? Our prerogative 
Calls not your counsels, but our natural goodness 
Imparts this; which, if you - or stupefied 
Or seeming so in skill - cannot or will not 
Relish a truth like us, inform yourselves 
We need no more of your advice. The matter, 
The lass, the gain, the ord'ring on't, is all 
Properly ours. 121" 
The competing terms alternatively informing an individual's 
character-jytic moral tone of conduct as the function and outcome of his 
fundamental choice - these terms being the socialpsychologically 
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authentic and the socialpsychologically unauthentic frameworks for 
individual consciousness - are mutually exclusive in relation to one 
another, and work at each others' peril. It is conceivable that in a 
society which happens to be tolerant of the individual's inner authentic 
liberty, the socialpsychologically unauthentic agent will profess views 
which are, in keeping with the reigning norm, phenotypically congenial 
to some values which coincide with those of human reality; but in the 
event that the reigning, institutionally held ideology changes its tune 
about its individually acceptable tenets and/or policies, the 
socialpsychologically unauthentic agent will uncritically side with 
these altered policies, unacceptable by human measures as they may be, 
and the sham fibre of his personal goodness (by human reality's 
measures), will show through for what it is: socialpsychologically 
unauthentic. Conversely, it may be the case (as it is in what Sartre's 
calls 'elective assumption', reviewed in the Introduction), that a 
socialpsychologically authentic agent underscores, of his own free will, 
society's norms when those happen to be overwhelmingly congenial to the 
dicta of human reality, and in this event his attitude to the social 
norm will phenotypically coincide with that of the socialpsychologically 
unauthentic agent, supportive of the social norm whatever the contents 
of its morality. However, the allegience of the personally authentically 
commited agent to the given norm is a fickle one; as soon as he 
perceives the norm as turned from its human reality-tolerant and 
corroborative hue and content, his own moral colour and modality of 
personally authentic conduct will not turn with the wind of such outside 
normative changes, and he will continue to keep up his individually 
authentic sets of standards prompting him the imperatives of human 
decency and the critique of a society which is oppressive to personally 
tolerable and authentic standards. 
In Section 3. in this chapter, some human qualities have been listed 
- vivaciousness, charm, intelligence, principled insistance on one's 
personally authentic lights in conceiving of and conducting one's self, 
even when that has been unjustly slighted - which qualities appear 
decorous in the light of human reality even in the socially profaned or 
'fallen' individual, but which qualities are necessarily grasped as 
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faults in the book of the principled socialpsychologically unauthentic 
agent, particularly if those qualities pertain to one or another class 
of profane. Vivaciousness in the mentally ill, as a result, is easily 
labelled as out-of-place hyperactivity by the socialpsychologically 
unauthentic 'caretaker' and by one unquestioningly bowing to his 
authority; charm in the 'gypsy' in any sense of the term metamorphoses 
in the eye of the unauthentic Pukka into something to be mistrusted, 
intelligence and adequacy on the terms of the ego in the non-pukka came 
to figure as an unfitting and morally suspect 'cleverness', and the 
continued reference to an 'ideal self' in the way in which a 'profane' 
agent conceives of himself, is grasped as a 'chip on his shoulder'. This 
list of human attributes may be extended in our present context, to 
support the contention that many, or most, adjectives that are essential 
to human nature and an authentic conduct, systematically appear as 
virtues to the socialpsychologically authentic, and as faults to the 
socialpsychologically unauthentic, and vice versa. Spontaneousness, 
inventiveness, originality-preference in one's pursuance of his 
ordinary, everyday conduct or in carrying out one's work, for instance, 
will appear as a precious personal characteristic to the 
socialpsychologically authentic, and as suspect and undesirable features 
to his unauthentic counterpart; and conversely, the epithet (prized by 
the socialpsychologically unauthentic) of a predominant and typical 
reliance on already respectable 'secondary sources' in academic work or 
in everyday moral or intellectual style, will come over as contemptible 
to the socialpsychologicaly authentic. It may be said that the two 
noncoincidental moral frameworks, socialpsychologically authentic and 
socialpsychologically unauthentic, systematically and necessarily 
support and sport differing and conflicting sets of basic virtues, and 
that the resulting non-complementary arrays of human attributes are, 
potentially and also actually (when called on for the agent's 
assumption, in choice situations, in their competing extremes), in a 
dialectically opposite relation to each other, firstly in the respect 
of their capacities as socialpsychologically organised, coherent and 
informed springs of people's personal motivation as individuals, to 
which modality of morality the uncompromising socialpsychologically 
authentic approach of righteousness is naturally congenial, and an 
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unquestioning assumption of consciousness in socialpsychologic 
unauthenticity is uncongenial. This fact reflects our already 
extensively argued contention that 'goodness', 'righteousness' in a 
socialpsychologically authentic frame of reference, in sharp contrast 
with a socialpsychologically unauthentic conduct, draws its 
justification and mode of its furtherance from an active social 
creativity, be that interpersonal or completely intrapersonal in its 
radius, resulting in a choice of the agent's consciousness which is 
(whether he is articulate about and conscious of that in his own conduct 
or not), operative as a fertile, inspirational talent, experienced and 
exercised at first hand, with the individual's will called upon and 
actively engaged as a key ingredient in crusading, wittingly (or 
unwittingly, as an unselfconscious by-product of such a project 
following from human reality as one's chosen conduct) for a society in 
which leeway for the lights and needs of an "I" (if that be truly 
authentic and inclusive of universally implicative humanitarian 
principles) is universally assumed in the name of all who subscribe to 
the necessity of such humanly authentic lights and needs; this project 
acting as, amounting to the hallmark of goodness according to one of 
these sets of moral standards: the personally authentic one, out of the 
two with which we now concern ourselves in the light of a comparison 
between the two. 
The framework for the goodness of the unauthentic, in contrast, is 
(ideally from its own point of view) relative to the form of society 
that happens to exist, derivative from that regarding its content 
(though as a source of reference as a morality and in its everyday 
application perfected, with practice, into an unhaltingly flowing 
fountainhead of information and colourant of external conduct) and, 
unlike the righteousness of the subscriber to the dicta of the dignity 
and fulfilment of one's own self and, by implication, the self of 
others, is not original, in the sense that it is based exclusively on 
the acquisition, learning and assimilation of the given norm in the 
world as sacrosanct (with one's primary sensitivity to the 
universalistic promptings of the collective consciousness at its ideal, 
into which a presence to the needs of the self may blossom out in 
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adulthood, after a lifetime of the observance of authentic human values 
in a dialectic counterrelation with one's socialisation). The blindly 
norm-abiding choice of one's morality is, furthermore, also relative 
regarding its operation, as it works by way of a comparison, consists in 
the measuring of one's own personally unauthentic moral standing as 
indicated in one's social respectability in the world as the index of 
one's 'goodness', by the yardstick of the similarly unauthentic 'worth' 
of others, as that is read and judged through the external signs of 
tangible rewards, more easily attached to and attained through a 
socialpsychologically unauthentic choice of oneself than through the 
risky pursuit of an authentic excellence. 
A further, and connected, key difference between the personally 
authentic and unauthentic ways of grasping and propagating goodness is 
that the excellence, virtue, righteousness of the authentic, as has 
already been said, stems from, 'makes itself', consists of and is 
carried, thrust forward by the taxing process of 'angest' or anxiety- 
engagement, supersession and vanquishment, which project alone is vested 
with the capacity to produce and maintain a self with a certain 
distinctive sheen, grace, a sense of first-rateness. In 
counterdistinction, the fountainhead of the goodness of the unauthentic, 
is faithfulness to the morality of the normative status quo, with the 
tactics for and product of it as 'goodness' 'matt' in its quality, so to 
speak, and continuous with the generalized other, its 'metal' as a self 
(as it's often referred to in everyday parlance) indistinguishable from 
that, in the light of the secondary, imitative assimilation of its 
ready-made recipe for goodness, one already proven as positively 
reinforcing in the world as it is. The unauthentic consciousness differs 
tram the authentic one in that it waives, by necessity (as it would be 
destructive of itself), the first-hand, spontaneous mode of its conduct 
and betterment as prompted by human reality, in that it decries the very 
medium of the goodness of the authentic, borne in the difficult course 
of 'angest', and seeks and exercises in the place of that and as its 
substitute. The source and operative frame of reference which fires it 
is different from the authentic's 'angest', it's one which is based on 
and generated by a judgemental sense of comparison between its own 
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routine morality and the mode of the consciousness and conduct of the 
odd, disdainful towards the odd and the dissenters of any kind from the 
generalized other. This, socialpsychologically unauthentic source of 
gooaness, virtue, will receive the label Righteous Indignation, as the 
attitude, the gauge and expression between fellow-generalized others in 
the project of a successful adherence to individual undistinction as the 
standard of goodness, with the resulting socialpsychologically degraded 
brotherhood between selves of a counterfeit excellence, serving as the 
basis of the sentiment which acts as an emotive reinforcement 
existentially sustaining the norm as it is in its established state, as 
it is operative, and is which is sustained by such a sham human 
socialpsychologic level. Righteous Indignation sustains and propagates a 
false sense of excellence between selves who assert themselves in 
unauthentic pride as objects only, breeding a sense of distinction which 
consists in a proudly sported state of proven spotlessness of any 
maverick conduct in the social world, expressed in one's social 
reputation and (very often) in the typical trappings of that reputation 
in the way of possessions, useful connections and a favourable 
ascription. This process of a sort of moral keeping up with the Joneses, 
kits proof being the public recognition that one is as faithful and 
morally undeviating an adherer to the totally predictable, because 
totally established, normative values, as the next man, and doing as 
well in the world as a consequence) - this project of ostentatious 
moral elbowing forth, serves as the somewhat circular justification of 
our having what we have, and excusing ourselves from the pursuance of 
human excellence the hard, socialpsychologically positive and authentic 
way. It may be helpful at this point to turn to Graham Greene's vividly 
described distinction between these two competing approaches to and 
grasps of 'good' - that stemming from a personal authenticity and that 
stemming from a personal unauthenticity - which is very expressive of 
the contents of both these competing frames of moral reference, as well 
as of the special, mutually exclusive, alternative relationship between 
the two, and for that reason we now recall a passage from his novel 
Travels with my Aunt, though we have already quoted these words of his 
in the last Section of Chapter 2. Assuming the character of his main 
hero who embarks on an expedition of wholeheartedly savouring the 
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remainder of his life in the company of his remarkable 'aunt' after an 
entire career spent as an 'Accountant', so to speak, rather than a 
'Gypsy', (to draw, once more, on Kenneth Tynan's nomenclature), Graham 
Greene puts forward the following description of his hero's state of 
mind: 
It was as though I had escaped from an open prison, had been 
snatched away, provided with a rope ladder and a waiting 
car, into my aunt's world, the world of the unexpected 
character and the unforeseen event... I can remember very 
little of the vision preceding the prison house: it must 
have faded away very early 'into the light of the common 
day'... and (I) thought of my aunt, that she, for one 
never allowed the vision to fade. Perhaps a sense of 
morality is the sad compensation we learn to enjoy like a 
remission for good conduct. 
1221 
In enlarging on the difference, and the relationship, between these 
two distinct frames of reference of 'goodness' - that obtainable through 
a personal deservingness and righteousness by the dicta of and as 
emanated by human reality through the method of an active social 
creativity, on the one hand, and the sense of 'goodness' inherent in and 
fed by what we call here Righteous Indignation, on the other, a return 
to . Mead's nation of the 'sentinel' may be useful. Mead (it may be 
recapitulated here) denotes with the label 'sentinel capacity' the 
phylogenetic legacy in humans of the phenomenon of the special endowment 
of one animal excelling in a herd, and this individual acting as the 
outstanding scout to all the others, and followed by those. In man, Mead 
reasons, such natural endowment with extra sharpness and edge to one's 
senses qualifying and distinguishing one in comparison with everyone 
else, becomes self-consciously reflected upon, graduates to a feature 
which is appreciated as morally decorous, with this sentinel-capacity 
operating as an ideal for each by definition as a natural by-product of 
being human, acknowledged as everyone's possibility, and universally 
desired. Mead distinguishes between two differing approaches by man to 
the project of reaching such acknowledged excellence in comparison with 
the gathering of the unendowed in similar respects, one of these 
approaches historically more primitive than the other, in a way which 
allows for the comparison of one of these ruses for the achievement of 
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such sentinel-capacity with the ploy of our socialpsychologically 
unauthentic, and the other out of these two ruses with the project of 
our socialpsychologically authentic. Firstly, as a survival from early 
times in man's history, Mead considers, man may go about stressing his 
sentinelship by showing that he is the same as the generalized other, 
but with a vengeance. He complies with the norm as a self who is just as 
dedicated to the standards by which everyone abides as is anyone else, 
but with knobs on, so to speak; by dressing according to the fashion, 
for instance, but in a way which makes him stand out through the 
superiority of the price he paid for his outfit, on account of that 
being of a better material, by sporting the most extensive'wardrobe 
within the confines of that fashion. Alternatively, (this tactic being 
historically newer and telling of greater sophistication as an 
approach), he may go about his excelling by being different from 
everybody else and unique in relation to those, rising above the 
generalized other by virtue of his originality, through the enhancement 
of nis individuality; not as a meaningless and fart pour 1'art 
exercise, but with personally authentic 'value' recognised and adopted 
as the spring and progenitor of human reality in one's conduct, and 
favoured because of that reason alone. 1231, Putting Mead's observation 
into an ethical context, our big-letter Righteous Indignation as 
uiscerned here, is the choice of the first approach to 'sentinel 
quality', that obtainable through the cultivation and sensation of an 
'enhanced sameness' in a more than average dedication to being object 
only in the idiom of consciousness which is available to subscription, 
as a matter of one's keynote to personal morality, to the generalized 
other at its unauthentic (the personally safe approach to a sense of 
elevation on account of one's 'goodness'), in sharp counter- distinctio n 
with the pursuit of 'sentinel'-capacity as grasped and propagated in and 
by one on the basis and strength of the uniqueness of one's first-hand 
talent (available to all if so chosen, in some form or another) , as a 
matter of one's fundamental choice. The unauthentic ruse for achieving a 
semblance of 'sentinelship' is the assumption of the more primitive 
approach to exemplariness than the burdensome, active, authentic 
approximation of that borne of and propelled by 'angest', the self's 
ideal expectation of itself as such, complete with the moral implication 
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of the imperative to ever further the realisation of such an ideal set 
of expectations of one's self, and demand the same of others. Big-letter 
Righteous Indignation, as identified here, is a state of mind, that 
which is meant to afford, and, accordingly, does afford and consists of 
the power (which comes to man without effort if his mind is suitably 
prepared by virtue of his chosen loyalty to the norm of the Absentee 
Landlord and his reign in the world as it is) to stereotypically judge 
others in a raw readiness and with a speed unhalted by any empathic 
consideration of one's fellow-men as fellow-individuals in the spirit 
expressed in the phrase 'there, but for the grace of God, go I', in a 
constant act of judgement devoid of any critical reflection upon the 
human object of one's judgement in the true merit and complexity of his 
situation eliciting his conduct, waving aside the possibility of 
specially endorsing or, if that be in place, specially resisting, as a 
person, the easy and unreflective facility of the most socially 
immediate, stereotypic judgement of his fellow-man in his own capacity 
as a complex and discriminating self himself. Big-letter Social 
Indignation is the vehicle of the indiscriminate judgement of any 
apparent deviance, as an exercise yielding a sense of unauthentic 
excellence and for the sake of that. The glee with which the unauthentic 
exercises his capacity for Righteous Indignation for the sake of doing 
so as a measure of his own human excellence, consists in and is 
characterised by the attitude of the socially primitive agent's 
triggerhappiness as a man and therefore a judging animal, with this 
faculty of his used and seen by him as a mark and medium of his sense of 
gooaness; - as a shortcut to a state of mind as big-letter 
Rignteousness, by way of one's dedicated affiliation to the routine 
being of the generalized other, as an alternative to the authentic 
project of achieving, constantly earning the not easily available 
socialpsychologic laurels of a person as human reality (should he choose 
the latter framework as the informant of his sense of excellence as a 
self). We may enrich our definition of the big-letter Righteously 
Indignant as presently put forward, by introducing the label 'amateur 
judge' as a synonym of the unauthentically Righteously Indignant. This 
additional tag in naming him underlines his characteristic practice of 
revelling, as a mark of his own elevation as a self, in his orthodox 
Our Big-letter and Small-letter Righteousness as Object. -301- 
judgemental faculty for the sake of it, so as to provide him with a 
sense of 61itism in his mediocrity through the elemental and 
unreflecting condemnation of the 'different' in a moral comparison with 
himself as an unconditional mercenary of the norm, putting into 
operation his unrefelctive faculty of judgement as a vehicle and tool 
for the asserting, for the zealous identification with any measure of 
his own ascribed sacredness, in whatever tier in the corridors, or 
rather staircase, of the established system of the social rank-and file 
that happens to exist in the world, by way of the resulting sensation of 
a goodness 'holier than thou'. The nature of such 'amateur judgement' as 
a socialpsychologically operative mechanism in 'the mob' (in Mead's 
sense), in counterdistinction with the operation of the faculty of 
judgement in the hands of the initiated, trained and consequently more 
discriminating and sophisticated professionals, may be highlighted by 
the overwhelming popularity of the death sentence as tapped in an 
opinion poll in recent years, at a time when this extreme punitive 
measure was voted down in the House of Commons by the large majority of 
the specialists in the repesentation of the people: Members of 
Parliament, the elected and expert arbiters of the law on people's 
behalf. 'The tracking down of a murderer takes one back to the vengeance 
attitude of the primitive community', Mead writes. 1: 24-1 This attitude, 
that of the exercise of Righteous Indignation as the tool and hallmark 
of unauthentic personal goodness, underscored by the standards of a 
primitive generalized other (whether operative in the crowd degraded 
through this project: the mob, or in a single individual in bad faith), 
may conveniently be called 'mediocracy'; as already observed, it is the 
worship of and indulgence in a sense of excellence that is verified, 
OK-d, reinforced by a pride in our range of belongings (our public 
respectability, at the symbolic level of positive society, certainly 
included among these), by the grace of the Absentee Landlord who saw it 
fit to give us these benefits for our unconditional worship of him and 
of his order of ascription in the world, at all times and at all costs. 
The distinction, in Mead's work, between two capacities of the 
generalized other: a primitive, morally crude one, called by him 'the 
mob', «s' and his finely discerned postulation of a historically more 
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developed generalized other which underlies, sophisticatedly, the 
entirety of his most consequential socialpsychologic work Kind, Self and 
Society, is strongly akin with Kierkegaard's and particularly Bultmann's 
differentiation between the authentic and unauthentic possibilities of 
the community, and brings us to the important observation that 
'romantic' (particularly existentialistic) strands of social thought are 
wrongly and unnecessarily accused, in popular conceptualisations of such 
schools of thought, of equating an authentic mode of conduct with the 
individual's mode of consciousness, and of branding the mode of 
consciousness of the crowd as axiomatically unauthentic. Out of the 
existentialist socialpsychologic theories, it is solely the concept of 
'das Man - Heidegger's rival notion to the generalized other - which 
emerges as the epitomy of a contemptible and sham morality, by 
personally authentic measures, without any qualifications, while other 
socialpsychologic frameworks of a 'romantic' hue often, and importantly, 
allow for the insight that authenticity or unauthenticity is not a 
question of numbers, that the justification of the application of one 
or the other of these two moral qualities does not lie in the 
circumstance whether it is adopted by one or by many. The choice between 
conducting the self in that phoney and predigested idiom which is 
labelled here Righteous Indignation, or, contrarywise, in first-hand and 
personally staked authenticity, is open to crowds no less than to 
individuals. An authentic body, community of selves, and Mead's 'mob', 
is the same crowd, consists of the same people and number of people, all 
cohering as the generalized other, whose ensuing differential moral 
quality depends on that crowd's choice of itself as authentic or 
unauthentic. A crowd may be, and often is (in revolutions, for instance) 
fired, in the face of morally inhumanly outrageous and unjustifiable 
affairs in the world and in response to those, in human authenticity, 
with each and every member of it summoned in a genuine capacity as an 
ego, in a communal act of 24-carat 'social creativity' by so many 
'Engineers' (for the meaning of the latter concept see the last 
Section. ) Two important points follow from the appreciation of the 
freedom of the crowd to summon itself, in such a'fundamental choice', 
as authentic or unauthentic. 
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One is the recognition that a socialpsychologically unauthentic, 
big-letter Righteous Indignation, if opted for, may serve in the crowd, 
no less than in the individual, as the vehicle of the displacement, in a 
way writ large, of the calls of an ourtaged and humanly authentic 
angest, bastardising that authentic sentiment as a framework of goodness 
into a pale semblance of it in the conduct of the unauthentic and lazy. 
The Righteous Indignation of aa crowd, (no less than that of a 
socialpsychologically unauthentic individual), conceivably embracing a 
whole nation, is identified here as the frequent deposer of 'angest' as 
a motivational source feeding the craving for excellence in man (never 
extinguished even if he chooses to be socialpsychologically 
unauthentic), and lends itself to a comparison with the mechanism and 
function of angest as a source of motivation. An important property of 
Righteous Indignation, whether it operates in the crowd or in the 
individual, lies in the characteristic of its being free-floatfhg, as i! s, 
angest or anxiety, whose difficult and demanding authentic prevalence 
and creative role it bastardises and usurps. It attaches itself, as does 
anxiety, following the changing fashions for its institutionalised, 
legitimised outlet), to objects of it (various kind of rachmones, that 
is, which happen to be appropriate targets to the current moral tastes 
of an historically ever-changing norm, which differing, fashionably 
despised groups of rachmones as the potential object of the ever- 
demanding capacity of people for a sense of excellence in unauthentic 
ways, vary in the course of history from culture to culture, sticking at 
any time, to the group of Rachmones whom it is currently pukka to hate. 
The ideology of fascist Germany, which took the ideal of 'mediocracy' as 
a measure of human excellence to its extreme (as so evocatively analysed 
by Sartre in his work Antisemite and Jew), 126. ' invented and operated a 
highly sophisticated, variegated and elaborate official system of norms, 
bringing under the umbrella of its sanctified moral disdain of that all 
groups of Difrerent who were identified and judged in comparison with 
the ideologically mollycoddled majority's own ideal of mediocre populism 
both an racial and ideological grounds, which they put an a moral 
pedestal as the fountainhe. ac of citizenly virtue, compulsory for all; 
(such populism to be distinguished from democracy, of course). This all- 
embracing and hostile classification on the 'national socialists" part 
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of the Different in all conceivable senses, yielded a system of fine 
discrimination embracing an amazing number of classes of the Blemished, 
for the explicit purpose of scapegoating any discontent that previously 
loomed in German society, and for the successful hogging by the new 
ascribed elite any semblence of gooodness and excellence that was 
possible to have in the world, the emerging ideological smokescreen of 
Nazism designed to hide and displace the sense of ill in the nation 
which was threatening to undermine the social order in response to 
decades of bad government. The play Bent C27. ' unfolds the operation in a 
Second-World-War concentration camp of the resulting finely discerned 
hierarchy of these many classes of persecuted Blemished, indicated by 
various colour badges worn by the inmates, qualifying those for 
differing kinds of treatment at the hands of the camp commanding 
personnel. The physically or mentally odd had no badges but were 
immediately exterminated without further ado. The worst off were the 
homosexuals who were set apart from the rest by having to wear pink 
badges. Next up in awaiting their turn for extermination in this 
inverted row of ascendancy, were the Jews, who wore yellow badges, their 
extermination the most staggering out of all groups destined to be 
murdered, by virtue of the greatness of their numbers as murder-victims, 
but, regarding their treatment in the period of their waiting for the 
gas-chamber, somewhat better treated than the homosexuals and fed on a 
slightly better diet in this queue for death. The elite among the 
condemned were the common criminals, who wore green badges. These were 
entrusted with little chores by the Nazis and, unlike the other groups 
who were the targets of the Nazis' hate, given food with some degree of 
nourishment in it. 
Our current form of government and practical ideology which reigns 
in this country in our day, cannot, of course, be brought on a par with 
Nazi Germany in any sense, particularly not in the sense of the overt 
inhumanity that it shows towards its unfavoured. Nevertheless, this 
government is not at all macrasociologically naive in the promoting of 
the monopoly of 'goodness' which is jealously reserved for those who are 
'pukka' by ascription, and kept tooth and nail from those who are not 
(albeit in very subtle ways compared with the Nazis), as we have shown, 
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mostly in Chapter 2 Section 2, in our analysis of the differential 
apportioning of chances for being 'good' to the ascribed Pukka and to 
the ascribed Rachmones, respectively, by means, largely, of its campaign 
of Hidden Persuasion knowingly promoting the Pukka's monopoly for 
goodness, in the service of its very practical ideology. What is being 
further maintained here, moreover, is the conviction that the unashamed 
scapegoating of the deviant (one class of those only, in the case of our 
government), for the purpose of channelling and attaching to that group 
the currently prevalent freefloating national discontent, looming 
unsympathically towards this government on account, largely, of the 
mass-unemployment for whose implementation it is predominantly 
responsible, is going on in our society by a socialpsychologically 
articulate and meaning design, It is usefully remarked at this point 
that the papuitsam to courting of the tastes of a generalized other not 
noted for its demands and wish for the pursuance of an excellence born 
in taxing personal authenticity), for which this government is well 
known regarding its politics in respect of the arts, has concomitant 
moral overtones (not incidental ones) in actuality, which extend to 
social reality in that this populism orchestrates, directs the 
unauthentic range of moral tastes (a natural companion to the artistic 
'mediocracy' cultivated and encouraged in the generalized other of our 
play), against the one group of Blemished vis-a-vis whom the present 
government levels itself in abandoned Righteous Indignation. Of course, 
this group is not - cannot be - any of those groups of Different for 
whose persecution the Nazis have become historically discredited; it's 
not, on the face of it, the blacks, the Jews, the homosexuals into whom 
the government explicitly displaces the freefloating Righteous 
Indignation which the generalized other is in readiness to deploy, if 
successfully unauthenticised. It is, in our day and culture, the criminal 
only who fills the bill of the sanctioned object of the selfrighteous 
hate of a sizeable part of the masses, educated to be populistic in 
moral ways as well as artistic ones; it is the criminal, consequently, 
who serves as the occasion for the exercise of the 'mediocratic' 
trj2ger happiness of the morally sweetly courted generalized other. in a 
consciously manoeuvred way, so as to afford an anchorage for the safe 
landing and termination, in actuality, of this nationwidely manipulated 
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macro-psychologic function: anomie -a function reshaped and rebaptised 
as the anti-criminal wrath of the population, to serve for the 
equilibration of the established norm, the government thereby taking the 
heat out of the large-scale small-letter righteous indignation of the 
people on account of the staggering scale of unemployment, in the form 
of which it originally lingered, and which, if not tackled, would have 
further found its expression in the form of its engagement as authentic 
righteous indignation over the employment-situation in our society, 
which gave rise to the socially untoward discontent in search for a 
scapegoat, on this account, in the first place. 
This argument doesn't wish to comment on the real merit and 
justification of the condemnation of the criminal element as a desirable 
or undesirable end in itself, on which level the government tackles the 
matter, to appearances. This argument merely means to clinically 
observe that in the context of the freefloating, or perhaps already 
deconstructively engaged discontent of the nation on account of the 
government's systematic and cynical creation of mass-unemployment as an 
articulately envisaged part and by-product of their economic policies 
from the moment of their being first elected, is effectively, and by 
design, sidetracked into the government's 'war against crime', this 
campaign agitatedly promoted by officialdom through all available media 
and means so as to side-track and metamorphose the attention, the moral 
quality and the colour of allegience of a voting public which that would 
otnerwise have directed in uncongenial ways to the government in power. 
As a result of this government's socialpsychologically sophisticated 
response to this danger as just described, the 'war against crime' has 
graduated to a central issue at the heart of the Tory Party's election 
campaign, at the same time, ironically, as the crime-rate was in fact 
soaring in social actuality as a direct product of the government's 
uncaring attitude to the public whom they would have liked to, and 
eventually have, persuaded to vote them into power again, with this 
socialpsychologic ploy such a hit with the public that it had to be 
adopted, as a necessary precondition to winning, as a central issue in 
the Labour Party's election manifesto too. 
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So far one side-benefit of recognising the crowd as the possible 
vehicle of authenticity, as well as of a possible unauthenticity, 
depending on its fundamental choice of itself, has been pursued at some 
length. To summarise this already argued point, this first side-benefit 
of the recognition of the community's moral freedom and power to be 
authentic or unauthentic, just as much as such a moral freedom is the 
property of the consciousness of the individual, consists of the 
uncovering of 'Righteous Indignation' and the morality that goes with 
it, as the mechanisms, in dimensions writ large, of the common 
displacement of a first-hand social creativity, born in an authentic 
angest and concern about one's lot and that of one's fellot-men, and of 
the frequent evading by governments or other 'caretakers' of their 
ensuing humanly authentic duties to the community, of which duties 
towards the community and its members, we are all the custodians, in 
whatever menial a capacity. 
The second side-benefit inherent in entertaining the generalized 
other as alternatively authentic or unauthentic, is that such a grasp of 
the generalized other allows to underscore the contention, put forward 
in the Introduction, that the collective consciousness at its pure (as 
embodied in the body of the law in its absoluteness and impersonality), 
is not the same thing as the generalized other. The generalized other 
(unlike the body of the law or the collective consciousness whose 
constitution is purely factual in a sociologically scientific idiom) is 
a socialpsychologic concept, albeit one writ large, which is prone to, 
mediated and shaped by emotion, particularly by the emotion of an 
authentic and small-letter, or alternatively an unauthentic and big- 
letter Righteous Indignation in the face of its moral sentiments 
elicited by affairs touching the lot of people in the world, depending 
on whether the generalized other takes an authentic or unauthentic 
stance in its corporate capacity in response to such affairs. However, 
the body of the law and the norm at its 'lived' in the modality of the 
generalized other, are in a special relationship to one another, the two 
running parallel in the course and process of legislation. The standards 
of the generalized other - the norm at its 'lived' - has the capacity of 
constituting a pressure on the body of the law, a retrograde one in 
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comparison with the content of the law, if choosing itself in human 
unauthenticity, and a progressive one in its authentic forms and phases. 
On the avenue towards social progress (along which, one hopes, we are 
reaching towards constantly greater and greater degrees of perfection of 
social tolerance), the generalized other is thus at times ahead of, and 
at other times behind the law in its demands of a more civilised 
humanitarianism. For the illumination of the occasional humanly 
authentic, progressive function of the generalized other, impatient of 
human anomalies in legislation, or in an intended legislation, we may 
cite the wide-spread pressure, in our day, for a return to the once 
outstanding standards of the National Health Service, or in the demand 
for the future continuity of the subsidised higher education for the 
academically deserving members of the democratic majority at a certain 
stage of their education, the widespread and volatile voicing of which 
demand caused the Conservative Government, in comparatively recent 
times, to abandon its preparations for the cessation of student grants. 
Conversely, the generalized other, in its unauthentic choice of itself, 
may trail behind legislation in the respect of the liberal tolerance of 
not-yet culturally emancipated social groups, with the law declaring 
homosexuals, working women, blacks and other members of traditionally 
disadvantaged groups as the equals of anybody else, and the generalized 
other slow to release its hold on these 'deviants', as sections of the 
community from whom opportunities, equal in comparison with those who 
are Unblemished, continue to be withheld in practical ways. 
Several ramifications follow from a comparison between an authentic 
or small-letter, and an unauthentic or big-letter understanding of 
goodness, righteousness, or righteous indignation, which are important 
in both theoretical and practical ways. The theoretic foundations of the 
relationship between these two competing moral frameworks have now been 
laid, and may now be usefully recapitulated, with a view to paving the 
way to the practical consideration of the topic, by way of the peppering 
of its further discussion with concrete examples. 
In previous Sections we have commented amply an the project of the 
'Gypsy', identifying that as the authentic way and attempt to draw from 
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and ever insist, in the course of one's creative project (whether that 
is spectacular or modestly everyday in its nature) upon the 24-carat 
proof quality of the self as human reality in pursuing its attainment as 
such, and which immediate, spontaneous and direct well of inspiration as 
human reality alone has the capacity to generate the sort of self which 
is marked off by a first-hand originality. The Accountant's 
understanding of goodness, excellence, in contrast, as already said, 
takes its source and frame of reference from the heights of already 
existing ascription, moral and aesthetic, and hopes to approximate that 
by mimicking the rules and recipes according to which that works in its 
established actuality. The latter, unauthetic champion of Academy- 
determined orthodoxy in the arts (or indeed in the creative sciences) 
avoids the 'gypsy's' kind of first-hand approach to output for his part 
and views that practice with suspicion in others; (because of the 
arduousness of that process, the fact that this course and phase of 
creation is not manifest to the eye of a humdrum interpreter of first- 
hand work and because in such an authentic, first-hand approach there is 
an element of the risk of failure). The humanly unauthentic pursuer or 
interpreter of the project of creation sees excellence as the product of 
industry alone, as the fruit of an untiring dedicatedness to 
'meaiocratic' confines, which he adopts as the ultimate source and 
horizon of any excellence. To the 'mediocratic' 'idealist' goodness lies 
in, is nurtured by, identification with the brotherhood of the not odd, 
the so-called normal. As an example to illuminate the moral and 
aesthetic philistine's tone-deafness, 'Accountant'-fashion, to the 
difference between these two contrasting approaches to excellence - the 
authentic and the unauthentic, and his ensuing denial of the authentic 
way, - we could recall a film made a few years ago about the beginnings 
of the Beatles, depicting the early life-story of the group as a 
chronicle of each of its young members as that of the typical 'boy next 
door'. The lives of each of the four young men in the group are 
uniformly presented as a constant process of working very hard together 
in the spirit of neighbourliness and behavioural harmony, never at 
loggerheads with each other or in any major way with the authorities, 
the resulting message of the film suggesting that any four nice lads 
could achieve the same success and degree of excellence if only they 
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tried hard enough. Richard Wagner's opera The Master Singers ridicules 
the character of a civic dignitary, Beckmesser, who enters the annual 
Mastersinger competition of medieval Nuremberg, having prepared for it 
with extra diligence, composing his entry song, as all competitors had 
to, with the strict observance of the aesthetic rules as already laid 
down, and falling flat on his face an account of the mediocrity of his 
entry in front of the adjudicators. The well-known story of Mozart and 
Salieri provides another example of the fight to the death between these 
two artists, one (Salieri) second rte and dedicated to a life of 
industry without a spark of human reality in him, and the other, Mozart, 
a genius who rose to exceptional creative heigths through the constant, 
inspired, vital engagement of his elemental gift as human reality, 
superseding, overtaking every established rule. Another figure in real 
life, Florence Foster Jenkins, and a character of fiction, the second 
wife of 'Citizen Kane' in Orson Welles' classic film of that title, 
(both the characters 'singers'), offer themselves as two further 
examples in our current endeavour to demonstrate the fact that being 
well rewarded, indeed outstandingly endowed in external terms - notably 
in the way of wealth, connections - is, in itself, a totally incidental 
and barren condition for the generation of one's well-deserved success 
as an artist; the staggering sums of money that both Jenkins and citizen 
Kane poured into establishing palaces of the arts so as to buy the 
status of stardom in those for oneself or one's 'loved one' (in the case 
of Kane), is an approach which is totally inappropriate and wrong for 
creating, fuelling or maintaining outstanding gift where there is none - 
both these characters becoming pathetic objects of derision when they 
tried to assert their claim to artistic fame, to try their wings as 
firstrate creative artists, (whose quality as people they coveted), by 
actually performing in the palaces of art which they built. 
In describing the relationship between the two conceptions of 
'goodness' which we argue, a special connection seems to emerge between 
these alternative avenues to and grasps of morality, an the one hand, 
and the notions of 'fixing' and 'engineering', on the other, in the 
sense in which the latter two notions figured in the last Section. The 
authentic approach to the creative process takes its source from and 
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thrives through the pursuit of what we called 'Engineering' - the 
project of bringing creative inventiveness to practical fruition in 
gratifying, expressing the visions, needs, demands and bids of an 
unsurrendered "I" in a personally outstanding "me", summoned in a first- 
hand endeavour for the realisation of this "I" in the existentiell idiom 
of the first person singular, for better or for worse. The other, the 
unauthentic approach, typically makes and advances itself by 'fixing' 
rather than creating - its notion of 'goodness', 'excellence' searching 
and finding itself in the servile manipulation of already existing 
aesthetic and moral formulae, without resort to new elements offering 
themselves in the process of inspiration, and, in another sense of the 
term, the 'fixing' of, the effecting a lack of actual opportunities for 
those whose genuine talent threatens both them and their understanding 
of 'goodness', by its novelty and dynamism; the second understanding of 
'fixing' conceivably entailing the active exercise of conspiracy and 
trickery to which both Salieri in real life and Beckmesser in the world 
of fiction, actually resorted in the pursuit of their claims to fame as 
artists. Poor Salieri and Beckmesser haven't got a chance to strike the 
right chord, so to speak, in their endeavour to take on the authentic 
artist regarding the quality of his excellence (in cases when the 
project of the latter happens to succeed), in spite of all the industry 
and/or 'fixing', trickery of the unauthentic artist. Our Beckmessers and 
Salieris simply go about their pursuit of1irSt 'rateness as artists the 
wrong way, having slavishly pledged themselves to the aesthetic and 
moral status quo, above all, as the fountainhead in their pursuit of 
art or simply lifestyle, in the original act of their fundamental 
choice; in their having opted, in the first place, for that frame of 
reference as their touchstone and guide of creativity, which decries, 
hates, fears, separates itself from human reality as the framework to 
challenging, probing the limits of its ultimate potentials, siding with 
the 'Accountants' in choosing their morals and aesthetic values, and 
recognising themselves in their opposition to those of the 'gypsy'. What 
is meat to one of these frames of reference in the exercise of 
creativity, is poison to the other one, and, (both of these alternative 
frameworks understanding themselves as the key to and quintessence of 
excellence and goodness), in our rummaging among the repertoire of 
Our Big-letter and Small-letter Righteousness as Object. - 312- 
methods and toolkit which peculiarly and appropriately come with buying 
into one or the other of these frames of references, authentic or 
unauthentic, the application of items in these different sets of 
instruments which are inclusive in the price which we pay for our chosen 
mode of conduct and allegiance, will really prove itself as congenial, 
reinforcing, corroborative to our chosen framework in approaching the 
job of collecting and enjoying the extraordinarily glorious laurels 
which are available to the self when successful by virtue of its output 
(whether we are engaged in the pursuance of the arts in the 
conventional sense or in the art of everyday social creativity, pure and 
simple), and items in the weaponry peculiarly apt to the pursuance of 
this goal in the mode and idiom of one of these two frames of 
references, will prove inappropriate and disruptive to the other. As 
Macbeth observes when his Lady and himself realise that in order for 
them to have reason to be 'jocund' in the secure knowledge of the 
success of their project to become king and queen of the land, further 
murders are necessary in addition to the past chain of their acts of 
vicious 'fixing', including murder: 'Things bad begun make strong 
themselves by ill. ' '-201 It may be said that playing the game of the 
pursuit of excellence, may in some respects be likened to adopting one 
set of conventions or another in our way of playing bridge. Each 
coherent set of conventions applied singly is potentially suitable as a 
strategy for winning the game - the game, in our metaphoric sense, of 
pursuing excellence, whether in humanly first-rate or second-rate ways, 
depending on which of these ways we pledged ourselves to follow; but 
mixing sets of conventions can only lead to confusion and defeat, it can 
only lead to losing the game, whether we envisaged winning it 
authentically or unauthentically. 
Two of our earlier examples may be usefully recalled here to throw 
further light on the practical ways in which the two competing moral 
and socialpsychologic frameworks - the 'mediocratically' unauthentic and 
the personally authentic - show themselves and operate as inmical to 
and intolerant of each other, as repellent to one another. In Chapter 2. 
Section 2., we quoted the case of a released prisoner (an ascriptionally 
greatly Blemished), who wished to take part in the highly elating event 
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of the London Marathon which he hoped would afford him an occasion to 
feel as one of the anonymous crowd of the intending excellent by human 
measures, but found this avenue barred from him on his own dignified 
human terms as an anonymous 'harajan', so to speak, and everybody's 
equal in this sense. In another of our earlier examples, the underground 
traindriver Chris Hughes, whose project to become International 
Mastermind succeeded in 1983, also met with the wrath and the 
retribution of his unauthentic Pukka superiors by ascription, lesser 
than Hughes in human terms. These examples illustrate the typical denial 
or the sense of excellence fuelled by the needs and dicta of human 
reality, by the ascription-abiding and informed arbiters of a 
'mediocratic', second-rate excellence. The following two examples 
illustrate the opposite paradigm of the intolerance and repugnance of 
one of these two approaches to excellence to the other. This second and 
alternative paradigm springs into being and operation in situations 
where human reality is confronted with a coercion bidding the agent to 
abide by a set of second-best dicta of excellence born in the framework 
or 'mediocracy' idealised, which is untenable to the agent who pledged 
and cultivated himself as authentic human reality throughout his entire 
past, which latter mode of creativity by means of the unreserved 
engagement of himself as an inspired, original self, he once opted for 
as the mode of his fundamental choice. 
The first of these examples is provided, by the plot of the play 
entitled Whose Life is it Anyway. 1119' It treats the predicament of a 
sculptor and connoisseur of life who becomes a tetraplegic in a road 
accident. Tempted in his hospital bed by an overpowering selection of 
high-tech gadgetry to afford him a measure of scope for his continued 
activity within a very diminished radius of further creativity to 
function as an individual, he decides to commit suicide rather than 
settle for what he sees as a degraded range of activites in comparison 
with his originally chosen life-project. But because of his great 
physical disability he needs to be aided by the hospital staff to carry 
out this new project of authenticity, solely available to him now, as he 
sees it: suicide. He gets into a collision course with the chief 
physician who throughout the better part of the play imposes on him his 
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own morality according to which life, however diminished in its quality 
for the one who must lead it, must be preserved. The conflict consists 
in the hero's affirmation of his own freedom to decide on the worth and 
quality of his own life, of his right to choose between the complete and 
uncompromised being or the complete absence of it in absolute terms, 
and, on the other hand, the moral stance of the chief physician who 
questions and denies him this right as an individual, superimposing over 
that his own code of practice prompted by the imperative of preserving 
life, however painful and disagreeable the experience of that life for 
the agent on whose behalf the matter of life or death is being decided. 
Finally, the people he encounters in his new situation, first swayed by 
the chief physician's moral grasp of the sculptor's dilemma causing them 
to resist in their attitude the sculptor's project of suicide, come to 
respect the authenticity of the sculptor's choice and the power of 
judgement which that choice rightfully wields within the confines of a 
self, and, thanks to their compassion and help, his life-support system 
is finally turned off. Another play, similar in important features of 
its synopsis, which makes a point akin to the former one, is Tom 
Kempinsky's Duet for One. <_°' In its plot it is multiple sclerosis 
which causes the debility of a violinist's hands; and it is this 
circumstance which forces the heroine to consider the adoption of an 
alternative, diminished range of activities as her new calling in life. 
There is pressure on her from the outside world to assimilate the 
sensible values of its mundane dicta, bidding her, according to the 
promptings of the common-sense morality of the socialpsychologic 'norm' 
in the world, to simply maintain her life with its new compromised 
horizons. She learnt to play the violin as a little girl to overcome her 
grief over her mother's death, this loss fuelling, inspiring, launching 
her to be an exceptional artist throughout her entire life. We witness 
her sessions in the psychiatrist's office, which she attends because of 
the intolerable frustration of not being able to carry on with her 
authentically chosen vocation, and her inability to accept the 
redundancy in her way of future activity of the underlying meaning of 
her work which has always fuelled her output as a human being. She too 
contemplates suicide, and the series of her sessions at the psychiatrist 
(of which the plot of the play consists), shows her psychological 
f 
ortune. s 
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in coping with her weighty predicament, and the process in which the 
second-rateness of her altered, alienly experienced, make-do range of 
little occupations which fill her days, permeates her entire life, 
affecting the quality of her relationship with her equally famous 
husband, whose artistic equal (or even superior) and partner in music 
she has once been, and her own new tone of perceiving herself as a 
result of her redundancy now in that relationship. What makes both the 
artists in these two examples contemplate death, is the enforced 
watering down, indeed replacement, of the peak of authenticity in their 
creative lives, by a lifestyle relying on values prompted by the 
practical rationality, the humiliating force of external circumstances 
which, due to their altered situation, creep into their lives, usurping 
there the role of their originally chosen authentic project: offering 
them both a life with diminished horizons, unacceptable to both. 
The fact that in the above two examples it was artists whose 
fortunes as selves illustrated the case in which one's original pledge 
to cultivate human reality proved intolerant and resistant to being 
dislodged by standards of mere expediency disallowing the carrying out 
of that pledge, should not be taken to imply that authenticity can only 
thrive through activity in the echelons of the fine arts. The next 
example chosen to illuminate the same paradigm (that of the 
uncongeniality of the compromise of one's authentic choice of oneself to 
the future functioning of consciousness in loyalty to human reality, as 
a question of fundamental choice) is called on here to show that an 
authentic genius in the way of everyday forms and areas of social 
creativity is not only a conceivable but a general and frequent, indeed 
constant possibility for the selves of all, and that such an everyday 
sort of genius is just as vitally corrupted by the introduction of a 
degraded morality into the pursuit of its own kind of excellence as is 
the genius of the artist when the authentic mode and idiom of its 
conducting itself is fatally and effectively challenged. It is Grusha, 
the main character in Brecht's The Caucasian Chalk Circle, (31`1 whose 
example Swill be invoked here to illustrate this point. Grusha meets her 
betrothed, Simon, in a revolution in which they both fight for the 
overthrow of the tyrannical rule of the monarch, who is eventually 
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killed in the revolution. In the course of the revolutionary events, 
Grusha and Simon are thrown apart and lose each other. Grusha rescues 
the monarch's infant son: a choice on her part dictated by the spirit in 
which the revolution was fought (and which she shared with Simon), that 
of a new understanding and the democratic appropriation of a good and 
human nobility for all, the innocent child included, as human reality 
whose upkeep was undertaken and pledged by and for all. This ideological 
by-product of the aim of the revolution is clearly implied by Brecht, 
along with the concurrent and more manifest aim of the revolution, that 
of the redistribution of wealth. The plot follows Grusha throughout her 
pilgrimage to search for Simon together with the infant grown to a boy, 
now her son, caring for him, working to support him, in poverty, and 
shouldering the stigma which attaches to the unmarried mother: her 
authentic project, in love and authenticity both to Simon, herself and 
the child. This project of hers is the medium and form of her excellence 
as human reality. But she falters on the way to carrying this project to 
its authentic conclusion; at one stage of this project and journey, she 
betrays, shortchanges this aim for the apparent values of married 
respectability, marrying an old and rich man on what seemed to be his 
deathbed, trading in her original project together with her faith in 
Simon's return, for a wedding ring so that her child should have a name. 
She got intimidated by Righteous Indignation, and gave up her small- 
letter human integrity and authenticity: her small-letter righteousness. 
According to the legend which was the basis of Brecht's story, poetic 
justice is dealt to Grusha for opting for a life at this point which was 
supported by a mere semblance of values, without love, untrue to her 
first undertaking. Her husband is nursed back to health and ties her 
down to his side. Grusha abides by her marriage vows and fulfils her 
role as his wife, in a reverse sort of ethical paradigm, whose 
immorality attains meaning through its comparison with the nature of her 
first choice of herself, her first authentically envisaged way of life, 
as her original project. She finally meets Simon, but is now pledged to 
someone else, and loses Simon's love and all that stood for, having made 
a fatal concession, in a moment of unauthentic choice incongruous with 
her original one, giving in to the sham values of a degraded sense of 
'good' as upheld by the generalized other at its unauthentic. 
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As a conclusion of the above train of thought, that concerning one's 
loyalty in exclusive ways either to the Accountant's or to the Gypsy's 
understanding of goodness (to conveniently take advantage here of 
Kenneth Tynan's shorthand terminolgy in expressing the complex notion of 
our necessary choice of ourselves either in the humanly unauthentic or, 
alternatively, the authentic mode of our consciousness as the typical 
and overriding colour differentially informing our way of life), two 
more diagrams classifying man's belonging to either the Sacred 
('Accountant') or the profane (gypsy'), may be drawn up here; one 
depicting the authenticity, the other the unauthenticity of such a 
choice. However, the ensuing little tables representing the polarization 
of mankind into one of these classes or the other, will be different 
here from the classification of people in such opposite ways which were 
advanced before, in the important respect that the ascribed Sacred will 
not figure in either polarity of our first diagramme (that mapping out 
authenticity), and therefore only one category out of our usual former 
two, will be populated, filled with people: that of the profane. In our 
present context, we grasp our fundamental classification of the sacred 
and the profane, in inner, innerweltlich terms, with everybody, by the 
dicta of Paul, ideally and at least potentially belonging to one and the 
same side when authentically choosing himself: the side of people quite 
simply, of the profane, of the sinners, to which anthropologic class we 
all belong, or ought to belong, if we opt, (as we should), to 
authentically shoulder and cultivate our being as people, taking our 
inevitable angest, schismicity, by the horn and trying to trascend, 
supersede it. Of course, we may choose ourselves unauthentically and opt 
to assume our consciousness in the bad faith of Paul's, Sartre's and the 
existentialist theologians understanding of that term, rejecting our 
only rind of, inevitably schismic, being as humans, and choose instead 
co sleep our lives through in the denunciation of our lot as people, and 
authentic at that. 
In the case of our authentic choice, our Gurus are on the same side 
as ourselves, they are included among the only class of humans as 
depicted in the first diagramme: the profane. Unlike our previous 
diagrams, they are not even represented as intermediaries in a half- 
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way position between the Sacred and the profane; no anthropologic 
agencies are; so all of us, our Gurus included, handle and relate 
together, as profane, to our own tropism towards what the Sacred stands 
here for: an ideal. That polarity in our diagram- which is usually 
occupied by the Sacred or Pukka, is in this context devoid of people and 
not directly represented by men: any man. What occupies the polarity 
opposite the people, the profane, is the ideal of grace, which is there 
for us to direct our consciousness towards, (here on earth, of course. ) 
The notion of grace, in the context of our following diagram, is 
meaningfully and workably filled by many senses of that term. However, 
we shall concern ourselves with only one meaning of the concept: that 
given to it by Sartre 13211, to be enlarged on in the next chapter in 
the Section entitled 'Paradigms of Grace'. This Sartrian notion serves 
as a synonym of another Sartrian notion, 'adjustment', which is the 
index of man's natural socialpsychologic decorum as small-letter sacred, 
it serves as a standard of an innerly balanced equilibrium of an 
operative self-fulfilling self, with neither of the two ingredients of 
the self's infrastructure (the "me" and the "I" that is) waived. Grace 
(bodily grace, in Sartre's treatment), is the index of inner gracefulnQss. 
as an ego, of the successful feat of the self conducting itself as the 
hybrid it properly is, somewhat divine as a function of the "I", and 
also object as profane, (not object only but object as well), by 
necessity, by virtue its being body in the physiologic and also in the 
socialpsychologic sense; an organisation of its 'members' (meaning 
physiologic organs: as the soma), and a 'member' itself in his capacity 
as filling a niche as a man in the larger, symbolic body to which he 
belongs: the community, soma Christou (to borrow from Bultmann's 
vocabulary in making a connection between the two strata of nature - the 
physiologic and the socialpsychologic - which the "me" simultaneously 
occupies). Utilising this connection between the concurrent capacities 
in which the term 'body' pertains to the life of man, it may be said 
that the Pauline notion of being schismic - having 'sin in one's 
members' - needn't be exclusively entertained in the narrow, 
physiologic sense only, but its significance may be extended to be 
implicative also of the schism in one's consciousness as a member of 
one's community. In this latter context, man is sinful or schismic 
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because of his constant potential to view the community that he lives in 
through the perspective and aperture of a self complete with an 
unsurrendered personal "I", with his resulting, schismic vision of the 
community (if assumed) compromising, soiling an Aithusserian or 
Durkheimian socialpsychologically sterile conceptualisation of the 
selves of all of us as social 'carriers'. Secondly, when assuming 
ourselves as sinful (because critical) social 'carriers', we also 
discover ourselves as schismic on account of our cognising and 
appreciating the corruption which may obtain in a given society (the 
hard outside of the community, in the inevitable positivity in which 
that subsists in and dovetails - 'glieders' - with the given social 
world), and the concomitant bad faith operative there, of which social 
world we are also part as a matter of hard sociologic fact and therefore 
also sinful in sharing the corruption of that; and because of the 
inevitable schism in our consciousness (whether we own up to it or not) 
as imperfect, because'ever human social 'carriers', we also share in the 
sin of our critique vis-a-vis society's actual condition and our own 
human condition as responsible 'members' of that. 
In the light of the above train of thought, then, the definition of 
fundamental choice can be paraphrased to boil down to our freedom, and 
our way of engaging that in relation to our own selves and to the 
social world, to either side with the profane (the condition of us all), 
wishing to own up to the ensuing biddings of the lights of this 
authentic frame of reference of consciousness, or, alternatively, wash 
our hands of this sense of belonging with the blemished - ourselves and 
everyone else in authenticity - and try to be unauthentic god only 
instead, the fledgeling or imitator of the Absentee Landlord. The 
following pair of diagrams is meant to represent this choice. 
Table 8. 
(a) profane, sinner, harajan, blemished, grace (socialpsychologic 
(the unauthentic if he wishes to adjustment as human 
convert) reality, the authenticity 
of the individual). 
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Alternatively, the opposite paradigm, that of waiving recourse to 
grace in personal unauthenticity, may also be presented in diagrammatic 
form. 'Grace', in this case, does not lose its meaning as the 
unauthentic will have it, - it will amount to, and operate, instead, as 
a morally consequential ideal conspicuously disregarded. The continued 
meaning of grace if ignored by an agent as a standard, and the outwardly 
indicable effects of such an authentic choice of the self in conduct, 
will be analysed at length in the next chapter. 
Table 8. (continued) 
(b) The Pukka (high-ranking or low), 
with his sociologically big- 
letter Sacred regalia as a self 
unsupported with a personal "me" 
(human object-status), without which 
no self is complete and authentic. 
lack of grace 
Some of the historic heroes who made an outstanding pledge to side 
with the profane as a matter of fundamental choice as the colour, the 
very mode of their selves, life-project, and their rejection, at the 
same stroke, of the reflected, sham, second-hand elevatedness as 
institutionally oriented and guided big-letter Pukka, who immediately 
spring to mind, are Diogenes, Socrates, Jesus, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, 
Emile Zola (who removed in his writing the formerly demanded social 
class-distinction as a precondition of a character's literary 
elevatedness to the status of a main hero, and sported in such a pride 
of artistic place in his plots 'common' people instead), Victor Hugo, 
Gerhard Hauptmann and Gorky, on the same account (these three extended 
sympathetic and psychologically well-discerned main hero-status to 
thieves and other criminals), Chaplin, Shaw, Sartre, who consequentially 
expanded this practice even further in their works, and the Rev. David 
Jenkins, Bishop of Durham, who, in our day, voices the affinity of his 
consciousness with the lights of the dicta of human reality, underlain 
by the principle of the anthropologic equality of all men, and his 
disgust in the face of the fact that the government of our day 
contradicts and disregards these dicta in their treatment of the poor, 
in sham Christianity. 
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Section 6. Part One: On Being Subject too. Which Came First; the 
Chicken or the Egg? 
The two terms of the dualism we are dealing with in this thesis are 
'human reality' - 'social reality'. There are, of course, many synonyms 
to these two terms - we may paraphrase the terms in that dyad as 'my 
world' - 'the social world', and indeed in many other ways, as listed 
and presented in diagram. . 
form in the Introduction, with the two 
diagrams. summarising these various expressions for these terms, 
affording a fairly extensive thesaurus of wards referring to these 
concepts. 
In dealing with the relationship between the two terms which serve 
at the heart of the dualism of our interest, we showed a bias to the 
'human reality' component in that dyad, in the respect of the volume 
dedicated to it in our descriptions of it. We have shown, established 
that term, I think, as meaningful and autonomous in its meaning, as one 
which has a permanent and consistent identity, as one which subsists, 
takes its reference from and is mediated by the self as its basic unit, 
and as one which has typical, indeed inevitable effects, both overt and 
covert, in the context of the self, effects which touch the social world 
too, over and above the way in which that term is constitutive of and 
determines the self. At this stage we are to some extent equipped to 
tackle the notorious question whether this term, satisfying so many of 
the criteria of the autonomy of a concept (an autonomy which is 
assertable at least by virtue of that term's firmly exclusive 
relationship vis-a-vis another autonomous notion: that of the positive 
being of society in Durkheim's sense), can therefore be seen as itself 
a positivity in some sense? If the answer is 'no' and the term is 
regarded as a negativity, as it is by Sartre, we must further ask 
whether we can legitimately attach the tag 'being' to it, alongside with 
characterising the outside world (including the stratum of society in 
that), as also endowed with 'being', as does Sartre, this practice on 
his part resulting in an ambiguity in his oeuvre of the term 'being'. We 
can, I feel, also hope to elucidate, maybe even remove, this ambiguity, 
as an incidental by-product of our discussion of the conceivable 
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positivity of the term 'human reality', 'my world', etc., - which is the 
main task in hand at the moment. 
Our answer to the erstwhile question: 'is human reality positive? ' - 
is a simple one. The two terms of the dualism we are commenting on, that 
of Durkheimian positive society and that of human reality, 'my world' 
etc., are in a special, inseparable, direct and necessary dialectic and 
mutually exclusive relation to each other, tied to each other in a 
partnership of opposition: they are the two sides of the coin of human 
consciousness, amounting to a kinship of negation relative to each 
other, and in this sense even 'human reality' is experienc6d as a 
positivity, at least from a subjective point of view (which is not good 
enough and therefore we must further argue to show 'human reality' as in 
a sense positive from an objective point of view too), in moments when 
'human reality' is necessarily and successfully pitted against the 
society as a matter of one's fundamental choice. Not only 'social 
reality' but also 'human reality' can momentarily assume such a status 
of 'being', externalised in behaviour for all to see, in overt terms in 
this sense, in instances when the agent sees it fit to negate in its 
special idiom - that of the self - the external norm, by means of its 
insights. (The 'being' of human reality is, in such instances, indicated 
in terms of what empiricists mean by 'objectivity'; we sha' n' t 
complicate the issue here with that which Sartre means, in 
counterdistinction with the empiricists, by 'objectivity', though to 
that Sartrian understanding of the notion, the 'being' of 'human 
an 
reality' is^ ssential and a necessary precondition. ) What we merely wish 
to establish here - or rather, stress again, for the contention was 
already put forward in the last Section - is that whatever is positivity 
to one of these pivotal terms of the dualism of our concern, is 
negativity to the other, and the definition of either of these terms may 
be taken as tantamount to that which the other is not, as Sartre argues 
and discerns. Whether one or the other operates as a positivity in 
consciousness, is a question of focus, as are ambiguous 'figure and 
ground' pictures in the repertoire of Gestalt psychology, with 'figure' 
coming to the fore at one time, and 'ground' at another, either one at 
the other's expense and exclusion. The 'human reality' term, as just 
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observed, can be grasped as a positivity relative to society when the 
latter is experienced as an intolerable barrier to the rights and 
axiomatically assertive standards of the self as such, to its radius of 
the 'being' of the self sui generis, C'being' understood here as 
contained within socialpsychologic confines, and of a socialpsychologic 
kind) a 'being' in this peculiar sense, which is irrepressible as we 
shall try to show, while the 'Being' of society in a different sense co- 
subsisting within consciousness in its opposite genre, uncongenial to 
the 'being' of the self as such. (lt may be useful to denote the 
'being' of society in its own peculiar idiom, by spelling its first 
letter with a 'capital'. ) Whilst asserting that consciousness is ever 
potantially present to the standards of human reality as such, not 
ousted from there by our sensibility of the schemata of the collective 
consciousness, we must also stress that, conversely, any attempt on the 
part of human reality to deny or dislodge society's own kind of 
Durkheimian, positive Being within as well as outside consciousness, is, 
of course, an equally hopeless task. Even within consciousness, the 
Being of society, in Durkheim' s. %e'tise is permanently present as a 
potential at least, even in moments of our nihilating it; the two kinds 
of structures within consciousness, those of society as it subsists in 
its norm on the one hand, and those of the self on the other, lie 
dormantly side-by-side even at times when the opposite out of these two 
alternative modalities of consciousness is being asserted, whether 
dramatically in extreme choice situations, or in undramatic and everyday 
ways, in which case either of these terms may prevail latently as a 
potential only, one ignored and never militantly assumed, one or the 
other of these modes of consciousness as one's possibility as a self 
quietly hibernating throughout a lifetime even. However, at times of 
crises, the two sets of standards, sociologic and socialpsychologic, 
Sacred and profane, may clash and then the socialpsychologic ones act as 
destructive to the collective consciousness in its actuality and, 
conversely, publicly enforced norms are destructive to the inward 
standards, conditions and dictates of human reality. Relative to one 
another, in situation. 5 of clashes, the sociologic and socialpsychologic 
planes of 'being' are negative, atomising to, disconstitutive of one 
another. 
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We endeavour to show here the meaningfulness of the 'being' of human 
reality as a positivity in the special sense of the prevalence in 
consciousness of the agent's possibility as a self, by no means 
coincidental with what the agent's self is at its established, as a 
personality in the present, as a mere overt "me"; the 'being' of the 
self in this sense is the ever prevalent necessary possibility of a self 
at its completely dualistic, comprised both by the present "me" and the 
future "I", to which the agent is in a definitive sense privy, if he so 
chooses himself in socialpsychologic authenticity. The positivity of the 
self in this sense, (a universal standard to all), is inclusive of the 
"I" and the functions of the "I": the needs, the duties of'the self 
which rest on, and in turn, comprise the "I" - it is inclusive of the 
"I"'s experienceable and interpersonally verifiable co-presence with the 
"me" of our own and the Other's self in our consciousness, indicated by 
the directly observable physical and the indirectly observable 
attitudinal grace of the self - that of ourselves and that of the Other, 
as we defined that towards the very end of the last Section. The self's 
'objectivity' in this sense, is meaningful even to the empiricist; and 
its ensuing 'being' (ideally at least if not yet actually), amounts to 
our and the Other's being or at least capacity as a one hundred per cent 
harajan, small-letter sacred self, it amounts to each and every one of 
us being a hundred per cent whole as such, - to all of us being 
fulfilled human realities as a matter of our possibilities over and 
above our actualities as selves (if we don't denounce that); it amounts 
to the insight and circumstance that one of us, in this full capacity 
of ourselves, is not worth more than the Other but is worth exactly as 
much, to the insight and circumstance that each one of us is more than 
the sums of our parts. In this latter sense, we have a definition of an 
'objectivity' whereby to judge the self, which is broader, deeper and 
more pertinent and complete than the empiricists' grasp of that. 
The positive Being of society, as has already been observed at 
several points of our previous argument, is, if pitted against such a 
grasp of the 'being' of the self, disconstitutive, 'atomising' to our 
'being' as selves in this special sense - and, in extreme cases, 
fundamentally threatening to it. We enlisted several examples to show 
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how the 'disconstitution' of the self may take place when attacked by 
the heavy authority of the established norm's understanding and 
classification - or rather declassification - of us as selves; the 
stories of Bluebeard and Judith, that of the awarders of a small grant 
to me who asked of me, in their anonymity, a begging letter, though they 
already knew me very well, the instance of a former, long-lost 'friend' 
quizzing me over the telephone about my family's, and my own, current 
status in the world so as to prepare me for 'Gerede' in the circles of 
the subculture which I left, were all variations on this theme. Now I 
would like to add another example to these in order to illuminate from 
yet another angle how the small-letter sacred status of selves may be 
fatally disturbed and caused to go off in a puff of smoke when our own 
understanding of ourselves, and our right to be fellow-harajans in an 
anthropologic equality with everybody who posits himself in a similar 
capacity, is coercively challenged by shoving the official definition of 
ourselves down our throats on account of our being lowly ascribed in 
social terms, as a function of our ascriptionally belonging to one kind 
of rachmones or the other, which forms were enlisted, in an accumulative 
way, throughout our former argument. 
I once taught, briefly, during the first few weeks of a schoolyear, 
in a school where the headmaster, I remember, called out on one occasion 
after Assembly: 'Those qualifying for free uniform, please take ten 
steps forward. ' On another occasion he called out: 'Will those who 
qualify for free school meals, step to one side. ' Two formations of 
people resulted on both occasions whose noticeable level of 'being', in 
both senses of this term, socially ascribed and socialpsychologically 
maintained, palpably registered as different from the more dignified 
selves of the children who were not asked to move. Those singled out by 
the headmaster's command, became manifest as selves - reduced, atomised, 
unfulfilled ones - declarative to the eye of their non-management, 
inadequacy in the socialpsychologic fob of gracefully co-ordinating, as 
autonomous persons, the needs of the "I" with the "me" as the occasion 
to meet and satisfy those needs and lights. They stood there as "me"-s 
only, but not as successfully stated "I"-s as well, they did not feature 
as their privileges to be complete, small-letter sacred selves in the 
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sense of the roundedness of their egos with the legitimacy of their 
being self-fulfilled selves inclusive with the statement or indication 
of their own "I" underlying their "me", just like all the others who 
were not asked to step out of the formation of the first, seemingly 
homogeneous group of individuals, of whom we assumed, to begin with, 
that they were satisfactorily coping with their everydays as such. The 
headmaster, their 'Referee' for the moment so to speak (for the meaning 
of this term see Section 2. in this chapter), displayed them as second- 
rate selves in the above described sense. They lacked grace; and so, 
Paul and Sartre would say, did the headmaster who has rendered them thus 
in manifest actuality. The non-managers stood out as 'not iihole' in 
socialpsychologic terms, they stood out as people with 'no halo' in the 
sense formerly described in the context of the Referee. They were shown 
as big-letter, ascribed Rachmones, owing to both social and 
socialpsychologic features inherent in them as displayed, as underlined 
by the two formations resulting from the headmaster's command, the locus 
of the children as occupants of one of the two groups or the other, 
indicative of their social, and, just as importantly in the context 
which we endeavour to argue here, also anthropologic class (as either 
Sacred or Profane, that is), though they may have been 'master', small- 
letter sacred, as an intrapersonal matter private to them. The 
'romantic' social thinker, particularly the existentialist, will tell us 
that whether or not the agent complies as his private affair with his 
externally typecast role prompted by his sociologically, structurally 
constituted situation, whether or not he adjusts as a self to his 
ascribed anthropologic classification as gestured from without, - his 
"me" will not collapse into the collective consciousness without 
residue, - his "me", fulfilled or unfulfilled, will persist as the 
experience of the self, sui generis. There is a peculiar autonomy of a 
socialpsychologic nature, albeit sometimes present as a potential only, 
in people being self-possessed, in an episode, an encounter which is 
properly of a socialpsychologic nature being self-contained, self- 
sufficient as such, and very great reward in the quiet adequacy of the 
successful co-ordination of "me"-s and "I"-s in terms of selves, within 
a socialpsychologic compass; in simply coping, in other words, in people 
conducting, producing, managing the husbandry of the self in 
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satisfactory socialpsychologic relations to other selves, which 
interpersonal socialpsychologic traffic takes place in terms of "me"-s 
and "I"-s between people in the idiom of social creativity, 
inventiveness, as a matter of the participants' own discretion, with 
relationships and dependencies adequately managed by all, in the spirit 
of respect for the self in oneself as well as in others as equal 
harajans. Such adequate management is an undramatic catharsis, 
adjustment, synthesis, coincidence between man's two sets of 
possibilities, needed and actual, "me"-s and "I"-s, enjoyed in a quietly 
conscious, rather than self-unaware manner; the everyday, experientially 
soiled, lived, small-letter nirvana of life quite simply doped with, 
one which doesn't normally include crises - it is the successfully 
managed socialpsychologic mastery of the reality of significant selves 
(defined and described as 'salient' in the Introduction) - one's own 
included - it's the self-reflective intrinsic reward of such adequacy, 
and of effecting such adequacy in others in a project of 'engineering' 
(the concept described in Section 4. in this chapter), the joy in the 
act of bringing together "me"- and "I"-s that fit, as a matter of 
course, with the resulting socialpsychologic reality seen and enjoyed as 
an end in itself. It was this tier and sense of the 'being' of the self 
- the properly and peculiarly socialpsychologic one, which the 
headmaster chose to burst, using the potent socialpsychologic weapon of 
defining, classifying the children as small-letter and big-letter 
Profane which was at his disposal as the 'caretaker'of the individuals 
in his care, by bringing to bear on their situation the ascribed, 
socially external classification of the children in question, an idiom 
alien and repellent to the 'being' of their selves in and as their 
socialpsychologic fullness and therefore adequacy as whole selves. 
We have tried to show the sanctity of the self or human reality as a 
proper and self-contained sphere of the being of the self, - self- 
contained because systematically different from the slavish ascription- 
abidance of consciousness as a function of the agent's fundamental 
choice - showing human reality as a well delineated radius for 'being' 
and acting as a consciousness which consists, in a real, meaningful and 
peculiar way, in the grasp and mode of one's conduct as 
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socialpsychologically whole, which is susceptible to 'disconstitution' 
if the whole in which it peculiarly subsists, is torpedoed, threatened 
in its own peculiar idiom, its organisation into an autonomous self 
caused to burst into pieces, dislodged and replaced by a socially 
ascriptional or empiricist ically atomistic definition of that. Now we 
will turn our attention to the opposite paradigm of 'disconstitution', 
that of the atomisation, this time by human reality, of the autonomous 
whole in which society peculiarly consists (as Durkheim showed), with 
the content of the 'wholeness' of the externally positive Being of 
society, different from that of the self, but a wholeness none the less 
which is essential for society to subsist sacredly and with its own kind 
of dignity, as it must, particularly in situations where it is essential 
and proper that it be spared individual critique as a precondition of 
the asserton and upkeep of its very Being. Such is the case in 
courtrooms, in games where the role, standing and ruling of the umpire 
or referee must not be challenged, in the various kinds o Forces, or in 
the various government offices where the administrative function of 
society is being enforced and conducted, to pinpoint just a few of all 
those occasions and settings where the idiom of the Being of society 
emphatically and properly prevails in a superordinate capacity over the 
'being' of human reality. In such situations the introduction and 
voicing of the socialpsychologic idiom registers as other, alien, as 
inappropriate. Subjective side-tracks, personal witticisms, acts of 
individual self-assertion, are redundant, and have the effect of being 
disruptive, disconstitutive, 'deconstructive' of the socially whole, 
sacred, solemn representation and prevalence of the collective 
consciousness at its pure and formal: the condition of its very Being as 
specially asserted and sustained in such situations; and if challenged 
and threatened to be replaced and disrupted by human reality, the 
introduction of the idiom of the self is liable to 'atomise', 
shortchange, betray its Being for what it is, by blowing that to shreds, 
fragmenting, parcelling it up so as to serve the ego's lights and 
purposes. We have already put forward an example of how this may happen, 
when we analysed, from this point of view, 
Sveik's 
escapades in the army 
of the Kaiser, in Chapter I. Some new examples will now be offered to 
Which Came First: the Chicken or the Egg? - 329 - 
illustrate the phenomenon of the 'atomisation' of the proper whole of 
society by human reality, in disrespect and uncongeniality to it. 
Someone told me that, the other day, when his business took him to 
court, he saw a man come up before the judge, charged with a small 
crime. 'Have you anything to say? ' the judged asked before sentencing 
him. 'Beam me up, Scottie', the man remarked, hopefully. Everyone 
present fell about, laughing; the court disintegrated and the judge 
imposed on the man a fine for contempt of court, in accord with the 
demands of the situation. He 'had no choice' as the judge; he was less 
free to deviate from the standard practices of the court than was the 
man up in front of him. The judge had to be his own judge too, enforcing 
the judiciality of everyone's consciousness, appropriately defined in 
the given situation as the collective consciousness - whereas the man, 
in exchange for a mere fine, had taken back his blemished ego from the 
care of the judge, and asserted it as whole on the situation-alien plane 
of human reality. 
From the world of literature, a fine example of the symbolic 
rendering of the rival concurrence in consciousness of these two 
frameworks available for its choice, the socially sacred and the 
socialpsychologically profane, is afforded by Chekhov's The Cherry 
Orchard. III: ' The cherry orchard in this play quite simply stands for 
the collective consciousness or the Sacred; and Lopakhin, in having 
taken it over merely by virtue of having earned his right to it by way 
of individual business enterprise, is in this sense guilty of heresy. 
The heresy of his act does not consist in his having crossed, by the 
same fell swoop, the crucial social class barrier between the money-ed 
and the havenots, or not in that alone as an oversimplistic critic might 
make out, but in having transformed the Being of the 'cherry orchard' as 
that social whole in which it was formerly represented by the landed 
family in the ancient rdgime, so to speak, (a feudal one), which was in 
a relationship of an ideologically formerly and traditionally justified, 
not to say Sacred ownership and caretakership to that land. Chekhov 
characterises this ascriptionally highly elevated family richly and in 
terms of the noblest personality traits - not for Chekhov to present 
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that now historically redundant upper class by means of a cheap, 
pastiche schematisation. Lopakhin succeeded in buying the cherry orchard 
by taking out a mortgage payable back only after the land's division 
into rentable allo tm eats. With the "me" of Lopakhin (in the broad sense 
as decribed in the Section called 'Being and Having'), as the telos of 
the act, the individual project of his act as the new 'master' of the 
'cherry orchard', fulfilled, had atomised the 'orchard', made it into 
dust, and with it everything for which that stood: the intact whole of 
the by-gone society, complete with its own values. Lopakhin, brought up 
as the offspring of a serf, is sensible to his heresy and 
cringes, stumbles awkwardly this way and that, bows under the guilt of 
it; as a fulfilled self he is jubilant - these two conflicting modes of 
the awareness of his self, the socialpsychologic one realised and the 
society-compliant and abiding one failed in the duty to which he was 
conditioned, alternating in the character during the last act, without a 
middle course. 
Another example which symbolically depicts a wild individualism and 
self-seeking, causing the disintegration of the whole of the state, 
without, however, a reciprocal social insight within consciousness 
inwardly resulting in remorse at this sacrilege, is provided by Marlowe 
in the character of Edward the Second, as reflected in this excerpt: 
King Edward: (aside) It boots me not to threat; I must speak fair: 
The legate of the Pope will be obey'd. 
(Aloud> My lord, you shall be Chancellor of the realm; 
Thou, Lancaster, High Admiral of our fleet; 
Young Mortimer and his uncle shall be earls; 
And you, Lord Warwick, President of the North; 
And thou of Wales. If this content you not, 
Make several kingdoms of this monarchy, 
And share it equally amongst you all, 
So I may have some nook or corner left 
To frolic with my dearest Gaveston. 134. ' 
When positing social reality and human reality, the two terms in the 
dualism we are dealing with, as two layers of reality, each one with a 
well-delineated radius of 'being', organically tied together as 
consumers, by necessity, of one another as a function of and as the 
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possibility of their own assertion, subsistance, and both interdependent 
in their mutual opposition as the 'no' to the other as the condition of 
the saying 'yes' to itself, the question of the primacy of one or the 
other of these terms in their actuality on this earth, inevitably 
arises. Which came first, the Being of social reality in consciousness 
in Durkheim's positive sense, or human reality as the absolute 
negativity to that, for which both Durkheim and Sartre recognise that in 
its relationhip to the indismissable Being of society? Our answer to 
this famous dilemma is inspired by, takes its position from, French 
structuralism which sees any two of such interdependent, dualistic 
categories, as absolutely simultaneous in the question of 
their 
advent, 
as well as in their import; with neither of the terms deserving title to 
primacy, but both simultaneous, depending for their own definition on 
each other, each gaining meaningfulness and identity as that which the 
other is not as consciousness. We may observe with Bertrand Russell that 
language (one important index and overt medium of consciousness), bears 
witness to the circumstance that man learnt to say 'no' as soon as he 
learnt to say 'yes', from the outset: with things and affairs human, 
Russell proposes, being marked and expressed, and functioning 
exclusively, in concepts which are capable of being negated. We might 
say that society is the phylogenetic precondition of the reality of 
human consciousness as the self, endowed with the power of reflection to 
know itself as such, because in evolution, rudiments of society preceded 
the emergence of humanity. On the other hand, rudiments of intelligence 
(experimental psychology shows), also preceded the presence of homo 
sapiens on earth. 
Ontogenetically approached, our position is also even-handedly 
dualistic with regard to the question of the primacy of one of our 
terms or the other, either the social "me", the vehicle of the 
generalized other (developed in the course of socialisation) or, 
alternatively, the "I", the spontaneous tool and medium for the 
promotion of man's individual needs and responses to society as such, 
which Mead sees as also an indismissable precondition in the mechanism 
whereby the self is ever mediated, though he modestly qualifies the "I" 
as merely a 'methodical device' in his model of human conduct and 
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consciousness. The natural concurrence of the "I" and the "me" in 
conducting any verbal, reflective or interpersonal traffic, and the 
unnaturalness and 'obscenity' (Sartre's term) of jettisoning an "I"- 
saturated modality of the self - or, in Sartre's terminology: human 
reality, in the business of conducting ourselves in personal and 
interpersonal intercourse in any here-and now as adult consciousnesses, 
is an important point in making a case for the natural concurrence (the 
precondition of adjustment, to Sartre) <3a, of the 'body', the social 
body included, for us, by implication, as expanded an before, and, on 
the other side, the subjectivity-shot 'my world' or simply the self as 
such. An exhaustive thesaurus of morally and socialpsychologically 
unbecoming paradigms and modalities of the self in which either 'object' 
or 'subject', "me" or "I", is made redundantin conduct, will be put 
forward and analysed in some depth and volume throughout the next 
chapter. However, in the question of the temporal primacy in ontogeny of 
one of these two terms in the self (the "me" and the "I", that is), we 
also assume a stance egalitarian to both these terms, from the point of 
view of their advent in a person's life-history, a point which may 
conventiently be discussed here. 
The French Enlightenment was fundamentally preoccupied with what we 
now call the infrastrucutre of the self at its complete as both "me" and 
"I", highly critical of the way of life which living as a "me" only 
amounted to, no less than was Sartre. &ousseau in particular concerned 
himself with the ideal of what we now call a fully shouldered human 
reality informed by its authentic, spontaneous lights at its true, 
entertaining that as a morally desirable frame of reference, superior to 
a merely conventionlly socialised "me" as the fountainhead of one's 
private morality. He saw, as we do, human reality in its true form 
hallmarked by laudable attributes peculiar to it, with the self's 
excellence being of a certain first-hand quality available only with 
regard to and by the assimilation of those attributes. But we cannot 
agree (and modern social science also showed it as erroneous), with the 
tenet on which Rousseau based his educationalistically consequential 
novel Emile, that keeping, safeguarding the developing child from 
socialisation in the world as it was in his day, which he critically 
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identified as rotten to the core, would produce a breed of man innocent 
of the artfulness of that society and its morally unattractive norms - 
that by simply banning, stifling, eliminating from the child's education 
any exposure to the generalized other with all the ethical imperfections 
of it, would produce a 'Noble Savage', a valiant Tarzan, uncorrupted by 
thesc', (f_contradictory standards of the reigning society. The fortunes of 
Amala and Kamala, two twin sisters, lost from infancy from their little 
Indian village and reared by animals (as was the fictional Mowgli, also 
inspired by a similar socialpsychologically 'romantic' view), only to be 
recovered, at the age of ten, by the human community into which they 
were born, unable to learn to speak, to relate socially to other humans, 
to walk upright or even to survive for very long after their 
rediscovery, shows the naivete of the socialscientifically romantic myth 
that in ontogeny the noble standards of human reality at its highly 
developed can conceivably be spoon-fed as some tangible positivity in a 
pure form as such, in independence and seclusion from the "me". The two 
girls of our example whose developing selves were kept altogether from 
socialisation, failed to attain such horizons of rationality which were 
human at all, let alone superior to the compromised limits of selves 
socialised to an unattractive model of a given generalized other, 
however disagreeable the reigning form of that established system of 
norms may have been to the authentic. 
Nor can we agree, as the other side of the coin, with those social 
theoreticians who reserve any meaningfulness, validity and endowment 
with 'being' to the "me" only (out of the socialpsychologic "me"-"I" 
ensemble), waiving aside the role and existence of the "I" as 
speculative and absurdly (and certainly unfashionably) metaphysical. The 
tabula rasa theory ingeniously and insightfully postulates that man's 
consciousness at birth is like a wax writing board which awaits 
psychologically overt expeiences being carved onto it in the course of 
social learning so as to attain any acquisition as an intelligence which 
is of a human order; but however apt, useful and fruitful this theory, 
we cannot agree with those empiricistic apostles of it who equate the 
emptiness of that 'board' at the outset in life, and its scope, 
programmability, with nothing at all - we can't agree with theories of 
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the tabula rasa, in other wards, which, because of the virginity of that 
'board' at birth, deny or miss the tabula rasa of their postulation as a 
significant and meaningful frame of capacities for peculiarly human 
possibilities, we can't side with such interpretations of it which deny 
the simile of the tabula rasa its role as the ground of the eventual 
negation by the socialised adult of the social contents with which it 
has been filled as the "me" in imperceptible continuity with the social 
norm as expressed in the generalized other (of which kind of negation 
man alone is capable). We decry such approaches to the tabula rasa which 
miss its character as a well-delineated and absolute Sartrian 'lack' 
ready and endowed with the capacity to receive input for a'rationality 
gathered in the process of consciousness being furnished with external 
social stimuli, and beyond that empirical input, as a critical response 
to those stimuli, ever pushing itself as such a response capacity to 
hitherto unplumbed, untried heights of a rationality and intelligence 
which supersedes in its repertoire and quality its overt input, and is 
no longer justified and completely analysable in terms of that input 
alone. We cannot accept such interpretations of the tabula rasa theory 
of consciousness which treat that concept, just because of its 
intactness from any stimulation at birth, and just because of its 
susceptibility to being thwarted by insufficiently intensive 
stimulation, is something that might as well not be there, not reckoned 
with as the potential mammoth horizon for human consciousness as such. 
This tabula rasa, in the usual human sense, is something that man 
emphatically does have and lower animals don't, however intensively 
they may be stimulated. Foucault pointed out that every culture at its 
given and actual is that set of choices which the species did not 
reject, which it cared, chose to engrave onto the tabula rasa in the 
dimensions of an entire culture. Ontogenetically speaking, Simone de 
Beauvoir observed that every choice involves, marks, represents a loss: 
the lass of another potential, another scope for human consciousness 
than the one opted for, the rejected one also potentially amenable to 
entering onto the tabula rasa, that which the tabula rasa might have 
been ready and capable of accomodating, assimilating, tolerating, 
catering for, but didn't happen to. The fact (returning to Foucault's 
cultural dimensions of entertaining this notion) that the species, 
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genetically hardly varied, supports so many cultures, suggests that to 
the metaphoric tabula rasa, to this firmament of possibilities for the 
modes and degrees of accomplishments of human consiousness, actual 
cultures are fortuitous limits; and (back in the realms of ontogeny 
again), monozygotic twin studies in psychology show that two specimens 
of the species identically encoded with potentials for sustaining a 
"me", are capable of developing completely different personalities, 
choosing completely different courses of life. This implies the reality 
and import of the tabula rasa as emphatically not nothing, but a 
framework of possibilities inclusive of all that which consciousness is 
not, not yet, not quite and not for everyone, and it also thaws the 
absurdity of a puristic learning theory in which the notion of the 
tabula rasa is used to negate this concept as the capacity of 
consciousness as a meaningful and perhaps infinite repertoire and store 
of possibilities for human choices, - in a grasp of that notion which is 
pitifully inadequate when compared with a postulation of the tabula rasa 
as a necessary precondition of the cross-fertilising process in 
ontogenetic history between a peculiarly human frame of capacities on 
the one hand, and its stimulation, endorsement, by way of learning, 
through the systematic exposure of that to the environment on the other 
hand, as does Piaget. Piaget has a name for the dimension of 
consciousness whose existence we currently argue - that of man's 
potential encodedness to be responsive to, effected and complemented by 
learning, borrowed from Saussure, his fellow-strucuralist. The name of 
this dimension is the semiotic function, which, according to Saussure's 
and Piaget's postulation, causes the child (and the adult if this 
faculty is not eventually conditioned out of him by his being 
systematically punished for engaging in other than tangibly positive 
goal-directed learning), to play for hours on end without being 
reinforced in an extrinsic sense, in that sense, in other words, in 
which classical learning theorists exclusively understand 
'reinforcement'. 
Towards the end of Section 1. in this chapter, we treated and 
analysed the notion of 'the gift' at considerable length. Summarily put, 
'the gift' is the entire and all-inclusive array of one's talents, 
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capacities of consciousness for being realised in overt conduct as the 
degree and form of excellence for the cultivation, activation, 
fulfilment, cashing in of it in the actuality of one's socialpsychologic 
lifecourse, with which we were specially encoded when we came into the 
world. The view we afforded of this concept at that point of our thesis 
had a lot in common with the moral of the 'parable of the talents' in 
the New Testament. We distinguished at that point between the small- 
letter meaning of 'the gift' - that of the duty, by the lights of 
socialpsychologic authenticity, to realise the scores of capacities with 
which we were blessed as individuals when were born, as just referred to 
- and the big-letter meaning of the term, denoting those pbjects, 
tangible or socially symbolic 'valuables', which we present to others 
as tokens representing us as 'gifted', figuring as a representative 
sample of our very selves and of our output as somewhat excellent, as 
signified by a section of our self-made (including earned) rewards of 
that with which we chose to part so as to share that with the Other in 
and through the gift. Returning to the first, small-letter meaning of 
the term, how could we underscore, supplement by way of our use of it, 
our current endeavour to demonstrate the 'being' of the self in a 
special, socialpsychologic sense? How could we better pinpoint, using 
that concept, the meaningful reality of the store of our original 
potentials as cognisant humans, uniquely 'gifted', unlike other animals, 
as 'species-beings', as well as uniquely and variably 'gifted', as 
individuals, at a stage when our 'gift' or rather store of 'gifts', is 
still unrealised, as in the case of the newborn infant, or in the more 
mature individual in whom the realisation of the 'gift' of the self 
failed to come to full fruition? In elucidating the difference between 
our maximum potentials as home sapiens and as individual specimens as 
such from the outset in terms of our possibilities, and the extent to 
which we turned out to be gifted in some particular sense or another, as 
'objectively' measurable by the psychologist and also indicated in its 
observable actuality in other ways by ourselves and by others (the two, 
the ceiling of our potential 'gift' and what we can actually show for it 
conceivably, indeed often, not coincidental), we can profitably borrow 
from McGill University's famous psychologist, Hebb, for the analogy- 
value of his thesis regarding the two facets of intelligence in any one 
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of us, potential and actual. 'Intelligence', Hebb's sole object of 
interest in this context, is not, of course, the same concept as human 
reality for whose demonstration as a dual capacity (ideal and actual), 
we shall borrow from Hebb; his 'intelligence' comprises merely one item 
in the possibly obtainable armoury of the latter; and it is certainly 
not a necessary determinant or precondition for one's excellence as 
and endownnent with our capacity for human reality. However, human 
reality as a concept and phenomenon is nevertheless profitably 
amenable, as a question of form and method, to a like treatment to 
Hebb's approach to intelligence, with the role of the pre-encoded 
qualities tacitly inherent in the tabula rasa, virgin consciousness as 
such the way I see it, capable of being fathomed analogously, in many 
ways, to Hebb's 'potential intelligence', and the agent's - any agent's 
- quality as a human reality in its factually attained form, lending 
itself to a fertile formal comparison with Hebb's 'actual intelligence'. 
Hebb postulates two aspects of intelligence, pertaining to everyone, 
Intelligence A and Intelligence B. Intelligence A is the ideal, 'pure' 
ceiling to one's intelligence as genetically encoded for one, that limit 
to which intelligence is capable of being developed, of being expressed 
in the measurable actuality of that after an educational lifetime of its 
optimum stimulation: a capacity. Hebb's work implies that this maximal 
potential ceiling is concrete in each individual, varying from person to 
person. Intelligence B, in contrast, is that level of intelligence, 
demonstrable and testable in a narrow sense, which the individual has 
actually attained, that level of accomplishment which has actually been 
carved upon the tabula rasa, in intellectual terms. If - or rather when 
- less than optimally stimulated, coaxed, teased into its actual being, 
intelligence B is inferior in its scope and quality to Intelligence A, 
and, conversely and sadly, in cases where Intelligence A is of a very 
limited standard, no extent of coaxing and coaching will significantly 
and generically push that to any barrier higher than Intelligence A, as 
completely realised in an Intelligence B; (though there are some who 
don't accept the second half of this proposition). Human reality, 
capacity for social creativity (as distinct from the capacity for one's 
merely being intelligent), can, I feel, also be postulated, fathomed, 
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grapsed at its ideal, as an 'A-capacity', so to speak, available for 
one's fulfillment or, alternatively, to the starvation, to the laying 
oneself waste as such in one's conduct, if not cultivated. This A- 
capacity, I believe, is individual-invariant in its general presence for 
all persons, (not in the respect of its given forms which obtain, out of 
the store of all possible talents, in any one of us, of course), a 
constant for the species, haunting each individual as a universal 
potential quality which is there for all, though not universal for all 
regarding its content, and certainly not dependent, in all of its forms, 
on I. Q. I once attended a lecture by MacQuarrie, in which he spoke of 
the concept of this maximal endowment, A-capacity for excellence by 
general human measures in the species and the particular ways in which 
this meaningfully exists for the individual, particularly as this 
notion is entertained in Japanese philosophy as the Ideal Face. The 
Ideal Face, to expand on this notion, is the self as optimally fulfilled 
to the maximum potential of its original capacity for merit as that 
which we call human reality, which is there as an ideal, even if we 
sadly fail to completely realise, or even significantly approximate to 
it, hitting, in its ideality if not in its actuality, the upper limit 
which man, endowed with the tabula rasa (tantamount to the Ideal Face 
when not conceived as a void, empiricist fashion, just because not yet 
'written' on it at birth), has it in him to attain - the store of 
talents, in other words, which Christian personal ethics bid man, in a 
kindred way to ancient Japanese philosophy, to bring to as full a 
fruition as possible in the way one conducts oneself with this ideal of 
one's excellence as human reality always in sight. Our actual self as 
manifest, amenable both to psychologic testability and, even more 
poignantly and importantly, to the constant appraisal of it both by 
ourselves and by others in the business of our normal everydays, could 
be conceived as our 'Actual Face', as a sort of Human Reality B, the 
totality of us, in our actual personalities, as the mere extent to 
which we managed, as a matter of empiricistically 'objective' fact, to 
cash in on the talents which we came into the world with, and whose 
incompleteness with the rest of our potentials, both to the ancient 
Japanese philosopher and to the authentic Christian, we are accountable 
to ourselves and to others. The Ideal Face of our selves is both 
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experienceable (its presence as our pure possibilities ever 'haunting 
us', as Sartre will have it), and meaningful, both to the individual 
whose Ideal Face is implicated (everyone), and as a notion for 
philosophy or even social science to usefully (and, I think, 
necessarily) entertain. The difference between our Ideal Face and our 
Actual Face is that in the notion of the Ideal Face the "I" assumes a 
predominant role, whereas our 'Actual Face' consists, in cases of 
absolute bad faith, of a "me" only. The "I" of which the Ideal Face 
almost exclusively consists, is not, of course, a pure and disembodied 
notion. It is an "I" which differentially obtains for everyone, and 
makes sense only in conjunction with the limited and experientially 
soiled "me", whose concrete limitations when compared with our presence 
to our 'haunting' Ideal Face, we wish to supersede in the very 
particularity in which it consists and irks us with its imperfection, as 
a precondition of our attaining, or at least approximating, our Ideal 
Face. The Ideal Face is the mode of our emphatic g2l being as selves 
what we ought to be, illuminated in the meaningful light of that ideal 
of us, to which we are ever present if we so choose, as ancient Japanese 
thinkers and Sartre are telling us, and it (the'ideal Face', that is), 
is therefore useful and makes sense in terms of its ever-continuous 
conjunction with the "me" which we in fact are as that imperfect state 
and standard of us as personalities which we wish to transcend. The 
Ideal Face is of import as an available party, saturated as it is with 
an "I", which we may crave to marry, if we are authentic, to our actual 
"me" in our consciousness and conduct, so that those may be fulfilled by 
the peculiar measures and dicta of human reality; - the Ideal Face, 
then, serves as the scope for our ideal realisation as selves, 
attainable for our knowledge, and acts as the standard of our self as 
that ought to be, peculiarly for each and every one of us. It would not 
be out of joint with a Sartrian conceptualisation of this "I"-saturated 
residue in our selves over and above what we are in actuality as "me"-s 
only, to call that 'the soul'; though in its Sartre-prompted 
understanding, this soul is (at a hundred and eighty degree variance 
with its usual conceptualisation) something that is plentiful (at its 
completely unrealised), absolute as the total bundle of the individual's 
human possibilities at birth, and completely, absolutely lost at death 
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after a lifetime of its waning, at which moment it's only the body which 
remains intact and survives as the plenitude of the "me". Our stress in 
viewing the "me" which we leave behind at our death, is not, at this 
moment, on the physiologic tier of its being 'body', flesh, but (as 
accentuated in the last Section), the symbolic tier of the being of the 
"me" as a question of its occupation of, membership in the body of the 
community, soma Cbristou, in which context Sartre so compellingly treats 
this phenomenon in his chapter called 'My Death', and the other chapters 
surrounding that in Being and Nothin ess, In such a context, it is true 
to say, with Sartre, that the being of the self, having shed the soul 
(the "I", the firmament of the self's further possibilities as such, its 
Sartrian 'movement', its dynamism), will graduate to, or be demoted to 
(depending an the point of view which we adopt towards it), a purely 
sociologic sphere of its existence, as the name for which it survives, 
as object only in this sociologic and socialpsychologic sense, 
available for comment and judgement by the Other and the generalized 
other, without being able to retort to that by way of its ever-altered 
'being' as a live and vital human reality which it carries on shaping, 
in response to its recognised limitations in the light of the criticism 
of the generalized other, and its own personal response to that as the 
living soul, informed by the Ideal Face: a private and inexhaustable 
frame of reference for an ever more authentic being as a self. 
Sartre also devotes his attention to the relation of this 'soul' to 
the carnal human body, the evolutionarily lowest tier of the 'being' of 
the "me" for us, out of the three tiers of 'being' it is anchored in: 
the physiologic, the socialpsychologic and the social, to which three- 
fold stratum of its necessary sphere of functioning we have already 
dedicated considerable volume in our foregoing argument, and Sartre's 
observation that it is the 'soul' which ceases at death and the 
physiological body in its absurd and perishable form which remains, 
also holds good in this latter, antic context. As has been the case with 
the 'being' of the socialpsychologic "me" whose perishing at death and 
transformation into a purely sociologic "me" we just commented an, the 
'soul' (and all its synonyms just enlisted: 'movement', dynamism etc), 
which at this point leaves the body, is but an abstraction when 
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postulated as something distinct from the "me" as a component of the 
self: it doesn't occur in nature in any form or sense other than in 
conjunction with the "me", the occasion for that in the living body: 
it's simply the 'life' of it, whether on the actual level of physiology, 
or on the symbolic one as the socialpsychologic "me", as already 
commented on above. Conversely, restricting our argument for the moment 
to the physiologic confines of the being of the Sartrian 'body' or self, 
whilst the "I" is never directly encountered in nature in a way 
disembodied from it (though indicated in people's lifetime by way of 
indices of it in the overt behaviour of the 'body' and its 
socialpsychologic qualities), the body without life is eminently 
conceivable and observable in its tangible actuality, though, of course, 
not as alive. Is this circumstance reason to grant the physiologic body 
(the "me" only at the biologic level, that is) primacy over the "I", 
which during life inhabits it? Such a conception upholding on this 
ground the primacy of the body crude and raw in its relationship to the 
"I", would absurdly 'tend to put the corpse at the origin of the living 
body', as Sartre observed. lab' The phenomenon we are interested in is 
the 'body' in the full Sartrian, animated sense, as activated and 
operative hybridly with the "I" in and as its peculiar reality, that of 
the self in otherwords, a "me" ever-married, in one's lifetime, to the 
"I", its life-function as full human reality. The manifest corpse - the 
body without life - is in no way more relevant, to this reality in the 
making and operation of the self in its full and proper sense than is 
the abstract "I" alone. It is true of the "I", what is true of the 
'flesh', the physiologic "me" only, that it can only attain occasion to 
function to its full potential in the living self as understood by us, 
in and through its ensemble with the other out of these components of 
the self, and either the raw physiologic "me" or the disembodied "I" is 
inconcievable in any sense in the context of the self's living and 
therefore full and proper reality as such, apart from the other 
component of the self; the "me" attains meaning in the "I", the "I" 
attains Being in the "me", and the two together yield human reality, 
which is properly hybrid with these two components of itself, in the 
active 'marriage' of which components it attains and sustains 'being' in 
the sense peculiar to itself. 
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What other attributes, apart from its life, does Sartre identify as 
defining and characterising the "I", or rather one's pure possibilities 
in the Being-for-Itself, as dualistically married in such inseparable 
conjunction to the 'flesh' in the biologic tier of the "me", and the 
psychologic, or socialpsychologic personality at the symbolic tier of 
the 'being' of the "me", as a memt e. r of the body society? 
In the same train of thought by him regarding the corpse to which 
we just referred, Sartre puts forward two further essential aspects of 
his concept of pure possibilities (our 'soul', the "I", etc. ). These two 
further aspects or attributes of the notion in hand, are 'action' and 
'meaning'. 'There is no difference in nature between action and life', 
he writes, also observing that '... the body... is meaningful... The body 
is the totality of meaningful relations to the world. ' The 'body' is 
used by him in these contexts in his own, special sense, understood as 
hybrid and alive, as synonymous with human reality, as the dualistic 
conglomerate of body and soul, "me" and "I" if we want to use a Meadean 
terminology; in a sense therefore which is to be sharply distinguished 
from the corpse. At another point of Being and Nothingness, when Sartre 
elucidates the problem of 'grace', he adds the attribute of 'movement' 
to those features, already listed, whose presence in consciousness and 
overt behavioural actuality distinguishes the full self from a mere 
"me" <-; ", and we propose to contribute the concept of the 'future' to 
round off this inventory of attributes characteristically attaching to 
our so far somewhat motley notion of the "I", pure possibilities, etc., 
which is postulated here as in a special and fateful relation opposite 
the biologic and/or socialpsychologic "me" in making up the self in its 
proper and full sense, in the several tiers of its reality. 
'Life' as used by Sartre, biologic life in its crudest and most 
essential form, is a strong and fruitful term to see at the care of the 
Sartrian dualistic notion of the 'body', the body as living, as endowed 
with an "I", as being complete with anima breath, movement. Anima seems 
a happy term to denote this composite notion, our "I", as it unites, in 
its connotations, the concepts of the soul and of its index, according 
to Sartre, in movement, animation. The interchangeable use of 'life' and 
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'soul' by the early Christians, bestowed on 'life' a symbolic meaning 
too (as we do), expanding the mere physiologic meaning of that term to 
encompass the function, area of operation and the meaning of the anima 
as operative in its socialpsychologic compass in relation to the sphere 
of being of the "me" at the symbolic level, as a function of one's 
membership in the community, the generalized other, soma Christou. By 
their understanding of 'life' at this level, they extended, projected 
their grasp of 'life' in this latter, socialpsychologic sense, into 
heaven after the individual's ontic death, as a displacement mechanism, 
source of comfort, in the face of the suffering by many (or rather most) 
an unjustly starved, thwarted condition of the "I" and its worldly 
socialpsychologic grace and dignity here on earth during their lifetime; 
affording, by virtue of this displacement, a dimension of the notion of 
the "I" (and its synonyms), which is not necessary for its meaningful 
postulation in its mundane spheres in the here-and-now, or in the 
immeadiate future vitally connected with the here-and-now (our concern), 
though not embarrassing to that either; merely incidental to that. As 
for the kinship, or even synonymity, in this context, of the "I", man's 
possibilities as individuals etc., with the notion of the 'future', we 
can again say both with Sartre and with Bultmann (and other 'romantic' 
Christians), that it exists, pertains, operates, if not denied natural 
and spontaneous expansion in the course of a kind of socialization 
repressive to it, as the tabula rasa of our understanding as initially 
not yet realised, but imperatively to-be-realised talent as social 
creativity and any or all farms of it (expanded on in Section 1. in this 
chapter), for which our potential and particular endowment makes us fit. 
The tabula rasa subsists significantly as a set of potentials for, the 
future at birth: there is plenty of "I", plenty of its 'future' then; 
not first and foremost in the sense of the projection of that future, 
displaced into heaven after life as it was to the early Christians, for 
instance, but as understood by us, here on earth, within the compass of 
a lifetime. To enlist here Sartre's famous moon-metaphor for elucidating 
the meaning of this 'future', "I", virgin 'Being-for-Itself' etc., and 
its ontogenetic history, we may liken the firmament of these as yet 
almost totally unrealised, possibilities at birth to the large invisible 
area at the heart of the waxing moon, and the "me", (or the 'existing', 
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to Sartre> as the thin slice of the visible portion of the disc of the 
moon which at this early stage of its waxing is perceptible to us. At 
first the self, by analogy, is almost all future, secret, darkness to 
us, fathomable as the non-manifest conglomerate of our as yet latent 
potentials, with very little 'existing' as an already lived "me". But 
the moon waxes: there is less and less of the future and more and more 
of the 'existing', more and more of the "me" of the self as learned, 
already socialised, that overt component of the self which has already 
come to pass, as it both 1_ä and knows itself to be in external and 
observahlz 8s well as self-analytic ways, as therefore possessed in 
this way, by oneself and by others, through its ever-more-completely 
realised being and knowledge pertaining to itself in and as the self, 
and to others in relation to that. To the existentialist moralist, and 
even more pronouncedly to the existentialist theologian, such as 
Tillich, it is therefore not nothing at all in which the dark area of 
the moon, signifying the individual's realm of potentials, consists, but 
big-letter, significant Nothing, a genetic encodedness and duty to 
realise as human reality, which the developing and fully developed 
individual may retain as a live-wire potential to be an original self 
and authentic at that during adulthood even, underlying his ever-growing 
overt personality in the form of the Sartrian 'existing' and the Meadean 
"me", a splinter of god or the spark as the Gnostics saw it, if you 
like, who isn't, always, forever, a share in us of the almighty who is 
omnipresently not, who is for an eternity dependably, functionally, 
usefully absent as a standard to the self which that is called to 
realise, and which is irreducibly other in kind than the "me" from the 
outset (though in a vital and particular dialectic relation to that as a 
condition of the concrete 'being' of that as a self), which is in an 
organic and fateful relation to the "me" or the 'existing', the overt 
personality as that demonstrably exists at any time, not vulgarly 
absent, meaningless and devoid of a referent as the materialistic monist 
would have it, but present as potential energy at birth when the 'soul', 
if you like, is absolute, looms large in the innocence of childhood, in 
the child's (and if not conditioned out of him in the course of 
socialisation, also the adult's) play, as the Saussurian 'semiotic 
function'. As life goes on, this precious dark area as integral part, 
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referent and precondition of the authentic self wanes, together with 
the waxing of the visible portion of the moon, and is, at death, 
completely lost, ceasing totally at the moment when the soul of the 
individual in the way as we see that, dies, and one's life at the level 
of the symbolic positivity of society, in which the realised biography 
of the self was and remains included, continues as part of society only 
and in no other sense, without its being socialpsychologically enlivened 
by the vivid and active individual "I", the once alive self, surviving, 
after the death of the "I", in one's name, in a solid, social "me" only, 
occupying the here-and-now apart now from one's particularly 
experienced, living self, without human reality; it exists, survives at 
this stage in the form of its already accomplished 'existing', "me", as 
public property, with the outside events in which the individual agent 
was engaged having completely caught up with him as a self, without any 
further remaining possibilities for him as a self in the 'disc of the 
moon', without any future in earthly confines, without any chance for 
the further transcendence, betterment of the self. At this point one is 
sociologic body only, the index of the now completely judged individual 
after his exertions as human reality in the race to catch up with the 
socialpsychologically enticing 'kingdom come' awaiting, teasing the 
individual here on earth, as the ideality of one's fathomed Human 
Reality A, the Ideal Face. At death Human Reality B becomes the official 
version of one's curriculum vitae, graduating at this point to an 
obituary, the definitive version of his story about himself, which is 
from that point in time onwards no longer subject to argument, pleading, 
room for manoeuvre, further choices or qualitative alterations of that 
on the part of the individual to whom this life-story attaches. 
At this point of the argument, the "I", with all its synonyms 
enlisted so far, postulated as an indismissable component dimension of 
the self, emerges as illuminated through many angles, enriched with 
several kindred notions put forward in the hope of enhancing the 
meaningfulness and importance of it as we postulate it. A summary of the 
above enlisted synonyms and kins of this notion, the "I", will follow 
directly below, in Part 2. of this Section, where it will be further 
highlighted by a couple of new notions vitally pertaining to it. 
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Section 6. Part Two: On Being Subject too; Rosebud or Bete Noire? 
The train of thought of Part 1. of this Section treated the question 
of the primacy, or more precisely, the co-presence, in consciousness, of 
the two pivotal terms of our dualism, one of its terms, the externally 
positive one, somewhat extended, in this context, to embrace not only 
the sociological, but also the physiological realm of its Being and 
operation: involving, in a dialectic relation to each other, the 
external reality in which we are anchored, in two tiers of nature, 
through our "me" which occupies these two strata of crudely positive 
Being in the world (the social and the physiological, that is), on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, human reality in the full sense, 
importantly, innerly, indismissably and properly constituted partially 
by the "I", as well as by the "me" in both of the tiers in nature in 
which the "me" is externally lodged, so that this marriage between the 
active "I" and the two-tiered "me" as human reality may afford the self 
as such in the socialpsychologic sphere of its 'being'. We treated the 
relationship between the "I", our response potential as humans to the 
positivity of the world which the "me" manifoldly, variegatedly and 
complexly occupies, and, on the other hand, the crude 'body' or "me"- 
only, at two of those levels at which that 'body' figures, in two 
ambiguous senses (as the physiologic and the social 'body', that is), 
consequentially, from the point of view of the self; with our bias in 
interpreting the role of these two 'bodies' into which the "me" is 
lodged in its relation to the "I", so far tilting the proportions of 
our argument in favour of the physiologic aspect of the "me", concerning 
ourselves, in the main, with the indelibly linked interdependence of the 
'flesh' and its life (the function of the "I"); with the physiologic 
'body' emerging, as a result of its merger with the "I", Sartrian 
fashion, as something commposite and live, as properly hybrid as a "me" 
with an "I", forever shot, socialpsychologically soiled with that "I", 
and the resulting active alloy of "me" and "I" simply amounting, as a 
phenomenon, to the self or human reality or Being-for-Itself. But our 
argument also touched, though in lesser proportions, on the higher-order 
category, at the symbolic level, of the organic bond between the self's 
"me" as a constituent of the socialpsychologic and social 'body' too, in 
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the sense of that as soma Christou on the one hand, and, an the other 
hand, the "I" or the soul or 'life' at the socialpsychologic level, in 
the Christian as well as the Sartrian sense. In the course of Part 1. of 
this Section, immediately preceding the train of thought currently 
pursued, the "I"'s sphere of activity, as operative vis-a-vis the "me" 
at the physiologic as well as the socialpsychologic levels, emerged as 
related or indeed tantamount to a variety of concepts, which may be 
summarily recalled here, to possible benefit. These kindred or 
synonymous concepts to the "I", were the soul or anima, the 'future', 
the semiotic function, playfulness, movement, the dynamism of the self, 
'Human Reality A', the small-letter gift or one's store of-talents, the 
firmament of one's possibilities as a self, the dark centre of the 
waxing Sartian moon, which simile is adopted here to represent the self 
in its ontogenic development, and, finally, action, movement and 
meaning; and, of course, 'subject' too, though this term didn't as yet 
figure in our thesaurus of the relatives of our "I" put forward so far. 
We now mean to devote greater attention to the operation of the 
dualistic make-up of the self (as both "me" and "I", that is) at the 
higher, socialpsychologically and socially symbolic level, as expressed 
in and as the choice of one's conduct in authenticity as human reality, 
complete with one's explicitly and willingly shouldered profaneness in 
whatever course of life one is engaged, complete with one's acceptance 
and staking, cultivating one's total array of human capacities as a way 
of life. In the course of tilting our argument of the relationship 
between the "me" and the "I" in the socialpsychologic rather than the 
physiologic direction this time, three more terms denoting or at least 
further illuminating the "I", will emerge, which may usefully be 
included in our description of the "I". 
One is Marcel Nauss' notion of the Stranger; a concept greatly 
overlapping the "I" in this context. Nauss' work The Gift C3` may be 
read to demonstrate the poor tolerance, by a given social body, of a 
self not yet coded and therefore not yet possessed in terms of that 
society, and the pressure upon the self to lend itself to a safe and 
decodable pigeon-holing in terms of the society in the surrounds of 
which that self appears, so as to make that as yet free-floating, not 
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yet properly possessed and therefore free self, in this sense, amenable 
to being 'appropriated' and consequently accepted by a culture as 
prevalent in its givenness; this phenomenon condensed, in Mauss' 
treatment, into the instance of making a gift, (which embodies and 
symbolises the self making the gift), in a symbolic gesture, in this 
sense, by an ambassador of a foreign, not yet known community and 
culture, one not yet classified in terms of the visited culture's 
generalized other, to the representative, usually the chief, of the 
visited society to which the gift is brought. In Mauss' handling, this 
phenomenon is treated in the macro-, or at least microsociologic (not 
socialpsychologic) dimensions, embracing tribes and entire, cultures, but 
the experience is well enough known and easily transferable into 
smaller-scale socialpsychologic interpersonal confines. This pressure 
for the socialisation of a newly arrived self is, of course, 
recognisable, in a more gradual process, in the course of the growing 
up of a child, and moments of the psychologically traumatic and 
significant encounters between representatives of alien categories of 
people, may be identified in ways to which Mauss' desription of such 
symbolic meetings is useful and analogous, in instances, say, where 
sympathies between people across any sort of cardinal 
anthropologic, political or social barriers are suddenly developed, 
such as when an individual on either side of the Profane-Sacred chasm, 
or a member of the enemy forces perhaps, comes to command the respect of 
the representatives, or one representative, of the 'other half'. The 
dramatic value of the bridging of anthropologic, political, 
evolutionary or other kinds of profound chasms between participants, in 
sudden and convention-alien friendliness to one another, is exploited 
and extended in fiction to the meeting between humans and extra- 
terrestrial beings, with supernatural stories taking the presentation of 
such experiences between mundane mortals and the representatives of the 
extraordinary who are not bound by the limits of our established 
socially rational area of activities even further, contriving occasions 
in which ghosts, the dead in heaven, witches or whatever, meet and 
befriend the ordinary living. All these fictional and real instances of 
the meeting between Aliens, Strangers, the Different, on the one hand, 
and the representatives of the established norm of our civilisation, on 
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the other, share the feature that there is an ambivalent interpersonal 
fascination, preoccupation with the visitor or sojourner at the bottom 
of these encounters, with attention directed at the newcomer in a 
poignant mixture of love and hate, of trust advanced and fearful 
suspicion. This phenomenon, that of suddenly learning to know the 
Stranger, as has been said, is the most acutely intense 
socialpsychologic relationship there is between groups and kinds of 
people in the face of each other; hence the compelling viewing of films 
explöitfng such occurrences. The Stranger is not well tolerated whilst an 
uncategorised, untapped, uncomfortable freedom as human reality for 
which it first appears in foreign surrounds, and Nauss' work implies 
that his free "I", not yet conquered by the host culture at the moment 
of its appearance, axiomatilcally clamours, in and by the culture 
receiving the Stranger, for being defined, 'arrested', patriated, had, 
in and by the generalized other there, so as to be sorted out, given its 
meaning and niche in the social web of the receiving culture. The 
Stranger is under great pressure to offer himself as a self decodable, 
managable there, to allow his foreignness to be made safe by its 
signalled appropriability in the familiar idiom of the norm there, and, 
for as long as he stays, the measure of his success in his being 
considered and treated as safe, as pukka, as not disturbingly alien and 
no longer subject to further pressures for surrendering himself as the 
unattached freedom for which he is first apprehended, is the degree to 
which he manages to reassure the host culture that as an ego he is 
compatible and 'the same' as the generalized other receiving him. Nauss 
claims that in the custom of bringing a gift, the newcomer reflects 
himself in the gift as of great value, an absolute value in a first 
person singular human reality which he dedicates to the receiving 
community or any of its representatives, the gift expressing, at the 
same time, the great value, in his estimation, of the people to whom the 
gift is offered; the essence of the gift thus standing for the union 
between two sets of valuable, small-letter sacred people, oneself and 
the Other and/or all similar others in the host culture to whom the gift 
is made. The gift expresses the wish on the presenter's part that he be 
possessed by the recipient, that he be counted on. It stands 
symbolically for his giving himself in the spirit of socialised safety, 
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for the subordination of his self to the generalized other of his hosts. 
The expression 'the little stranger' in referring to the newborn child, 
extends into ontogeny the echo of Nauss' insight and observation 
regarding the meaning of the gift, as already observed - the child as 
the gift himself representing the as yet unacquisitioned self as the 
object of future social adoption, patriation, clamouring for his 
introduction into the culture he was born into, in a process which is to 
continue throughout his entire life. 
The second notion usefully identified here as a relative of the "I" 
is Foucault's concept of irrationality, that capacity of consciousness 
which is uncharted by socialisation, which is as yet, or forever, not 
quite expressed in that framework of conditioned learning which is 
governed by a goal-directed, pragmatic rationality, and other in kind 
than that which realised overt behaviour is to the behaviourists, in 
other words, something which is axiomatically and entirely accountable 
for in terms of empirically functional and sucessful goaldirectedness. 
Foucault's term refers to an ever-available, fortuitous, extra realm 
over-and-above that overt personality for which aspect of the self as a 
"me" only the behaviourists will exclusively allow; with Foucault 
entertaining the notion of the irrational as meaningfully and actively 
figuring in conduct as the not yet or not entirely realised self, which 
is an inexhaustible fountain and condition for personal originality and 
which need not be, and isn't, if one is authentic, surrendered in 
adultnood even. Continued resort in conduct to Foucault's irrationality 
must of course not be conceived of as divorced in its effect and mode of 
being from the pragmatically rational output of the self as the "me", 
which the behaviourists acknowledge as exhaustively making up the 
subject matter of psychology, both in the social and personal contexts 
of it; the presence of Foucaults's `irrational' as an informant of 
conduct is indicated merely by the original quality of overt behaviour 
and output, which quality is missing when recourse to the 'irrational' 
is decried and denied by the agent in the way he conducts himself. The 
actuality of the self as the "me" will emerge as the richer for always 
being partly born of a spontaneous, not merely pragmatically rational 
"I" underlying that "me", that's all; this personally fresher and more 
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first-hand conduct than the totally predictable, purely empirically 
goal-directed behaviour of the unauthentic, is the only index of the 
active working of this irrationality at the back of the authentic self. 
Other, mostly French, students of and commentators on the 'irrational', 
correctly identify recourse to this element in our consciousness as the 
indismissable precondition of what they call 'the Work': some monument 
in the agent's output of a first-hand, original intellectual or artistic 
creation. But they also insist (incorrectly, for Foucault's money), on 
the actual carrying out such a 'Work' as the necessary justification of 
having such a first-rate mind, or rather consciousness. Foucault claims, 
in counterdistinction to his colleagues who insist on 'the. Work' as 
indismissable proof of such an original self, that conduct with its 
keynote in irrationality is completely vindicated as the mode of the 
'being' of one's consciousness, and nothing more, even if the project of 
maintaining such conduct is not crowned in actuality by such a 'Work', 
but cultivated and pursued as an end in itself in everyday conduct 
merely, as the style of the way of leading one's ordinary life. 
The third new notion to illuminate what we mean by the 111" even more 
extensively, is taken from Orson Welles' classic film Citizen Kane. The 
synapsis of the film can be permissibly (though too schematically, to do 
its psychologically rich presentation justice), summarised as the story 
of best part of a life spent in unrelenting goal-directedness as an 
uncompromisingly ambitious "me" only, giving an account of the life of a 
citizen fulfilled in such a capacity, as a mere "me" in bad faith, that 
is, in constant and vain search for that element in his life which would 
make it happy. Plucked from his family as a small child, after the best 
education money could buy, his approach to the content of his life 
(including his career as a journalist: the chosen profession to which he 
pledged himself in his youth, and in his patronage of the arts), came to 
be pursued with an unscrupulous dedicatedness to the glory of such a 
singularly and outwardly distinguished "me"-only, accumulating badges of 
honour in public life, and greater and greater wealth. As a 
consequence, the hero achieved, as the by-product of this pursuit on his 
part, a stark, lonely, isolated lifestyle, spent in an entombedness in a 
luxurious but lifeless palace, and his condemnation to two marriages 
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both of which were lacking in love, each, but particularly the second 
one, conducted in the loneliness of two people at each others' side. The 
course of this kind of life came to be the passing of his time, till the 
very end of it, as a 'body'-only in the context of society, a "me" at 
this higher, symbolic level which lacked a spontaneous and authentic "I" 
and any recourse to that as a self, 'dead' in no less true a sense than 
the physiologic 'body' that is without life, a 'corpse' of a "me" as a 
socialpsychologic human reality or a self in the full and authentic 
sense, in the context of the world into which he was so optimally 
anchored in the form of great wealth and high connections. On his 
deathbed, after such a lifecourse, clutching and then dropping a cheap 
toy winter scene, with falling snow, encased in a little glass 
container, Kane's last word was 'rosebud', of which his fellow- 
journalists, eager to report the manner of his life and death, were at 
great pains to learn the meaning. Nothing among his belongings, 
conscientiously rummaged through, offered a clue; until, as the last 
item to be thrown into the fire where worthless items of the content of 
his house were burnt, a little child's sledge turned up, with the word 
'Rosebud' painted on its back. The audience, but not the journalist 
searching for the meaning of the word, realised that it was after he was 
playing on this sledge outside his home on a winter's day, that he 
learnt that he was to be sent away to school by his mother, never to be 
intimately part of his family again. The film ends with the image of 
this little sledge being thrown onto the fire and burnt in the furnace 
among his other meaningless everyday possessions. To my way of thinking, 
and to that of a host of commentators and students of this classic film, 
'Rosebud' stands for the "I" as previously discerned here. It stands for' 
that intact, virgin medium of the self of a child from whose pursuance 
Kane was banished, and which element in conduct he consequently 
banished, in turn, from his own life, in self-defence and as a safeguard 
against the memory of the pain which the loss of the 'rosebud' in his 
life caused in him; it stands for a spontaneity, an openness, a 
vulnerability to an "I" sensitive to the raw experience of human reality 
as such, life pure and simple, a youth, a playfulness, an innocnce, 
which Kane decried, went without, as a consequence of his fundamental 
choice to shun that in his consciousness as a grown person. The term and 
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concept 'rosebud' emerges here, in the light of such a consideration of 
it, as an apt term to enrich, indeed denote, stand for, be 
interchangeable with the "I" in the sense in which it is argued here. 
We have just used the term 'innocence' as a characteristic feature, 
an attribute at the heart of the notion of 'the rosebud', the unspoilt, 
childlike, playful "I". On reflecting for a moment on this term - 
innocence - we discover that it can be used in an ambiguous way, with a 
big-letter and small-letter meaning, and we can identify these two 
senses of the term as in a dialectic relationship to each other; the 
small-letter variety of it grasped as a positivity operative in the 
radius of human reality, denoting the quality of the "I" as something 
strongly meaningful, personally and interpersonally constructive, 
decisive and characteristic in the framework of the authentic agent's 
properly subjectivity-shot and enriched 'my world', and the big-letter 
version of that term identified as supporting and generative of the 
upkeep of the given society as such, contributory to the special kind of 
positivity, Being of society, these two meanings of the term contrary, 
destructive, mutually exclusive of each other in their operation, as 
will be argued. The two differential life-projects which have at their 
hearts, respectively, one of these two understandings of 'innocence' or 
the other, both acknowledge and sport this ambiguous attribute - 
innocence - as the hallmark of moral goodness in the differential grasp 
both of 'innocence' and of the two frameworks, understandings of 
goodness at the heart of which 'innocence' in one of its meanings or the 
other, is a key attribute; between which two senses of goodness we have 
distinguished in Section 5. of this chapter; discerning two meanings of 
'goodness', one that informs the socialpsychologically authentic, on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, the sense in which 'goodness' serves 
at the centre of the moral conduct of the blindly and unquestioningly 
authority-abiding agent. 'Innocence', it may be validly observed, in its 
small-letter and big-letter senses respectively, figures as the supreme 
virtue in one or the other of these two differential frameworks of 
goodness, elbowing the lifestyle centrally informed by the other 
understanding of 'goodness' and its most morally decorous attribute: 
'innocence' in the matching authentic or unauthentic sense, out of 
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operation and room in consciousness. In the first of these senses of 
'innocence' - the small-letter one -, this attribute to conduct figures 
as the most positive virtue of human reality, whilst not regarded as 
relevant or pertinent in the social sciences as conceived in positivist 
ways; indeed, it is viewed as disruptive to morality in the latter 
framework, and treated in that latter context with suspicion. When 
conceived in this first sense, in the spirit in which human reality is 
posited as the paramount area of 'being' to be upheld, 'innocence' is 
seen as the operative virtue of being and having resort to the 'rosebud' 
in one's life, in the sense in which this latter notion figures in 
Citizen Kane; it meaningfully amounts to the key attribute in the 
conduct of the self choosing itself in loyalty to, awareness of, 
gracefuless as human reality, in the act of the agent's pledge of 
himself to the basis of preserving and perpetuating that lifestyle; it's 
a condition of one's freshness of vision as a human being, complete with 
intuition, a spontaneity, playfulness and generosity as a self, an 
Ur-selfconscious nakedness of one as profane, it's the individual's lack 
of either artfulness or apologeticness as a self; it stands for an 
unashamedness of this nakedness as a self which one has no reason or 
call to hide, and is therefore freely given N3flt in conduct, serving as 
the inimitable trademark of a first-order human reality there. In the 
second, big-letter sense, 'innocence', or rather 'Innocence', congenial 
and nourishing to the stability of Durkheimian positive social reality, 
the term's connotations are akin to 'innocence in the eyes of the law', 
and the term stands for a negativity of conduct when grasped form the 
viewpoint of the standards of human reality, the notion in the big- 
letter sense referring to the absence of one having blotted one's 
copybook, of having littered one's curriculum vitae with marks of 
experientially, contentually soiled, rude, naked living, and a lack of 
evidencing in the course of one's life that one was present and alert as 
a consciousness to the duty, by the dicta of authentic human reality, of 
remaining loyal to the self's schismic, critical vision of and presence 
to the quality of social reality when that is less than morally 
decorously perpetuated in its actuality, with which potentially schismic 
view of the self in relation to outward actuality, the meaning of 
individual consciousness is simply tantamount (as we have argued, 
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inspired by Sartre). It seems strange that it is a score of Russian 
literary works which should spring to mind abundantly to aid us in our 
wish to illuminate, through examples, firstly the power and the moral 
superiority of the individual's schismic view, as a function of the 
simple and spontaneous authenticity of that, to the moral and human 
fallibility of an ethically crude government, and secondly the 
conclusion - in the light of that fallibility of society's 
represenatives in high places - the romantic tenet that the absence of 
error on the part of the individual as the ideal of his conduct, which 
such morally frail governments demand of the ordinary man, holds, in 
% 
reality, little virtue both as a matter of the intrinsic worth of such 
conduct for the edification of the individual, and also in its effects 
upon the qua]ity of society which demands such conduct of us; 
nevertheless, for some reason, it seems to be Russian literary works 
which offer these two related insights in a tumultuous prevalence, and 
we shall gratefully take advantage of some of these. 
Two famous Russian comedies are based on and exploit the Pauline 
message that one's profane, schismic status as merely human is universal 
in places socially high and low, and that everyone, even the lowest of 
us by ascriptive standards, is endowed with reponse potential to human 
frailty, shortcoming in high places as a consciousness, apt to judge 
that frailty in officialdom by the measure and echo in ourselves of the 
same capacity for frailty, in the light of everyone's potential 
presence to the ideal of a more authentic conduct by the ideal standards 
of human reality; our Human Reality A as defined in Part I. of this 
Section. These two comedies are Gogol's The Government Inspector and 
Chekhov's one-act play The Jubilee; both these works cashing in on the 
satirical value of engaging a critical, humanly authentic vision 
vis-a-vis the corrupt practices of agencies in highly ascribed quarters, 
as the source of ridicule of the 'sacred' in established society, 
'deconstructed' and identified as fallible humans by these two authors. 
The plots of both of these plays amount to a strong statement of the 
fact that the human agencies populating the ascribed 'sacred' Pukka 
circles and the bureaucratic echelons of the established societies of 
their day, were themselves schismic on account of the non-coincidence 
Rosebud or Bete Noire? - 356 - 
between their actual conduct and practices in the mode in which they 
carried out their office in reality, on t6. one hand, and the ideal 
appearances they wished to project about themselves on the other; bath 
these plays revealing that underneath the Pukkas' appearance of 
elevatedness and moral loftiness, they were inadequate, corrupt, 
hysterical and maladjusted (in the sense of lacking grace as human 
realities). This message transpires, in the case of Th Government 
Inspector, by the contrivance on Gogol's part of a mistaken identity: in 
its plot, a high-spirited confidence-trickster successfully poses during 
his sojourn in a Russian province, as the government inspector whose 
visit is due at the local government offices. After the trickster's 
timely 4isap pearance (having taken advantage of the appealing front which 
the officials were keen to present about themselves as officials, this 
air of them specially assumed for the occasion, and having exhausted 
the bribes lavished on him), the real inspector appears, catching the 
local government personnel with their trousers down, undisguisedly 
ineffective and detestable. In the plot of The Jubilee, Chekhov conveys 
a similar message. In the case of the latter play, it is the 
disintegration of a bank's celebratory anniversary party, which shows 
up the fragility, underneath the surface of the initial seriousness of 
the occasion carried and perpetrated by the self-important bank 
manager, which veneer of solemnity gradually peels off in the course of 
the occasion, through the cumulative drunkenness of the manager's silly 
wife, by the rudeness and bitterness of the long-suffering and 
maltreated office clerk, and by the gatecrashing of a widow unstylishly 
demanding money. 
Our third exaM ple from Russian literature highlights, by even 
stranger satirical means, the message which we currently mean to 
discern, that 'innocence' in the big-letter sense, is not only an ever- 
sham, because impossible, intactness of human frailty in the conduct and 
consciousness of 'the serious', but also an anaemic substitute for, and 
a pale virtue in everyone's everyday conduct in comparison with, 
'innocence' in the small-letter sense, the socialpsychologically 
positive attribute and endowment of an active, authentic self. We wish 
to call on the story forming the basis of Prokofiev's Lieutenant Kije to 
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demonstrate this point. The author of the narrative which inspired 
Prokofiev in the composition of this piece, holds up a mirror to the 
unreality of a way of life of which the so-called virtue of innocence in 
the big-letter sense forms the basis, to the absurdity, by human 
measures, of a successful career in life whose excellence consists in a 
blamelessness of any untowardly naked, rudely fresh unselfconscious 
human reality, in refraining from utilising the capacities and 
functions of one's life as a self, with all its risks and hazards to the 
individual inherent in the active engagement of one's consciousness as 
such. Lieutenant Kije, according to the plot, came into being as a 
spelling error in the official files, and the allegoric story tells of 
'his' rise to the rank of General, and the crown princess' fiance, as 
his reward for the supreme virtue in the eyes of those swearing by the 
standards of sacredness by ascription as their ideal, of considerately 
not existing at all in the impolite, experientially soiled, offending, 
ordinary sense of live human reality, of not accumulating any blemishes 
on his file by way of instances of the unruliness of man's profane 
being, by not operating as a self threatening, as such, with a degree of 
unpredictability, error of judgement in the face of established rules 
as laid down and therefore as a self which is politely and exemplarily 
contained, by virtue of his humanly unnoticeable conduct, for these 
reasons, within the confines of a totally predictable, pure "me", in 
which aspect of his self 'Kije's' personality was totally exhausted and 
with which it was completely coincidental, with none of that 
inconvenient residue that is rooted in and carried by a conceivably 
establishment-discordant, active "I" looming as the possibility of his 
self; never idiosyncratically affirming himself in one way or another, 
never uttering surprising comments or displaying any other such 
singularity, his self representing no risk of any deviation from the 
norm which is determined by ascriptive ways alone,. through the danger of 
actually and concretely putting them into play in the dodgy and fallible 
context of human actuality, without being exposed to that profane idiom 
which is inherent in people actually living in terms of the norm, in 
their concretely acting it out. I am reminded of a term in modern police 
jargon in rendering this ideal of conduct of the individual, that of his 
big-letter Innocence, as demanded by authority. In their work of 
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detection, the police strive to contrive a so-called 'sterile' condition 
in which to tackle and eventually apprehend the suspect: a situation 
devoid of psychologic and other complications caused by so-called 
extraneous variables in relation to the perfectly distilled context of 
the crime, devoid of the 'microbes' of any human actuality in which 
'bacterial' culture', if you like, of actual individual conduct, man's 
axiomatic fallibility thrives, to which human reality is simply 
tantamount when given vent in the full sense. 
There are two points of possible social scäet'1t is usefulness which 
the modern parable of Kie affords when viewed in the light of a 
'romantic', human reality-tolerant and oriented approach to it, and 
which a positivist stance in relation to its message (the absurdity of a 
morality which demands the banishing of the not totally predictable "I" 
from conduct) typically and necessarily misses, has nothing to say for, 
denies, and waves aside as meaningless. One is that the all too common 
lack in a lifecourse of the exercising, engaging of an active "I", a 
life-history spent as a "me" only, without 'life' in the symbolic sense 
as we understand that notion, (this attribute, its lack of 'life' in our 
sense, pushed to the extreme, by satirical means, in the story of Kie), 
need not entail, as the only possible explanation of the popularity of a 
life-project without recourse to the "I", that there is no such thing 
as the "I", as the positivist will have it. Not a bit of it; it may be 
the case that the renunciation of an "I", and human reality in the full 
sense which is inclusive with the "I", by the agent conducting himself 
in bad faith, is deliberately chosen with the ulterior motive of dipping 
in more profitably into the unauthentic's readily attained tangibly 
empirical and socially positive rewards in the world; in an act of 
choice on the part of the "I"-denying agent, which is unnatural, and 
shortchanges him considerably, in terms of human reality. It is at the 
cost of the violation of the nature and capacity of consciousness - 
everyone's consciousness - for truth, intelligence and natural common 
sense, Kije's story pregnantly implies, that one is capable of being 
good and virtuous by officially 'sacred' and 'serious' standards as the 
condition of one's blamelessness - big-letter Innocence: the ultimate 
ideal and the only kind of goodness which the solemnly Sacred Pukka 
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demand of the profane. The project of perfect "me"-identification, as 
officially demanded of the profane, particularly if authentic, is an 
uphill struggle whose course differs considerably from the spontaneous 
dictates of human nature, a struggle, moreover, which goes hand-in-hand, 
as part of the bargain on offer to the Rachmoneses by society, as a 
condition of being declared deserving of the epithet 'good' and all that 
implies, with the denunciation of the pursuit of an outstanding quality 
as an individual - in other words, 'good' as understood by the agent who 
adopts human reality and its peculiar lights as the prime informer of 
his consciousness and conduct, as a matter of his fundamental choice. In 
the production by the agent (in keeping with society's command), of a 
truncated self, a "me"-only, which meaningly dismisses the "I" from its 
frame of reference as a self at the cost of such effort, is commonly 
systematically, purposefully and functionally underlain by the explicit 
and not easily suppressed ruse, at the heart of such a 
socialpsychologically unauthentic life-project, to send begging the 
perfectly meaningful and commonly available vision of one's 
subjectivity-shot, critical individual 'perspective' upon the world and 
its state, so as to clear the way for the more easily reinforcing and 
satisfactory life, (in worldly terms, of course), as socialpsychologic 
objeCt only. If the agent wants an exemplary curriculum vitae such as 
that of Kije, then a very explicit awareness either as regards the 
actual ways of the world, or recourse to the fantasy or vision, if you 
like, and sense of calling of oneself as a citizen of a better society 
in the light of the collective consciousness readily fathomed by all in 
its more perfect ideality than those states of affairs which happen to 
prevail in the reigning society, will not be of very great help to one. 
If a man with a very keen ability to see the firm's jubilee party, as 
did Chekhov, with his tongue in his cheek, and the shoddy human fibre of 
those with greater title to taking care of his affairs than he is 
allowed to, on account of their greater ascribed sacredness, if the 
moral foundations of the social world surrounding him appears to him 
very explicitly as rather weak and shaky as they do in Gogol's play The. 
Government Inspector, then he doesn't stand much chance for being able 
to keep under his hat his capacity for the sin of being with the schism, 
of social blasphemy and heresy as something that had better remain a 
Rosebud or Bete Noire? - 360 - 
matter just between him and his conscience, as was the case with the 
authentic schism-managers we considered before (Sveik, Auntie Googey, 
etc. ), who put down that schism inwardly and philosophically as simply 
man's inheritance through just being a man, irrespective of whether he 
opens his mouth or lifts a finger in the light of his capacity for such 
a schismic consciousness, or not. The blemishes, heresies, to which the 
'thought-crimes' of a highly aware critic of his actual society amount, 
will be prone to become actual faux pass, witnessed as a public affair, 
slowing down his progress to Generalship considerably. Such a man - one 
with his eyes very fondly on a Generalship, will not be very keen to own 
an "I", and if he recognises that he has one, to cultivate it as such. 
He will not try to be an amateur Socrates when making his fundamental 
choice, but opt for the horizons of his self as that of an aspiring pig, 
wallowing in the radius of a self without a demanding spirit (to fall 
back for a moment on John Stuart Mill's terminology in classifying 
humanity as a function of which level of the being of consciousness one 
adopts as one's qualitative target as human reality), not because man, 
every man and woman, doesn't have it in themselves to be a bit of a 
Socrates, capable of entertai+ng heights of consciousness and capacity 
for judgement regarding the ways of the world in one area of human 
endeavour or another, as the positivist would have it (the 'romantic', 
particularly the existentialist social scientist will insist that 
everyone is cursed with the burden of some degree of Socrates-capacity 
and the moral, intellectual and practical responsibilities following 
from that endowment), but because of one's awareness, acquired in the 
course of socialisation, of learning, both in one's own experience and 
through studying history), that the price which the body of a Socrates 
(including his standing in the world in his blemished citizenly capacity 
as a "me" brought to justice), has to pay for his exercising the great 
beauty and perfectionism, the admirable daring and honesty of his 
spirit, involves the risk of, and more often than not, brings about the 
'fall' of his self, if no longer, in our day, in the form of the 
physiological annihilation of that "me", at least, still very commonly, 
in the form of the loss of the small-letter sacred status of that "me" 
as a self in society. The man in bad faith, who makes his "I" redundant, 
does so because he has learnt in his personal lifetime and in his 
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reflections on the course of man's history, that daring to be a 
Socrates, speaking one's mind as an individual, particularly if that 
individual is a very keenly schooled and critically discerning one by 
the standards of human reality, sticking one's neck out as such a 
human reality first and foremost, which activity one can choose to adopt 
as his characteristic mode of conducting oneself, risking, as a 
consequence, the possibility of erring to everyone's knowledge, offering 
up his possibility as a schismic, dutifully profane consciousness, so as 
to make a difference in one aspect of the world as it is or another, is 
not more but very much less likely to attain the goal of being regarded 
as a virtuous, good, deserving person, than the man to wham the meaning 
of good comes to equal the kind of choice of himself which is free from 
such a self-dedicating endeavour, which lacks, foregoes the eminently 
possible project of one's engaging one's "I" in an outstanding capacity 
as a self for the good both of oneself and of society. 
The second insight available to the 'romantic' and (Sartre would say: 
deliberately) unavailable to the positivist, or more precisely, 
empiricistic, narrowly behaviouristic student of the self, on which the 
story of Kije also throws a dramatic light, is partly contained or 
implied in our comments on the first point. It is the insight that for 
the gain of a reputation that is blameless, for a place under the social 
sun alongside with the Sacred, the price of not living at all - or at 
least, not living fully as a self, living with the greater part and 
capacity and the potentially truly available reality of human 
consciousness given up, foregone, is too great. As a further extenSLon 
of this implication, the 'romantic' social scientist and thinker sees, 
just as the socialscientific empiricist doesn't, that by man choosing 
his lifeproject in bad faith in this manner, by the lights of a self 
from which the "I" is jettisoned, as just described, does not yield him 
adjustment by the 'romantic's', and particularly the Sartrian's 
yardstick and, by such Sartrian impications at least, man doesn't 
attain 'adjustment', 'normalcy', natural fullness as a self; and what 
is traded to him under these labels, is of sham socialpsychologic and 
individual psychologic value. Part of what he foregoes as a consequence 
of his choice of opting to be a "me" only, is the presence of his 
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consciousness to adjustment in the full sense, a grasp of, a capacity of 
his adjustment in a sense which equals man's desire for his adjustment 
to a better society, articulated or at least meaningfully fathomed in 
his consciousness as an individual, of which he*would be a happy member, 
and in which he would be happy to participate in the depth of experience 
and consquentiality of someone whose self - ever complete with both "me" 
and "I" - is thereby, in turn, fulfilled. This understanding of one's 
adjustment in and to a society, (actual if the reigning norm in it is 
easily assimilable by the agent's humanly authentic lights, in the 
authentic agent's positive attitude to that which Sartre calls 
'elective assumption', and otherwise prompted by the agent's presence to 
the ideal of a better, more self-tolerant society), is importantly and 
fundamentally different from that which 'adjustment' means to those 
social s(, iv, 4AI tr-all)f empiricists who demand of man, as a condition of 
his adjustment in their sense, that he aim for the complete coincidence 
and identification of his self and of his whole being as that which is 
possible in the given social world, whatever the quality of that norm 
sustaining it. Kije's story ridicules, in the implication of its satiric 
stance with respect to the ideal of a mere social blamelessness as the 
condition of access to rich pickings in the way of both social and 
empirically tangible rewards, a way of life adopted through an "I"- 
abstinence, in which the mere absence of social erring amounts to the 
touchstone of virtuousness: a life led in perfect inconspicuousness as a 
seit, with the non-existence of human reality in that adopted lifestyle, 
parading as and mistaken for virtuousness. Of course, many people live 
in Kije's lifestyle: that of an effectively curtailed range of 
displaying human excellence by virtue of feats of the self, through the 
force of circumstances, and with no room for choice, in actual terms, 
regarding their situation, which does not allow them the alternative of 
living in such a way as to authentically cultivate a 
socialpsychologially decorous and outstanding self, as an end in itself, 
for the sake of venting and sustaining human reality as such. Their 
radius for a sense of goodness is often confined, through no choice of 
their own, to the sham social virtue that's demanded of them and which 
consists of the delaying and foregoing the gratification of their selves 
and of the 'being' of that in socialpsychologically real terms, in a way 
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in which striving for the good things available for the selves in the 
positivity of the social world in the here-and-now, and personal worth 
in the first person singular, which is a man's due for a lifetime of 
hard effort in obeying the arduous dictates of striving to be moral 
through the denial of the self, are systematically kept apart in the 
sense of virtuousness that is deemed, by the dicta of the reigning norm, 
as proper to man. The choice whether or not to nod assent to the veto 
which the reigning moral code dictating the current official definition 
of a man's propriety, becomes available to many people only when their 
situation, and the displacement between their "I" (taken into 'care' or 
denied them by other ways), and the "me" (demanded in surrender to the 
reigning norm), is made explicit and intelligible to them; as was the 
case in the instance of the character of 'The Little Monk' in Brecht's 
play The Life of Galileo (already referred to once), in which Galileo 
awakens 'The Little Monk' to his duty: the fruit of his education, to 
adjust, during the years ahead of him as a priest, his horizons to the 
need of making other descendants of plebeian forebears, such as himself, 
aware of the moral dishonesty and ideological as well as human 
destructiveness of the dictum, shoved down the throats of his kind, that 
the just deserts of a hard-working lifetime properly await those who are 
uncomplaining, self-denying and therefore 'virtuous' by the yardstick of 
the prevailing norm, in the world after and not on this earth. But, the 
existentialist points out, many people live a life blind to the ceilings 
of their human possibilities which could be theirs by rights, without 
being forced to do so an account of circumstances depriving them of the 
liberty to choose any other code of personal worth and virtuousness than 
that of Kije, and existentialists also point out the fact that, whatever 
people's reasons for opting for a Kije-type lifestyle and understanding 
of a sense of virtuousness, they typically compensate themselves with 
the displacement, as a consolation for their loss of the ideal of a good 
and humanly fully deserving life, striving for which is an aim which, as 
everyone who is suitably enlightened knows, man is capable of truly and 
articulately wanting, and incapable of not wanting, except at the cost 
of effort to consciousness; (the most common forms of displacement being 
the conceptualisation of the rewards of a hardworking lifetime as 
otherworldly only, the exaltation of those things that one can or does 
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in fact have, or the cultivation of such an ideology, kindred to that of 
the Nazis, on Sartre's account, which morally elevates mediocrity to the 
ideal of goodness, as the measure of man's real personal worth in the 
world and the key of his just deserts there; so many ideologies of bad 
faith, ) The agent, then, in the ordinary way, wages the worth of the 
'good' in the 'romantic' sense of that, against the 'good' in the sense 
of. the blindly authority-abiding socialpsychologically unauthentic: the 
security which living as a citizen Kane or a Kije can typically bring, 
and elects, as the keynote of his conduct, 'goodness' in the second 
sense as the fountainhead of his morality; and the 'romantic' will say, 
with a degree of justification meaningfully deriving from bis own point 
of view, that for the 'good' objectively and subjectively available to 
man through a reputation of blamelessness (as has already been observed) 
too much is given up out of the possible scope of human life as offering 
itself in a really available and necessay sense for and in the idiom of 
perpetrating and being sensible to authentic socialpsychologic virtue 
and excellence, as a matter of first-hand experience. From the outside, 
the way of life of the pursuit of authentic human excellence, even if 
somewhat fallen (the term 'fallen', in our sense, defined in Section 3. 
of this chapter), in the course of the fumblings of a would-be Socrates, 
may seem as a lesser project of virtue than that of an unblotted 
copybook; the blankness of the pages of one's diary if an aspiring Kije, 
may not seem something regrettable compared with the curriculum vitae of 
a little bit fallen excellence; it will seem as virtue. But by the 
private, profane, small-letter standards of human reality, to those who 
are present to the possibility of their grace as a self `°°', in the 
authentic adjustment of that self by Paul's and Sartre's standards - all 
men, in fact -, a diary filled with small-talk or non-existent because 
of the lack of a sort of life to report, will not seem a satisfactory 
biography, nor a desirable one. In comparison with those who have the 
shining social reputation of a Kije, the somewhat fallen aspiring 
authentic excellent can boast to have gained a freedom as profane and to 
have attained the prize and luxury of an unselfconscious, not 
puritanically self-tortured, guilt-ridden consciousness, on account 
of being unresigned to the necessary sin of being human - both merely 
human and fully human, and properly so to some extent in order to be 
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human at all. Man is profane at all times as his actual condition as a 
self, his consciousness as such complete with the possibility of 
reponding schismically, unconventionally, irreverently, critically, 
capable of recognising a quality of society's norms as the stimulus to 
his conduct, as schismic, if it be so. Even if fallen - and fallen well 
and good -, this freedom as a self's remaining possibilities need and 
will not be rendered out of commission in the conduct and consciousness 
of the authentic. Marx observed, in the context of macro-sociology, that 
the ruling class exposes itself to a great degree of insecurity and risk 
if it leaves the working class with nothing to lose but its chains, by 
virtue of the fact that the resulting absolute deprivation'of the 
oppressed class, both in the way of the tangibly positive and the 
socially symbolic sets of its belongings as consciousnesses and 
citizens with a degree of vested interest in the ruling regime, endows 
them with a great degree of freedom in the face of the world, in a real 
and meaningful sense. This observation, I feel, finds an echo and 
analogy in the context of a self fallen as such in the world in a once- 
for-all manner, with the implications of Marx's observation writ small. 
Kierkegaard, the migrant, vagrant have-not as a function of his 
fundamental choice in his elected authenticity as small-letter profane, 
certainly seems to have thought that in the course of his increasing 
reputation of anti-sociality and enmity as a consciousness towards the 
reigning hypocritical moral standards and practices of the world 
surrounding him, gradually causing him to lose, as a result, his wealth 
as well as his privileged standing by virtue of his being barn into 
highly ascribed circles in the first place, has brought him something 
that was of value (even if the process of gaining that was painful and 
the price was high): the booty of a clear conscience, an authenticity 
and a freedom, waxing in direct proportion with the waning of the 
positive benefits of his initially privileged anchorage of the world. 
Kije's story implicitly suggests the absurdity and concomitant loss 
involved in the project of sustaining a vulgarian sense of normalcy 
and adjustment, which is attained not by living up to the 'romantic's' 
and the authentic's internal standards in judging and claiming room for 
the agent's inherent possibilities as a self, but by ever living down to 
the standards of a mere "me" as publicly defined and actually available 
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to the self in the world as both that and the niche of the self in that 
la, as one's chosen creed, in order to be deserving of the titles 
'adjusted', 'normal', 'reliable' in a puristically empiricistic 
socialscientific sense, nodding assent, through the overriding choice of 
one's personal conduct in bad faith, to the decrying of a more authentic 
way of life as meaningful and possible, in keeping with the degraded and 
human reality-wise minimalistic or even completely intolerant ideology 
tacitly underlying the social sciences at their morally and 
experientially most impoverished. Kije's story advocates the normalcy 
and legitimacy of our profanness in the everyday business of living our 
lives in an abandon to the human reality in which that life actually 
consists,, in an inverted sort of way, by showing the absurdity of a 
life devoid of an anthropologically fuller than a so-called 'sterile' 
ideal and understanding of a consciousness's socialpsychologically 
authentic scope and standard of adjustment, by satirically showing the 
socialpsychological ungrace and anomalousness, and the moral and 
experiential barrenness of the ideal of big-letter Innocence at the 
heart of conduct: of the ideal of the mere absence of social erring in 
its operation. It's the Rosebud and all which this concept implies and 
brings with it as the informant of one's socialpsychologically positive 
and active quality of conduct in a very real and rich sense, as expanded 
on a little while ago, that a Kije or a citizen Kane forego and opt to 
go without. In Kane's case, it was his faithfulness to his core of 
youthful ideals, in the spirit of which he first undertook his career as 
a journalist and newspaper proprietor, solemnly pledging to tell the 
truth to his readers irrespective of the cost of this project to himself 
as the publisher of an uncompromising authenticity-spirited paper, or 
better still, in the hope of and with a view to bettering affairs in the 
world and people's lot there, which he came to cynically denounce at the 
point of his allowing his limitless, unscrupulous and unjustified self- 
aggrandisement to creep into his work, for instance, by fabricating good 
reviews about his wife who was an atrocious singer; this lack of 
authenticity informing this newly adopted humanly unprincipled practice 
on his part, and the moral stance underlying that, ultimately poisoning 
the happiness botiý^ his wife and ultimately of himself. 
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I think we have established to some degree of satisfaction the 
contention that our notion of the soul, anima, the "I", 'life', the 
'rosebud' (for a more complete list of synonyms see Part 1. of this 
Section), and the acknowledgement, cultivation and gratification of that 
dimension, encodedness of consciousness in practical conduct, is a 
necessary condition for attaining excellence, goodness shining with the 
distinclive and special quality of human reality: that this dimension 
and aspect of, room for the 'being' of consciousness as a meaningful 
and available potential of that underlying conduct, is an indismissable 
factor and attribute of childhood, youth, retainable also in adulthood 
(in a constant conjunction with a normally developed and shouldered 
"me", of course), and that a reliance on that as the source of 
inventiveness, of an originally questioning attitude in the light of 
that capacity and encodedness, is a basic necessity and condition of 
creativity, of conducting oneself in the rich and full three- 
dimensionality of a socialpsychologically 'salient' self (in the sense 
in which 'salience' was defined in the Introduction), rather than a 
mockery of the two-dimensional cartoon character of a self which chooses 
to have recourse to the "me" only, in a citizenship of laziness, 
responsibility-shyness, blindness and indifference to the true 
complexity of the human condition and state of affairs in the world. But 
we have not yet established that a way of life which is 
characteristically led with an active recourse to the "I", is a 
sufficient condition for such an outstanding excellence as human 
reality. For this to be so, it is necessary that the "I" (anima, 
'meaning', 'dynamism' of the self etc. ), be constructively channelled. 
One's decorousness and articulateness as a self actively and organically 
complete with an "I" as the keynote of one's conduct, may be made into 
the mechanism of and the precondition to the evil in one's individual 
conduct, too; and in the remainder of this part of the current Section 
we shall argue that, formally speaking, 'good' and 'evil' as alternative 
functions of human reality as such, are not generical opposites when 
seen in their similarly repugnant and contemptuous relationship to bad 
faith or the socialpsychologic unauthenticity as the possibility of 
one's conduct, but both the 'good' and the 'evil' modalities and 
varieties of human reality in the conduct of the self actively engaged 
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as such, stand in opposition to the lowly and simpleminded dishonesty 
and betrayal of human reality in the bad faith of the 
socialpsychologically unauthentic, with socialpsychologically cultivated 
and carried goodness and evil sharing the same dimension and capacity in 
consiousness, (that of the "I"), with evil definable as the goodness of 
the authentic self warped, as authentic goodness gone wrong and usurping 
the room and capacity in consciousness of authentic human reality as 
informed, ideally, by its own authentic standards. Evil is the fruit of 
the debasing transposition of the socialpsychologically positive 
attribute and modality of consciousness as authentic innocence, not in 
the direction of the unauthenic, human quality-free big-letter 
'Innocence' of bad faith, deaf-and-blind to the meaning and ideal 
standards of authenticity universally available to all, but into the 
bastardisation, misuse and usury of the peculiar equippedness, arsenal 
of attributes and tactics for consciousness of the authentic, 
unselfconsciously inherent in his human reality-wise positive innocence 
which yields, in its true form, an extensive repertoire of 
individualistic means for doing and promoting the good of selves who 
will have that good (including oneself). Evil is the abusing of that 
good, for the purpose of the promotion of the ends of an unscrupulous 
and mischieveous egotism of nurturing and cultivating an ego without 
regard for the good of others - the term to be sharply distinguished 
from egoism, the latter notion 'healthy', because essential for the 
socialpsychologically positive quality of the 'graceful' and fertile, 
human reality-generative adjustment of one's self along universalistic 
lines (that is to say, along lines on which the ego presupposes and 
keeps in sight the adjustment of others, in ways analogous to its own 
adjustment, or, conversely put, in tha act and attitude of the ego 
insistier on its own adjustment as a self in ways analogous to that of 
others who display an adjusted and fulfilled self). Kierkegaard offers a 
distinction between 'egoism' in the 'bad' sense (referred to here as 
'egotism'), and 'egoism' in the latter, 'good' sense, which is a 
necessary precondition of our very authenticity, of the ideal of the 
unselfconscious sustenance and enjoyment of the 'my world' of everyone 
and anyone, with all its peculiar and proper benefits and endowments for 
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the self, using the simile of the bird rejoicing in its own radius of 
happy being, which he can't help living, exercising to the full. 11" 
Two consequences arise from such a way of viewing the individual 
good and evil of conduct, as the alternative occupants of the dimension 
of human reality in consciousness. One is the stubbornness and the 
strong survival potential of this human reality, which may, and does, at 
least as a potential but often as a socialpsycholigc actuality, 
continue to be meaningful and operative when assumed as a matter of 
one's fundamental choice, even when society's coercive pressure to the 
'fallen', publicly profaned self demands that it assume itself in bad 
faith, as merely object only for the rest of its life; its innocence 
debased, bastardised, but not effectively waived. The socially 
problematic conduct of a great proportion of the young in our society 
affords a case in point for supporting such a contention - the 
contention of the oftentime futility of attempts for the suppression of 
the ebullient spirit as an axiomatic phenomenon in people, particularly 
young ones, a spirit which does not become disembodied and evaporated 
when separated, by society's command, from the "me", the typcast dished 
out to us profane in the scenario of society, but which continues to 
operate in conjunction with the norm as that is in the world, and which 
will know itself as critique, socially and socialpsychologically 
functional or dysfunctional, as the case may be, when affairs in the 
world are intuited as unjustifiable in the light of the self's 
authentic, spontaneous judgement and experience of those affairs. When 
society's aims and measures are not congenial to the lights of such a 
spirit, the spirit of the 'rosebud', of the "I" as an original attribute 
in ontogeny, (our dowry as consciousnesses when we come into the world), 
will be alternatively channelled in our attitude to the world, not 
towards the spirit of a constructivity in relation to it, but into that 
of unconstructivity, 'deconstructiveness' vis-a-vis the world. The 
phenomenon of vandalism and football hooliganism of our day are cults in 
which the spirit of youth is (often explicitly) engaged in the 
affirmation of itself in the face of a society which chronically fails 
to harness that energy, the energy of the 'rosebud' productively, and is 
blind to the need for that, and to its duty, by definition, to 
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satisfactorily nurture that, as an unwritten law firmly and 
axiomatically landed on the doorstep of every society. Its blindness to 
this duty is crystal clear in the light of the not just 
socialpsychologically, but also socially disastrous history, manifested 
in the continued failure, from every point of view, personal and social, 
of the so-called 'short, sharp shock' method of the punishment of young 
criminals. These 'short sharp shock' centres have their usual routine 
revised from time to time, to remove those aspects of the regime imposed 
on the youths which prove to be enjoyable to them, to which their 
misdirected spirits may attach themselves in a socialpsychologically, 
maybe even socially constructive positivity, such as vigorous physical 
exercise which proved itself popular with the youngsters in the early 
days; this practice telling of the attitude of irrational hate towards 
the young offenders by them, and a lack of concern by the Pukka with the 
consequence of this stance towards the unruly young as that manifests 
itself in the ever-growing rate of reoffending. The phenomenon of the 
increasing rate of reoffending amongst the youngsters who went through 
this form of punishment, also demonstrates the futility of the attempts 
of this government - any government - to legislate, coercively bid out 
of existence the presence, in any society, of a youthful readiness and 
preparedness to engage itself as active human reality in the mode of an 
unwillingness to surrender the spirit of the "I" to society, in ways 
which may be engineered to be beneficial for the improvement of the 
present state of society, by humanly purer lights than that reigning 
within that, even, or particularly, when this surplus spirit over and 
above plain citizenship, in a potential subjective discontinuity with 
the latter, was ignored, laid waste in a great proportion among a 
nation's young, was made redundant, ignored and caused to go frustrated 
and eventually fatally warped, by virtue of the shortcomings, 
shortsightedness and duty-evasion by the Pukka to society's young. 
Socialpsychologically approached, as we see it and as we suggested 
earlier, a way of life with active resort to the "I" is the vehicle both 
of constructive and destructive 'deviance', of goodness and of evil, for 
social creativity or social highwaymanship; and we may reaffirm our 
contention that criminality, as a frame of mind, is the 'rosebud' gone 
wrong. 
Rosebud or Bate Noire? - 371- 
A second consequence which the insight that active personal 
goodness and evil share the same dimension of consciousness (that of the 
"I)", and that the variety of outstanding personal evil of an agent as a 
quality of human reality, with which we concern ourselves now, actively 
deputises for and usurps consciousness's scope for authentic human 
reality and excellence in the idiom of that human reality, may be 
appreciated when looking at the relationship of bad faith to both of 
these varieties of dynalniC human reality: outstandingly personal good or 
evil in one's conduct as a self in the socialpsychologically autonomous 
sense of that. Both these "I"-informed and fed modes of personal 
conduct, one constructively and the other dysfunctionally applied 
(personal good or evil, that is), are repellent of and inmical to bad 
faith, with bad faith, when adopted, causing one to disguise and mask an 
authenticity of conduct, whether well or mischieveously used. Bad faith 
may conceal both good and evil. It usually conceals evil, 'egotism' 
rather than 'egoism'; it most commonly covers up that reprehensible 
sense of the promotion of the ego which is motivated by material 
selfishness, in contrast with egoism in the 'good' sense, as already 
defined: - the sense of conducting ourselves with as much regard for and 
expectations of our own selves as we are prepared to advance to others, 
in authenticity both to them and to ourselves. The first kind of, 
morally unbecoming, egoism - denoted hereas 'egotism' - typically makes 
use of bad faith to hide, behind the agent's bland and stereotypic, 
unspontaneous armoury of second-hand virtues, a project of unscr"te: -: iIj 
subjugating and twisting all our values as a human reality, which are 
alternatively and normally available to be decorously used, to serve his 
own selfish ends at the cost of others. But bad faith, lying about our 
real potentials as human reality, may came to be used to conceal an 
outstandingly decorous endowment as human reality as well, in instances 
when the agent, blessed with over-average, remarkable gifts, does not 
insist, with an 'egoism' of the right and healthy kind, on his right and 
duty to put to use the exceptional virtues which he is singularly 
endowed with, in instances when he bows to the laying waste, to the 
surrendering of his special endowment when such endowment is judged, 
signalled, 'gestured' as out of place by the standards of a generalized 
other, by the outside norm which is more average and lesser in some 
Rosebud or Bete Noire? - 372 - 
respect or another than that of the authentic who comes into contact 
with that. Parain's lies consist in the falsification, in public 
interpersonal accounts of the self and its history, of one's 
idiosyncratic contents as an authentic self, which gets into the way of 
the accepted and simpler norm governing the "me" of selves, which latter 
aspect of the self alone is sharable by and meaningful to all. Parain's 
lies are aimed to simplify, admissibly and conveniently (according to 
Parain's lights, at least), by getting the idiosyncratic contents of 
one's self out of the way, the job of presenting and involving the self 
in everyday human traffic. Lying by an overqualified candidate at a 
prospective place of work where a prestigeous Ph. D. would be contrary to 
the normal level of qualMr- ations of future colleagues, in settings 
where such a badge of human excellence would be resented, affords 
another example of bad faith being employed to conceal laurels of an 
outstandingly positive personal capacity, in one aspect at least, as a 
self. One may ponder on the question whether the unfashionableness of 
saints in our present day and age, is a true index of the absence of any 
such people in our contemporaneous societies, when compared with the 
much higher incidence of saints in by-gone times. The hypothesis may 
perhaps be ventured that there may, in our days, be people who are 
guided and informed by intense moral promptings and visions, comparable 
to those of the saints in a historic past, who wisely attenuate and 
transpose, with a degree of bad faith, this special sensitivity and 
presence of themselves to higher spiritual truths than the current norm 
defining and dictating the rational limits of cosciousnesses and selves, 
so as to bring those visions and intuitions within the confines of our 
ordinary standards of language and conduct, to save themselves from 
being locked in a mental hospital. To pursue even further the 
implications of the contention that personal good and evil are close 
bedfellows, and the fickleness therefore of the moral classification of 
our consciousness as one or the other, good or evil, we may perhaps 
usefully observe that postulating good and evil as generic opposites, 
seated in two separate faculties within, or, even more calculatingly, 
exclusively outside our consciousness, would be psychologically very 
convenient to us in instances when we chose to do evil. Such a divorce 
between our capacities to do good and the eadowedness of our 
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consciousness, by the same token, to do evil as a human reality, as a 
responsible self, would agreeably allow us to put down our inclinations 
for misdeeds, even our acting upon such inclinations for such misdeeds 
in our actual conduct, to the promptings of the Devil, seen as an 
external and self-alien force, as something outside us and nothing to do 
with our will: a single dimension. 
Another interesting possible classification of the quality and 
degree of the personal goodness of our conduct, lies in the analysis of 
the extent of its drawing on the social ideality of the collective 
consciousness, and its universality in considering the good of others in 
its projects of authenticity in the face of a society, intolerant of us 
as profane, somewhat 'fallen' or lowly ascribed, or as very authentic 
consciousnesses. The conduct of Don Giovanni and his fellow-evil 
usurpers of the armoury at the disposal of the constructively authentic, 
for his own egotistic ends and to the detriment of the human dignity and 
fulfilment of other selves, completely lacks in a universalism, in the 
consideration and wish to extend the benefits of one's authentic lights 
to other selves as such. But even within the context of humanly decorous 
and interpersonally not destructive projects of the pursuance and 
furthering of a human reality in one's own conduct, we may identify and 
discern degrees and varieties of goodness or an effective universalistic 
sharing with one's fellow-authentic the socialpsychologically beneficial 
fruits of one's project of authenticity. In foregoing analyses of ways 
and methods of the maintainance and management of the schism by the 
authentic, (this schism yielded by the difference between the scope of 
one's bare "me" which alone is allowed the profane in the world, and 
one's insistance on a more complete self as personally retained and 
entertained), we have 
JiStingu, lshed between the quality and the 
radicality of the method of openly stating this schism in the fight to 
make one's more ideal self than presently allowed acceptable to and 
rehabilitated by the generalized other, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the more quiet and and socially ineffective and inconsequential 
but also authentic project of privately stomaching and resolving our 
schism, our deviance, our irrepressible endowment with the qualities of 
an exuberant youthfulness and innocence in the face of the inert norm in 
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the world hostile to such affirmations of the self in the profane, 
without us making a public witness of this quality as human reality in 
militance, without our trying to use that critically constructive schism 
for altering the world so that its norm should be more receptive of us 
and the likes of us, without actively asserting the need that our own 
variety of the Different may unapologetically parade among the small- 
letter sacred in the world as uncurtailed, rather than stereotypically 
conceived and reduced human realities, with our human status there equal 
to everyone else's. A hierarchy of human worth, excellence as human 
reality, more finely graded than either saintliness or pathologic 
criminality, extreme good or extreme evil as the two morally qualitative 
polarities of the dimension of the "I", will emerge from an analysis of 
the degrees and quality of the use to which one's witness to that "I" is 
put. Antigone's kind of responding to the bidding of the oppressive 
society-critical schism in her consciousness, yielded by her own keen 
awareness of the absolute standards of human decency as an active and 
morally discerning self in the face of a society which is totally 
insensitive and oppressive of that, is the most admirable because of a 
most constructive order, totally universalistic in the sense of her 
envisaging the humane promptings of her own lights as human reality, as 
imperatively extendable to everyone in her situation and aimed at 
altering the law itself so as to accommodate her personal moral insight 
through the precedence which she created. She makes a public stand of 
her schism as human reality in the face of Creon's rule, which means 
(and bids her too) to thwart her possibilities of acting on her own 
moral lights as a self-respecting human being, which forbids her to bury 
her dead in the name of her respect for the life of those dead and for 
everybody's life, her project complete with the authority of a better 
society which is more tolerant than the present one, of human reality 
and its biddings, a future society of which she is a herald, a pioneer. 
To delve into the store of literature again, we can find a fine 
example in Restoration comedies for a paradigm of schism-management and 
trascendence in which, unlike in the project of Antigone, the choice of 
sticking to one's guns as 'rosebud', youthful vitality and bid for 
freedom, is conducted with a lesser degree of ambitiousness for the 
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universalitic consequences of such an undertaking. The topics of 
comedies of that era usually treat the fortunes of youngsters in love, 
who have our support and sympathies as audience because they are more 
sensitive than the older and more established perpetrators of the artful 
and false norm of the reigning society, because they are more innocent, 
vulnerable and natural as human realities in comparison with the 
hardness and calculatedness, with regard to human relationships, of the 
reigning norm, because they suffer under its corrupt yoke which 
threatens the course of their genuine, small-letter, spontaneous love 
and which bars their innocent happiness; but they don't plead their case 
in the name of a better society, tolerant of the ways of romantic lovers 
and free young spirits. Their target, telos and actual fulfilment is 
envisaged as coming into their own in terms of the same pretentious high 
society which opposes them; they mean to graduate to that society in a 
married respectability according to its conventions; they mean to be 
subsequently accepted, when their affairs of the heart become 
victorious, in the privileged notch for them in the social hierarchy 
which awaits them there. It is merely their greater than demanded, 
approved, allowed, 'normal' moral sensibility, and lack of cynicism, 
expressed in their romantic love, which makes us keep our fingers 
crossed for them. The authors' (particularly Congreve's) prism in 
depicting the rotten society of their day is penetrating and profound, 
and this is the extent to which their critical vision is deployed. They 
entertain no alternatives but to live in and with such a society, 
corrupt as it is, a society which they do not reject but shoulder as 
their own, which elicits a sadness, but not a hate in them. The result 
is a variety of authenticity, heartfelt but not universally aspirative 
or consequential in its implications in actual social ways; hence the 
quality of a tart and pessimistic authenticity and delectable decadence 
characterising these plays; every one of them a masterpiece. (The same 
evaluation and criticism may be made with regard to Scott Fitzgerald's 
lifework, as well as of Oscar Wilde's plays, such as An Ideal Husband. ) 
But whatever quality, form, strength, the "I" will come to assume in its 
assertion of itself in the self as human reality, political militance, 
heresy, an introverted, socially passive, prolongued state of 
sensibility, or even its criminally channelled avenues, it will (because 
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it is real as one's gift or burden, depending on the point of view 
adopted towards it), resist, in a meaningful and emphatic sense, 
attempts to stifle it, render it out of existence by officialdom, in the 
context of the family or of society; it will haunt one necessarily in 
childhood and in youth, and also in adulthood if we choose to resort to 
it, if we don't denounce it in bad faith, if it continues in conduct and 
consciousness as something to be reckoned with as one's necessary 
possibiity as a self. As Mead so plausibly suggests, C42' even the most 
zealous observers of the seemly confines of a socially proper existence, 
as a matter of their fundamental choice, can and must find channels for 
engaging the residue of their selves produced by a never quite 
repressible "I", somewhat deviant in its relation to the mere "me" as 
the entirely evidencible radius of our selves in which we are exhausted 
as selves in the knowledge of us by others, and even by ourselves, if in 
bad faith; however much we may wish to effectively suppress that. Not 
even the most respectable of citizens is excused from the need and job 
of managing, channelling or letting off steam as an "I", at least in a 
pretend way, at least in a way in which he can hide it even from himself 
that he does so, Mead writes with a sense of disgust about the 
popularity of murder stories in which the otherwise seemingly perfectly 
socialised pukka, the totally compliant individual, gives vent to a 
degraded, latent "I"; hence the thrilling qualities of such works. 'It 
is astonishing what part of the "I" of the sick is constituted' in such 
forms of art, he observes. 
I would suggest that in addition to Mead's observation that this 
(the clandestine motivation to sport an "I" which is disallowed room in 
the conduct of the polite in society), is at the bottom of people's 
fascination, not only for crime movies, but for missionary films too or 
films about the pioneers of other good and daring human or artistic 
causes: films depicting social creativity in the most constructive 
sense. By identifying with the main heroes/heroines of such films as the 
champions of the spirit of pure goodness or exellence as human reality, 
the social etiquette-wise normally very conventional and cautious viewer 
takes his "I" on a little trip an which in real life he would never 
embark. On the face of it, he pretends to himself that, like the good 
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guys in the film, he would have helped the social or artistic innovator 
portrayed in the movie, the character he now knows to be supremely good 
or excellent in social or artistic ways, because the hero/heroine had 
since wan, thereby emancipating his/her arrogance in appointing 
himself/herself divine ambassador with a calling to change some society 
or established Academy somewhere in a respect which seemed intolerably 
unjustifiable to him/her, for having found a way to do so, and for 
pushing their innovative vision and project through. However, nothing 
could be further from the truth than such a picture regarding the very 
conventional and socially proper viewer, the paragon of goodness by the 
standards of ascription. In real life, the average Pukka would have been 
offended by or been jealous of the freedom and visionary endowment of 
the hero/heroine which moved him/her to tamper with affairs in the 
world as they are. He would have shelved indefinitely the artist's 
submissions and the missionary's letters, refused the hero/heroine 
appointments had he/she tried to call, or have had left him/her 
unattended in the waiting room in case he/she tried to call 
nevertheless; or, more likely still, had him/her politely dismissed by 
his secretary; and, had he nevertheless acquired some notion of the 
worth of the artist's or the missionary's project or idea, he would have 
stolen it as soon as he felt reassured that he/she had been shaken off 
well and good, taken that as 'toll' by virtue of his privileged 
ascription, as the dues payable to his officiality, and put that project 
or- those ideas into operation as his own, so as to appear to have earned 
some degree of excellence for himself. 
I think the folk tradition of the Whitsun King on the Continent - 
appointing someone from the village to be king for a day, real king, one 
living in the palace, with everyone following his orders, bowing to his 
regalia -a folk custom to which the tradition of the Child Bishop in 
this country is somewhat comparable - conceivably also satisfies the 
need for man to act on his hubris, let his "I" hang out every now and 
then, in a way which is legitimised, made safe through its being brought 
within the context of the Christian calendar, somewhat ritualised and 
transposed into the idiom of festive jollity, fun, a jest, made a mere 
and temporary flirtation with the real thing. This folk custom gives the 
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Child Bishop or the Whitsun King the opportunity to give his "I" a 
field-day - to remember for a life-time that he had once been a god of a 
sort for a day, even if only in pretence; and to some extent provides 
the by-standers - his subjects for the day - with the opp. ortun(y to have 
the same trip to divinity by identifying with their mate in the 
ordinary way - the Child Bishop or the Whitsun King -, feeling that 
they might just as well had been the lucky ones, been in his shoes. 
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Section 6. Part 3. On Being Subject too: The Coarse Caretaker. 
I once heard sociology defined as 'the celebration of the ordinary 
man'. This definition may be approached and understood in two ways; one 
authentic and the other one unauthentic. Out of the first grasp of this 
statement emerges a view of man - every man, including the Rachmones - 
which throws into relief man's capacity and potential for adjustment in 
the full sense as just described in Part 2. of this Section - in the 
sense of recognising and emphasising the fact that man has the ability, 
it not always the opportunity, to actively live his own, personal self 
in the context of a shared, public social reality as both a participant 
in and as the conscience of that - either endorsing it with the power of 
his personal vote for that norm, prompted by his "I" as well as carried 
out with his "me", in instances when that norm tallies with and is 
judged by him as univeralistically accomodative of himself as an 
authentic human reality and of other selves in society such as himself, 
or, if society fails this test by his authentic lights as a self, he 
exercises the "I" of his self in applying himself as an authentic 
citizen of his society, as the critic of society in all its phases and 
varieties, good or bad. In either case, he experiences and uses the "me" 
as both the right and the fitting platform for the "I" of his self, and 
the anchorage of his whole self in society - the actual one or a more 
ideal one fathomed by him and informing him - participating in one or 
the other (the actual society as it is or the actual society as it 
should be, for his money, in the light of a more ideal collective 
consciousness to which he is present), as a "me" which he is happy, or 
would be happy, to experience his self as continuous with the prevailing 
norm, because in terms of the prevailing norm the need of the "I" to be 
sovereign in society as a self, is, or could be, satisfied. In other 
words, that man has the need and capacity to experience and engage 
himself as a 'Whitsun King' (see the last paragraph in the foregoing 
Part in this Section), in the real 'kingdom' in which he lives, positing 
himself as one who has a say in it as an authentic and somewhat 
personally powerful citizen at all times, not just during 'Whitsun'. 
Sociology, serving and studying the participation of the individual in 
society in this first sense, is the celebration of the insight that this 
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need and possibility is ordinary to man and universal to man, and true 
of people who grasp and summon their selves as such; and it's a 
particularly strong point of existentialist social thought that it is 
equipped to distinguish strongly between this first possible 
interpretation of the definition of sociology as just quoted, and a 
second, more pedestrian understanding of it, according to which the 
definition just quoted becomes a little twisted to assert that 
'sociology is the celebration of the ordinary in. man. ' It is Sartre 
whose writings show, to my mind, the greatest appreciation of the 
distinction between these two possible interpretations of social 
experience and participation by the individual, the full and authentic 
one as first given here, and the degraded one as latterly quoted; a 
distinction of which Mead too is cognisant and to which Mead too is 
sensible. X43' In Antisemite and Jew 144: 1 Sartre gives an insightful 
rendering of the antisemite's debased form of man's socialpsychologic 
sense of reinforcement for his unconditionally society-corroborative 
participation in politics in bad faith, available through the worship of 
one's averageness as a self as an ideal, coupled with a dedicated 
rejection and suspicion of any flexibility, spontaneity, originality, 
display of individual differences. The antisemite, as shown by Sartre, 
gains a sense of elevation as a person through the cultivated experience 
of mediocrity, which affords him a substitute for an authentically 
earned sense of excellence, and provides an external, macro- 
socialpsychologic mechanism too which acts as the lazy and otherwise 
unendowed man's surrogate hubris, made interested in abandoning his 
authentic one, - deploying and cashing in on the citizen's surrogate, 
unauthentic "I" (this process described in the Section called 'Our Big- 
letter and Small-leter Righteousness as Object'). This practice in 
fascism proved to be an instrument to link the fascist to those more 
highly ranking than himself in the ascribed hierarchy in society, the 
mechanism uniting several, otherwise distinctly circumscribed and 
separated social types through their shared hate of the Jew, the newly 
arrived competitor for participation in the older, wider, already 
established national heritage, and the scapegoat for society's ills. In 
addition to this very extreme, obvious and undisguisedly bizarre and 
humanly twisted form of ideology in which the antisemite substitutes a 
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mediocrity for the deserts of real excellence as an authentic self (of 
which he would also be capable but which would cost him greater effort), 
Sartre affords, in the course of his various socialtheoretic writings, 
many other shades and forms of established thought, historical, social 
c3nd, political, according to which man's 'normalcy' and qualification for 
'adjusted' status, are equated to his living strictly and commitdly 
within the confines of a "me"-only, (for the resulting humanly anomalous 
and limited sense of 'normalcy and 'adjustment' see the last Part and 
the beginning of the current Part of this Section), and according to 
which the implicit command of the reigning norm that man forego the 
insights and critique of the "I", surrendering the choices and 
responsibilities that go with an active resort to that "I" to the 
caretakers; and Sartre is consistent in showing how such a limited 
demand on man, or rather such a demand for this limitation as the 
condition of the granting of his 'adjustment', shortchanges him in terms 
of his full capacity for adjustment in the authentic sense. Romantics 
are, generally speaking, agreed and aware that while it is true, as 
socialscientific positivists, empiricists and behaviourists claim, that 
the subjectivity of the judgement of the "I", the deviance of the 
'perspective' of the individual in relation to the shared content of 
consciousness as society or the collective consciousness as it exists, 
is indeed the source of error, 111: ' and of all the ill that may follow 
from the exercise of deviant judgement in the light of that 
'perspective' or self, both outside in society and inside of the self in 
question, as authentic hubris gone sad and sour; but they also see and 
concern themselves with the experiential loss, socialpsychologic 
anomalousness and less than optimal and authentic scope and quality of 
the self as both a citizen and a private person, through the 
denunciation of man's capacity for fresh insights and novel and 
authentic responses to society, an attitude prompted by a fear of 
erring, resulting in a way of life which adopts a cautious 
inconspicuousness of the individual's consciousness as its ideal, which 
is also the source of the barring of the self from attaining virtue in 
the authentic sense, as argued in the foregoing Part of this Section. 
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Michael Green wrote an amusing series of books attaching the 
adjective 'coarse' in the title to every one of the areas of activities 
described by him in each of the books, such as The Art of Coarse Acting, 
The Art of Coarse Golfing, etc. Cod' Analogously to the dichotomy in 
dividing projects, occupations, activities, into two ways of approaching 
them, coarse and other, as suggested by Green's usage, the possibility 
seems to offer itself that the job of 'caretaking', which in former 
descriptions of it in this thesis emerged so far as always coarse, 
stereotypic and humanly insensitive in its approach to the profane, may 
be entertained and presented as other than coarse. Coarse and other 
caretaking will be distinguished from each other here by the index of 
their effect in interpersonal affairs, and by the different keynote 
which underlies the 'caretaker's' job of governing other people's 
chances and affairs, and of exercising a say in the ascriptional 
classification of other people's human status in the world. Coarse 
caretaking is the style of government (and this means here not just 
political and state government, but the government of any interpersonal 
relationship in which the duties belonging to the "me" and the rights 
belonging to an "I" of one or more other selves whose affairs are being 
managed, 'taken care of') - in which the benefits of the caretaking are 
envisaged and imparted to the recipients of caretaking in a direct 
manner, without recourse to <or opprtunity for) the exercise of the 
recipient's own freedom, choice, individual judgement or autonomy as a 
self. A one-party electoral system, in which voting for the only party 
that figures on the ballot paper is compulsory, even if the party in 
question is popular, historically right and convincingly vindicated - 
would be an example of coarse caretaking, in which people are made to do 
the right thing, but not as a function of their individual choice, and 
without drawing on, giving scope for their autonomy, without putting 
into play, engaging their capacity, as individuals, to coordinate the 
rights of their own "I"-s and the duties of their own "me"-s according 
to their own chosen lights as individulas, as a matter of their own 
personal judgement. But a coarse style of political caretaking on such a 
grand, national scale can operate in subtler and less obvious ways too, 
such as in instances where there is a two- or multiparty electoral 
system, but the voting population is courted and bombarded by the ruling 
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party for the returning of that party, by below-the-belt, 
psychologically deep and sophisticated, subliminal ways of suggesting 
the favourability of that party on the media, including the skillful, 
direct and systematic advertising of recommended forms of activities 
congenial to that party's policies, by methods of Hidden Persuasion. 
Generally speaking, coarse caretaking is based on the view, and an the 
promotion of that view by measures available to the caretakers with 
ascriptive powers, that the responsible business of the coordination of 
the rights and duties, "I"-s and "me"-s of citizens, properly belongs to 
the initiated - politicians, local government officials, social services 
personnel, psychiatric personnel, who have been trained to do this job, 
and the voters or other recipients of caretaking of various forms - in a 
word: the ascribed Profane, are amateurs, "me"-s only, who need to be 
told how to put to good use the "me" which the country, the 'normal' 
population and other manifestations of the established crust of the norm 
and any human corpus unauthentically sustaining that status quo, needs; 
with all varieties of Profane identified by us so far apprehended by the 
ascribed Sacred and its respresentatives, as in need of acting on their 
behalf when it comes to choices concerning them; and the kind of 
political bad faith which consists in the citizens', or some citizens', 
preferring to benefit from government decisions taken on their behalf 
without drawing on the exercise of their personal and authentic choices, 
and in the denial that ordinary citizens need to match, or are 
potentially capable of matching, the initiated in aptitude for 
judgements exercised on their behalf, may be termed 'coarse 
citizenship. ' A coarse form of government is that to which it is 
undesirable that the collective consciousness for which it sees itself 
should consist of citizens with politically autonomous and active 
selves, whose consciousness is free in and through the exercise and 
voicing of their awn judgement, idiosyncratic and politically creative 
insights as selves complete with an "I", as consciousnesses which are 
not completely indistinguishable from or identical with the generalized 
other, and such a coarse government is punitive, in more or less avert 
or, alternatively, more or less subtle and hidden ways, of such a 
politically authentic attitude of individuals as citizens. It's a style 
of caretaking which means to benefit its citizens (if it's not cynical 
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enough to lack this motivation), by making idividual freedom redundant 
in the way in which its citizens draw advantages from it. Coarse 
caretaking is the type of government which does not see or does not want 
to see that a form of state that consists of individually independent 
citizens supportive of it (as its ultimate aim) who have the faculty to 
make political judgements for themselves, is a better form of state, 
better form of political system and a better quality collective 
consciousness than the coarse one, not just for the sake of the 
individuals that inhabit it, but for the sake of the government and for 
the sake of the quality of the collective consciousness that happens to 
reign. Coarse teaching styles will be easily identified on analogous 
lines - those approaches to education in which the values of the 
culture, and the content of those academic subjects that are being 
taught - are imparted directly by spoonfeeding them to the children and 
which are blind to the value to the children (eventually adults), and to 
the culture which they will eventually populate as adults, of social 
being of a quality in which individuals are self-sufficient, autonomous, 
do the right things because they see the need, have it in them, can be 
trusted to, and want to do those; and who can be listened to if they 
don't, because they may be right and the system may be in need of 
repairing in certain respects if they judge it right for it to be so. 
Finally, the notion of coarse sociology and social psychology, making 
the safeguarding and ensuring of the adjustment ('equilibrium', to 
Durkheim) of society and people's consciousness and attitudes to it, 
exclusively their business, thrust themselves to attention in this 
context again, an analogous lines. Coarse sociology is that which 
conceptualises adjustment as something which equals causing people's 
selves to be absolutely coincidental with the "me"-only, in other words, 
with the generalized other without residue as an "I" in the self, as 
opposed to the anthropologically full understanding of a self's 
adjustment, as referred to in the last Part of this Section - an 
adjustment or good match within selves, between the social ideals of 
the self, partly the business of the "I", and the actuality of society, 
as available to and coincidental with the "me", as that "me" which is in 
fact available to meet people's needs and desires for those social 
ideals. Coarse sociology will deny that people's selves may have more 
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authentic than 'gestured', they are capable of entertaining and being 
profitably consulted about the meaningful and legitimate social ideals 
which they hold over and above their actual possibilities as the "me"-s 
in the world which they actually are as overt, citizenly personalities 
and which they are bid to be as the exhaustive radius for their selves;, 
and the coarse sociologist will deny that the actual prevailing norm 
that's available as the sole and exclusive informant of the "me" of the 
selves in a complete identification with that norm, may be judged and 
experienced as less than ideally satisfying in moral and existentiell 
ways in the personally authentic lights of any individual as such, that 
the "me" typecast for people may at any time come over and feel in their 
experience as less than fair, fitting and satisfactory by their socially 
and personally authentic judgement, however ordinary a social niche he 
may occupy. Even that type of coarse sociology which sees itself as 
progressive, will deal with the concept of a better and more just future 
society than the present one, in a way in which the enriched 
possibilities of selves in that coming society are envisaged entirely in 
terms of, and as coincidental with, a future "me" only for all, with a 
future generalized other which, again, won't cater for diversity and 
deviation, which will be compulsory for all in the only available way in 
which that will serve as the actual possibility for individual selves. 
If an enlarged scope for the "I"-s of selves is envisaged, romatic 
socialtheoretic fashion, as a possible universalistic moral and 
socialpsychologically rewarding side-benefit to selves in that socially 
more just future society, the coarse progressive sociologist or 
politician will dismiss the notion as meaningless or a frivolity for 
which the busy and practical man has no time. C47 The coarse 
sociologist, whether socially progressive or reactionary, will 
arrogantly regard himself as the highest authority and expert on 
society's as well as people's individual 'adjustment' (not admitting the 
axiomatic, legitimate and generic difference between these two standarýa 
for adjustment any time), and the 'ordinary man' who is regarded as 
either unentitled to or uninitiated in the project of the pursuit of his 
own adjustment as a grown fledgeling venturing out of the nest of the 
generalized other which socialized and shaped him as a "me" in the image 
of the reigning norm whilst a budding self, regards every self, 
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ordinarily profane, as an amateur in the ways of society and his lot 
within that as a citizen, on whose behalf it is his uplifting task to 
act so as to promote social adjustment within and outside him as a self. 
Sociology to him will be the celebration of the 'ordinary man' in a 
condescending way, in the way in which he very kindly does the 
celebrating, and the 'ordinary man' whom he credits with a "me" only, is 
fodder in the process oriented to social adjustment both in the inner 
and the outer sense, who is someone whose consciousness is not sacred 
in a tutored and explicit way in the feat of the adjustment between 
society and selves, not capable of or properly, meaningfully and 
legitimately desirous of the thrill which is inherent in the 
appreciation, socially constructive personal exercise and existential 
savouring of the coincidence between the collective consciousness he 
agrees with and the individual consciousness which solemnly chooses that 
society out of his own free will, in the act and experience which Sartre 
calls 'elective assumption' - the highest form of social consciousness - 
and which receives attention in the Introduction at some length. 
There are two kinds of coarse sociologists; one is the type that 
will entertain, allow for, own up to the meaningfulness and/or possible 
experience of an "I" as attaching to, involved in the phenomenon of 
coincidence (the coincidence between the ideals of the self and the 
collective consciousness, actual or ideal, which the self will choose 
for its personal endorsement), for his own part, but not for the part of 
the 'ordinary man', and who will claim privileged access to the mystery 
of such practice as one of the initiated - as the sole authority on 
engineering (in the ordinary sense) and knowing this phenomenon of the 
collective consciousness, which in reality is open to the 'ordinary man' 
in the act of solemnly exercising the project of 'elective assumption' 
as a morally sovereign, decorous and significant ego. This type of 
coarse sociologict, siding with or appointing himself as the equal to 
and the mouthpiece of the highly ascribed 'caretaker' Pukka involved in 
charitable work or in an executive position in the social services, will 
be one who conceives of himself as someone apart from the 
consciousnesses of those who, as far as he and the social process he 
appoints himself as the promoter of are concerned, are properly endowed, 
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to his view, with a "me" only; this first type of coarse Pukka caretaker 
will see himself, in a word, as someone apart from those consciousnesses 
which are the object and medium in which the collective consciousness in 
its actuality factually consists as collective. The being of the 
consciousness of the 'ordinary man' as "me", as object only, to the mind 
of this first kind of coarse sociologist or executive 'caretaker', is in 
fact the condition of his own possibilities as a complete self, 
inclusive of an "I" as such, which he will grant to himself or herself, 
rather than the possibilities of a complete and full exercise and 
realisation of the self, on similarly dignified terms, of the 'ordinary 
man' whose 'caretaker' he is. The Pukka engaged in such a'style of 
'caretaking' doesn't have to be in a very highly ascribed position in 
charitable networks or the social services to sustain and promote such 
an attitude in the mode of his relating to his client, the 'ordinary 
man'. One can encounter such an attitude in relation to clients in quite 
rank-and-file workers in the social services too. One can identify 
socially not highly elevated coarse social workers who see their job as 
worthwhile as a condition of their own happiness and fulfilment, 
forgetting the demand for and the right to a comparable human dignity in 
the conception of the selves who are his or her 'cases'. 
The second type of coarse sociologist or social worker, highly 
ascribed or low, is the socialtheoretic positivist. This latter type 
will not not see the "I" as at work in any form of sociologic or 
caseworking practice, in the self of anyone involved in it, client or 
'caretaker'. He will approach the task and the practices of the study of 
sociology or the application of it 'in the field', in actual encounters 
with the 'ordinary man', in a perfectly matter-of-fact manner, in a way 
to which the celebratory mood is inappropriate, and will regard both 
himself and the 'ordinary man' - the object of his study or professional 
assistance - in the cool light of day only, to fall back for a moment on 
a Bachelardian nomenclature. There is an aphorism in G. B. Shaw's play 
Pygmalion, in the farm of a line given to one of the main characters, 
Elisa Doolittle, according to which there are two distinct and differing 
styles in which to be pukka ('gentleman') - one is treating even a 
princess as though she is a flowergirl, and the other treating even a 
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flowergirl as if she is a princess. Of course, these two differing 
stations in the world - 'princess' and 'flowergirl' - must not be taken 
here in a socially narrow and facile way to falsely imply that Blisa's 
observation refers to the flowergirl's poorer and the princess' better 
actual chances in the world for being less or more elevated in the 
hierarchy of class society, thereby reducing the complexity and 
anthropoogic subtlety of the message at the heart of Shaw's play, 
misinterpreting the story of Elisa's pilgrimage from flowergirl to 
'princess', to a question of social mobility. The two terms in which 
Elisa sees her alternative possibilities as-either doormat to Henry and 
his likes or a lady on her own human terms, whether flowergirl in social 
actuality or not, are to be understood in a socialpsychologic, human 
context in Shaw's updated story of Pygmalion: the creator of a 'body' 
complete with life and therefore soul, out of the raw material of an 
apparent, humanly unambitious and undynamic, consenting "me"-only. By 
wishing to be 'princess', she fights her way to being the 'princess', 
the socialpsychologically 'graceful' being (for this Sartrian meaning of 
'graceful' see the concluding Section of this thesis), which every girl 
has a right to be as a person if she so chooses, in an anthropologic 
ambitiousness and discerningness generally expandable to all, a quality 
with which an actual princess need not be endowed in the least, as this 
possibility (the lack of 'gentleman', 'prince' or 'princess' status, so 
to speak, by human measures, in the highly ascribed), was described in 
Chapter 2. Section 2., showing up the meagre extent of human class in 
Bertie Wooster and Almaviva, compared with their manservants', Jeeves' 
and Figaro's abundant endowedness with human excellence. 'Princess' in 
the sense Elisa refers to it, is synonymous with the terms 'Whitsun 
King' or 'Socrates' ( rather than a 'pig'), in the sense in which these 
terms were featured in the last Part of this Section. It refers to one's 
classification as a self, and therefore socialpsychlogic status in life 
as a matter of one's private ideal possibilities as a self, with these 
possibilities drawn on, thrown into one's way of conducting one's 
intra- or interpersonal business at all times, with these 
possibilities unavoidably, either enticingly or unwantedly and 
menacingly (according to one's fundamental choice), available to 
consciousness as a decisive part of the mode of its being; its 
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incorporation into one's everyday style of conduct yielding a 'grace' in 
the Sartrian sense which the individual either is with, or, equally 
conspiculously, is without. In illuminating this contention, I would 
like to call on the example of a woman I know who, moving to a town 
where her new job took her, advertised for accomrnoäation there. She had 
one response to her advertisement, and an taking the room offered, she 
became aware that it was let to her on the tacit condition, and with the 
anticipation (underneath the legally orthodox terms) that as a condition 
of her tenancy, she would make the order of her being, her anthropologic 
standing, continuous with the culturally, or rather subculturally 
established hierarchy which pretty well completely determined her self- 
image as a single and independent-minded woman, in terms of the 
prejudices towards such a person in relation to the propertied male who 
offered her the accommoo at on as well as to the minds of his friends and 
family, whether they lived on the premises or not. The subculture 
suddenly surrouding her was unanimous in assigning, ascribing to her a 
self so subservient to the letting party that escaping the landlord's 
insulting attitude to her which consisted of the way in which he 
apprehended her as a self, cost her constant effort during a sustained 
period, whilst being obliged to accept the tenancy for the lack of the 
availability of any other. Under her circumstances, it made a great 
difference whether the woman in question chose her possibilities as a 
'princess' or, less outlandishly put, as a 'lady' in a 
socialpsychologically perfectly meaningful sense, (even though, as a 
matter of social ascription, she belonged to the working class) - or 
whether she chose her self in terms of that mere "me" which was 
'gestured' as proper to her by the human quality and set of expectations 
of his human surrounds, in terms of the stereotype to which her "me" 
amounted in terms of the convention of the subculture with which she 
made contact. Romantic social theoreticians will tell us that the woman 
in our example was free to define her self and to lead her life 
inclusively of her possibilities as a 'princess', 'Socrates', 'Whitsun 
King' (or rather, 'Whitsun Queen'), or whathever metaphor we may choose 
out of those offered here so far to denote the humanly more authentic 
mode of her self than the pedestrian one typecast for her as someone 
lowly ascribed according to the conventions of the culture surrounding 
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her. A romantic way of socialtheoretical thinking throws light an the 
fact that she was free to see and conduct herself as the emancipated 
citizen of an as yet future society, 'Whitsun' kingdom, illuminated by 
the 'halo', the "I" to which she remained faithful and 'present', for 
her part, and the romantic social or socialpsychologic theoretician will 
also tell us that while it is truly the case that positive social 
reality or the "me" available to her as a matter of course in the world 
as it was, really did define her personality according to overt, 
external socialpsychologic and social measures in the present, her 
'presence' to a more fully human self, complete with an 
anthropologically more aspirative "I", was indeed capable of causally 
eliciting her response to her situation, and as a consequence of her 
authentic response to the inert classification of her self as typecast, 
as a "me"-only, she succesfu, tIy because freely chose herself as 
inclusive of her private ideal possibilities, anthropologically more 
complete than her present ones, which in an active and dissenting 
response to her typecast, reacted back upon and actually shaped the 
actual reality both of her self and and of her cultural and social 
environs, and bettered the quality of her self there in real terms. Mead 
calls this process of action and reaction between social stimulus and a 
critical response to it, 'the conversation of the "me" and the "I" 
Romantic socialscientific theory - including that of Mead - is 
definitely inclusive of the rationalistic element making up the subject 
matter of their study, which consists of the power of the "I" as a 
response consequential to the quality of the social world as stimulus, 
as just shown by our example. It maintains (in Meadean language) not 
only that the "I" comes into being in response to the "me" or 
generalized other or social stimulus, but that the "I" must really be 
reckoned with as a capacity, as a stimulus-hunger, as the need of the 
self for human reality in which to thrive, a kind of reality other than 
the bare and stark Durkheimian social one which stands immutably over 
against that peculiar human reality which partly consists in the 
response capacity of the "I", in terms of which response the socially, 
physiologically and materially positive depositories of the world become 
humanly meaningful stimuli, peculiarly defined by and 'answering to' the 
needs and dicta for the fulfilment of that peculiar, humanly populated, 
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constituted and demanding stratum of reality - human reality - which 
operates in terms of its special, socialpsychologic idiom rather than a 
rigidly social one as does the collective consciousness. Through this 
mode of personal being as a self, by way of which these stimuli in the 
world, social and other, come to attain a 'meaning' both in general and 
particular human terms in a way exactly appropriate to the needs of the 
"I" as a capacity to apprehend, define and enliven, bring alive, 
illuminate stimuli in such a sense, in the process of the self 
incorporating, colonising for its own particular mode of being, those 
stimuli out of the mere haphazard array of raw material in the world 
which potentially avails itself to being incorporated into'man's world, 
into man's 'my world', into human reality in a significant way, which 
human reality will then, in turn, define, shape, make sense of, indeed, 
the world to a great extent. There is no question, no doubt as to 
the fact that this Kantian element forms one part of Mead's theory of 
the process of social reality, and this circumstance makes, to my mind, 
Mead's theory of the constant emergence of society in this way in its 
effect, one of the dualistic sociologies of knowledge, similarly to 
Althusser's or to Sartre's account of the constant upsurge of the 
external social world, in terms of man's need and ability for the 
realisation of the "I", or rather the creation and maintainance of 
Being-for-Itself, 'lived reality', 'my world', the 'perspective' etc., a 
tier of reality axiomatically inclusive of the "I": human reality. 
Romantic social theory (as already argued at length early in a former 
Section which bears in its title the words 'The Social Uncreativity of 
the Pukka'), is most definitely and importantly inclusive of crediting 
people with Pygmalionic powers in relation to each other, by virtue of 
their capacity to conceive the Other ('external social reality' 
according to its very fertile Sartrian conceptualisation), either 
passively as an immutable part of that external social reality, as a 
mere stereotypic "me"-only, or, alternatively, in a humanly dynamic way 
as a fellow-Being-far-Itself, complete with the full human dignity of 
such a self, which comes through its 'grace', a self which is authentic, 
regarding its potentials, no less than one's own; making it, through 
one's interpersonally creative or uncreative classification of other 
people as selves, either difficult or easy for them to be 'princesses' 
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rather than 'flowergirls', or 'flowergirls' rather than 'princesses'. 
It's a Hegelian thought, as remarked in the Section called 'The Social 
Uncreativity of the Pukka', that seeing ourselves defined, constituted 
in the mirror of the eye of the Other in terms which are different, 
often humanly lesser, than those terms in which we have chosen, 
constituted our individual selves in a maximalistic authenticity, the 
mirror image of our 'real self' bouncing back on us our mere "me" in the 
Other's gaze, the noncoincidence of our self as grasped by us and as 
defined by the other, affording us the experience of the duality of our 
selves as ideal and actual, an experience which jars in our consciousness 
on such an account. Romantic social science in this century (including 
that of Mead), is typically preoccupied with this dualism of the self, 
yielded by its private conceptualisation and entertainment of a 
possible, more ideal, personally fathomable and cognisable "me" 
(prompted by the "I") than that "me" for which we are commonly known in 
a pedestrian social and interpersonal actuality. Our sticking to our 
guns of the conceptualisation of our so-called 'ideal selves' as 
meaningful, and our insistance on the relevance of that aspect of our 
selves which we may effectively and actively create and cultivate, if we 
so choose, in the name of that one-member society in which we are ace 
and fully recognised citizens by the dicta of the peculiar lights and 
imperative of the humanly perfectionist standards of our own individual 
consciousness as such, yields a strongly operative vision of the social 
placement and quality of our selves in the ideal society tolerant of our 
selves as fathomed by us, to which there may not be any other "me"-s to 
correspond as yet, of which the only citizen at the present moment is 
the "me" of our self already living according to the not-yet existing 
norm and standards of that society in which people of our own kind as 
Whitsun pukka, so to speak - pukka in advance in the present, in spite 
of the fact that our pukka status, our 'prince' or 'princess' status, 
our emancipated citizen, small-letter sacred status is not yet endorsed 
by the "me" of anyone else, and, sadly, needn't necessarily come to be 
endorsed at any time by any kind of posterity. The 'romantic' social 
thinker and the romantic moralist is egalitarian in the 
anthropologically full sense - in the sense that he restores the 'halo' 
to everyone and advances a 'halo' to everyone. (For the meaning of 
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'halo', see the former Section featuring in its title the phrase 'The 
Social Uncreativity of the Pukka. ') The 'romantic' social theorist makes 
every agent responsible for his part in how far others who are in an 
interpersonal liaison with him have realised their selves, helped by him 
and by the power of his 'gaze' or, more Sartrian still, of their 'look', 
inclusive of their original human possibilities, those potentials which 
their selves once had, and still have in the "I" - as the promise they 
once saw themselves as, and which they still are as the "I" - and the 
'romantic' social thinker also makes every agent responsible for the 
extent to which he had performed or alternatively failed to have 
performed the same duty to himself as the equal of the Other - of every 
authentic other; consistently with the New Testament's message expressed 
in the parable of talents, as considered in Section 1. in this chapter. 
The 'romantic' social thinker makes all of us responsible for the extent 
to which we have done our best to humanly emancipate ourselves, for how 
far we created ourselves as full persons and not the stereotype 
interpretations of our selves, to which fully human interpretation of 
themselves our selves avail themselves. The 'romantic' will judge us by 
the measure of how far we have done our best to be a consciousness, each 
and every one of us, one that is the witness to those ideal 
possibilities of ourselves of which we are aware of now, which we are 
living now, by the more inclusive norms of a more ideal collective 
consciousness than the currently prevailing body of prejudices by which 
our 'real selves', our "me"-s are invited to abide. By insisting that 
every self live, apprehend and conduct himself or herself complete with 
the sense of duty, the freedom and the socially not yet predigested 
idiom of thought which is the prize of those who choose to identify with 
their possibilities not as the blemish they are now but as the sovereign 
person they are capable of thinking of themselves as being - in other 
words, by restoring people's halos to them, the 'romantic' sociologist 
and moralist does everyone a debatably welcome favour, in so far as his 
halo is not an unequivocally kind gift to the 'ordinary man', for it 
makes him, if he chooses to live with recourse to it, one of the 
universally extraordinary, and takes away the pretence that there is no 
choice for him but to be less. It goes with the bidding that the 
'flowergirl' be the 'princess' she sees herself as, and whom she feels 
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if she so chooses, and makes her mindful of and responsible for the 
choice of being so or declining to be so. 'Romantic' egalitarianism is 
the apprehension of all selves as complete with the "1"; with the 
resulting understanding both of egalitarianism and of adjustment 
completely different from a positivistic understanding of both these 
notions, and, generally speaking, different from all those 
understandings of 'egalitarianism' and 'adjustment' which do not allow 
for the "I" as the possibility - the necessary possibility - of the 
'ordinary man' - which do not make use of the dignified possibility for 
all of the inclusion in their selves of the "I" as the condition of 
everyone's equality. The coarse sociologist or coarse social worker who 
is coarse in the first manner of courseness identified here a little 
while ago - by virtue of separating from the 'ordinary man' the elation 
which is inherent in a man's or woman's capacity and experience as 
adjusted to universal standards as a self fulfilled, sovereign, - 
reserving familiarity with this sense of elation to himself or herself 
as the 'expert' on this phenomenon, and our second type of coarse social 
practitioner whose coarseness of social thought consists of universally 
disallowing everyone (including himself or herself) the possible role of 
the "I" in the conducing of the self, in other words, who denies for 
everyone the potential of being a 'Socrates', 'Whitsun King' etc., and 
who works with his or her clients in the spirit of universal 
indifference and subservience to a stereotype anthropologic ideal of man 
as all "me" - both these types ? rcrnote a sham equality and sham 
adjustment, barring the possibility of a more true-to-life, more 
spontaneous, a completely effortless, more real and anthropologically 
more fully inclusive equality and adjustment, one that's anchored in and 
encompasses both the individual's inner perspective and his 
interpersonal relations. Through not crediting his clients with an "I", 
the coarse social practitioners will be slumming in face-to-face 
situations with their clients, either not bothering with promoting a 
semblance of human equality between the 'caretaker' and the 'caretaken' 
atall, or forcing a sense of equality between the two agencies in 
question, which doens't ring true and doesn't come naturally. 
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The 'slumming' referred to here is an anthropologic attitude, one 
that's not at all parallel to or interchangeable with the problem on the 
part of the socially arrogant of mixin% with the culturally alien lower- 
class agent, and it would amount to a misleading oversimpification to 
see it thus; as a matter of social class, that is. The demeanour of the 
coarse social practitioners who themselves come from quite poor 
backgrounds is just as prone to being shot with the kind of human 
reality-wise offensive patronising when face-to-face with a 'case', in 
an anthropologic sense, as is the demeanour of coarse social workers 
coming from across the social chasm, from a more affluent socio-economic 
background than that of their clients. The attitude referred to here - 
anthropologic slumming - takes its source from the need on the coarse 
empiricistically informed social practioner's part to cover up his or 
her embarrassment over engaging in personal dealings with someone he or 
she apprehends as one divested of a soul, as one without an "I", as one 
ascribed as blemished, as one socially humiliated, and psychologically 
'ungraceful', even depressed; exhibitionistically flaunting an overjolly 
"me", as the 'gesture' whose meaning is this: 'All nice people have such 
a jolly "me" in common, at least as their glorious possibility; look how 
hard I work on mine; so you jolly well respond accordingly, take your 
jolly "me" into both hands and put it to work; then you will do as well 
out of playing my game as you possibly can with the chances left to you 
according to the game in the social world. ' There are entire subcultures 
where the untiring cultivation of a jolly, humanly egalitarian "me" in 
an unceasing demonstration of a personally adjusted comradeship is a 
socially highly prized attitude, not to say one that's constantly 
demanded of people as the signification of their one hundred per cent 
social 'normality'; and as the condition of their being able to reap the 
tangible droplets of a reward due to those who try hard to be such a 
"me". The type keenly complying with and promoting such conduct, is 
widespread in such cultures, and is not necessarily confined there to the 
professional practitioners in such liaisons between the enthusiastic 
"me"-promoters and other rank-and-file profane; and can be conveniently 
called 'the organisational type'. In Hungary, where this attitude 
happens to be most typically perpetrated by females, the expression 
'organisational woman' ('mozgalmi nö'), is part of everyday usage, 
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strikes a chord and affords a meaning which everyone understands, one 
that people from different cultures may also readily recognise as 
familiar. The 'organisational woman' will eat out or go to a holiday 
resort mostly and typically when public functions so demand; even then 
she will not enjoy herself and relax for a moment but talk to the 
kitchen staff, unnecessarily from eveyone's point of view except her 
own, boring them with small-talk which the staff is too intelligent to 
draw any spiritual benefit or sense of interest from and which holds 
them up usually at a time when there is the most urgent need for them to 
do their work. Whilst talking, the 'organisational woman' will show 
signs of strain, fatigue, lack of concentration and other tide-effects 
of working too hard, often repeating herself as a consequence and 
offending her partners in the conversation who are initially naive to 
her self-indulgent motivation in starting the conversation, by showing 
at certain stages of the encounter that she paid no attention to their 
earlier replies. In her rare moments of solitude (rather than privacy, 
which latter state of mind is alien to her), all life goes out of her 
after such intensive working stints; she is fatigued, her mind nervously 
clinging to, moving on to, the next mundane social chore which she'd 
better do. There is nothing to occupy her consciousness independently of 
others and she cannot enjoy herself, cannot draw advantage of, cannot 
savour or cultivate her moments of loneliness for the intra-individual 
benefits that making good use of those may yield, reading such books 
even at such times, which arm her to perform the duty of constructive 
socialisation even more perfectly and zealously during the next 
interpersonal occasion. She would be ashamed to admit to inner resources 
and makes sure she never encounters any. Suggestions that the 
possibilities of a Socrates could be hers for a moment or that she could 
think of herself as a 'princess' in Elisa Doolittle's sense, would seem 
mad and decadent to her, and she would do her best to thrust them from 
her memory as quickly as she could if these possibilities were put to 
her; they would represent antisociality, immorality to her, and 
entertaining them would give her a bad conscience. So, as we see, 
anthropologic slumming need not go hand-in-hand with social slumming, 
and its interpersonal performance may even be based on the fathoming of 
a need to respect the human status of other human beings, albeit in a 
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sense that degrades the capacity of other profane to be dignified selves 
by their own socialpsychologically more discriminating and sophisticated 
scope, needs and standards according to which to be human, and narrows 
the meaning of that anthropologic dignity down in the human object 
approached in the slumming experiene, to an area of the recommended 
being of the approached person, to spheres which are unrealistically, 
uncomfortably and inappropriately restrictive to him as a person, as a 
quality as a person, as a self. Conversely, it would be equally mistaken 
and misleading to equate a person's choice of his higher than merely 
social stereotype-prompted possibilities, his project of rejecting his 
way of life as typecast as a mere "me", and his exchanging'that for a 
way of life that is based on values that he holds higher, more 
socialpsychologically authentic and fulfilling as a self, with a ruse to 
yield him socially higher, ascriptively more advantageous horizons. An 
example of the conceivable class-irrelevance of a project of 
anthropologic mobility towards a greater human nobleness than that which 
would stereotypically emanate from an unimaginative, society-wise mud- 
bound and fatalistic understanding of one's fitting human ranking in the 
world as a function of class, and a type of behaviour that would 
slavishly follow from that, is afforded by the course of action of the 
father of Turner, the painter. At a point in his life, when his son was 
still a young, struggling artist, Turner the older sold his own 
flourishing barber-shop, and apprenticed himself to the young man, 
learning techniques of how to mix paint and other skills that would have 
ordinarily seemed menial in comparison with the secure career he had 
given up, to give a much-needed helping hand to his son who embarked, 
before him, on a dicy career, that of an artist. The Registrar General's 
classification of occupations would be quite an irrelevant guide to 
interpreting the greater human dignity than that which the father would 
have been able to display had he stuck to the career predetermined and 
justified for him, according to an ordinary and conventional rationale, 
by the glory and his success as his own bass. Anthropologically 
speaking, the two Turners were equal as regards their ranks as selves. 
In rejecting a socially inert, readymade course by virtue of their 
class-origins, for the rest of their lives - rejecting a future entirely 
given by and in unbroken continuity with the past, by jettisoning the 
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option which would have led both of them to a safe middle course in the 
predictable social orbit for both their selves, by rejecting acting upon 
the kind of consideration which, to a conventional kind of approach to 
their proper careers, might have appeared as the most 'normal' one, by 
not adopting a way of thinking according to which 'maybe letting the boy 
do what he wants will lead to greater heights, maybe not - but by not 
changing the way of life which has been working for us quite nicely so 
far, we can't go far wrong' - Turner senior has most certainly realised 
his ideal possibilities as a self as fully as he could, and chosen for 
himself a kind of being as a self which was exactly as creative and 
original as that of the young Turner; the older Turner's originality and 
authenticity as a self taking the form of the special talent which Mead 
dubs 'social creativity'. Perhaps the worth of the older Turner's act as 
humanly higher-order than the entirely predigested stereotypic 
alternative course of action he could have chosen, was even greater than 
that of his son in following the dictates of his genius, always self- 
evidently clamouring to him for its realisation. There was certainly no 
anthropologic servitude in the father choosing to serve his young son 
expertly, professionally - because in opting for that new career for 
himself, he also chose, at the same stroke, the dignified job of being 
Pygmalion to his son, and became his progenitor over again, this time 
not in the physiologic sense but as the creator and promoter of his 
son's possibilities, as a fulfilled mature self himself; he 'made him' 
to some extent, in the sense the Americans use this turn of phrase, in 
the Pygmalionic sense. The young Turner had made an equally important 
and authentic choice in accepting his father's gift of his own self, so 
to speak; accepting this gift 'made him' as a human being in addition to 
'making him' as an artist, in the spirit of a socially unusually 
creative freedom and originality. By coyly hesitating, by letting petty 
scruples as to whether he was worthy of his father's gift or not get in 
the way, or by imposing his own opinion as to whether his father's 
choice was the wisest one from his own point of view, stopping his 
father in realising his own act of social creativity, the young Turner's 
conduct would have been unauthentic in the light of the confidence and 
his presence to the imperative that he must paint: the proper dues and 
consequence of his own recognised genius. Hesitation, rejection in the 
The Coarse Caretaker - 399 - 
face of his father's gift of himself to his son, would have ruined the 
chance for, and eventually the realised fact of, both father's and son's 
concurrent and mutual fulfilment as selves. However, as it happened, the 
young man had the generosity and authenticity to accept the father's 
new, risky choice of a career, his sacrifice, which in truth was his 
father's ascent in a sense, and the ascent of his own, in a more obvious 
sense. Fortunately, the young Turner was mature enough not to choose the 
path of false modesty, and instead got on with the job, authentically, 
for the purpose of which his father 'risked his being', to borrow a turn 
of phrase from Hegel. In contrast, the coarse social practitioner 
unmakes potentially full and complete 'ordinary people' by-what he has 
in mind for the 'ordinary man' as the proper lot of the latter, by 
disconstituting people, persons, 'cases' who are, as their original 
possibilities, both "I"-s and "me"-s, by decreeing them, defining them 
, in the mirror of their eyes', as just "me"-s, as selves whose true 
potential is, as far as the coarse social practitioner is concerned, 
running the full course of their social inertia as persons. A Tolstoy, a 
Shaw - their socioeconomically upper-class origins notwithstanding - had 
never mirrored, either in their writing or in their everyday 
interpersonal conduct - the person of, say, a serf or a down-and-out 
such as Elisa or her father, in such a humanly condescending way, in 
which the coarse social practiotioner's professional fieldwork manner on 
the job (comparable to the doctor's patting-on-the-shoulder bedside 
manner) shows up, arrogantly, his 'cases', his clients, as less than 
themselves, or in which our 'organisational woman' grabs the female 
proletarian employee by the button, so to speak, drowning her with a 
larger-than-life, "I"-exclusive, over-jovial "me", in an affected, 
laboured exhibition of sameness between all people, particularly and 
privilegedly her own and the one to whom she is just talking, in a 
strained demonstration of the two of them as two identical slabs of the 
salt of the earth inside their selves - an overloud performance which in 
truth covers a lack of sense an the part of the coarse social 
practitioner that her partner in the conversation, and indeed she 
herself, have a soul. All kinds of coarse social practitioners, the 
solemnly Pukka who insists that he alone has an "I" but not the client, 
or the empiricist who swears that neither he (she) nor the client has 
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got one, are motivated by the desire, whilst performing their caretaking 
job, to avoid having to identify with their clients in a 
socialpsychologic attitudinal depth of authenticity; with our 
'organisational woman', or, conceivably, 'man', out of our gallery of 
positivists, exalting his or her chosen way of being a self as object 
only, to emotional heights, imperatively extending the 
socialpsychologic project of the choice of oneself as object only, one 
devoid of an "I", to all members of his or her social environs with 
missionary zeal, making it morally compulsory, for his or her money, for 
everyone to be 'ordinary' in the socialpsychologically limited and 
limiting sense, and shying away from the possibility of himself or 
herself, as well as his or her clients being extraordinary, each and 
every one of them, as selves complete with the faculty of social 
originality, human immediacy and social critique if that be in place, in 
quite simple walks of life, for which there is plenty of room for anyone 
who cares to choose the latter option in conceiving of and conducting 
his self. Both the solemnly 'serious' coarse Pukka caretaker, who sees 
himself or herself as Sacred and with a mission as one endowed with an 
"I" towards the less fortunate than himself or herself in this respect, 
and the coarse empiricist caretaker, including our 'organisational 
woman' or 'man', who too loudly exhibits his or her own "me" in relation 
to the client's fellow-"me" in a hypocritical demonstration of an 
attitudinal generosity to the client, does so as a ploy to be able to 
engage his own practical "me" in the interpersonal encounter as a mere 
taken of giving himself or herself to the client in need of his or her 
caretaking or help, advancing to the client a "me" which, underneath the 
larger-than-life assertion of that, lacks a meant illumination by an "I" 
in conceiving the client, and therefore is devoid of a significant 
personal and interpersonal human content, which in his or her practice 
is distanced, which amounts to the quality of a self in himself or 
herself that is not risked, not staked, not exposed to contamination, to 
the possibility of catching germs, of being dirtied in real 
identification with the conceivably angry because self-deprived client, 
desirous of a complete self, small-letter sacred status in society, just 
as much as that of his 'caretaker', and this project on the 
'caretaker's' part, whether anthropologocally pompously or 
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empiricistically coarse (because humanly mean in the way of grasping 
other selves), amounts to a tactics to avoid such a fully 
interpersonally authentic conception of the client in a respectful 
empathy towards him as another small-letter sacred self-aspirative human 
being. The authentic caretaker, in contrast, is one who appreciates the 
need of all people to be fully-fledged selves as an ideally natural 
part and bonus of their re-emancipation by the 'caretaker' whose 
vocation it is to help the client in ways which are inclusive of 
producing their ideal self-image -a self-image on the client's part 
which is typically not a fanciful notion but one that often lends itself 
to a natural understanding by the 'caretaker', and takes little effort 
on the 'caretaker's' part to appreciate, with a modicum of empathy 
imagination. Such an authentic approach to the client on the 
'caretaker's' part needn't go with an ostentatious exhibition or even an 
explicit articulation of this minimally imaginative demand, expectation, 
appreciation and allowance for a capacity for a human decency on both 
his or her own, and on the client's part, but may operate as a quiet or 
even tacit human universalism and goodwill in conceiving all people, 
whatever their ascriptional status, as potential anthropologic equals; 
this human authenticity on the 'caretaker's' part quite conceivably 
operating as nothing more than a latent assumption and premise 
underneath an efficient, competent, undramatic and discreet or even 
smooth professionalism in which he or she carries out his or her job; 
with the possibility of an emotionally heightened exhibition of his or 
her natural anthropologic generosity as an authentic human being in his 
or her style of dealing with his cases, usually laughed off by him or 
her as both needlessly taxing for all concerned and repellent to good 
taste. Nor is such an authentic stance and attitudinal undercarriage in 
initially conceiving cases, tantamount to a hopeless naivetd on the 
'caretaker's' part; should the client signal to the 'caretaker' by way 
of his own behaviour or attitude, that he is undeserving of, 
unauthentically deaf-and-blind or too calloused for his part to humanly 
utilise such an attitude and advancement of authenticity towards him in 
the spirit in which this possibility is offered to him, the 'caretaker' 
will routinely, wisely and fusslessly register the redundancy of his or 
her own kind of personally authentic attitude in the interpersonal 
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encounter, and nevertheless carry out his or her job in relation to his 
or her 'case', as best he or she can, for this is what he or she is paid 
for. He or she will recognise with Mead, that sympathy alone - because 
of its interpersonal particularity, as well as fickleness, in spite of 
the social practitioner's best intentions - is a poor basis for social 
work. 1.4E' It follows, by implication, that if adhered to in the purity 
of the social worker's humanly authentic motivation, sympathy as the 
exclusive motivation fuelling the raison d'etre of the social worker in 
his professional capacity, will shortchange some clients as a result of 
the social worker not helping whole-heartedly those he or she doesn't 
like; moreover, if interpersonal sympathy is cultivated and exercised by 
the 'caretaker' with its full emotional chargedness in every case, this 
will leave the social practitioner emotionally unprotected, prove an 
intolerable imposition to him or her in getting though his or her 
workload, and leave him or her emotionally drained. But in spite of all 
these qualifiations, it may be validly asserted that the quality of the 
authenticity of the 'caretaker' is one that will shine through as an 
ideal appreciable to the intellect, meaningful as a worthwhile personal 
feat in the authentic as opposed to the coarse 'caretaker', and often 
and vitally, in the effective concomitant quality, totality, worth and 
perfection of the client's rehabilitation in the respect in which the 
social practitioner gets into contact with him in the first place. To 
extend the results and effects of such authenticity to literary 
examples, we may say that the human richness, fullness of 
characterisation of literary figures created by Tolstoy or by Shaw, 
irrespective of the conceivably low social class of the character and 
the high social class by original ascription of the authors, is so 
because these two great writers apprehended and engaged their own selves 
in the fullness in which they grasped all human realities, with the 
social "me"-s they depicted in everyone, concretely, understandingly put 
on a par with their own fully experienced and cultivated one, 
illuminated by the thorough knowledge of such "me"-s by their own 
analogous familiarity with their awn, and also because they apprehended 
other people - every character, irrespective of their social backgrounds 
- with their endowment with a soul included, no less than they were 
aware of having souls themselves (or rather: being souls themselves), 
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and therefore 'equality' meant to both these great minds, that they 
themselves were complete with both a "me" and an "I", and so were other 
people - other selves - all other selves, potentially at least. In 
interpersonal relations it is important both that the agent sees himself 
thus and live accordingly, and that he sees others thus: as autonomous - 
or, regrettably, non-autonomous managers of their inner relationship 
between an active and engaged "me", and an active, engaged, truthful, 
responsible, receptive, imaginative "I", and as a consequence, either 
fulfilled and adjusted Cif good managers of the relationship between 
their "me"-s and "I"-s, rights and duties), or regrettably, unfulfilled 
and non-adjusted, in case either a "me" or an "I" is denied them, or is 
voluntarily denied by them, and the adjustmnent of their relationship 
between the "me" and the "I" therefore askew, awkward, forced, false, 
unnatural. 
CHAPTER IV. - 404 - 
THE SELF 
Section 1. The Romantic's Two-Stroke Categorical Imperative. 
and the Two Ways in Which to Violate It. 
In the last four Sections of Chapter 3. we argued the 'romantic' 
notion that the reality of the self is properly hybrid with "me" and "I" 
in a manner of which the self need not be ashamed on either account, but 
which duality of the infrastructure of the self he must uphold in its 
true and proper complexity if it aspires to attain the label 'authentic, 
as this dual infrastructural make-up in the constitution of the self 
amounts to the medium of human reality, which underlies consciousness 
and determinately colours one's style of conduct AS -authentic, 3nc( e= 
which level of the self's 'being', no-one should, or indeed xr, 1il. 
successfully wash his hands. As a consequence of this 'romantic' insight 
into and determination of the self, a dual moral imperative arises from 
'romantic' socialtheoretic thought, addressed to the self, which could 
be phrased something like this: 'Be fully human and exactly human. Do 
not attempt to be more than human (as "I" only), or less than human (as 
a "me"-only)'. 
There are, then, as follows from this dual 'categorical 
imperative' (the precondition of socialpsychologic authenticity), and as 
already anticipated in former parts of this thesis, two ways in which 
one may be unauthentic, or betray, dismiss, the self's proper hybridness 
witn both "me" and "I", as a condition of its amounting to and operating 
as an 'adjustad' human reality, and a 'graceful' one at that, in 
Sartre's sense of these terms. ''' One of these ways is the dismissal, 
jettisoning of the "me" in the self, the other way is to send begging 
the "I" in the manner in which we choose ourselves as selves, as 
consciousnesses, and in the way we conduct ourselves. A grasp of these 
two types of socialpsychologic 'gracelessness' or 'obscenity' (Sartre's 
term), may be facilitated by illuminating them through examples. 
A modern parable bringing to expression the sin of unauthenticity in 
this first sense, which consists in dabbling with one's possibilities as 
spirit only, of turning a blind eye to one half of the 'romantic's' 
above quoted imperative: 'do not try to be more than a man; know and be 
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your limits, duties and needs as a "me", is afforded in The Sorcerer's 
Apprez ntice; and a less allegorically gross, indeed psychologically very 
finely discerned presentation of the same kind of undertaking - that of 
trying to be and "I"-only by dismissing the dicta of a "me" in conduct, 
is offered in Dostoyevsky's rendering of the project of Raskolnikov, the 
main hero in his novel Crime and Punishment, in which Raskolnikov 
embarks on murder, the ultimate crime in the eyes of the law as the 
social body (as well as by the dicta of human reality), with the 
experimental purpose of seeing whether this crime would go officially 
undetected as well as indifferent and inconsequential to Raskolnikov's 
initially strongly summoned consciousness as a mere "I". As we know, 
Raskolnikov will fail on the latter score. Another manifestation in 
human conduct of the same kind of unauthenticity - that of trying to 
secure access to unlimited powers man imagines can belong to him on 
account of the capacities of consciousness as more than mere object, 
pretending the while that his social object status demands no decent 
limits to the realisation of his possibilities as subject - is the trend 
and practice in state bureaucracies, particularly technologically very 
advanced ones, of having a wholesale, microchip-stored data-collection 
about 'ordinary people', thereby reducing them to as explicit object 
only status as imaginable and, of course, as practical, divesting them 
of privacy, of having the privileges of subject to some extent - to an 
extent necessary for them to be and operate as autonomous selves, to 
conauct their selves in the medium of human reality, 'shining torches' 
on their lives reduced, owned, captured, 'taped' as mere facticity. For 
their own part, the agencies doing this, remain in anonymity. As human 
realities, even as representatives of the society of the 'ordinary man' 
which poses as democratically comprehensible and accountable, in its 
generally moral and concretely executive capacities, to the average 
individual, this technologically updated, bureaucratic upper crust, 
remains nameless and faceless to the 'ordinary man', actively 
occasioning and nurturing, in its unseen ways, a constant and large- 
scale confrontation between subject (the state and its representatives 
and servants) and object (the 'ordinary man'); in a manner and by 
methods whose ways of operation we identified and argued at length in 
Parts 1 and 2 in the previous Chapter. The extreme ideology based on an 
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indecent "me"-contempt and "I"-cultivation in such an unbalanced pursuit 
of the limits of the possibilities of the human spirit, is fascism. 
The other way in which a person may be unauthentic, through 
betraying, to a decisive extent, the 'romantic's' two-stroke categorical. 
imperative as advanced above, happens, on Sartre's account, through the 
denying the "I" as a reality which partly constitutes the self, denying 
the capacity of people for subjectivity-shot, spontaneous, personal 
judgement of human situations, a judgement by each individual for 
himself as the expert, at first hand, of such situations which effects 
him as a self or the likes of him as selves, and the sense'of individual 
duty which arises out of this critical capacity of each self as a 
consciousness, that capacity, that endowment of consciousness which is 
clamouring, in the ordinary way, to be given room in conduct so as to be 
satisfied in and through acts which every man needs to, and, 
unavoidably, does perform, necessarily causing a personality to emerge: 
if not an authentic one, then an unauthentic one. A man is unauthentic 
in this second sense through unnaturally, untruthfully suppressing the 
"I", through deliberately underestimating the freedom and the need of 
human consciousness to exercise its critical insight and capacity for 
individual judgement in response to anomalous or schismic social 
stimulation, when such is encountered. This second type of 
unauthenticity - that of "I"-suppression in the self - may take the form 
of aeliberately curbing one's own horizons, or of denying and 
suppressing recourse to the "I" in conduct for the benefit and in the 
face of oneself, as well as to others, and with that the chance to 
realise oneself and to be instrumental and helpful in others realising 
themselves and their individual possibilities over-and-above their 
"me"-s, (and of course in one's own), as the stereotypes conventionally 
available for one's own and for other people's socialpsychologic 
'being', in terms which are type-cast for one in the real-life soap 
opera of the social game according to the humanly impoverished and 
cliche 'script' of it if interpreted and furthered in the direction of 
the least resistance for that in society. 
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Examples for this second type of maladjustment through the 
unauthenticity which follows from an "I"-denial, have already been put 
forward when citing, for instance, 'The Little Monk' in Brecht's play 
Galileo who, in his choice to grasp his sphere of activity and 
consciousness as object only: a mere soldier of the Inquisition, 
betrayed his duty to summon his fellow-plebeian faithful as full selves 
with rights to match such a complete human status here on earth, and 
when commenting on Willy Loman, the main character in Arthur Miller's 
play Death of a Salesman, who in his supreme endeavour to be a 'well- 
liked' man, adapting in a spiritual servility this imperative demanded 
and enforced by the ideology in his society, was driven into depressions 
and eventually to suicide, by his lack of success in this project and 
the loss of the love (or so it seemed to him) of his nearest and dearest 
in the course of his committedly pursuing this bidding of the social 
norm. (A detailed analysis of the plot and message of this play is 
offered in Section 4 in this chapter, entitled 'Paradigms of Grace'). 
On pondering an the romantic's demanding two-stroke definition of 
adjustment, inviting people to be authentic 'object' as well as 
authentic 'subject' to a certain extent, in a comely balance between 
these two capacities of themselves within their selves, we should 
perhaps say that such a definition of adjustment as is maintained by 
them, is not mutually exclusive with a positivistic sociologic thought, 
only it is more inclusive. It does not contradict the 
socialtheoretically positivistic dictum, or rather imperative, that the 
individual, as a condition of his 'grace' and fulfilment and for the 
sake of the fulfilment of society, should and must be adjusted, and 
adjusted in the terms of the actuality of the positive being of the 
external, existing society, that the self, the individual's perspective 
with its capacity for deviant or critical thoughts, should become 
adjusted to society, that the "I" should be brought into alignment with 
the "me" in order to secure the norm bath for the benefit of society and 
as the aid for the clinical normalcy of the individual, so that the 
norm, in which the individual's "me" is anchored, should be experienced 
by the individual as that platform, source and touchstone of his 
stimulation, by which he is happy and contented to abide, upon which the 
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self is happy to appear and perform. Only, the 'romantic' social thinker 
would add two provisos to maintaining this part of his double-stroke 
imperative: 'be the "me" you are in society as your unavoidable social 
facticity and real personality as one condition of your authenticity'. 
The first is that if the actual norm doesn't live up, in the individual 
agent's authentic estimation, to standards of universalistic fairness to 
all its authentically adjustment-desirous members, he should be free, 
and justifiably so, to entertain a morally improved and more ideal 
society (conceived in practical terms, of course) than the one he is a 
member of in actuality; '=' that he should be free to define and 
practice his sphere of 'being' as a citizen, in the name of the 
collective consciousness as improved and more ideal, to which he is and 
remains sensible and loyal, in spite and in the face of the existing 
society, anomalous on a universalistic moral account, in the mode of the 
criticism of that existing society on the score on which that society 
is judged by him as morally wanting. The other difference between the 
behaviourist's ideal of adjustment and that of the 'roman'c'e consists 
in the circumstance that the 'romantic' social theorist will insist that 
the need for the self to adjust to the affairs in the world and his 
self's position in them as the condition of its sanity is only half the 
story, and only one part of the definition of adjustment. The ideal of 
adjustment is indeed both a socialpsychologically and socially practical 
and a moral imperative, but the maintainance of 'normalcy' and 
'adjustment' is a two-stroke process; hence the two parts of his 
categorical imperative bidding man to be adjusted. The first part of the 
imperative as maintained by the 'romantic' school of socialtheoretic 
thought in this century - as given above in its full form - is, as we 
have just said: 'be no more than human'; don't try to be just 'subject'; 
adjust to the "me" as a condition of your mental balance as a condition 
of your viable, practical personal adjustment the way the positivists 
agree you should, demand you should. But, at the same time, the second 
part of the 'romantic's' long categorical imperative, given above, 
insists, bids the agent: 'be no less than human' - do not try to be just 
a "me", for then you will again not be what you are as a man, as man. As 
Ibsen sums up this part of the existentialist imperative to the being of 
the self in Peer Gynt - 'be thyself'; be a self, that of your own, 
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fully. Not just thy self and none of the social world, as Peer Gynt 
vainly attempted to be, but 'thy self' as well as being a social fixture 
in the world, as part of your adjustment. Freud has a technical term 
for the manner in which the socialscientific positivist demands 
adjustment of the individual. The positivist's demand of the 
individual's adjustment is 'autoplastic'; it involves changing the self, 
together with its insights and standards peculiar to it as such, so as 
to fit demands of it, the mould for it, in society. The 'romantic' 
socialtheoratic idea of adjustment, in contrast, is importantly 
inclusive of that phase in the process of adjustment which the 
individual must regard as his ideal as the concrete, experl. enceable form 
of itself as human reality and which it must take it on himself to 
perpetrate and effect, which Freud calls 'alloplastic' and which means 
changing the world, making the world give too, in the process of 
accomplishing adjustment - an adjustment conceptualised, grasped, 
inclusively with the personal adjustment in people of a "me" to an "I", 
insisting on a "me"which a self individually judges and experiences as 
right for itself in its true lights - or to push this statement to more 
dramatic limits, choosing a "me" which an "I" can tolerate if it is 
authentically activated and brought to bear on the self's condition in 
the world - and the 'romantic's' criterion for adjustment is also 
inclusive of the adjustment of an "I" to a "me", in an observance of the 
actually possible to the limit of the self which the "me" can tolarate 
it fully engaged in its authenticity, so as to achieve a comely balance 
between "me" and "I" with neither of these two factors within the self 
either suppressed out of existence or untenably overtaxed, but both 
authentically retained and wisely used to its optimum. Romantic 
socialtheoretic and moralistic thought in this century, particularly the 
existentialist and Gestalt psychological brands within it, fulfils the 
function of pointing out by means of analytic reflection both of a 
phenomenological and of a scientific kind, (I am thinking here of Mead, 
Asch and Milgram), that any route taken towards the securing of 
the adjustment of an individually judged set of norms to a publicly 
judged and maintained set of norms so as to secure what Sartre would 
call the 'being of the individual's consciousness' in the continuity of 
that with the collective consciousness as actualised and given in the 
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social norm -, in other words, any route taken towards the securing of 
the achievement of securing the adjustment of the consciousness of the 
self to society, which has no recourse to the individually judged, 
personal authentic witness of the truth by human measures in that 
situation, and which takes a shortcut in achieving such adjustment 
through by-passing the need for people's intrapersonal adjustment 
between "me" and "I" in achieving this outward adjustment, is wrong, and 
is also traumatic or downright intolerable to the individual as such, as 
well as generative of personal maladjustment, or, in Sartrian 
vocabulary, the socialpsychologically 'obscene'. The existentialists go 
furthest in exploring the manifold ways in which it is possible and 
instructive to discern this discovery in individual psychologic, 
socialpsychologic and sociologic contexts, with Mead going along with 
them a very long way. 
What can be easily and legitimately identified as a kindred 
conceptualisation of adjustment as a two-stroke, two-fold process and 
phenomenon in the emergence of social consciousness within and outside 
the self in Mead's Mind, Self and Society ''-5' - with one aspect of the 
adjustment process consisting in the judicial fitting of the "I" (though 
without denouncing that) as response to the simulation of the self by 
social objects, including other people's, and one's own, existing 
personality or "me", and the other aspect of the adjustment process 
consisting in the rationalistic, Pygmalionic one, that is the creation 
and shaping, within reason, of course, of the social stimulus, the state 
of the world and the Other as part of that, to accommvdgte ones " I" if 
the unique lights and demands of that happen to be justified, as already 
outlined towards the very end of the last Chapter - could be summarily 
put in the following way, using Meadean idiom: Not only is it the case 
that the adjusted self is responsive to stimulation that has the 
capacity to satisfy it, but it's also the case that the quality of 
stimulation chosen ('selected', in Mead's words) by the self and 
incorporated into conduct, 'answers to' the need and the capacity of the 
"I" - the need of the self as such - in a way which precisely fits this 
need as a self, or at least satisfies that need the most optimally out 
of the range of the stimuli available to such a 'selection' by the "I" 
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available in the world, so as to make the 'selected' stimuli integral 
part of conduct and of the self. It is through this process that the 
"me" or one's personality (with a view to that "me" serving as the 
platform and the occasion of the rights of the "I"), and the 
interpersonal social world comes about, to a great extent. However, 
Mead's dialectic model postulating in this fashion the two phases of 
social emergence, is but implcitly put and carries no further 
implications; restricting his above described theory to 
socialpsychologic confines; though within those confines, this 
postulation of his has much in common with the existentialist model of 
the emergence (upsurge) of consciousness - creative of itself and of its 
social object, its own personality included as such; and the central 
role assigned to this process by the 'romantic', is the proper part of 
the complex process of adjustment, by the 'romantic's' measure. 
In contrast, existentialist socialtheoretic thought in this century, 
does carry its two-fold criterion of adjustment to such limits as to 
lead in its implications into other disciplines too. To comment first on 
an existentialist social theory's contribution to 
socialpsychology/micro-anthropology, it has already been shown that this 
school at thought is critical of both those sources of unauthenticity 
which have been considered so far - of the displacement of either of the 
two complementary components of the self (the "me" and the "I"), into 
the functioning, into the active cultivation of the other component, 
exclusively governing consciousness, as a result, as the overriding 
modality of that as either a "me"-only or as an "I"-only; such a school 
of thought is critical of the wasting, the starving of the self of one 
aspect of its being or the other, of its swelling itself as all "me" in 
bad faith pretending it doesn't have consequential choices to make as an 
"I", and that it needn't and can't be a responsible and effective 
caretaker to its own self and to those around it to whose being and 
possibilities it is instrumental, and that it's nonsensical that the 
freedom to apprentice oneself as paintmixer and dogsbody to a not yet 
established artist, as a project with a possibly dicy outcome in actual 
terms, as did Turner's father in our example quoted near the end of the 
last chapter, can be sanely, legitimately and unapologetically made part 
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of it to certain personal and interpersonal benefit, as an end in 
itself. Conversely, existentialist thought is also critical of the 
unauthenticity of the self swelling itself up as all "I", contemptuous 
and unable to suffer those mundane day-to-day routine tasks which it 
owes others and also itself for the sake of the sane management of its 
anchorage in the various aspects of the concrete, given world "", as a 
mere, practical "me", with no direct and immediate relevance to the 
self's own advancement and glorification in an obvious way. 
At the socialpsychologic level, 'romantic' thought, then, 
importantly, states, as one of the criteria of the total phenomenon of 
adjustment, the need for a balanced and complementary relationship 
within the infrastructure of the self, between an "I" which is given the 
full scope spontaneously inherent in it - as fully put into play in 
response to the recognised demands of the actual social "me", and a "me" 
just as frankly admitted and fully put into play so as to avail itself 
as a concrete, active social object, a platform and occasion for itself 
or for the need of another self by its own decision, as in the case of 
the older Turner, in contrast to abstaining, to withdrawing, to being 
unavailable. 
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Section 2. Adjustment and aladjustmnent in the act. 
the 'romantic' conceptualisation of the total phenomenon of 
adjustment has just been outlined in the previous Section. It is 
emphatically underlain by the maintainance of the need, not only for 
the self to accornmodate the standards, calls and demands of society, in 
what Freud calls 'autoplastic' adjustment to the world, if the self be 
deficient in the light of the more applicable, appropriae and adequate 
social norm there, but also the need, possibility and demand for the 
occasioning of the adjustment of the world by and to the self, in a so- 
called 'alloplastic' socialpsychologic process, in cases when the lights 
of the self are more justified than the moral ways of the existing 
social norm, or some particular aspect of it which concern the self. It 
may be useful to analyse the 'romantics" resulting complex notion of 
adjustment - (whose postulation receives detailed comment in the 
previous Section, and which to the 'romantics' is the only adequate way 
of conceptualising that) - into two dimensions: its lateral structure, 
and its deep structure. 
The lateral structure of adjustment is its socialpsychologically 
authentic dimension. It comes about in the tacit act of reflection and 
the overt act in conduct, by the cultivation of an active and practical 
socialpsychologic ideal of a balance between the visions, duties, needs 
of the "I" and the realisation of those in the "me" both within and 
outside the self, peculiarly and properly within a personal and/or 
interpersonal socialpsychologic compass, and from a point of view 
inclusive of it. The bonus for successfully effecting and maintaining 
such a balance between the "me" and the "I" in one's tacit or explicit 
area of activities, is the self's socialpsychologic 'grace' -a synonym, 
in Sartre, for the feat of 'adjustment' "'', an attribute in which both 
Raskolnikov (the "me"-denouncer) and Brecht's 'Little Monk' and Willy 
Loman (the "I"-denouncers) in our examples put forth in the previous 
Section), were lacking. (A detailed account of Willy Loman's case will 
follow in an analysis of Arthur Miller's play Death of a Salesman, in 
Section 4. of this chapter. ) The sphere of the lateral structure of the 
active consciousness and overt conduct, consists of and is exhausted in 
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the activity of the synthesising of the "me" and the "I" in the act, 
covert, and particularly and more importantly, overt, or, contrarywise, 
in the significant and poignant failure to synthesise the "I", as fully 
recognised and owned up to as the self's reponse capacity, with the 
"me", or the capacity of the self to choose to be a concrete object and 
to serve as the concrete occasion for the recognised response capacity 
of the self as partly an "I" - in one's own concrete self and/or in 
that of another which we may occasion. All the 'romantics' considered 
here are pragmatists in the sense in which MacQuarrie and elsewhere 
Sartre entertain that notion, "' '' in that they see human reality, 
the reality of consciousness, in the act. They share Goethe's 
proposition (Sartre explicitly quoting it): 'In the beginning was the 
act. ' The act to them - the unit of human reality - is the synthesis, as 
that human reality happens, takes place in its upsurge, between man's 
dual possibilities as it were - those not yet but perhaps eventually 
realised, possibilities of which man explicitly knows he is capable, has 
the capacity for, and, in Sartre's 'book', has the right to (in a 
particularly conspicuous way when those possibilities are 
unfulfilled); '-"0) - his ideal possibilities, which consist in his 
encodedness for certain response capacities as a species being and whose 
frustration he feels unnatural and untenable if he is true to himself as 
a self - his authenticity as an "I"; and, on the other hand, those 
possibilities which he has as a "me", as an overt personality with 
certain credibility, standing, means, which has or alternatively, 
significantly and regrettably has not got the capacity, in actual terms, 
to be the occasion to his sense of duty, for the rights, for the need of 
the "I", as a "me", in other words, which can do something about those 
needs. The first mentioned set of man's possibilities (its repository in 
the "I"), is the rationalistic precondition to, component of the act, 
the second, that of the "me", the actual; each are necessary conditions 
to the act, and their actualised synthesis is the sufficient condition 
for it. Mead and Derrida "I -12: 1 label the first set of possibilities, 
that which a man can toy with, judge whether it's a possibility proper 
and/or worthy of 'marrying' with the actual possibilities in external 
reality of the overt "me" in and through the act, with the term 
'rehearsal'. The rehearsal is done privately; in Mead's description, the 
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rehearsal precedes an occasion in which the agent at first encounters, 
as a novelty even to himself, the response of the "I" to a problematic 
or unexpected situation affecting his self called on to act, whether in 
a social or the personally creative context, and practices, as it were, 
the way in which that will be put over publicly to the scientific, 
artistic or just social community, (the generalized other in all these 
ways), weighing up how he will come over as a "me"-cum-"I", or a self, 
in the actuality of that self, how his personality with his newly 
discovered "I" brought to bear upon that, will actually come about, come 
to 'be' in outward reality, matching that "I" to more than one possible 
"me"-s (by a Meadean implication) that one can put into cgntact with, 
incorporate into the actual reality of the overt personality and make 
part of the reality of the world, 'actualise' or (in Sartrian language) 
'possibilise'; to which he decides, in other words, to give the verdict 
(to draw on filming jargon): 'print that'. The well-rehearsed new 
ensemble of the "me" and the "I", his chosen self, that is, will become 
tae object which the self overtly, actually, concretely, publicly, 
verifiably, in fact, la, the real thing after the rehearsals, the 
previously private content of the reflective consciousness in the 
subjectivity of its perspective, surrendered, concretised - made part of 
the social act - of external socialpsychologic reality. The rehearsal 
goes on after the real thing, real 'performance' too - it precedes that 
both in Derrida, Mead and also Sartre, and, according to all these 
'romantics', it follows that too: the "I" rises again in a new upsurge 
in response to, in critique of the 'real thing', to the Meadean "me", to 
the Sartrian 'existing', whose impact is unsatisfactory, or will soon 
be unsatisfactory when that becomes inadequate in the light of a new 
insight by the "I", or with the 'performance' gone a bit wrong, somewhat 
misfired, misunderstood, not well enough credited publicly to result in 
the adjustment of the self or of society in the new light of the "I", 
which, as the judgement of and response capacity to the imperfections of 
the "me" as it is to oneself and to the Other, or to many others. the 
community, is never given up. 
Which came first: the real thing or the rehearsal - the "me" or the 
"I"? The response capacity perhaps in the spirit of critique or 
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unconventional inventiveness in response to a problematic social 
stimulus situation affecting the "me", or does the self's capacity to be 
a "me" come first? Mead says the "me" does, and so do most modern 
theorists of the self - Lacan most pronouncedly - but the question of 
the primacy of the "me" over the "I", the "I" over the me, makes sense 
outside the context of the act only, in which context Derrida, in fact, 
considers it. In the act, the complementary realisation of the "I" in 
terms of the "me", and, conversely, the "me" in the "I", are the 
condition of one another, the condition of the act, the condition of the 
self and the definition of adjustment at the socialpsychologic level, 
all at the same stroke, and what students of the act as the unit of 
conduct and of human reality are concerned with, is whether the act and 
with it the authentic possibilities of the self, dually made up 
regarding the analytic structure and conditions of its production in the 
above suggested way, and, as a consequence of that, the creation and 
advancement of human reality, do in fact come to pass in and through the 
synthesis between the "me" and the "I" in the given, particular, 
concrete act time after time, or do not come to pass altough they might 
do, and are thereby significantly missed? 
The unit of human reality, as just observed, is the act; this unit 
may be of the duration of a lifetime, or of the duration of a prompt, 
single act in which the self acts upon a newly discovered potential for 
itself or for other selves effected by its act. The idiom of 
consciousness and conduct as human reality is its realised and 
realiseable action potential, or simply its action: its creativity, with 
special emphasis on its social creativity -a necessary by-product of 
all human reality-wise positive activity; and the way in which it shows 
itself as fulfilled, as being what it is, is in that it is productive. 
It is an important part of this postulation of the act as the product 
and index of the 'marriage' between the "me" and the "I", that "me"-s 
(the concrete, actual, overt possibilities of selves) can be joined to 
the need and the ideal potential of an "I" clamouring for fulfilment, 
outside the bounds of a single self; the self can offer its own "me" as 
the platform and occasion of the realisation of other selves' "I"-s, 
or, conversely, the insights of one's "I" may be offered for the 
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enhancement of the realisation of the "me" of another self, or several 
selves. Human reality is created in such instances just the same, as was 
shown in our earlier example offered on the last pages of the last 
chapter, of Turner's father having changed his "me", the range of the 
actual potentials, to suit that to his son's ideal potentials as an 
artist, or "I"; and conver-, 'eiy' the younger Turner offered his "I" for 
the betterment and greater discrimination and pleasure of the qualities 
of the "me" of his father as well as the "me"-s of countless others who, 
as a consequence, can now view and appreciate his vision, realised in 
his work. 
it has been observed in the last Section that there are two possible 
'lateral' sources of bad faith, that is, fulfilled and active self- 
avoidance. To recapitulate, one is "I"-denial, pretending one is 
personally too inconsequential, powerless, inert, too absolutely bound 
by social conventions, too object-like as a self to socially or 
socialpsychologically make a difference, and for that reason it's not 
proper or worth it for him to act in a novel and personally 
conspicuously endorsed way - with the weight of his person behind the 
act. The other source of bad faith is "me"-denial, pretending to be too 
precious, too well-bred, too much a cut above a mere social object- 
status to sink to the practical level of conduct. This variety of bad 
faith is carried to its conclusion in the extreme and uncommon case of 
Raskoln1kov, asserting the "I", in the spectacular act of calculated 
murder, at the exclusion, in his consciousness, of the dicta of the 
"me", both as a social 'carrier' bound by the law (the external 
standards of the social norm) and, in an intrapersonal context, at the 
exclusion of the peculiar standards governing the self, and particularly 
its executor: the "me". These socialpsychologic standards informing the 
ego, bid and demand, as an imperative, that the self have regard for 
life - for one's own life and that of another, - and it was with these 
tritra - personally powerful standards informing the self and pro m- 
t ng 
the personal "me" to abide by this human dictum, that Raskolnikov failed 
to reckon, and whose prevalence and potency he at first underestimated 
and fatally overlooked as a consequence; and, as a result, human reality 
of a positive nature from its own point of view, failed to be created, 
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or, even more retrogradely and negatively, was destroyed, by his 
act. "-3 1 
The first out of these two possible sources of bad faith is more 
common and is the one which enjoys the more respectability, 
justification and protection out of the two in other than 'romantic' 
schools of socialtheoretic thought and codes of conduct. Outside the 
'romantic' frame of reference, the characteristically passive way of 
life in which personal responsibility and discretion, credit or blame in 
complying with acts issued from up high is waived, is rarely equated 
with a source of and for maladjustment, although the perpetrators of 
maladjustment on this first account, Willy Loman fashion, swells the 
nuinoers of patients in mental hospitals; and romantic social thought is 
to be credited with identifying, showing this more common approach to 
and method of sidestepping chances for social creativity, for the bad 
faith and maladjustment it is. The other systematic and complementary 
source of bad faith, that of "me"-denial, particularly when of a 
pathological nature, is more universally and readily identified as such, 
and as the index of maladjustment. Systematic avoidance of acting on 
actual opportunities to fulfill a self's needs (or more selves' need), 
may come about through a clinically deficient grasp of reality as that 
is given - as in cases of delusions of grandeur (deficient interpersonal 
conduct) - schizoid uncoupling - (reality-irrelevant personal conduct) - 
or inaeed such social reality-deficiency may come about by way of the 
specialised conditioning of one anthropologic class to concern itself 
with thinking and issuing orders, leaving it to another anthropologic 
class to conduct itself practically and/or carry out orders. Latter-type 
bad faith - that of the "me"-denial of the self - is, of course, 
universally available to members of all social classes and is not 
restricted to members of the upper class - as the comedy Little Malcolm 
and his Fight with the Eunuchs. shows - its plot depicting the response 
of Malcolm, the rebel youngster, in the face of his sudden success in 
securing for himself a real chance in life after years of crusading for 
one. When actually available, the hero of the play refuses to take the 
far greater risk and trouble than diligent political outspokenness, 
which is involved in the project of really wanting to make something of 
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one's break, and opts for the pose and affectation for merely debating 
for such chances as a habitual mode of being a noncomforming 
consciousness. 
'Little Malcolm's' shunning the pursuance of the real opportunities 
available to his "me" in the world, amounts to an example of the way in 
which "me"-denuciation results in a typical lack of productivity and 
action of a personal order and quality of which only the authentically 
fulfilled self is capable of contributing. As a contrast, another ax. aM O 
will be summoned here to show how the "I"-denunciation of the agent (the 
opposite paradigm of the self's authenticity-distorting and betraying 
conduct to Malcolm's and Raskolnikov's "me"-denunciation), also 
frustrates the authentic act, to demonstrate how this second type of 
socialpsychologic unauthenticity (the mirror maladjustment to that of 
Malcolm's and Raskolnikov's), operates and comes to be deserving of the 
attribute of bad faith, both in the individual perpetrating, and in 
people around him demanding and encouraging such conduct, and how this 
second, opposite type of bad faith, foils, equally effectively, the full 
possibility for the creation, in and through the act, of the agent's 
decorous, productive and authentic self in particular and the creation 
of human reality in its proper capacity, in general. We have already 
offered earlier on the examples of Brecht's 'Little Monk' and Arthur 
Miller's Willy Loman (referred to, among other places, in the last 
Section of this chapter) to demomstrate this case, but now we hope to 
reinforce the argumant of this paradigm of maladjustment in the context 
or the act, through the additional example of Beatrix Potter. A talent 
as an artist on many scores, for which she has eventually proved 
herself, Beatrix Potter spent the first decades of her adult life 
tending the whims of her bad-tempered, invalid and totally possessive 
father, which full-time occupation for her prevented her both from 
getting married and from cultivating a career much earlier on than she 
actually did, as the writer and illustator of genius, for which she 
eventually declared herself relatively late in life, after her father's 
death. Throughout the best part of her adult life, her self was kept, no 
less than the practical output-shunning 'Little Malcolm' who avoided 
employing his "me" when the opportunity to do so had come to him, from 
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the productivity-generating 'marriage' within her self between her 
outstanding endowment with an ideal creative potential as an "I" which 
dormantly amounted during many years to her sense of calling in life and 
which had to be kept quiet and frustrated during this great span of 
time, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 'actualising' of that 
ideal potential in and through the real potentials available to the "me" 
in the world to do justice to those 'ideal' possibilties and talents of 
her as an artist, the way in which this 'marriage' between "I" and "me" 
within her self, eventually came to be effected and expressed in her 
remarkable oeuvre; suppressing and exchanging throughout the decades of 
her earlier adulthood, her authentic potential for output is a self and 
an artist in the personal light of her "I", which she always longed to 
be, and which eventually came to pass and became vindicated as her real 
self, for the creatively passive life (by her standards) of a 
domestically efficient spinster of means, managing her affairs as such 
on her father's side, in bitterness about her lot. 
(Although we referred to the existence, in a real and meaningful 
sense, of Beatrix Potter's self as an authoress even during her years of 
domestic confinement - in which period her eventually vindicated self as 
an artist of great ability already loomed as her 'ideal self', it may 
be mentioned here in parentheses that there are 'romantic' social 
psychologists to whom Beatrix Potter as writer and illustrator of 
excellence, and not as her father's housekeeper, was her 'real self', 
even during the early years of the frustration of her talent, although 
this 'real self' of hers was only belatedly endorsed by her in the act, 
ana it was consequently later that this 'real self' of hers graduated to 
an actual reality. The status of the self that she was cheated out of by 
her father over many years, they would say, was not of the feeble order 
of a merely imagined ideal self, but was a necessary one; 'objective', if 
not by the empiricist's measure, perhaps by a Sartrian one ; and some 
would go so far as to say that her self as an authoress would have been 
her 'real self' even without her ever having been in a position to 
provide tangible proof of that 'real self' later on in life. One can 
sympathise with such a conceptualisation of the notion which is the 
'ideal self' to us, and see the point in grasping it as also real, in a 
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very meaningful sense; but deviating from the way in which we used the 
term 'real self' so far - that inclusive of the aspect of the self for 
which the Other knows us and of which he informs us in the here-and-now 
- would introduce confusion into our argument, and for that reason 
this interesting nomenclature in the usage of some 'romantics' in 
referring to our 'ideal self' as also 'real', is only mentioned here as 
a point of interest. ) 
The examples of 'Little Malcolm' and Beatrix Potter, both of whose 
frustrated selves borrowed from, and in turn, produced a consequentially 
negative effect upon the external world which became impoverished 
through their prolongued lack of output in actual terms, show that there 
is always an element of arbitrariness in commenting on the lateral 
structure of a person's adjustment, or of any act, in a divorce from its 
deep structure, which is afforded by the relationship between the sphere 
of activity of a person as a self, and the framework and background to 
that within society, as will be enlarged on in a little while. Malcolm's 
choice to denounce the opportunities for his "me" in the world, had the 
side-effect of the withdrawal of his self, when the chips were down, 
from the practical consolidation at the collective level and platform 
for his life-long verbal crusade for an equal chance for all in social 
actuality, - an externally very consequential negative result of his 
conduct, - and Beatrix Potter, in silencing the unique endowment of her 
"I" for many years, and making that "I" redundant, failed to make a 
stand against Victorian society's values which called for the sacrifice 
of her self with its potentials for achievent and output as a sovereign 
individual, demanding that she surrender the talents with which she was 
singularly blessed, to the oppressive and socially authoritative 
expectations and biddings of that society, ordering her as a mere 
daughter to submit herself, as a matter of course, to her social and 
ascriptional elders and betters in the small society of the family, and 
therefore to her father and his bad-tempered caprices whilst he was 
alive. 
To summarise the conclusions drawn from the examples of Malcolm and 
Beatrix Potter through the spectacles of the 'romantic' social and 
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socialpsychological theorist, we may observe that the view of the 
'romantic' student of society and of human reality characterised by a 
strong concern, in grasping and entertaining the notion of adjustment, 
with the relationship between the self as human reality, and every 
stratum of nature on which the self and its activities impinge - the 
biologic and the social in particular, in addition to the 
socialpsychologic one - and a concern also with the way in which the 
self makes an impact on all three of these levels of its being and 
conduct part of the 'romantic's' notion and judgement of the self's 
adjustment. These cross-categoric makings of adjustment and 
maladjustment - taking their source from the simultaneous Involvement of 
the self in its adjustment in the physiologic and social (in addition to 
the socialpsychologic) levels of nature all at the same time - are 
identified here as the deep structure of adjustment. Out of this cross- 
categoric ensemble of the total adjustment-structure as just specified, 
the sociologic or social, and the socialpsychologic strata, are in a 
special relationship to each other, which may be seen as dialectic and 
deepstructural. It is, of course, the socialpsychologic or micro- 
anthropologic layer which is most properly and realistically seen as the 
deep structure of positive sociologic reality in this relationship and 
not the other way round; the Durkheim-postulated stratum of reality in 
this relationship (or the collective consciousness), adherence to which 
as a behavioural and normative ideal and typical practice historically 
reigned supreme before society grew increasingly tolerant to the 
society-critical, individualistically more sophisticated and somewhat 
deviant fashions of citizenship, must be recognised as the primary term 
in this special relationship between society and human reality or the 
'my world' of the self. Nevertheless, the 'romantic' and particularly 
existentialist tradition and tendency in this century, to insist on the 
separateness and the relative autonomy of the socialpsychologic level of 
reality, that which subsists, characteristically, in terms of selves, 
which is transient, which consists in the dual and complementary 
possibilities of "me"-s and "I"-s being seen and realised, acted on, 
'possibilised', 'married' (I think Mead's synonym: 'consummated' is the 
best), in concrete acts by concrete people, as a reality other than the 
permanently manifest and crudely and already given, predigested and 
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ready-made social norm, is seen as meaningful and reality-relevant. 
Albeit merely the source of change in relation to the stereotype 
prevailing social norm, the transient, inventive, concrete activation of 
"me"-s and "I"-s in terms of each other, offering themselves for 
'marriage' from situation to situation, is a reality precisely as a 
source of change which must be paid attention to (for social reality 
does change and does so according to regularities that analysably and 
discernably obtain in socialpsychologic reality) - and also because the 
self's inventiveness in terms of activating laterally complementary 
opportunities for the 'marriage' or consummation in each other of "me"-s 
and "I"-s when they are found to potentially tally, is an axiomatic 
feature of human consciousness - its engagement in this activity, which 
holds its own kind of fulfilment, is the index of its being what it is, 
and the denial of this level of the being of consciousness, results in 
the unauthenticity of selves in particular and in the unauthenticity, 
the betrayal of nature itself in which the activation of 
socialpsychologic reality through the human act, is a universal 
possibility and, if realised, then also a reality, in all situations 
where there are people. On the 'romantic' secialtheoretical view, 
particularly as propounded by the existentialists in this century, a 
marked non-coincidence (amounting to a matter of fundamental choice) can 
be identified as obtaining (at least as a potential) in all human 
situations at all times, particularly critical ones, between the 
conditions of adjustment to society by the self in keeping with 
socialpsychologically authentic standards (alloplastic, to an 
appreciable measure), and another route to the adjustment by the self to 
society, entirely in terms of the the ready-made idiom of the already 
prevailing norm (unconditionally autoplastic), which is glib as the mode 
of the expression of the self, aiming at the realisation of the 
stereotypically grasped self in society in a way which is alternative to 
the personally authentic one, by-passing all recourse to human reality 
and its awn standards of judgement, sense of responsibility, presence 
and weight as a self or as an opportunity for social inventiveness, 
drawing entirely on cliches of the self as a matter of the chosen 
preference of that. (We have previously asserted that, even in cases 
where the authentic self chooses to prop up, endorse the norm of an 
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existing society, there is nevertheless a difference between this 
authentic way on its part to give itself to the society in question in 
the significant personally meant act of 'elective assumption', in which 
act the intrapersonal adjustment of the self as an active and operative 
ensemble of the "me" and "I" does not become redundant, and the 
unconditional surrender of the self to society at all times by the 
unauthentic agent, so as to avoid having to engage and maintain the 
socialpsychologically arduous way of the authenticity of the self. A 
description of 'elective assumption' is given in the Introduction. ) 
There is, then, always a choice for the inalIVIdual, the 'romantic' will 
say, as to which out of these two routes, the personally authentic and 
the personally unauthentic one, to take in the capacity of the self as 
the occasion for society, which the 'romantic' will characteristically 
see as part of the whole adjustment phenomenon. The 'romantic', 
particularly the existentialist, is as concerned with the way a person's 
own idea of his adjustment as a self dovetails (glieder) with that of 
society as Durkheim is with the same issue, and on top of this aspect of 
the cross-categoric connection between the self's and society's 
equilibrium or adjustment, he also concerns himself with how personal 
adjustment dovetails with the physiologic level of fulfilment, something 
that doesn't occur in Durkheim's problematic at all. 
Perhaps Durkheim's system and modern European socialtheoretic 
thought are unique in entertaining, and in making integral part and 
cornerstone in their socialtheoretic thinking, the shared insight that 
external social reality as a source of information to consciusness is 
irreaucibly other than the intimate, particularistic mode of 
consciousness apprehending its reality - the insight, in other words, 
tnat sociologic reality in its pure, scientifically entertained form as 
a mode of human consciousness, and socialpsychologic (or in Sartre's 
language: human) reality, are irreducibly other, and properly studied 
and appreciated as separate subject matters, whether these kinds of 
realities and modes of consciousness are approached 
interdisciplinarily, or treated in different disciplines. Consequently, 
Durkheim and the existentialists are probably unique among 
socialtheoretic thinkers in considering the question: 'how is society 
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the intended/ unintended outcome of individual wills? ' - as meaningless 
and as one with which they do not concern themselves in the least, each 
of these two schools maintaining (though Durkheim not caring) that the 
interplay of wills and their actual interpersonal realisation does 
appropriately form part of the study of the infrastructure of the self 
and properly belong to the area and study of socialpsychologic reality; 
furthermore, Durkheim and the existentialists also share the 
appreciation that the being of society is properly studied within 
positive social science. Durkheim and the modern existentialists also 
agree that neither of these two strata of consciousness - the sociologic 
or the socialpsychologic - will reduce to the other, but they will both 
figure and be effective over against one another in nature, in a 
dialectic, mutually exclusive and uncomplementary otherness, a state of 
affairs we devoted considerable attention to in the Section in 
Chapter 3. entitled 'Which Came First: the Chicken or the Egg? ' Durkheim 
and the existentialists both see that socialpsychologic reality will 
effect social reality inappropriately only so to speak, as anomie, as 
uncongenial to that social reality, if brought to bear on the being of 
society with its socialpsychologic standards posited as alternatives to 
society's own, other, but equally autonomous standards of 'adjustment' 
or rather, in Durkheim's terminology, 'equilibrium'. The pure phenomenon 
'society' is, for that reason, in no way the outcome of individual 
wills, intended or unintended, as Durkheim and modern existentialists 
will agree, but it stands indifferently over against selves and their 
wills as external, other, alien to them and experienced by selves 
accordingly. But, existentialists will add (and Durkheim and they will 
part company here), that these two modes of consciousness - sociologic 
proper and socialpsychologic proper - will both persist as the different 
and specially non-complementary autonomous realities they respectively 
are in their own right, both of them; congenial to one another or not, 
each the condition and the possibility of the other. Socialpsychologic 
reality is not easily and naturally attenuated, as Durkheim would have 
it, so as to become irrelevant to the continuous and inert being of 
equilibrated positive society, to which it incessantly relates. While 
maintaining the reality of the Durkheim-postulated positive Being of 
society outside the self, 'romantics' assert the concurrent reality of 
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the socialpsycholgic being of consciousness, that of human reality as 
one's, everyone's, potential to be a self - its reality as the perpetual 
readiness to incorporate into itself concrete stimulation in and by the 
world, according to the needs of the "I", in the continual emergence of 
the latter in response and critique of the "me", the actual condition of 
the self as continuous with the social world (imperceptibly, if the 
agent is unauthentic, and as a protuberance on the body of the norm if 
the self asserts itself authentically there, for what it is qua the 
sell). This continual emergence of the self, on account of the ceaseless 
birth of new "me"-s in response to the irrepressible "I"-s need and 
critique, and of the "I" in response to and in critique of'the quality 
of the "me" in actuality, amounts to an ongoing socialpsychologic 
process informed by the self's presence to its own standards demanding 
that it be a fulfilled self - one comprised by the satisfactorily 
composite and complementary relation between the "me" and the "I" within 
its infrastructure. This is the socialpsychologic level of the being of 
consciousness, a reality which, though other, is just as axiomaticaly 
meaningful and present in the here-and-now, and as autonomous within its 
proper compass: the area of the being of the self (the 'romantic' 
theorist will say), as that of the Durkheim-postulated and demonstrated 
external being of the collective consciousness, irrespective of 
Durkheim's hostile and normatively disapproving attitude to it. It is by 
virtue and through this process that human reality 'is what it is'. In 
$gjpg and Nothingness the being of consiousness as the potential which 
it always sees itself as being as a fulfilled and adjusted self, is 
equated with its right -a Sartrian proposition already touched on in 
this Section, under Reference 10. 
Of course, the same area of study, in the treatment of modern 
existentialist thought, that with which Durkheim's work is being 
juxtaposed here, suffers from the opposite bias of these radically 
'romantic' social theorists, who often conflate sociologically 
professional conduct and purely scientific thought - for which there 
most definitely is a time and place - with false affectations of those 
in human attitudes, underlain and amenable to being analytically shown 
as a socialpsychologically decodable motivation to avoid the arduous 
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prospect and course of authentically entertaining and maintaining an 
authentic conduct as a self, and a legitimate concern for that. For that 
reason the existentialist Bultmann is hostile to such attitudes, which 
he labels 'legalism', and, to Sartre's way of thinking, the values of 
the norm seem, in a blanket way, due to the common socialpsychological 
adulteration of that norm by the above described motivation of the 
unauthentic, to be 'antivalues' from the point of view of human reality. 
But this attitude does not move these existentialists to deny the being 
of external society which exists in that norm; on the contrary, it 
causes in them a heightened and correct awareness in their models of 
conduct and thought, of the external, positivistically objdctive mode of 
the being of consciousness, that which Durkheim propounds, as other than 
the socialpsychologic level of its functioning (which they claim, is 
also objective, or even more objective, includes the additional light of 
more microcosmic and discriminatingly socialpsychologic standards), and 
they characteristically grasp adjustment as complete with the objective 
reality of society outside; they treat adjustment as a phenomenon in 
which reckoning, coping with, even assuming individual responsibility 
, an 
for the external Being of society forms 
^integral 
part. It is for that 
reason (the above argument leads us back to the point), that it is at 
the cost of considerable arbitrariness that the lateral makings of 
adjustment are further traced here as relatively autonomous - not 
independent of the issue of the equilibrium of society sul generis, but 
other in kind than it, and its autonomy is salvaged from a Durkheimian 
absorption into an unattainable ideal of a human-adjustment-irrelevant, 
puristic socialscientific reality which, by Durkheimian normative 
implications, properly permeates all modes of consciousness, desirably 
yielding an all-encompassing and exclusive reality in every area of 
conduct from which human authenticity is jettisoned as cluttering up the 
tidiness of the positive monism there. A 'romantic' preoccupation with 
society and study of the lateral makings of adjustment, particularly in 
the context of society, are of avail; they supplement sociology, 
supplying it with the rules of its adulteration in high places or low, 
as well as with the structures of social novelty, creativity, emergence; 
lateral structures of adjustment are usefully analysed apart from a 
purely social level of fulfilment or a purely physiologic one, for the 
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choice on the part of a person as to how many of these levels of 
adjustment he cares to make his business, and regards as the object of 
his duty - whether he includes lateral or socialpsychologic standards in 
his conduct or not - affords different structures in consciousness and 
in outward reality. 
We have already offered two examples in this Section: those of 
'Little Malcolm' and of Beatrix Potter, to demonstrate the two possible 
constellations of bad faith within consciousness: "me"-denunciation with 
the overemphasising of the role of the "I" in conduct, and "I"- 
denunciation with the overemphasising and overdeploying the orphaned 
"me", which comes to the fore in conduct as a consequence of such a 
choice, as the sole and impoverished informant of the self in its 
participation within the spheres of its socialpsychologic as well as its 
social reality. We shall now turn to two further examples to demonstrate 
the same two paradigms of bad faith, picking instances this time in 
which the outward, sociologic as well as socialpsychologic 
consequentiality of these two projects of bad faith is greater and more 
paramount than was in the case of our examples of Potter and 'Little 
Malcolm'. 
To depict first the case of object-deficiency in such a context, we 
shall turn to Sartre's very critical, acid and sharp attack on the Jew 
in his work Antisemite and Jew, on account of the Jew's unauthetic 
project of withdrawing into the ivory tower of intellectualism, (a 
typical option on his part in the project of bettering his lot), whilst 
his race is persecuted in society. Through the example of the Jew, 
Sartre attacks, by implication, all people who belie, betray that which 
a person is in his unapologetic profaneness and social as well as 
socialpsychologic actuality in his somewhat powerful position in the 
social world as the 'carrier' of it - as part of that social body 
himself in such a capacity, in his capacity as an authentically, 
socialpsychologically, as well as socially, concrete "me". 
In depicting the opposite paradigm, that of "I"-denunciation on such 
a social and wide cultural scale, we turn to Sartre's writings again. In 
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his work Philosophic and Literary say, , Sartre writes about a 
Frenchman who had emigrated to the United States some time before Sartre 
and he met there, and who, during his years in the States, had 
identified with the vaudeville, most ready and crude stereotype image of 
the Frenchman known to and upheld by the humanly most lazy members in 
his new culture who didn't wish to be bothered with personally, singly, 
authentically relating to other citizens as humanly somewhat dignified 
or small-letter 'sacred' people and individual selves. The Frenchman, to 
oblige this stereotype, had learned to loudly thrust himself on 
everyone's attention as a one-tracked-minded, constantly sex-preoccupied 
character, as the permanent index and advertisement of his overriding 
project of eager compliance with the host culture's expectations of the 
Frenchman, quite unlike anyone Sartre had met in France. The man's 
exaggerated, larger-than-life familiarities embarrassed and saddened 
Sartre; the price this man chose to pay for his assimilation into the 
society chosen by him, was giving up his self; and he was also, though 
Sartre didn't make this point specially, a poor ambassador for the 
French. The reason the man was blameworthy in Sartre's book, was not 
that he chase to endorse with his being his adopted culture - society 
outside - existentialism allows for this part of a man's authenticity 
provided he makes himself available to society as a matter of his 
personally and honestly considered choice - but because he has given up 
his self as such the while - made himself object only, a stereotype 
lecher so as to maximally accommodate. as Problem free social object; a 
ready object in every stratum of the self except for that of the hybrid, 
synthetic, social psychologically realisable and imperative one - 
imperative at least to the 'romantic' nodal theoretician's way of 
thinking. He deliberately addressed his being, gave himself to, chose 
his self and his project to refract upon 'not reality', to quote the 
poet, but 'a heavenly copy of that', though in an inverted sense to that 
which was meant by the poet in question. '' " Whilst the Frenchman's 
consciousness, conduct, was made redundant within the compass of the 24- 
carat authenticity of real persons, through betraying that level of 
peculiarly human reality in which all social psychologically authentic 
feel at home, his being aimed at and involved the different, stereotype, 
socially schematised reality of an individual's 'ideal type' in public 
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opinion, that reality in which that of real persons is tranSPosecA into 
judged expectations of those as institutions. (Weber). I have recently 
heard of two competitions - one where prizes were offered to the best 
imitators of Graham Greene, and the other where prizes were offered to 
the best imitators of the GPO's 'whistling' telephone, the 'trimphone'. 
With the prizes given, Graham Greene wrote in to complain that his entry 
didn't get a placing in the Graham Greene competition; as for the 
'trimphone' contest, the 'trimphone' itself came a joint third. The 
Frenchman of the example (to utilise these analogies) aims to win 
popular competitions where his self is judged by a consensus, like a 
boppy number written for the Eurovision song contest for judges who 
don't know the indigeneous language of the countries entering, and to 
whom subtleties of Ixpression, idiosyncratic turns, moods, 
particularly authentic content, get in the way of judgement and 
enjoyment; and in order to come first, the Frenchman simply gives up who 
he really is. 
Sartre's example of the Frenchman in America provides here a 
convenient opportunity to clear up a misunderstanding that sometimes 
attaches to interpretations of the existentialist's demand for personal 
authenticity as against and as complete with the social background of 
adjustment; one to which our choice of the example of Turner's father at 
the very end of the last chapter, might have added some fuel. It's 
sometimes wrongly thought that the advocacy of the authenticity of acts 
- of the need to give one's attitude to the environment one's personal 
weight, the need to 'choose oneself' as the person who is there and 
available - is advocacy of some spectacularly flamboyant act that goes 
with the creation of a past-irrelevant new self or the turning of one's 
back an the old set-up. Far from it. The Frenchman in Sartre's example 
would have been more authentic if more discreet and less outlandish, had 
he overacted less. Had it been Turner's mother (to go back to our old 
example again) and not his father who had willingly made herself a 
special person-about-the-house, cook, apprentice, handy-person in the 
execution of the creative work of the young artist - even though coming 
from the mother, such a course of action would have coincided exactly 
with the cultural stereotype - her act and choice would have been just 
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as authentic as was Turner's father's under the circumstances. There are 
plenty of mothers who are authentic, give their all as persons to being 
a mother without kicking against social conventions in any way, and in 
Ibsen's portrayal of Mrs. Solness in The Masterbuilder, we have an 
example of an existentialism-prompted criticism of the personal 
unauthenticity of a mother-figure in the family, to whom all the chores 
involved in fulfilling her role in the house are merely solemn duties. 
Mrs. Solness has chosen, from the moment of her marriage to the 
masterbuilder, to accept the role of wife and mother in the household; 
but the death of her twin children has made her bitter, and warped her 
attitude and commitment to the role-set originally chosen by her; 
resulting in the type of "me"-denouncing maladjustment for which Ibsen 
represented her, with a critical edge on account of her subsequent, 
lifelong choice of herself as a pathetic, hurt figure, too precious to 
be part of the concrete world around her which clamoured in practical 
ways for her authentic and effective help within it, and was worse off 
through her emotional withdrawal of that. Mrs. Solness' way of carrying 
out her duties in the house, underlain by the affectation of an attitude 
of distaste for those chores nobly and virtuously conquered, serves as 
an example for an inconspicuous, everyday sort of unauthenticity, just 
as the converse attitude, the authenticity of many persons doing their 
bit as socially ascribed with the weight of their persons behind it, is 
not conspicuous. In the absence of a mother in the Turner-household, the 
father's authentic project stands out at a tangent with accepted 
stereotype behaviour, and in such cases there is positive proof, as it 
were, in the person's manifest conduct of his social creativity and 
inventiveness, of the personal authenticity of his conduct as an 
alternative, or extra, to his regard (or disregard) for social 
conventions - his authenticity thrown into dramatic relief over against 
that merely conventional background. I suppose it is for this reason 
that very conspicuous and anticonventional instances of authenticity 
tend to be quoted more; those are the ones that meet the eye. The 
existentialist's bidding: 'be authentic', however, is very clearly 
addressed to everyday people in everyday walks of life, as the two 
Sartrian examples, that of the Jew and that of the Frenchman imply. Both 
these people, Sartre suggests, should be less pretentious, assume 
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themselves as they find themselves and do the job that they can do 
through such means only, through their personal authenticity. They 
should be the selves they are, by their own choice, endorsed by their 
willingness, through assuming their own selves, complete with the 
facticity in which they find themselves as such; and if they supersede 
that, that facticity will remain part of their selves as the past, 
absorbed into their selves, as part of precisely that "me" which they 
superseded; they must choose to be the effective object they factually 
are in socialpsychologic reality. If a pun be permitted, the self as 
chosen object, is also the found object. First it is found as it is, and 
then creatively chosen, like Braque's and Picasso's bits of newspaper 
and string. On whichever account the self is lacking - whether on the 
account of a denied "I" or an account of a denied "me" - whichever types 
of these two synthesis-deficiencies prevent the self from being 
effective, should be supplemented by the self so that its authenticity 
may be resumed. The Frenchman is now object only; he should resume the 
old esArit, and climb off the footlights of vaudeville. The Jew should 
4E4 w mild-be subject only. 
He should not try to shed his blemished objective social being as such, 
but do the job of the simple martyrdom of his everydays in the ghetto, 
of serving as the sandwich-man, as the witness of the surrounding 
society's guilty conscience, by simply being there for who he is. 
Sartre's immigrant Frenchman is a relatively oversize "me" because of 
the outward society's promptings that he should be so - his greater 
completeness with an "I" than convenient for a stereotype way of 
thinking, which is always in a hurry, would complicate coping with, make 
difficult the dovetailing of a more particularistically attention- 
demanding authentic self into, the smooth running of the routine of 
social everydays. The Jew in Sartre's description is, contrariwise, a 
relatively oversize "I", on account of his own perception of himself as 
a not less than average personal excellence and repository of human 
capacities in general, in relation to the actual status ascribed by 
society to his 'me", degraded and inadequate as a platform to his normal 
"I". The most plausible way out for the Jew from such a predicament, to 
save him from the discomforts of the incongruity of his self as 
eperienced by himself as small-letter sacred, over against the social 
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background which casts him differently, is overreaching with his 
cultivated intellectual excellence, through hard work and achievement in 
such an intellectual way, the niche assigned to him in the world as it 
is, transporting himself into circles where intellectual excellence is 
O. K., fleeing into a project of intellectualism out of the context of a 
socially ordinary life where his relative excellence as a self socially 
disturbs, into circles, furthermore, where the self of the Jew himself 
will have an easier passage through adopting this project of flight, 
than he is having if staying put and having to pocket looks of hate from 
those who are not decent and of pity from those who are, as Sartre is 
aware he is casting towards the Jew whom he recognises as nearing the 
insignia of his social blemish -a David's star or the sad look of those 
set apart. The point has already been made that authentically choosing 
oneself as the "me" one already is, is often an undramatic project and 
act, in instances where the job of being who we are, involves assuming 
more willingly than we may wish, the unglamorous object the self finds 
itself as being - as in the case of Mrs. Solness who doesn't find it in 
her to da the chores of the mother and wife figure in the family 
cheerfully, or the Frenchman whose overt "me" in the new culture is 
tarnisned with a foreign accent and with other cultural differences that 
show in his personality as that naturally is, or in the case of anyone 
who hesitates to identify with the "me" which he finds is lacking in 
prestige in the world for some reason or another. Now perhaps the 
additional point may be beneficially made, to supplement this former 
observation, that in instances when in order to be who we are calls for 
assuming, not the "me", but the "I" which, as selves, we also are, in 
response to the situation which our "me" is already in, even then the 
"I" we assume in 'choosing ourselves' is not some fanciful possibility 
of ours of our own outlandish and imaginative making, but a 'found' "I", 
so to speak, one that's discovered as part of our already existing 
talents, sometimes not very prestigeous ones at all; it's something that 
gets, because it must be, by the 'romantic's' dicta, authentically coped 
with (just as is our "me"), in the business of getting on with what we 
must do in its light, and our authenticity as an "I" to a properly 
appreciable extent, simply consists in our giving it the scope it 
already has in our lives, if we make the effort to look for it. It's not 
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our authentic gratifying of the "I", but the denial of that in our 
lives, pretending it's not part of us, which is the course of action 
that involves fuss, falsehood, airs. In the case of the Jew in Sartre's 
study, who is aware of a greater "I" in himself than is cast for him in 
his antisemitic social surrounds, it's easy to see that he simply 
inherited the sensation and condition of an oversize "I" relative to the 
diminished prestige allowed for him by society outside, and that his 
greater personal standing than befits his station in the world is 
something he doesn't seek and would much rather be without, but he 
cannot easily shed it or transcend it, except at the cost of lying about 
who he is as object and betraying his own cultural past; and Sartre 
tells him that as he finds the "I", so he must choose and deploy it, in 
order to be authentic. But the existentialist claims that the job of 
assuming the "I" that we naturally are in part as selves, is something 
everyone must do all the time, not just those on the receiving end of 
discriminative social attitudes. For instance, in the context of the 
same example of the Jew's position in antisemitic France, the response 
of the non-Jew to the persecution of the Jew matters, even though he is 
part only of the social background to the Jew's problem; Sartre is just 
as angry with the non-Jew as he is with the unauthentically 
intellectualism-seeking Jew, for failing to assume his "I" where and 
when he finds it as a response to the given situation in question, and 
to respond as an authentic self in the face of this ready-found state of 
affairs touching the Jew in France. A restatement of the need to 
actively respond as an "I", as the condition of the authenticity of the 
self, to situations already there completely in the world that oneself 
was quite simply born into, which don't immediately attach to the narrow 
individual problem-area of the self who personally suffers through 
humanly anomalous and offensive affairs in the world, and which 
circumstances surrounding a person he has done nothing by his own effort 
to bring about, is afforded, in the contex of war, in the chapter called 
'Ethical Implications' in Being and Nothingness. Thomas Nagel also 
interestingly contemplates the issue of that guilt which consists simply 
in assenting unquestioningly, without bringing the individual judgement 
and the sense of responsibility of the "I" to bear an conduct, to 
institutional avenues of action, and posits the need for an alternative, 
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personally authentic approach to public issues. 1d' The need for the 
self to utilise its judgement qua the self for the preservation of its 
own equilibrium, adjustment -a prerogative easily endangered in the 
most mundane contexts and walks of life, is a favourite preoccupation of 
Gestalt social psychology. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing train of thought 
regarding the two logically, or perhaps ontologically, possible sources 
of maladjustment of the authentic and therefore properly hybrid self -a 
"me" deficiency and "I" deficiency, respectively? Several, and their 
implications touch on many disciplines: sociology, social psychology, 
aesthetics, ethics. The juxtaposition of these two Sartian examples - 
that of the unauthenticity of the immigrant Frenchman because of his 
under-eagerness as "I" and that of the unauthentic Jew because of his 
under-eagerness as "me", allow for the illumination of the synthetic 
nature of the 'romantic', particularly existentialist view, for it to be 
authentic, what it is, a self. I am not uncritical of Sartre's portrayal 
of the Jew and of the Jew's situation; I think it suffers from Sartre's 
naivete to bad faith in that subculture which is no more attractive 
there than than it is in any other society, and through his blindness to 
this factor, Sartre's case and argument for the authenticity or 
unauthenticity of the individual Jew who 'transcends' his surroundings 
as his society, as a matter private to him, is incomplete, and because 
of the rosy-coloured spectacles through which he views the subculture 
commented on, he is more grudging to the individual Jew in granting him 
the same conceivably valid chance to be a nihilating individual 
consciousness in For-Itself authenticity than he is to other people. But 
his criticism of the unauthenticity of many Jews in turning their backs 
on their culture through cold feet at the prospect of sticking at the 
difficult business of being a Jew in a hostile world, even though they, 
as selves, have no quarrel with the values of their own circle of 
society, very often fits the bill, and the resulting "me"-deficiency 
serves as a paradigm of unauthenticity to complement the the "I"- 
deficiency of the immigrant Frenchman's consciousness. The two 
contrasting unauthenticities that ensue from the Sartrian 
socialpsychological analyses of the intellectualism-seeking Jew and the 
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immigrant Frenchmen, afford poignant illustrations of the two possible 
sources of bad faith that have been posited earlier, those which, 
respectively, may prevent the lateral fulfilment, the pragmatic 
authenticity of the reality of the self. ('Pragmatism' here is 
understood in the sense in which it was defined at the very beginning of 
this Section. ) What is important from a pragmatistic point of view in 
the special sense which holds here in which the term is equated with a 
bias to overt action rather than narcissistic and passive preoccupations 
in the face of one's discovered duties and talents, a sense of the 
notion 'pragmatism' which is strongly affiliated with 'romantic' 
socialtheoretical views - and Mead's position is compatible here again 
with that of other 'romantics' - is the question whether the reality of 
the self does or does not come about in that synthesis between "me" and 
"I" for which the fulfilment in the act of the self is the occasion? The 
cardinal point of concern is whether the "me" is or is not assumed, 
whether the type of bad faith in which the "I" is too ponderous and 
finicky to strike reality as an effective self at the pragmatic 
socialpsychologic level of everydays is avoided, and whether or not 
action is frustrated by virtue of the converse source of bad faith, that 
of failure of the assumption of the action-generative "I" in its 
attachment in the act, or in overt conduct on the long term, to the too 
lazy or fretting mere "me" which, without the engagement of the "I", 
entirely saturates the self with an accentuated object self-image and 
actin radius so as to enable the agent to evade, by means of the 
convenience and appeal of the resulting, voluntarily endorsed or even 
chosen inferiority complex, the need to act with the responsibility of 
people fully in possession of their individual power of judgement and 
that appreciable degree of discretion which is the property and 
possibility of autonomous persons. """ 91 
The points that emerge from 'romantic' socialtheoretic preoccupation 
with this area of enquiry into the kind of reality peculiar unto itself 
which emerges when selves are fulfilled and doesn't emerge otherwise - 
socialpsychologic reality - is, first of all, that this area of reality 
", the reality, that is to say, that consists in terms of and in the 
idiom of selves is a reality of its own kind, with its own kind of 
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identity and when it's frustrated, when it doesn't come about though 
potentially it might, it's something meaningful and potentially 
realisable that's missed. It's the selves themselves that are missed 
when not done justice to as both the dual sets of potentials that they 
authentically are as human reality, as selves, as both "me" and "I" in 
synthetic unity. 
Of course, while it's useful to analyse the differential sources of 
unauthenticity ("me"-shyness and "I"-shyness) on account of which the 
self as authentic may be frustrated, missed, forfeited - nevertheless, 
when one of these types of bad faith or another is the case, it's not 
just part of the self which is unfulfilled, but the entire structure of 
the adjustment of the self is ruined, foregone. Whichever type of 
maladjustment of the self out of the two just described obtains, it's 
the whole self which is maladjusted in the 'romantic' sense of the term 
all at once, and not piecemeal. In fact, one type of maladjustment is 
seldom found in any given self without the other: both the Jew and the 
Frenchman abroad in the above examples have unauthentic "me"-s as well 
as unauthentic "I"-s. A headmaster who, regarding his personal and 
professional ethics, is very "me"-compliant, and apportions corporal 
punishment with great readiness because it's legal to do so and because 
he hesitates to superimpose alternative standards of personal discretion 
in punishing the child, thinking it unduly individualistic and airy- 
fairy liberalism and fashion-courting to do so, is both servile in this 
attitude, in other words is both a mere social object as regards his own 
chosen, perfectly norm-complying conduct, and at the same time he is 
also behaving sadistically, as mere subject in relation to the child he 
beats, whom he regards as less than him, as mere object in relation to 
him. The same may be the case with the commissioned officers, or 
ordinary privates even, in a war situation - it's through regarding 
themselves as mere objects without any title to draw on personally 
informed, alternative standards to those bidding them to kill the enemy 
in war, that they come to apprehend themselves as agencies who have 
moral title to take the life of others, title as absolute subject. When 
the law regarding corporal punishment is changed, or when the war is 
over, the very cornerstone of that which had informed the agents in the 
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examples just quoted as safely dependable on, and as the fountainhead of 
morality itself, is removed, then they may suddenly see the entire past 
history of of their overt conduct by authentic human standards which is 
in such situations all that remains for them to inform them normatively, 
ethically, aesthetically; suddenly exposed to the insight of the past 
course of action of their selves by the standards of human reality, such 
people in such situations sometimes suffer nervous breakdowns, possibly 
even incurable ones, as did the American pilot who dropped the atom bomb 
on Japan at the end of World War II. Conversely it may seem, on the face 
of it, that, say Torvald, Nora's authoritarian and overprotective 
husband in Ibsen's play A Doll's House, is subject only regarding his 
brand of bad faith in that interpersonal relationship in which their 
marriage consists, or likewise the schoolteachers who lay down the law 
firmly regarding the need to stick to the curriculum and tolerate no 
distraction from that by such inquisitive children whose intellectual 
needs and capacities seem problematic in relation to the strict letter 
of the curriculum, appear, judging by the disciplinarian style of their 
conduct, as 'subjects only', by virtue of their 'fundamental choice' in 
relation to the childrila but, at the same time, the effect of their 
chosen mode of conduct as 'subject only' by their own appointment, also 
involves that kind of bad faith on their part in which the agent's 
conduct is saturated with being effectively mere object. The self of 
Torvald as husband and partner is lesser in its scope in a concrete and 
personal way than that of the Nora who had, perhaps unconscºct ly, 
liberated herself in the positive act towards the latter part of the 
play (though she herself was at first unauthentic as object only 
throughout the better part of the play under her husband's pressure for 
her to be so), and the person of the authoritarian, curriculum-upholding 
teacher is probably often lesser when viewed as a total self including 
his potential capacities, than that of the inquisitive child in the 
class, and by Torvald and the teacher being (by virtue of their own 
choice as a self), fairly oppressive and authoritarian interpersonal 
mere objects too, laying down the law from a position of power regarding 
what's the proper ceiling for selves up to which those are free and 
virtuous to foster potentials, and acting as wet blankets to those more 
poterºtiai(y capable than themselves, more spirited, more complete with an 
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"I" as a condition of their fulfilment and authenticity. This is true of 
the relationship between Torvald and Nora as depicted by Ibsen, in which 
rendition Nora's self is shown as stifled by and according to 
justifications that ascribe lesser personal scope to selves who enjoy 
lesser ascribed anthropological ranking and standing in the reigning 
culture, i. e. wives in turn-of-the-century Norway, and it's also true 
in the context of the educational system that which is the instrument 
not only of the broadening of the horizons of the self of the developing 
child, but also of handing down those confines to educational potentials 
beyond which the teacher's own quality and degree of education did not 
stretch - standards which have often not hit very high summits. 
Because selves are authentic/unauthentic, as the case may be, not on 
account of adequate/inadequate "I"-assumption only, or on account of 
adequate/inadequate "me"-assumption only when their situation calls for 
their support as significant persons, but tend to be either unitarily 
and entirely authentic with "me" and "I" both fulfilled in terms of each 
other in complementary socialpsychologic equilibrium and adjustment, or, 
alternatively, entirely and unitarily unauthentic, with one kind of the 
above postulated unauthenticites ("I"-overdose or "me"-overdose) 
effecting the whole self and upsetting and frustrating the authenticity 
of both of its components and the entire make-up of the self, in the 
complementary disequilibrium and maladjustment of the "me" and the "I", 
the above discerned two types/sources of conduct in bad faith are seldom 
differentiated from each other in literature treating the topic of the 
authenticity or unauthenticity of the self. The terms 'authenticity' and 
'unauthenticity' usually refer, as ordinarily used, to the self in a 
blanket sort of way, qualifying that as authentic or unauthentic in 
toto, in its entire effect. This usual, en bloc usage of these terms - 
authenticity and its antonym - accentuates the pragmatistic side of 
'romantic' preoccupation with the self and with its reality. A 
differentiation between the two opposite styles and sources of bad faith 
illustrated above through the example of the Jew in Sartre's study and 
through the example of his immigrant Frenchman respectively, - the 
choice of someone as predominantly mere subject or as predominantly mere 
object - is analytically informative regarding the make-up and the 
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typology of the adjustment of the self, and as such a very important and 
characteristic aspect of the 'romantic' and particularly existentialist 
schools of thought. In practical contexts, however, particularly as 
observed in its setting over against its external social environment, 
the self is 'found' and 'chosen' - or fails to be 'found' and 'chosen', 
as an entire self and not usually in separate contemplation of the 
'found "I"' or the 'found "me"'. It is the question whether the self, in 
the final analysis, is assumed or not, which is of importance to 
socialtheoretically 'romantic' students of the self; it's the self in 
its entirety which is either there or not there as the reality of its 
own kind behind external conduct, as available when there is a need for 
it, or not so. The usual blanket sense in which 'unauthenticity' is 
ordinarily used, referring to the entire hue and quality of the self as 
a unity, affords a grosser and stronger contrast to authenticity than 
our previous distinction between the two possible origins of 
unauthenticity. This aýtfonger contrast resulting from the more general use 
of the term 'unauthenticity' without specifying which of its two 
possible varieties is meant, is that between the all-over unauthenticity 
which characterises the entire style of the conduct of the self as a 
whole against its concrete external setting, as opposed to the 
possibility of the authentic being of the self - its possibility of 
drawing an the special idiom, that of human reality, for the being of 
the self, one's own included. The more usual, unitary grasp of the self 
as authentic or unauthentic in its entirety, uhderscores the romantic 
insight, most strongly posited in Sartre's thought, that whether it's 
because an oversaturation with an "I", or oversaturation with a "me", 
that the self fails to be what it could be and what is called for - in 
either of these cases of unauthenticity it's because instead of drawing 
on, dealing with the situation in the socialpsychologic idiom which 
would be appropriate, the self attempts to cope with personal and 
interpersonal reality in terms of externally ascribed servitude or 
mastery - attitudes of consciousness appropriate to its sociologic mode 
of being, as argued in Chapter 3., but both externally ascribed 
servitude and mastery unauthentic to the socialpsychologic, personal 
intimate mode of the being of consciousness, to the reality of 
significant selves. It's because both kinds of the above discerned 
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chosen unauthenticities of the self, its voluntary servitude in trying 
to be just "me" or its would-be mastery by conducting itself as though 
just "I", inappropriately, irrelevantly by-pass the idiom of the 
prevailing socialpsychologic mode of reality, that which should be 
responded to, coped with, that unauthentic consciousness fails to answer 
the needs, calls, opportunities of human reality, that it's wrong, not 
authentic or appropriate in relation to that human reality and the 
selves involved in it. I think it should be observed here that the 
socialpsychologic idiom of conduct - conduct in terms of human reality, 
of the reality of the selves involved - is not necessarily the 
appropriate one, not necessarily that which is correctly chosen in 
preference to the alternative kind and tonality of conduct, the 
sociologically conceived one, in each and every interpersonal situation, 
as already argued in the Introduction; but in situations to which the 
socialpsychologic level of the being of conduct is obviously the 
properly applicable idiom, it matters that it's missed, not gratified, 
justice not done to the selves whose need as "I" and availability as 
"me" potentially makes for the reality of the selves involved. Many are 
those who, in positions of charge in relationships of personal 
dependency - parents, guardians, husbands, teachers - are so strongly, 
heatedly and so positively motivated in the idiom and terminology of 
consciousness of the institutional apprehension of their ascribed role 
as senior partners in their particular relationship, that they feel 
excused from having to observe the most minimal standards of ordinary 
human decency in the small-letter sense of the term, and fail those most 
of all for whom they would do the most. Ibsen's play A Doll's Hause 
tells the tragedy of two people - that of Torvald and that of Nora. Nora 
would be in the position neither of dominance nor of servitude of spirit 
to her husband - in the course of the play she actually frees herself 
from unauthentic type-casting an the latter score, into which 
typecasting her husband relegated her through his expectations of his 
wife, and to which typecasting as object only she herself nodded consent 
for a long time through her own personal unauthenticity as such, 
agreeing to conduct herself as object only. After her self-liberation 
through the act from anthropologic servant-status at the side of her 
husband, she would just be herself and love and be loved for who she 
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totally is. But this is not the way in which Torvald knows how to love; 
and although he too would love his wife well and be loved by her, he is 
too stilted in the way he thinks both of himself and of her to be able 
to be that partner to Nora they both wish he were. Both unfulfilled as 
selves, to begin with - one subject only and the other object only - and 
uncongenial later on regarding the respective idioms in which they know 
how to give themselves - one profoundly and immutably urºauthenticity- 
abiding and the other authenticity-thirsty - their one intention misses 
the target it aims at: their successful and loving relationship directed 
towards each other, and it aborts in different directions,. with Nora and 
Torvald both starving as selves. 
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, Section 3. The Necessity of the Self. and the Total Structure of 
Adjustment as Inclusive of rt. 
Romantic thought, preoccupying itself with the self hybridly grasped 
(as the organic alloy of the "me" and the "I" within its 
infrastructure), stresses very strongly the contention that the 
socialpsychologic radius of man's - every man's - being, is an 
irreducible, indismissable and proper compass of the consciousness, 
experience and existence of all as human beings, throughout a lifetime 
and in every concrete encounter in particular, and that the quality of 
every person's being as the resulting human reality, is decisively and 
consequentially coloured, tainted, characterised by, open to judgement 
as the good or bad, successful or unsuccessful, smoothly efficient and 
matter-of-course or, contrarywise, jerkily coping or ridiculously 
unbalanced, too pompous or unbecomingly subservient management within 
the self of some kind of balance, some kind of working enmeshment 
between the "me" and the "I", between object and subject, mastery and 
slavery, dependence and being on top; the resulting balance or imbalance 
between these two constituent components of the self - object-subject, 
master-slave, "me"-"I", caretaker-dependent, yielding the adjustment of 
the self as its product, making for the quality and being of the self as 
human reality. This is so even in situations whose differentially 
ascriptional features are very strong, that is to say, in which persons 
of positional (or in the case of the family, also maturational) 
seniority take part and exercise, engage their consciousness and conduct 
in their heavy, ascriptionally 'sacred' capacity, vis-a-vis their 
ascriptional juniors, the Rachmones in their 'care'. All these 
participants in such situations, both the ones positionally on top and 
the ones in a position of outwardly given dependency on the former, the 
romantic social theorist will insist, do also and concurrently with 
their socially ascribed roles in the situation, strike a figure as human 
reality too. This fact may of course not have, and very often doesn't 
have, the slightest bearing on the sociologic make-up of the situation 
which happens to simultaneously reign, in a conceivably overbearing and 
primary manner compared with the socialpsychologic makings of that 
situation, persisting immutably and concurrently over against and 
outside the 'my world' of the participants, and in a Durkheimian 
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indifference to them. Nevertheless, it can't be helped, according to the 
'romantic' student of the social sciences, that the reality of the 
selves also comes about side-by-side with the purely social makings of 
the situation in which they are functionally involved as 'carriers', as 
representatives and perpetrators of that outside social reality, by 
virtue of the roles they fulfil therein; the Rachmones promoting it in 
his capacity as object-only, and the Pukka functionally assuming his 
role within that framework as subject-only, as commented on at length in 
the previous two chapters. However, socialpsychologically speaking, the 
'romantic' will tell us, attempts, as a personal matter, for the 
suppression of the situation-redundant component of the self (the 
rachmones' "I" and the Pukka's "me"), will not effectively result in the 
effective dismissal and diffusion of the selves involved, or of their 
reality as such. The "me"-less Pukkas and the "I"-less Rachmoneses, 
functionally produced in the social process, will, when 
socialpsychologically approached, become thrust into personal 
significance as selves; maladjusted ones if they don't manage to 
personally transcend their typecasting, but selves, nevertheless. These 
two types of selves (the "I"-only Pukka and the "me"-only Rachmones), 
will cut figures which are corroborative to the role-sets cast for them 
by society, but which are untrue, unauthentic and misrepresentative of 
the full and authentic selves which are their possibilities but which 
they neglect to assume. Consciousnesses open to and drawing on their 
ascribed avenues only and characteristically, misrepresent the nature of 
human reality, trade it in for a two-dimensional signification of that 
which touches on the sociologic makings of the situation only, affording 
a sort of shorthand for human reality in terms of roles, with the selves 
in either of these two conditions of relative internal disequilibrium, 
that of putting over and living the self as though pure "me", and the 
other: conducting the self as though pure "I", deputising for just 
templates of those selves whose potentials as selves necessarily subsist 
the while. Cliche is French for sewing pattern -a kind of template. The 
reality of human reality, on a romantic social-theoretic account, if 
authentic, will escape heterogeneously and unscathed, cliche 
representations of it; attempts to account for its phenomena in terms of 
role-theories of personality and nothing more, will fail. 
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Socialpsychologically speaking, human reality, inevitably experienced 
wherever there are people in situations, will sit uncomfortably in 
cliches ready-made for selves on account of the mere sociologic role- 
sets attaching to them, and the self of the person taking part in any 
situation as a self which may potentially fully assume itself in its own 
kind of authenticity, will want to get out of ready-made niches and 
cliches of that situation of whatever kind, bulging out of those 
uncomfortably like a too fast growing younger cousin from the hand-me- 
down clothes that come to him in the rota of the age-hierarchy governing 
in the family. The attribute of a person as socialpsychologically 
authentic or unauthentic, has an appeal or lack of appeal as the case 
may be, at a socialpsychologic level, making an impact as human reality 
as distinct from any other mode of the being of consciousness, which 
cuts across political sympathies, or which may offend in spite of shared 
political views; conversely, the adjustment of the quality of the self 
amounts to its own peculiar kind of reality which speaks for itself in 
its own terms through a life lived, an act done, as a peculiar sort of 
being and quality which cannot be retrospectively imported back into a 
lifetime if it has not been there in the first place, however desirable 
this might be from the point of view of public relations. This is not to 
suggest that the romantic social thinker doesn't care about the stance a 
person takes as a self in relation to sociological and interpersonal 
affairs outside of his own self in the world, that the appeal of his 
quality of adjustment is independent of and a matter apart from his 
relationship to and choice of consciousness vis-a-vis the greater 
historic issues of his day as an additional condition of his adjustment, 
as long as the autonomous management between the "me" and the "I" in his 
own self is harmoniously enmeshed; and the romantic will certainly not 
be impressed with the conduct of Richard III in Shakespare's rendering, 
just because of the remarkable lack of self-deception of that character 
and his achievement of a perfect accord between the ruthlessly ambitious 
"I" and the ever-successful creation of a "me" to suit, in terms of 
actual outward, wordly opportunities and standing as a self, the 
gargantuously power-hungry appetites of the "I", as his individual 
project. On the contrary, the romantic social thinker is 
characteristically preoccupied with configurations of match or mismatch 
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between the individual's private and public sets of standards of 
righteousness, Aristotelean dramaturgical fashion. The romantic social 
thinker is a dualist. Mead himself draws attention to the elemental 
originality of ancient Greek thought and art on account of its radical 
individualism undeneath its classical formal facade, or rather, in 
significant conjunction with that. 179) Socialtheoretically romantic 
thought and 'art has, at the heart of its 'problematic', the tragic or 
tragicomic predicament of the agent who is inevitably responsible as an 
individual for the choice of his "me" (whether that is merely, though 
actively 'found' and assumed by him as 'found', or spectacularly and 
newly created by him to suit the biddings of his "I" in the factual 
transcendence of the situation into which he was born) - as a job which 
cannot be avoided by him, whether he cares to take on that 
responsibility or not, as his "me" will be continuous, whatever he does, 
with positive social reality outside, corroboratively with it or 
otherwise, morally becomingly or unbecomingly, rightly or wrongly; and 
the romantic social theoriser concerns himself with an endless number of 
paradigms and permutations of how inward and outward sets of virtue and 
conditions of equilibrium of consciousness may or may not, will or will 
not, complement one another. It's probably the only strand of social 
moralising tradition in art or in science which has time and sympathy 
for the individually authentic who is historically wrong, say, for 
Danton in Büchner's treatment who finds his social ideals, to the 
promotion of which he devoted his life, corrupted in the realisation, 
but nevertheless endowed with the sacredness of a victorious ideology 
which comes to be established as the norm in power or in the 
historically destined making, and himself and his finicky scruples and 
sensitivity to the imperative of the universal betterment of the 
conditions of all oppressed selves, which made him a revolutionary 
leader in the first place, as outdated and in the way of the promotion 
of the new society as it is gradually more established (partly his own 
brainchild), in the light of whose emerging norm he, as the persistent 
critic of any established society which is found by him to be humanly 
anomalous (the emergent one included) has to be disposed of. A similar 
paradigm may be found in the film The Bridge on to River Kwai whose 
hero, the English colonel in Japanese captivity, finds his dogged and 
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unimaginative adherence to his scrupulously and idealistically honest, 
romantic set of boyish, public-school standards which he upholds in his 
capacity as a self, as historically hopelessly stupid and very nearly 
politically and socially greatly destructive in its inflexible 
application in the greater, historic context, where its 
inappropriateness stares everyone else in the eye, and which beautiful, 
personally authentic but historically counterproductive, individual mode 
of consciousness informing his conduct, together with its tangible 
fruits, have to be and are rightly destroyed in the service of the 
greater historic cause for the upkeep of which he is there to serve. 
As a converse paradigm to that discerned in the above two examples, 
Jean Renoir's strongly pacifist and socially very romantically 
committed film Le grand illusion affords an elaborate statement of the 
righteousness and pathos Con the artist's view) inherent in the 
justifiable, indeed necessary dismissal by the microsociologically 
authentic and macrocosmically articulate and critical individual of 
morally anomalous public standards stretching to a global historic 
situation, in the name of the uncompromised human standards, movingly 
shared by every personally authentic character across geographic and 
political frontiers. 
Renoir (by implicit, artistic means) depicts the outside cruel norm 
in war which all the characters he cares to present, all authentic in 
the small-letter sense, universally defy as if by an unvoiced 
conspiracy, by keeping up their committed, ordinary with small-letter 
profaneness in43me everydays of the war, in preference to the paranoiac 
and murderous big-letter norm which gets out of control. According to 
Renoir's rendering - as a matter of his artistic testimony - both the 
men and their officers persist in their conduct as authentic 
individuals, neither set of characters suspending, in the face of the 
war and its dehumanised moral dictates, their dedication to their 
private standards as people: though in maintaining their small-letter 
authenticity as humans, no cantentual common denominator between the 
peculiar and non-coincidental profaneness of the rank-and-file men and 
that of the upper-class officers will arise either on the German or an 
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the French side, in keeping with the Sartrian insight that attempts to 
forge humanly authentic links of fraternity between people across social 
barriers, meets the strongest resistance among all attempts to establish 
such between unlikely partners, firstly because of the perishable or 
rather exhaustible nature of the sentiment of generosity which fuels 
such an attempt on the Pukka's side, and secondly (though Sartre doesn't 
mention this), because of the (authentic or unauthentic) pride and the 
well-placed suspicion on the part of the proletarian candidate for such 
a partnership in the face of the Pukka, from whom the proletarian's 
source and mode of profanefZS (different in its content, partly informed 
by a philosophic matertaIisrn, from that of the Pukka) is personally 
removed, is difficult to assimilate by the Pukka in effortless and 
first-hand ways and, even if the Pukka appreciates the need and function 
of the working class and peasant subcultures as the substance of the 
profaneness of these social classes, the concrete ways and forms of the 
proletarian's peculiar profanenFS5 are merely a matter for a distant and 
aloof contemplation for the Pukka. <2a. ' However, in the separateness of 
the repertoire of interpersonal authenticity that exists as a 
possibility for the lowly-born of the world, and for the highly-born of 
the world, respectively, Renoir provides many examples to demonstrate, 
in accord with his belief, that the bulk of people, whether 
ascriptionally high or low, is authentically profane in his own, 
ascriptionally separate way if given a chance, as is propounded in the 
film, for instance, in the episode when two rank-and-file German 
frontier guards let two escaping French fellow-proletarian prisoners of 
war, at the brink of success in their escape and worn out in the effort, 
slip over into neutral Switzerland. For the part of the well-born 
participants in the war, one of the main plots of the film explores how 
the two commanding officers on the two sides of the war, the French in 
captivity and the German as the captor, grow to develop a humanly very 
deep friendship in their capacities as individuals. Both the French 
prisoner-of-war commander and the German commander in charge of him and 
of his men as well, withhold from the performance of their big-letter 
Office the unquestioning subordination to that of their private sets of 
standards, so dear to them both respectively, and consequently they find 
that, owing both to the social and the human nobility of both, they have 
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much in common. They are fond of speaking English, of food that tastes 
good to the discriminating palate, and share a taste for good wines. In 
the meantime and concurrently with performing their individual project 
of conducting themselves in accord with what their authentic capacities 
as human beings demands of them - this project furthering and deepening 
their personal friendship - they also fulfil their roles as commanding 
officers in terms of their typecast in the external world on account of 
the war - their dual situation as officers in one sense and human 
beings in another, affording a real Racinean intrapersonal dramatic 
double-bind between the conflicting sets of private and public duties in 
the consciousnesses of both these men. The French officer heads the 
escape-attempt of his men; and when, within that plan, his moment to 
make his move arrives, he acts on it and the German commanding officer 
shoots at him, as his duty commands. He tries to miss the Frenchman, but 
his aim is too good. The Frenchman is mortally wounded; the best care 
(which he is given) can't save him; and as the German sees him die 
whilst sitting at his bedside, it is his best friend he is losing. 
Neither of these two commanders choose to be the mere cliches of their 
office which they could have been had they opted for the spirit of 
seriousness as the keynote of their conduct, had they related to their 
role typecast for them in the war, in the made of personal 
unauthenticity. They chose instead to retain, even in a war situation, 
their selves as the continued frame of reference and informant of their 
consciousness, and to remain, (underneath the badge of their office to 
which they could have reduced their being had they so chosen to), small- 
letter profane, or small-letter pukka, which is the same thing, as Paul 
tells us; this great Pauline message consisting in the recognition that 
small-letter sacredness is solely inherent in and available through 
shouldering at all times one's small-letter profaneness, as the 
touchstone of one's personal authenticity with all the human 
implications of that, a view shared by Sartre too. Both these 
anthropologists (Paul and Sartre) can be read in such a way as to yield 
up the insight that only through retaining who we are as profane, can we 
really be a pukka human being. Sartre once referred to a speaker on a 
public occasion he attended, who opened his speech with the words: "We 
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psychologists", and Sartre instantly concluded in response to these 
words that 'the an was a villain. ' 
At this juncture in the argument, the opportunity offers itself to 
stress again, and to pay tribute to Renoir's presenting in the 
characters of the French and German commanding officers (unxpectedly but 
compellingly displaying small-letter pukka qualities in relation to each 
other and to the war situation) the difference between the small-letter 
and the big-letter meanings of the term 'pukka', already commented on 
in Chapter 2 Section 2 and in the Section called 'The Coarse Caretaker', 
citing there the lack of gentlemanly, though not social elevation of the 
'masters' Bertie Waster and Almaviva, both of them losers in human terms 
in relation to their manservants. In these two foregoing Sections it has 
been argued (to recapitulate) that being small-letter Pukka is being the 
gentleman we all would like to be, in a human sense, which may have 
nothing to do with the degree of the social elevation which happens to 
be our lot in the world. Big-letter Pukka, in contrast, is someone who 
may not necessarily be dependable at all in small-letter, human terms 
the way the two commanding officers in Renoir's film are, but who is 
Pukka merely by virtue of the elevation of his social role-ascription, 
and conceivably a villain as regards his personal qualities. There is no 
guarantee that someone socially ascribed to big-letter Pukka status is 
a qualitatively outstanding person as a matter of his personal standards 
too; for him to be fully deserving of pukka-status in both senses of the 
word, he must also sport an internal 'adjustment' between his "me" and 
"I" as a person, as a human being; and in Renoir's handling of both of 
the two commanding officers as pukka in both senses of the term, social 
and anthropological, these two socially highly ascribed characters come 
to supersede in human terms, and to put to shame, the figures of 
Almaviva and Bertie Wooster. 
Turning now to the portrayal of the personally authentic morality 
of the proletarians depicted in Renoir's film (gentlemanly in 
anthropologic terms only), it is tru to say that just as the director 
avoids (as just shown) the pitfall of characterising the socially 
ascribed, high-ranking Pukka - the two commanding officers - in terns of 
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socially elevated two-dimensional cliches, to which their interpretation 
might avail itself to a socially and humanly coarse, simplistic and 
schematic artist, but represents them as people who by choice fully 
assume their private world, that which to them is their being as people 
in the ordinary way irrespective of the norm crudely and grossly 
'gesturing' their consciousness to shed that and to conduct themselves 
completely in terms of the office they represent, so, conversely, he 
doesn't shortchange his conception of the people he chooses to portray 
from the other end of the social spectrum, the men, avoiding a 
clumsiness in supporting his conception of the working and peasant 
classes by representing their individual members cliche-fa$hion, as 
objects only. The rank-and-file characters in the film are represented, 
in the main, by those two of the men who manage to escape, particularly 
through the delicately observed and rendered portrait of one of them and 
the gentle unfolding of his love affair with a German war-widow, a 
person delicate in her manner and at the same time strong, managing and 
caring with quietly fussless pathos, for herself and her little 
daughter on her lonely farm, where she hides the escaped prisoners from 
the patrolling German search-parties. In Renoir's interpretation of the 
branch of the plot which follows the two escaping men's and the German 
widow's fortunes, together with the episode of the two German frontier- 
patrols who allow these two men to escape into Switzerland, as already 
referred to, the characters who make up in this film the core of the 
socially un-elevated, amount to no lesser heroes than the two commanding 
officers, in the dramatic sense in which the rank-and-file participants 
of the war are each portrayed with exemplarily full dualistic 
complexity, no less than their two military superiors, as masters of 
their own destiny as human beings on the one hand, and the thralls of 
the humanly unauthentic norm of the war on the other, in the face of 
which, too, they assume themselves as responsible. 
With the fullness of the selves both with "me" and "I" so strongly 
stated in the film in the socially high as well as in the socially low - 
the officers refusing their type-cast possibility to be just "I", to be 
the solemn protagonists of their office and nothing else, and the rank- 
and-file participants in the war assuming their selves complete with the 
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social situation-irrelevant "I", thereby amounting to so many human 
beings of stature, as more than mare "me"-a, as more than mare fodder to 
the cause fought (illusory, on Renoir's testimony, with no hint on his 
part to the effect that the French fight in a just cause) - Renoir's 
film is a very strong statement on behalf of a united humanity, 
irrespective of national frontiers, in the name of human reality, for 
the propagation of which the artist himself strongly sticks his neck out 
as such, and which human reality he conjures up for us as the proper and 
necessary sphere of the being of man in order to be a man, or rather a 
person in any walk of life, in order to live; this human reality 
providing a set of personal moral standards that necessitates the total 
and absolute rejection of the impersonal forces of war and its inhuman 
norm outside, a choice which is available to all persons, on Renoir's 
interpretation, whether socially high or low. 
This is the anthropologic aspect of Renoir's message in this film; 
he puts it forward committedly, using his artistic licence as he must as 
an artist; for instance, by selection. As already pointed out, there are 
only authentic people in the film, the two high-class Pukka are both 
such people who turn their backs on what they socially stand for, and on 
the implications and connections of that in the outside world, 
dissociating their consciousness with the impersonal forces there which 
cause the war. They have subordinated their possibility to identify in 
their being with the dictates of their social role, and refuse to adopt 
those as their personal norm - they carry out the motions that go with 
their jobs, but as individual consciousnesses they have nothing to do 
with them. They choose to be people and not their roles, and suffer the 
consequences of their acts necessitated in the context of and by the 
war; greatly. Renoir doesn't bother to show the humanly unauthentic on 
either side of the social spectrum, leaves those alone as an artistic 
device to maximally underscore his anthropologic message as just set 
out, his personal and artistic creed, his belief that it is the 
universal potential of man - any man - to divorce himself from the 
impersonal forces at work in war. The film, at the same time, doesn't 
explicitly carry the implication that there are no such people in high 
places - indeed, in low places - who are responsible for the war and who 
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are humanly unauthentic in the face of it, although such people are only 
tacitly there in the plot, are there by implication, for there is a war 
in which people have to suppress their nature, aspirations and lives as 
people. The clear statement of this anthropoioYical message, w1'Ot't 
sacrificing the psychologically true-to-life complexity of the 
characters who bring to life and mediate this message, is a strong 
virtue of the film. 
There is, concurrently, another great artistic virtue in the message 
and method of Le grand illusion which singles out Renoir's film from 
among many sociologically romantic artistic comments on and statement of 
the same theme. This is Renoir's lack of naivete to social, reality, to 
the overriding primacy of its dictates in the world, over and above the 
anthropologic ideals, dreams of any man, not excluding Renoir's own 
wishful thinking about the universally nobler nature of man than his 
actual one which allows for war. Renoir manages to show his own vision: 
a world more true to human reality, as 'present' in terms of the way in 
which that not yet established world as a possibility of everybody's 
self already 'is' in their consciousness, in an anticipatory, Sartrian 
sense, even though no room and legitimacy for this more ideal world or 
the contemplation of it is granted in the here-and-now as it officially 
is; but in the wishing of which people are united as people, through the 
shared hate of the actual reality of the war, of things as they are, and 
on the envisaging and perception of which humanly more authentic world 
they already act. The film shows the two non-overlapping spheres of the 
being of man, that of the anthropologic aspect of his consciousness 
(human reality writ large) and that of the social actuality which is 
there for him, in counterdistinction with one another, both these 
different realms thoroughly and well observed. Anthropologically 
speaking, the film shows movingly how people's being as persons, highly 
ascribed or low, bulge desparately and wishfully (to draw once more on 
an earlier metaphore) out of the positively rigid 'honeycomb' of its 
placing in the actual structure of society as it is; but, for all that, 
Renoir is not blind to the indismissable being of that 'honeycomb', but 
acknowledges that and shows that in its overriding absoluteness, as it 
commandingly prevails side-by-side and simultaneously with the 
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anthropologically conceived, unfolded and depicted sphere of human 
reality, as analysed above. While the anthropologic universe, on 
Renoir's account, envelopes the whole of humanity, as the really 
available potential of all, the social chasm dividing the two basic 
classes in society: the ascribed Pukka and the ordinary folk within that 
meaningfulness of human reality for all, is absolute, in Renoir's 
realistic presentation of it. True, both the Pukka-kind and the socially 
'ordinary' type, as people, are shown in the film as fully authentic in 
the Pauline sense, both as regards their basic need to be so and in the 
respect of the actual conduct they practice, but clearly (as already 
hinted) they can only be so within the bounds and idiom of the separate 
compass of each of the social classes which the ascriptionally high- 
ranking and low-ranking respectively occupy, as a matter of social fact. 
There is indeed a small-letter profane sphere of consciousness available 
even to the highly ascribed Pukka to choose and exercise his self 
authentically, rather than socially stereotypically and unauthentically 
as a person, but his range of the experience as authentically and 
personally profane is not the same as the experiential content of small- 
letter profaneness of the socially ordinary man; except formally - in 
the sense that small-letter profaneness, if unattained, is accentuatedly 
experienced by every man in whatever walk of life as a lack which he 
must fill with private, small-letter standards of human excellence of an 
authentic, first-hand, experiential nature, as a condition of his moral 
salvation as human reality as it were, (though Sartre doubts that this 
is available to the socially high in any workable way. ) As has already 
been pointed out, at no point in the film is there an exchange at the 
level of friendship or in any personal depth between the socially well- 
born and 'the other half', as they say; the officers don't endeavour to 
endear themselves to the men, and the men don't give the question 
whether or not they are liked by the officers, a single thought. The 
consciousnesses of the lowly born and the highly born simply don't 
connect, though each half lives fully, richly in experience and in range 
of personal being, on the evidence of the film. The socially Pukka and 
the socially low-ranking quite simply don't exist for one another as 
human realities. While there is a strong sense of fraternity between the 
French and the German in each of the separate areas of social being - 
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the highly ascribed ones and the lowly ascribed ones, that is - 
demonstrated by the warm relationship between the two commanding 
officers, and, in the other main strand of the plot, between the two 
defecting men and their plebeian fellow-beings whom they encounter 
during their escape - yet, the film shows that, as the very condition of 
the authenticity of people belonging to one or the other socially 
ascribed half of humanity, they can't be authentic in each other's 
idiom. The configurations of the relationships serving to illuminate 
Renoir's social as distinct from anthropologic messages as those come to 
the fore in the film, spell out his position as the inverse of 
Durkheim's dictum (who, in his entire activity as a sociolggist, never 
touched on social class) - with Renoir's vision emerging as the 
antithesis of Durkheim's claim that the greatest chasm between man and 
man is of an anthropologic kind: sacred versus profane, in an elemental 
religious sense, and never the twain will be mixed up in conscºousne S.. 
Renoir maintains, at a tangent with this Durkheimian view, that all men 
are, if they so choose, anthropologically equal, with the common 
denominator between them as such provided by their all being in part 
small-letter sacred and in part small-letter profane as hybrid selves, 
in a humanly becoming personally equilibrated, autonomous ensemble 
between "me" and "I" in each and all, while the chasm between the two 
in social classes reigns as absolute on grounds for which there is no 
anthropologic justification; a truly socially romantic message. Renoir's 
work is anthropologically optimistic, socially pessimistic; proof that 
he appreciates the sociological and the anthropological (human realily- 
constituted) strands of being as distinct from each other. 
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Section 4. Paradigms of Grace. 
Renoir's film Le grand illusion (analysed in the previous Section) 
as an example to illustrate the distinguishability, in a meaningful way, 
of the anthropologic as distinct from the sociologic mode of the 
consciousness and morality of man, is very informative on another score 
too. With the elaborate and richly and inventively varied paradigms 
which its treatment affords between every one of its characters' 
accentuated personal authenticity on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the configuration which that humanly significant attribute - an 
appealing balance between "I" and "me" in the inward structure of the 
characters' personality - forms with their situation as "me"-s outside, 
firmly set, placed through these "me"-s in the'social 'honeycomb : the 
cast-list and structure of the historic pageantry going on around these 
selves, in which outward network the selves thus cast, form a part, play 
a role. Renoir's classic amounts to one of the very rare statements, in 
terms of positivity, of romantic social thought's ideal of the 
intrapersonally adjusted man, of personal authenticity; a notion which - 
important, not to say central to a romantic framework of social 
theorising as it is, is more usually stated within that tradition of 
thought in terms of negativity - through examples in which adjustment of 
personal demeanour as a human being, and thus the assumption of the self 
as authentic in its relationship with its outside historic setting, is 
deficient, unappealing, lacking. 
The socialpsychologically positive ideal of intrapersonal, humanly 
authentic adjustment, on the rare occasions when it receives an 
exposition in the socialtheoretically romantic tradition, is at times 
evocatively referred to as 'grace'. In Sartre's work - and, of course, 
in that of Paul, as has aleady been touched on once or twice before, the 
expression 'grace' consistently props up in this sense, in a manner 
which is to some extent comparable in Paul's and in Sartre's handling. 
The connection between Sartre's and Paul's somewhat overlapping 
understanding of this term emerges particularly poignantly through the 
work of Bultmann, the deliberate interpreter of Paul's and inadvertant 
ambassador of Sartre's anthropology, and the discerner of the 
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transferability (inherent in both Paul and Sartre) of some key notions 
concerning man as both physiological and social 'body'. In the brief 
section where Sartre explicitly puts forward the notion 'grace' C21). - 
he uses the term interchangeably with 'adjustment'. The Sartrian concept 
at this point in Being and Nothingness is the yield of an analysis of 
the situation in which the 'body' (Being-for-Itself') is engaged in a 
physiologic context, but of course it's meant, in Sartre's usage there 
too, with symbolic, sociologic significance as well. The Pauline 
connotations of the term 'grace' normally apply in a symbolic rather 
than physiologic context, with the term 'body' figuring at the socially 
ontologic level: the soma Christou, so to speak, 'graceful', 'membership' 
in which is usually to be taken as the affair of one's personally 
righteous sociologic or socialpsychologic participation in the worldly 
copy of the kingdom of Jesus, the ultimate in the ideality of the 
collective consciousness, rather than in one's capacity as a being with 
physiologic 'members', another preoccupation of Paul's; but these two 
understandings of the properties of the 'body' in Paul, socially 
symbolic and actual, as Bultmann discerned, are not unconnected, and 
echoes of one grasp of the 'body's 'grace' (the sociologic one) in the 
other grasp of this notion (the physiologic one), usefully reinforce one 
another, on Bultmann's account, in the Pauline context too. The 
possibility of the conflation of the most evident, sociologic meaning of 
'grace' in the Pauline sense with the most evident physiologic meaning 
of this decorous attribute in Sartre, is certainly one that didn't 
bother Sartre in his choosing the name of the concept; indeed, in his 
choice of the label for the notion 'grace' in his own peculiar, 
predominantly physiologic sense, without qualifications to distinguish 
its meaning from its usually sociologically symbolic Pauline one, was 
deliberate on Sartre's part, or at least it mirrors, it seems to me, an 
unselfconscious welcoming on Sartre's part of the ensuing dual, social 
and physiologic applicability and amenability of the term. 
'Grace' or 'adjustment' in Sartre's usage, as has already been 
pointed out, refers to physical demeanour. It's the index, the sign, the 
reward of the adjustment between the object-aspect of the 'body' 
(meaning the 'self') on the one hand, and, an the other, the agent's 
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capacity to retain and to exercise his autonomy as a self, his 
spontaneity, his self-mastery, his freedom as a self; reminiscent of the 
"I". 'Grace' as used at this point in Being and Nothingness by Sartre, 
is the index - and the reward - of the fullness of the self with both 
these aspects of itself - with the "I" on the one hand and, on the 
other, with the "me", both in the physiologic sense and in the 
socialpsychologic or sociologic one; it's an accomplishment in this 
sense, one that is gained in spontaneity, rather than through 
studiousness; it's a socialpsychologically natural endowment. Lack of 
grace, to Sartre, equals conduct as though Master or "I" or 'subject' or 
individual freedom only (sadism), or, in the case of the opposite 
maladjustment, as though doormat only (masochism). Conduct in either of 
these two assumptions of the self in bad faith (one entailing the other 
in an interpersonal context), is, on Sartre's account, obscene; 
masochism is no less deserving of this label than sadism. The 
transferability of the Sartrian notions of 'sadism' and 'masochism' onto 
the socialpsychologic or social planes of conduct, doesn't, I think, 
call for overmuch elaboration; both the terms in question are commonly 
used in the socialpsychologically or socially symbolic sense in ordinary 
parlance. The kinship between these two maladjustments of the self 
(sadism and masochism) in Sartre's overtly physiologic sense, and the 
applicability of those Sartrian maladjustments to an 'obscene' 
socialpsychologic attitude of arrogant 'mastery' vis-a-vis another, and 
the complementary 'obscenity' of a passive socialpsychologic attitude of 
the acceptance of such interpersonal dominance over oneself by another 
self, seems to me eminently meaningful and evident. Examples for both 
these types of socialpsychologic 'obcenities' - "me"-renunciation and 
"I"-renunciation, respectively - have already been offered in abundance 
so far, and will be highlighted again in our present context for 
classificatory purposes in considering the logical possibilities of 
authenticity and unauthenticity in the self, afforded by different 
constellations within the self between the "me" and the "I". 
In approaching, first of all, the first out of the self's two 
possibile obscenitiks or unauthenticities at the socialpsychologically 
symbolic level, we shall refresh our memories regarding that paradigm 
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of socialpsychologic obscenity which consists of assuming the "I" only 
and dismissing the concrete, practical "me", which "me" potentially and 
properly anchors, if properly assumed, each self into even a 
predominantly social situation, and is effective as the proper compass 
of what's within a person's sanity and call as a human being to do, in 
the light of the dictates of his "I". This, the first out of a person's 
two possible unauthenticities, is the 'obscenity' of a self who 
'believes his image' when that is publicly elevated and inflated into 
an idealised "I"-role, and missing on account of this pure subject- 
pretence the standards of adjustment as human reality, naturally 
defining the spontaneous self as properly both object and subject (as 
argued above). We already offered, to support a similar point, the 
examples of 'Little Malcolm' and Sartre's unauthentic Jew, but further 
examples here may strengthen the argument. One such example offers 
itself in the conduct of Jean-Jaques Rousseau, founder of and prolific 
contributor to modern educational theory. His work argued, for the first 
time in educational history, the recognised need in a child's natural 
and optimally fulfilling development, to ensure scope in that process 
for his individual potentials, as those are naturally there in his 
personality from the moment go as a specimen of the human race; while, 
at the same time, he put for adoption each and every one of his numerous 
children as they were barn, one after the other. A second further 
example for this kind of unauthenticity, more specific than Sartre's 
general objection to the unauthenticity of a Jew who escapes from his 
concrete problem in the world as a Jew by fleeing into an 
intellectualism, as outlined in his work Antisemite and Jew, (22' is 
offered by the person of Emile Durkheim, a Rabbi's son, who, with the 
public attitude which claimed Dreyfus as its scapegoat and victim 
politically very much in the air, dedicated his life to elaborating the 
sociologically invaluable theory that, at least in primitive cultures, 
the notions of 'sacred' and 'society' and (as a connected issue) the 
subject matter of society and religion, completely overlap. The example 
of the actor Raymond Burr can further be quoted here, who fell victim to 
the myth of the invincibility in court of Perry Mason, the famous 
television lawyer, the hero of a serial, played by him, and who decided 
to defend himself in court when charged on an issue which affected him 
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personally, spectacularly losing his case. Tsar Alexander of Russia and 
his family provide a further example in this context. Alexander accepted 
his worship by the Russian peasant, poor beyond description, who related 
to Alexander as a deity in utmost sincerity, never referring to him 
publicly or privately in any other way than 'our little father the 
Tsar'; penny-pinching throughout his life so as to be able to afford to 
give his few remaining kopeks to the Church as a way of expressing in 
prayer his thanks to the Tsar for his hand-to-mouth existence and asking 
his help in his deliverance from his pitiful condition. In accepting 
this, the conduct of the Tsar and his family take on a dimension which 
in its extent of personal unauthenticity and human offensiveness 
transcends confines which are themselves rational or which can be 
responded to rationally, a dimension and quality which is not entirely 
accounted for in terms of merely economic exploitation in which 
vulgarian historians sum up the anomalies which called the Russian 
Revolution into being, but it touches on, involves that stratum of human 
reality which makes sense in terms of selves and their condition as such 
as well, and draws, calls on an appreciation of both inter- and 
intrapersonal ideals and standards of adjustment; the total meaning and 
repugnant quality of the Tsar's conduct, and that of his family, is 
greater in this respect than that which the social positivists identify 
and acknowledge as its exclusively economically constituted and 
rationally appreciable make-up. In turn, the revolutionaries themselves 
responded irrationally, when their turn came, in a way which was perhaps 
not an unexpected response to this anomaly in the Tsar's treatment of 
them; in executing the Tsar and his family without further ado, they 
responded to the Tsar not only as the source of their economic 
exploitation, not only as the abuser and usurper of their labour, the 
appropriator of the economic fruits of their exertions so that he and 
the likes of him could pursue a lavish lifestyle at the expense of 
theirs, but also as the cynical betrayer and misappropriator of their 
kind's and their forefathers' spiritual offering to him and his forbears 
of their very selves. 
The 'organisational woman' (described earlier in the Section called 
'The Coarse Caretaker'), may be seen as illustrating this paradigm of 
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conduct (sheer "I"-assumption), showing how people in not exceptionally 
socially elevated positions - say, as rulers, executives or highly 
acknowledged artists or intellectuals in society, but in a rank-and-file 
capacity in the social world, can fail - the way many well-meaning 
social workers do - to hit the horizons of human reality altogether in 
their own consciousness and conduct, and therefore in conceiving, in 
their own image as complete selves (which they are not), the persons and 
the human terms of the rehabilitation of the people in their 'care'. In 
other words, the 'organisational woman' and her relatively lowly-born 
likes as social workers and workers in related fields, through 
conceiving of themselves in tems of a kind of 'sublimation', in the name 
of the collective consciousness of which they see themselves as the 
representatives as the totally exhaustive sphere of their consciousness 
and conduct, miss in the course of their work the content of human 
reality in their interpersonal dealings, both as far as their own selves 
and as far as the persons of their clients are concerned, forgetting and 
betraying that content of human reality which forms part of the human 
environment of which they themselves were once part, and in which 
framework they are now to apply their interpersonal skills, so as to 
rehabilitate their clients as selves in addition to rehabilitating their 
clients to some extent, in more tangible terms too. This shortcoming in 
the 'organisational woman' and her kindred-spirited colleagues (the 
denunciation of the "me" in them), causes the annullment for themselves 
and for their clients, of the dignity inherent in the assumption of 
their own small-letter sacred human and cultural roots, which lie in 
their fully granted, matter-of-course small-letter profanenness, and 
they deprive their clients, as they deprive themselves, of the freedom 
and good which such an assumption of their selves in the idiom of their 
own culture, would hold for them in socialpsychological, personal terms. 
Furthermore, the conduct of the 'organisational woman' and her likes, 
breeds not only an obscenely oversize "I" in them - they would never 
admit that they harbour such a self-image - but comes to typical 
expression in their conduct in a concurrent, obscenely affected, 
overstated, unnatural, too gross, not personally meant, often overjolly 
"me", and such individuals typically engage in a condescending 
anthropologic slumming in relation to their human status-deprived 
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clients, in an act of a humanly most offensive and hurtful arrogance. In 
their act of compensating for their being an "I"-template at the bottom 
of their own personal problem, they need to push an image as "me"- 
templates as well, so as to have a "me" of any sort at all, 
unauthenticity thus spreading to the whole make-up of their selves, 
affecting both of their selves' two components, the "me" as well as the 
"I". But they don't really mean this "me"-charade at all; it's an 
effort, play-acting for them, hard work, after which they take this "me" 
off as a pair of shoes that is too tight, doesn't fit, and abandon 
themselves as the "I"-only consciousnesses they truly are, just like 
their well-born colleagues, upper-class charitable ladies, relics of the 
Victorian era; (though this paradigm is more common 1n upper-class 
charitable ladies, who are still around in abundance. ) 
Examples of the other type of socialpsychologic 'obscenity' or 
personal unauthenticity: that of being "me"-templates only, surrendering 
the "I" as a self, 'believing one's image' as the "me"-only as is 
typecast for one (as already illustrated through the example of Sartre's 
Frenchman abroad), offer themselves in equally great numbers. The first 
to be enlisted is the life-project of Willy Loman, the main character in 
the play Death of a Salesman, though in the tragedy of this person 
Arthur Miller, the author, blames not this tragic anti-hero who falls 
because of choosing the pursuit of the sham ideals of a life which lacks 
a personally authentic "I" to serve him right as a person, but Miller 
blames for this phenomenon this man's typecast in the culture of which 
he is part, whose strait-jacket of the less than fully human and 
dignified horizons of a consciousness is forced on this well-meaning and 
loving person by the so-called 'American Dream' in which he is a 
helpless cog, whose demands of him to perform his part in this so-called 
'dream' in the human unauthenticity 'gestured' to him, this 
intellectually not especially endowed character is unable to question, 
transcend and reject. 
In Miller's presentation, Willy Loman, the play's hero, or rather 
anti-hero, arrives at a crossroads in his life. After a lifetime spent 
in the virtuous avoidance of offending the norm reigning in his culture 
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- exemplified in the terms of reference of his neighbourhood, 
particularly in the way of life of his relatively well-to-do next-door 
neighbour, - adopting, as Willy Loman does, the ultimate ideal as 
demanded by his culture of being 'well-liked' as the main endeavour in 
his conduct, and teaching his sons to live by this ideal too, Loman 
discovers that he has lost the respect of his sons, spent his hard- 
earned money senselessly in his attempts to maintain an unrealistic 
living standard, has not managed to meet his family's financial and even 
less its human needs, and became, hurtfully, a laughing stock in the 
wider world. In order to set the score right in all these respects, he 
makes the ill-judged decision to head for a fatal car accident for the 
benefit of the insurance (for which, unbeknown to him, he has forfeited 
his family's right by his former, unsuccessful suicide attempts), and 
for the benefit, as he saw it, of ridding the family of the presence of 
his self which he perceives as failed and irksome, whereas in reality, 
by the end of the play, he emerges as the object of love to his family, 
whose presence they all need and crave as a partner, as a friend, as a 
slighted fellow-traveller through the anomalies of the world: as a 
person. 
This second type of 'obscenity' in Sartre's book (that of exclusive 
"me"-prevalence and "l"-suppression, in interpersonal subservience), is 
a familiar paradigm of conduct in many ordinary walks of life; we 
discover it in Sartrian 'waiters' who exhaustively identify themselves 
with their subservient "me"-s or objects only to which their selves have 
become tantamount in the performance of their jobs. '23) Sometimes 
recognise this type in a certain breed of academic woman - stooped in 
her demeanour in the presence of Great Academic Men, or more ususally, 
Great Academic Man, looking askance at him, speaking sotto voce in his 
presence; Goethe's Wagner too is a junior scholar to Faust in such 
slavishness of spirit. We can identify this type of humanly, 
socialpsychologically maladjusted modality of consciousness in an 
interpersonal context, in those hypochondriacs whom we sometimes see in 
a doctor's waiting room, 'dressed for the occasion' as it were, in 
spirit at least, behaving as though in a temple, awaiting their turn to 
be in the presence of the Grpt Doctor, in whose spiritual radius such 
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people shine, come alive with a sacred glow, as though during a holy 
service. 
The soC. a) theoretically 'romantic' ideal of the authentic, 
'graceful', well-adjusted self, characterised by an internal and also 
external harmony in a self between its "me" and its "I", may be directly 
demonstrated by such examples in which such a mode of consciousness and 
conduct is successfully accomplished and perpetrated. Fortunately, such 
examples abound too, and the illustration of the ideal of the 'grace' of 
the self need not be exclusively and roundaboutly approached through 
such instances in which one or the other component of the self is 
forfeited, resulting in one sort of maladjustment, socialpsychologic 
'obscenity' in the Sartre-implied sense, or the other. 
A list of examples of the authenticity of a person - as an 
equilibrated self, with the "I" actively engaged in the assumption of 
its social anchorage, and a "me" to match that within the self, ready 
for its realisation in the first person singular, by getting one's own 
hands dirty in the process, so to speak, is perhaps fittingly headed by 
the style and quality of the conduct of J. S. Each who, while already 
publicly revered in his lifetime for the artist he was, found time to 
write two volumes of progressively difficult piano exercises for his 
wife who was interested in learning to play, and tutored several of his 
many sons to become musicians of note in their own right. Another such 
example may be provided by St. Joan who, moved by the ideals prompting 
her to free France from under the English yoke, fought in all battles 
alongside with the men who were inspired by her ideals. Of course the 
men fighting in her free army in a rank-and-file capacity - in so far as 
they fought on account of the same kind of motivation - because of the 
assumption of their selves in the service of ideals not first 
recognised, but endorsed and upheld by them as a matter of personal 
conviction, were no less authentic than Joan herself. A third example of 
true and socialpsychologically well-adjusted authenticity is provided by 
the manner of conduct of Rosa Luxemburg who insisted on serving all her 
prison sentences (save one), rather than be bailed out as was the 
privilege of the revolutionary leaders, though of course the criticism 
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charging her that while she wasted time in prison in the display of true 
and great personal decorum, the revolution went short of leadership, are 
perfectly sound and in place, from another point of view. It's not 
argued here that a person's choice of himself or herself as human 
reality as opposed to the predominant surrender of his or her self to 
the purely public function of it, is the correct choice of a person in 
every situation. It's not suggested, for instance, that Durkheim should 
have neglected his calling as a uniquely insightful and original 
social kkeoreticc'd writer, or that he should have contributed to social 
theory less than he did to make room in his life for serving ideals that 
are more attractive to a Sartrian; all that is suggested here is that 
the romantic social theorist's claim that a person will cut some kind of 
figure as human reality whether he means to or not, is fruitful, 
meaningful and suggestive. 
The above list of paradigms, postulating the possibility for the 
self to constitute itself (a) as "I"-template or subject only, (b) as 
"me"-template and object only and (c) in its full authenticity as a 
well-matched and optimally realised ensemble of "me" and "I" which 
defines the potential of the self in the complementary exercise and 
match between these two internal components of it, does not yet amount 
to a full typology, for the above treatment was confined to the socially 
sacred, as it were. All the people referred to in our above examples 
were players of the game, either not fallen in Durkheimian terms, or 
fallen (Joan, Rosa) only to be later emancipated by some society or 
subculture which succeeded as actual social reality, in keeping with 
those lights which they, through the engagement of the "I" in 
anticipation of a new society, upheld with their selves before that new 
society's time, and these people have been adopted by the new social 
norm when that emerged, as that new society's own Pukka. All the people 
referred to above - whether authentic in their personal capacity or not 
so - belong to those who are socially on the map among the Durkheimian 
unblemished, sacred, according to some already operative or newly 
established norm or another, they are all consciousnesses in the idiom 
of the social positivity which is now the case somewhere, and which they 
meant to be the case. But the human authenticity of a person, in so far 
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as that is a 'good' in its own terms, was an extra endowment available 
to these characters (as indeed it is to everybody) on top of being 
socially Pukka, an endowment which has been the choice of some Q. S. 
Bach, e. g. ), but not of others. (Raymond Burr, e. g., suffering from 
delusions of mastery of legal expertise without concrete grounding of 
such through training or real experience to justify it, displaying on 
this score a subject-only unauthenticity - and, as the other side of the 
coin, Goethe's Wagner, clinging throughout a lifetime to second-hand 
research by choice, displaying on this score an object-only 
unauthenticity. ) 
The aesthetic appeal of a person humanly adjusted in the above 
described sense, strikes home as social psychologically 'good', without 
much further qualification. The normative appeal of the equilibrium 
inherent in a decorously chosen compass of a self as an authentic human 
reality, not too much of a self-inflated and self-professed demigod, not 
someone with humble pie as his sale diet, in a comely balance between 
the "me" and the "I" on which the romantic student of the self in 
society insists, is also something few will argue with. Grace or 
adjustment of personality as such, in Paul's and Sartre's sense and in 
the sense of quite a common modern understanding of the adjustment of 
the personality in this context, figures as a standard and has its pay- 
off in the range and the medium of human reality itself, sui generis. 
This reward is coping as a person, quite simply normalcy, managing 
adequately, in a self-sufficient manner, the husbandry of the self and 
its private affairs; it's the success and the privilege of matching, on 
the long term, the business, as a person, of the co-ordination between 
one's sanely assessed potentials as an "I" in the light of one's own 
discretion, and the practice of the selection of adequate actual 
opportunities in society to do justice to those potentials in a graceful 
"me". It's this discretion (the "I"'s concern), and this range of actual 
opportunitites (the "me"'s concern), which are displaced in relation to 
one another, which are removed by ascription in the socially blemished, 
taken into care, The self's right and its propriety of the management of 
its own autonomy as a self, its self-sufficient caretakership of its own 
chances for its socidI psychologically adequate and fulfilling conduct as 
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the criterion of its normalcy and dignity in a small-letter sense, is 
propounded by much of Sucial rsyc/, ojogical thinking to-day, particularly by 
the Gestalt social P. Cycholv2'cal school; so we can add here that ' grace' on 
our Sartre-prompted understanding is a 'good' in a sort of clinical 
sense, too. 
There is, within the 'romantic' strain of approaching adjustment, a 
long-standing preoccupation with the study of the 'authoritarian 
personality', which is the type of consciousness that equates the self 
with the role which selves must perform, whether ascribed as Master or 
Servant, in the reigning ascriptional system as it is, coupled with a 
strong normative identification with that system as a matter of personal 
conviction. (Studies discerning this personality-type, may or may not 
approach it in the context of its contrast with its alternative: the 
self-adequacy and autonomy-valuing personality types and frames of 
intrapersonal reference, with an ideal of Master and Slave all rolled 
into one in the individual's consciousness and conduct, as it were). In 
one famous study in this line of research, that by Else Frenkel- 
Brunswick et al., (24`1 the 'authoritarian personality' as a mode of 
consciousness, does not come over as either very reassuring in the big- 
letter Caretaker, or as very conducive of happiness in his dependants if 
so ascribed by circumstance. The study shows the authoritarian type 
(using controls for comparison), as politically very aggressive, lacking 
in critical insight regarding their selves, as having difficulty in 
supporting loneliness, as having diminished perception regarding their 
own selves and those of others, and compensating in the face of any 
threat to their self-image, with excessive scape-goating or Freudian 
displacement. Controls, in contrast, were shown as more inventive, as 
having more varied pastimes, more interesting range of activities, and 
greater honesty and tolerance towards their own selves and towards those 
of others. Besides the socially oriented branch of psychology, there are 
other branches of psychology, notably clinical, developmental, and 
educational, which afford bodies of study showing that adjustment, a 
sense of accomplishment as a person, the chances even for a personal as 
distinct from social excellence in adulthood, correlate with lack of 
conditioning in a person's early history in terms of such a mentality 
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which prizes more highly a person's knowing his place, high or low, than 
the active participation in family situations of the junior and 
dependent. 
To pick up once more the main drift of the argument, there were two 
paradigms of maladjustment among the above listed examples, one afforded 
e. g. by Rousseau (not personally graceful but the initiator of good in 
educational thought, to be incorporated into educational dogma in later 
times) and the other one afforded by the example in the last Section of 
the commanding officer in the Bridge on the River Kwai (personally very 
gallant but historically wrong), which show, in their respective ways, 
that the phenomenon of adjustment as human reality, or social psychologic 
grace, is not necessarily tied to the good of the public cause upheld by 
the agent; and the two - social good and socialpsychologic virtue or 
'goad' - within the context of one person's conduct, are neither proof 
nor the necessary condition for one another. The socially ascribed Pukka 
can be without socialpsychologic grace (as shown through the examples of 
Almaviva and Bertie Waster in Chapter 2. Section 2. ), and in so far as 
they possess excellence in the idiom of human reality, they do so as an 
extra feature in addition to their social elevation in the world (as 
illustrated in the persons of the two commanding officers in Renoir's 
film, analysed in the last Section), and the Pukka must - can only - 
attain their personal grace, if they have it, through and in terms of 
the idiom of human reality, just like anybody else. 
At the same time, socialpsychological adjustment, grace, is 
available to the Rachmones, the socially blemished by ascription, to 
those who neither can nor necessarily would support the morally 
anomalous existng norm even if they could. (A very Pauline thought. ) Out 
of the three paradigms postulated above, that which consists of the 
unauthenticity of participating as social subject-template only in the 
actual social world, identifying with one's socially very sacred and 
elevated role and with that only in the definition of one's self, is of 
course unavailable to the socially blemished, but he is fully free to 
assume himself, giving the full weight of his person as a full-blown and 
successfully equilibrated ensemble of a "me" and an "I" as such, to the 
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authentic choice of himself as socially blemished, as that "me" which he 
in fact truly is as a matter of his ascription in positive social 
reality, in the mode of his self-acceptance as such a curtailed and 
blemished "me". Of course, the "I" which he assumes now (no authenticity 
is complete without that) is no longer anchored in a big-letter Pukka 
"me" to which alone actual external freedom can be granted as a matter 
of course; the freedom of his "me" survives only in the 
socialpsychologic sense as his personal, not always actual possibility; 
it lives on and continues to operate in an inward, Aristotelean sense in 
the main. However, in the light of the Rachmones' continued freedom, 
albeit within such internal, Aristotelean confines only, two genuine 
possibilites continue to avail themselves to him, as a socialpsychologic 
matter, for choosing himself in the face of the 'Fallen' condition of 
his "me"; his authenticity and his unauthenticity as such a 'Fallen' 
self, as already argued. He can choose himself as ascribed Rachmones in 
the humanly unauthentic way as object only, nodding assent to himself as 
a blemished "me"-only as ascribed socially a thing, a dependant with no 
recourse to sacred status in a small-letter sense, let alone a big- 
letter one - null as someone with social and personal weight, flaunting 
himself as a curtailed object-only self in a spirit of docility, of 
lifetime apology, thrusting himself underfoot all over the place to the 
Pukka as doormat, in subservience to them. Alternatively, he can be the 
social Blemished, the Sinner, the ascribed Servant he is in the 
personally authentic way that Paul and Sartre (Cicero, Seneca) 
recommend, by utilising the fully retained, inward, Aristotelean "I" 
vis-a-vis his realistically accepted diminished external definition of a 
"me" and of his situation, in the personal transcendence of that "me" 
and of his entire self in that as the mere social object typecast for 
him, for which he could see himself if he so chose; the latter, 
authentic choice of himself yielding him real grace, if not in terms of 
the social world, in socialpsychologic ones by all means. 
Examples of those ascribed Rachmones, Blemished in the Durkheimian 
sense - of those statistical embarrassments who spoil and dissolve the 
graphs in which the positivity of society comes to expression, 
contributing towards the pools of charted anomie in there - those, in a 
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word, who choose to assume their 'Fallen' "me" in the spirit of 
authenticity, may be conveniently begun, from the ranks of criminals, 
with the story of the character Fletcher in the television serial and 
film Porridge. Fletcher is the sage of his condition in the nick. He 
looks on quietly while a new inmate throws a fit, panickiti2 aL finding 
himself in prison. Fletcher stands by calmly and helpfully, and 
administers to the man words of consolation, expressed in the proverbs 
of experience, such as 'If you can't do the time, don't do the crime. ' A 
kindly, do-gooding visitor comes, and asks him condescendingly what 
crime it was that got him into prison. 'Got caught', Fletcher replies, 
obligingly. He is calm, helpful, decent, patient, always on his toes, 
while the screw in charge of him is tortured by the problems of a bad 
marriage, the caprices of his bad-tempered superiors, of being 
constantly short of money, and the other slings and arrows that those 
who are free in the outside world, have the privilege to be heir to. His 
gaoler practically never manages to keep his cool, and the rock-solid, 
unshakable decorum of Fletcher - the end of whose sentence never seems 
in sight - is not the least of the reasons for his always being in a 
state. Earlier on (at the beginning of Chapter 2) - we drew a 
distinction between 'pure' crime - hubris in the face of the 'Sacred', 
the 'stewards of gods', such as the crime of Antigone who took on Creon 
and his rigid, inhuman order - we were concerned with the guilt of 
explicit heresy against society, unadulterated in its make-up, in the 
name of alternative standards, ideals, which are seen by the 
socialpsychologically outspoken authentic individual as preferable to 
the reigning social norm. We drew a line between so-called 'pure' crime 
in the above sense and, on the other hand, petty crime soiled in its 
motivation with other content, and undertook then to restrict the 
argument to consideration of just acts of 'pure' heresy, and not get 
sidetracked by crime of the soiled type. The crime for which Fletcher 
got convicted in the first place, obviously belongs to the 'soiled' 
variety, though what it was is never said. But whatever it was, is 
incidental from the point of view of the treatment of Fletcher's story 
now. Whatever the particular crime that got him convicted to begin with, 
he is now, as the central issue of the story, guilty of a gently 
understated but incessant, consistent, chronic Aristotelean hubris too 
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as the normal way of his life, which gnaws away permanently at the bars 
of the expectations confining him within the limits of his stereotype- 
a criminal, and unfailingly resists being contained in the metaphoric 
prison of the constraint dished out to him as a self in the existing 
social order. The never-ending plot is a string of variations on this 
theme, it's the story of how this is the case episode after episode; and 
in this sense, it is the petty criminal Fletcher's 'pure' heresy, 
dramatic hubris in addition to his almost incidental, original crime of 
the 'soiled' variety, that affords, in quite a classic dramatic 
understanding of the notion 'hubris', the portrayal of a 
SODUI psychologically authentic self engaged vis-a-vis the constraning 
norm bent on subjugating his spirit, his "I". Through an irreverent 
borrowing by the writer of Aristotle's dramaturgical devices which are 
aimed at securing the viewers' sympathies for the main hero in his 
endeavour of willing out, on account of his greater than 'gestured' 
personal authenticity, from the 'honeycomb' of society to which he is 
forcibly committed as a self, Fletcher emerges as a dramatic hero who, 
paradoxically (in true Aristotelean dramaturgical vein), successfully 
takes on his 'caretakers' from situation to situation as the function 
and product of his greater inner freedom and greater human endowment and 
quality, succeeding, within socialpsychologic confines, in challenging, 
in the terms of human reality, the conventions of the ascribed hierarchy 
in a humanly shoddy and imperfect social actuality, by doggedly ana 
successfully (though, to appearances, unassumingly) maintaining private 
standards more outstanding in human terms than is the norm in the 
established order and particularly in the personality of its 
representatives. In a word, it's the central character's quiet, 
Aristotelean, everyday hubris pitted against the humanly unimpressive 
and imperfect existing social norm, which really serves, truly to 
classical traditions, as the centre of the plot, which provides 
artistic, dramatic and socialtheoretic fuel and comment in it. 
In representing the case of the certified mad who may be, just like 
the criminal Fletcher, embarrassingly and paradoxically adorned with 
the inward grace of personal authenticity superseding his typecast by 
the norm, we turn to the example of 
ýveik. The mad, in an important 
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sense, from the Durkheimian point of view of being a threat to the 
social norm as that is in actuality, are also heretics, on the same 
account as are the sane heretics of the criminal variety (particularly 
the politically criminal variety) on account of actively drawing on 
social 'surrealism' in their conduct in disobedient reference to the 
established norm in and as society, bringing their insights as human 
realities ex nihilo, so to speak, to bear on that society - on account 
of entertaining and practising, in reality, the enactment, the 
cultivation of systems, structures of possibilities, which are 
alternative to the normative order as it is in fact given in the 
positive being of society, but which personal structures in seeing the 
world, cause that to appear as divorced, dislodged in relation to the 
human standards applied to that in the mode of the carefree suspending 
and questioning of any content of consciousness, including external, 
V 
positive society, in Cartesian profundity. At least Sveik's variety of 
madness is of this type. The certificate is nothing that Sveik can do 
anything about - it's the badge of his "me" which the official 
classification of his personality in the world now equals, it's what 
Sveik has been ascribed as, which he, in a word, is, as far as society 
is concerned. He assumes this outward definition of his "me", the public 
aspect of his self, without quibbling, without quarrel, and makes of 
his authentic being as human reality what he can in view of and with 
regard to that "me". He plays the part of the certified lunatic (as 
Fletcher played his part as a criminal) unassumingly, without a word of 
complaint, and makes this badge publicly signifying his "me" to be of 
benefit to him in terms of human reality. It is on purpose that he 
exploits the advantages of his certificate of lunacy to bring him 
freedom from the wearisome responsibilities and constrains of conduct 
that apply to the Tormal and Respected, thereby achieving for himself a 
life of remarkable fulfilment, with constant opportunities to score 
points over his superiors as a person. It may of course be (Hasek, the 
author never lets on which of these alternatives is the case) that it is 
the natural side-effect of the abandon of the simplicity of the feeble- 
minded that yields Sveik great contentment in sailing through life, 
while his fellow-men, particularly his superiors, are condemned to 
muddling along through the obstacle-course of the complications of a 
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socially responsible way of life which causes them to be in a constant 
state of desperation. Whichever of these two possible readings of 
Hasek's novel is the correct one, it remains the case that the certified 
I/ lunatic Sveik seems to systematically cream off for himself the 
satisfactions of an ego in life in the course of his service as batman 
to his officer Lukas, leaving nothing but headache for his superiors in 
his trail. In one typical episode, Lukas lines up a rendezvous with a 
high-class lady acquaintnce and a champa dinner to help with the 
entertainment, but is unavoidably called away before the event. 'My 
God', Lukas exclaims to 
ýveik, 'what is there to do? Look after her, 
will you, and do everything you can to satisfy her every little whim. ' 
And Sveik does so, carrying out the order to a 't', in an act of 
seemingly complete and unquestioning subordination to the letter of the 
command of his superior officer, which apparent attitude on his part is 
not quite parallele-ä by a meant servility towards that sacred set of 
orders and the spirit of the ascribed norm pertaining to the 
relationship between a private and his superior. 
Such examples as afford a contrast to authenticity as a self in a 
position of Rachmones as a matter of ascribed position - as illustrated 
above - showing paradigms of unauthenticity in response to the command 
'gesturing' the Rachmones to be a devoted and obedient object-only in 
relation to the Pukka, may be introduced, first of all, by the well- 
known story and the character of the black servant Uncle Tom, who is 
yearning his soul away in subordinate love towards the children of the 
white Master and their heartrendingly model parents, from his pitiful 
cabin, bridging in an irrationally generous gift of himself, the gap (as 
far as he subjectively is concerned at least) which in terms of rigid 
and hard factual social reality separates, by the force of the coercive 
outside norm ascribed and maintained by the white Master, black from 
white, rich from poor, as a matter of hard-and-fast social fact. Uncle 
Tom's attitude strongly contrasts, in this respect, with the greater 
personal reserve which the socially unelevated privates displayed 
towards their commanding officers in Renoir's film reviewed in the 
previous Section - in an attitude which rather became the privates 
portrayed in the film in comparison with Uncle Tom's servile choice of 
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himself in the face of the humanly anomalous world of a rigid class 
society. Such political implications are, of course, not a necessary 
concomitant of the paradigm of consciousness we are considering now: 
that of the committed determination of a self to suck up, as a 
systematic socialpsychologic and interpersonal attitude, to one 
representative or the corporate body of the ascriptionally higher- 
ranking Pukka in the established terms of the world. Creeping in school, 
for instance, is a common example of such a servile choice of somebody's 
self in a context which is not political. 
These acts of anthropologically upward creeping by the'lowly 
ascribed (as just elaborated), are the complementary opposite to the 
Pukka's acts of anthropological slumming. The two acts are of the same 
genus: heresies, not in the idiom of society's norm (which is 
complemented by such acts) but according to the standards and in terms 
of the dicta of authentic human reality. Both these acts, 
anthropologically upward sliming by the ascribed Rachetones and downward 
sliming by the ascribed Pukka, are illicit gatecrashings, according to 
the moral code of human reality, into the human hearts of those who are 
differentially ascribed than the individual in point who is 
unauthentically giving himself in such a way to a socially differently 
ascribed agency as a person, in the sentimental, emotive idiom of the 
currently operative ideology; and such acts, whilst effectively 
perpetrating the established order, do not serve and are uncongenial to 
such gatecrashers as people, as selves, as authentic human realities. 
These acts and the interpersonal phenomenon they afford, are to be 
distinguished from the phenomenon of coolly calculating upward social 
mobility, whose underlying motivation and Psychological spring is not 
primarily emotive. Socially upward mobility of the clear-headed kind, 
may be seen as a heresy from the point of view of established society 
and its conventional norm, but it is not the same thing as the heresy jr, 
the face of the dicta of human reality of Uncle Tom's sentimental kind, 
which does not offend the social norm, but is complementary to its 
upkeep, and which is offensive in terms of the moral code of the self. 
It is well to keep in mind that the heresy (by human measures) of an 
Uncle Tom-type upward anthropologic creeping, is distinguishable from 
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the heresy (from society's point of view) of the upstart, the parvenu 
with tangible social advantage as the gain of this project exclusively 
in mind, such as Becky Sharp's in Thackeray's Vanity Fair, whose 
personality as human reality isn't really socialpsychologically 
ungraceful at all. Upward crossings of the ascribed borders in acts of 
anthropological (as distinct from social) creeping upwards, don't bring 
the crawler tangible social advantage by themselves, Uncle Tom's 
attitude to his Master as human reality doesn't really improve poor 
Uncle Tom's lot in the actual terms of his society and its structural 
makings, and creeping at school doesn't make the creep member of the 
staff or bring him better GCSE results, though of course there are 
school situations in which the pupil's progress is judged and determined 
on a basis other than objective tests, in which instances personal acts 
of sliming up the trouserlegs of those in authority do tend to get 
reinforced in tangibly advantageous ways, these situations and this type 
of conduct breeding, by virtue of the usual linkage between hard results 
and upward social amenability of attitude in its wake, the authoritarian 
rather than the liberal and liberated personality from an early age. But 
acts of anthropological, emotive reaching over social borders in a 
personally meant spirit, the act of the gift of the Rachmones's very 
self to someone or many across the social chasm as a question of human 
attitude, are distinguishable from the acts of the self involved in 
upward social mobility explicitly and predominantly with that project as 
one's aim, irrespective whether that project will suceed or fail. The 
anthropologic as opposed to social crossings are heresies not to society 
but to human reality, and it's in terms of human reality and not of 
instrumentally tangible gains, that anthropologic heresy yields its 
results, it's in terms of the moral attitudes in keeping with the 
established ideology that it necessarily takes place. Its yield is 
within human consciousnesses, it's the concretion of selves into an 
ideology, it consists in the gift of the very selves of the social 
underdog to the ascribed Pukka, conceived as though this gift were in 
keeping with and in the service of moral value, whereas it contributes 
not to value, which is always conducive of, meaningful and measured in 
terms of personal authenticity, but it does týowar s reinforcing and 
or `viscous` as Mary Warnock preja_rs caU it, 
serving the Sartrian gue, Aidentified 
by Sartre as antivalue from the 
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point of view of the dictates, demands and the ideal of the dignified, 
graceful selves of all. 
I think the Pauline notion of 'children of God' could be brought in 
here to benefit, and the process just described illuminated as the 
betrayal of that. 'Children of God' or a 'child of God' is a name for 
the agent which may be seen as the hybrid social psyc. hoiogc_sI Self wheel 
adjusted or 'graceful' in Sartre's sense, but anthropologically writ, 
writ in phylogenetic dimensions. 'God' to which the agent is linked, 
tied in the notion for which the Pauline label stands, corresponds to 
the "I" within the self in which lies the agent's necessity as a person 
rather than, say, an eel, his future, his possibility as a person, his 
creativeness, responsibility, will, capacity for what Mead calls 
'hypothesis-formation', and a say in the order of things and of course 
his own affairs in the first person singular, speaking for himself, as 
well as his capacity for choice. 'Child' in the expression stands for 
dependant, for profane or sinner, that is to say man as object, a "me" 
as well as an "I", laden with concrete and actual content both as 
physiologic and social body, the practical instrument and occasion to 
realise the possibility of selves, of any self to whom this "me" is made 
an instrument, one's awn included. Universal love reaching across 
ascribed, man-made borders in the Pauline sense (and every person other 
than one's self is a border, an Other, somewhat different regarding the 
social contingencies attaching to his personality - amounting to that 
other person as he is in fact), differs from the above described process 
of a socially ascribed Pukka person penetrating the consciousness of 
the ascribed Rachmones in his capacity as a 'warm, loving caretaker', as 
a self assuming for the Rachetones his "I" or spirit only as an act of 
gift of himself from above with an intonation of affect and 
personalness, and in the converse and complementary act of the ascribed 
Rachmones compliantly penetrating the consciousness of the ascribed 
Pukka, making himself a gift of merely object for him in the idiom of 
meant personalness. The difference between the two processes, universal 
love in Paul's sense and this complementary upward and downward sliming 
as emotive object and subject template-selves respectively between the 
ascribed Pukka and the ascribed Rachmones, is that in the Pauline 
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process both "me" and "I" are engaged in each person in a homogenised 
ensemble, while in the other process, the socialpsychologically 
unauthentic, emotively complementary act of the gift of the ascribed 
Pukka and ascribed Rachmones of their selves in their capacities as 
their respective social roles to one another, the "me" of the Pukka and 
the "I" of the Rachmones are rendered out of commission, and 
functionally so, from a social point of view, as analysed in Chapters 2. 
and 3. The latter mentioned process is that of public charity, as well 
as that of social work when pursued in the modality of personal 
unauthenticity on the social practitioner's part, while the contrasting 
process is that of love between people in the Pauline sense, usually not 
at all in a self-indulgent way, but in an unselfconscious one at its 
most typical and authentic, which is not at all incompatible as a 
motivation with a professionalism in social work. This latter-type 
authentic love in the Pauline sense is certainly within experience and 
is people's real possibility. This kind of universal love in Paul's 
sense, authentically advanced to all others conceived in one's own 
image, on principle, at the outset of any human encounter, is distinct, 
both regarding its socialpsychologic infrastructural make-up and in 
experience from the ascribed type of emotive established class-promotion 
process up and down the social ladder, as a condition of the Pukka's 
evident and publicly paraded 'goodness', fed by his unquestioned self- 
love and by his condescension from such a socialpsychologic position to 
the Rachmones, as well as of the Rachmones' supper, for which he must, 
under 'normal' circumstances, sing in the self-depreciating tones 
socially expected of him, as a typecast object only. The two kinds of 
processes, interpersonal traffic in the idiom of universal love and, in 
contrast, complementary upward and downward sliming across social 
borders between the subservients and the rulers, are not congenial to 
one another in experience, but work there to each others' exclusion. I 
am sure Tolstoy, the hugely wealthy landed gentleman, was capable as an 
artist and a human being of love to his fellow-men in the universal 
Pauline sense, but as he came to engage more and more fully and 
unsparingly all that he was as an artist and a human being in the 
practice of that, he became more and more self-conscious of and hindered 
in this project of his by all he bad as a land-owner, and he had to 
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reconcile these two matters for his consciousness, informing him, in 
clashing terms, of the socially lowly state of the serfs in his 
overlordship (conceived of by him, as were all of his fellow-men, as his 
anthropologic equals), and his own ideals regarding authentic 
interpersonal attitudes, by eventually surrendering his estate. As 
already mentioned at the end of Chapter 3., Mead interestingly 
considers 'sympathy' from those up high in a charitable set-up, in a 
chapter of Mind. Sel', and Society devoted to that notion. Sympathy in 
such a context, he implies, is, because of the individual person- 
dependency of its generation, an inadequate basis for social work; and 
Sartre's view expressed in his work Literary and Philosophical Essays 
(already referred to in the context of our analysis of Renoir's classic 
film in the previous Section), which considers that generosity in the 
personally meant sense from the socially high up, must fail them as 
selves in the endeavour of entering into a personal union, on humanly 
compatible and authentically brotherly terms, with those who are 
socially down, (through a lack, in no small part, of a shared background 
with the socially low in the repertoire of personal experience in 
consciousness), also comes into its own in our present train of 
thought 1261. 
The notion of 'children of God' is an aspect of the self. Like the 
self to the Gestalt psychologists (who influenced Sartre explicitly and 
Mead implicitly) - 'children of God' is a holistic concept. It's an 
ensemble of "me" and "I" as lived and managed, as co-ordinated in the 
unit of the self. There are differences between every concrete "me" and 
every concrete "I", so the actual degree and concrete content of 
personal excellence will be different in each person; and it's extremely 
arrogant to meaningly manipulate, cause a levelling in the content, and 
particularly in the degree of excellence in another self, in the name of 
a sham egalitarianism often rooted in jealousy. We already cited, 
earlier on in this thesis, an example of this false egalitarianism, when 
we referred to the film entitled The Nun's Story. In an episode in this 
film, an academically brilliant young nun is commanded by a superior in 
her order to deliberately fail an examination, as an exercise in 
humility in the spirit of the love of God. The warpedness in human terms 
Paradigms of Grace - 479 - 
of this command serves to emphasise the correct anthroplogic 
understanding of the equality of all children of God as selves, 
irrespective of individual differences regarding the depth and content 
of their endowedness as concrete consciousnesses, as propounded here. 
It's important to see that the need for everyone's generosity in 
accepting our fellow-children of God as humanly our equals, for which 
Paul compels us, definitely includes the act of our entertaining and 
acceptance in such a capacity of those who are naturally better endowed 
as selves than we are, alongside with our coping with the easier case of 
accepting those as our human equals who are naturally less well endowed 
as selves than ourselves. Even though everyone is different regarding 
his or her particular mixture of "me" and "I", his or her singular 
constellation of facticity and spiritual endowment in the self, his or 
her ratio of social dependency and caretaking, guardian function, each 
child of God as organised into the unit of the self is an absolute human 
reality and in this respect equal. The sham egalitarianism produced by 
the levelling of outstanding individual excellence is to be 
distinguished from a true egalitarianism (for which it often parades), 
from a humanly as well as socially authentic egalitarianism in other 
words, which is realistically tolerant of individual socialpsycholoigic 
diversity, which is not incompatible, but goes hand-in-hand with and 
informs an egalitarianism and impartiality in the sight of the law at 
its ideally perfect, with this feature of it coupled, by the dicta of 
the collective consciousness at its ideal and universal for all, with 
the extension to all of equal opportunities in the outside world for the 
realisation of any talent they may have, as the equal due of each person 
as an absolute human being, as an equal unit of human reality, as a self 
grasped in a socialpsychologically holistic way, in the light of which 
each self, each 'child of God', is worth one hundred per cent as such. 
The humanly reduced, reciprocally functional emotional process 
between Rachmones and Pukka of complementary upward compliance and 
downward condescension as just described, is not confined as regards its 
workings and structures, to the interpersonal makings of public charity, 
but many of its features characteristically apply to the processes of 
unauthentic love in more everyday walks of life, in education, in the 
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family or even dust between lovers, as discerned by Sartre in Part III 
of Being and Nothingness, in so far as the idiom of the selves of the 
participants is conceived of in terms of senior person and dependant, as 
up and down, respectively, in the way of human status, in relation to 
one another. However, special stress is in this thesis on that level, on 
those anthropologically embracing dimensions of the process of the 
unauthentic, socialpsychologic complementation of the ascribed Pukka's 
self by the ascribed Rachmones in terms of the Pukka's subject-only 
stereotype, and conversely, by the ascribed Pukka of the ascribed 
Rachmones in terms of the Rachmones' object only stereotype, at which 
the phenomenon of public charity takes place (as enlarged on throughout 
chapters 2. and 3. ). 
The need is stressed here again to see that this emotively shot 
exchange between the dominant and servile social types as this is 
'gestured', demanded by and goes to feed the conventions of society at 
its established, in compliance with these opposite-type roles as cast 
for the Pukka and the Rachmones respectively, is not at all identical 
with, not informative or descriptive of the level of the being of 
society itself which is served, propped up and complemented by these 
normatively enforced roles, which subsists independently of the 
socialpsychologic process just described, and which appears as outside 
of that process in individual consciousnesses too, as the Durkheim- 
identified positive social reality. The status quo-compliant, 
socialpsychologically operative upward and downward sliming process as 
complementarily performed by the Pukka and the Rachetones, is not at all 
the same thing as the social processes themselves that obtain in 
peculiarly social terms and actuality between these parties, and which 
are predominantly socio-economic in their make-up. To fall into the 
error of conflating the two, the socialpsychologic inter-class sliming 
and the processes, structures and institutions of society sui generis, 
would lead to the naive swallowing of the myth and illusion, which 
escapist aberrations of the creative arts mean to perpetrate, that, for 
instance, the amorous pranks of the gentry, of the well-heeled beaux and 
of romantic Hussars, as well as their women-folk in 'classic' Viennese 
and Hungarian operettas, provide some indication of, and indeed mirror 
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and characterise, the actual historic and sociologic order of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and its anomalous forces as a matter of 
sociologic fact, which these fictional representatives of that present 
to us as harmless and charming, or, to draw on a more modern-day form of 
escapistic mythology depicting 'society', it would lull us into the 
false reassurance that there is nothing for us to concern ourselves 
about in the state of industries and the world of the stockmarket over 
and above the escapades of J. R., Sue Ellen and other characters in 
'Dallas' and 'Dynasty' who represent, in the imagination of the 
socialscientifically soporific viewer, the industrial society of which 
these characters of fiction are the pillars and mouthpieces, at the 
highest level of its success. The process and maintainance of what to 
Sartre is antivalue (constituted, in an important part, by the 
transposition of both authentic human and honestly approached 
sociological standards and realities, into the actual practice or 
literary representations of schmaltzy emotional familiarities between 
the rich - or worse still: between the rich and the poor, or rather 
between social cliches of these two types), is not at all the same thing 
as the social classes themselves, it will not yield the latter, one 
stratum in question or the other (the social and its socialpsychologic 
twin-layer of reality) will not reduce to, melt into the other, the 
unauthentic human process will not melt into society itself, nor will 
society unfold its true nature and processes through a humanly 
sentimentalised grasp and representation of that. If the distinction 
between these two strata of realities, the social and the 
socialpsychologic, is not seen, and the meaningful, though different 
actuality of these two differing media of consciousness is not 
appreciated both as realities in their own rights and in the mutually 
indismissible autonomy and independence of both vis-a-vis each other, 
the consideration of the sovereign concurrence of each will slide into 
the philosophic idealism of Hegel and later LukAcs, students of the 
relationship between human classes in terms of en masse 
socialpsychologic mastery and servitude, both of whom, as thinkers, 
credited the socialpsychologic, human workings underlying society in the 
idiom of the self (albeit at a universalistic scale), as being, in the 
final analysis, definitive of society itself. Alternatively, a lack of 
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appreciation of the legitimate, not to say necessary place in 
appropriate situations of bath these strata of reality which 
consiousness dually occupies: that of society and that of human or 
'lived' reality, may lead to the sociologic arrogance, intellectual 
elitism and socialpsychologic naivete of Althusser who, while giving 
room in his dualistic system to the being of human reality as a 
phenomenon in its own right as such, always features the being of human 
reality as false, and writes as though socially scientific thinking were 
obtainable by all, or sustainable in the way of life of any one 
individual all the time. 
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Conclusion. 
The unique contribution of a romantic view in our sense to 
socialtheoretic thought is to bring to bear on all human situations, 
including properly social phenomena, appropriately or inappropriately, a 
microscopic, petitely, socialpsychologically conceived grasp of them, 
unavailable to a positivistic approach to the study of society and even 
of social psychology of a vulgarian, schematic, crudely empiricist 
sort: its usual way of presentation in the social sciences of our day. 
It may be said generally that romantic social thought serves the 
sometimes debatedly advantageous function of drawing attention 
relentlessly to Vie nkro"atithropoio cal prism which is potentially 
available for looking through in every sitation that involves people, 
including such situations in which such a view is as distracting, 
inappropriate, distorting of the characteristically social genre of that 
as it is to take a photograph of the family solemnly posing for 
posterity, with the use of X-ray equipment. The romantic, humanly 
analytic method can 'disconstitute' (deconstruct) properly social 
situations for what those are as such, as has been shown in our earlier 
examples, say, of Sveik issuing the command 'Attention! ' to the officers 
perched on the latrine when a superior of theirs was passing by, or the 
humorising small criminal up in court who called out 'Beam me up, 
Scottie' when he was invited by the judge to say a final word in his 
defence before his passing judgement. 
There is value in looking at socially sacred situations through such 
a micro-anthropologic prism, even when the insights gained through such 
an unduly discerning and socialpsychologic detail-oriented vantage point 
shows the social slice of life thus approached as just as startling and 
absurd by its own dicta as the group of skeletons shown up in the 
portrait of the family posing in their Sunday best, when the film used 
to immortalise them is focussed in through an X-ray apparatus. The 
viewing gained through the prism of micro-anthropology is true and aptly 
revealing from the individual's profane point of view at least, and 
sometimes the bizarre insights yielded from the micro-anthropologic 
vantage-point afford relevant information regarding a sociologic 
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overview of the situation too, particularly when that is anomalous in 
its own terms from the point of view of the critical dicta-of human 
reality which is brought to bear on it, and therefore deconstruction is 
called for and criticism is in place to prevent further anomalies in 
subsequent social construction along humanly intolerable lines, which in 
its excesses is ultimately and indirectly threatening to society too. 
One of the most fruitful aspects of the romantic practice of applying 
such unusual, cross-categoric standards to phenomena that are at least 
partly social, is in the context of the notion of adjustment which, in 
the book of the romantic, indismissably includes the good integration of 
the "me" and the "I" within the 'graceful' self, not only to its 
relation to the world, but also in terms of the self's own 
socialpsychologic, infrastructural dicta. Therefore, to the mind of the 
romantic, any maladjustment between the aspiring 'graceful' or 
socialpsychologically adjusted self and its jarring or constraining 
situation in the world preventing him from maintaining such an 
accomplished and fulfilled self, is just as plausibly, naturally and 
readily overcome by 'alloplastic' ways (by manipulating the world to 
suit everybody's right to be such a fulfilled and socialpsychologically 
balanced self as both a fully cultivated "me" and a fully cultivated 
"I"), as does the social positivism-advocated, alternative, 
'autoplastic' tactics for achieving adjustment both within the 
infrastructure and in terms of the outward, wordly situation of the 
self, in other words, the tactics of conveniently degrading, 
'flattening', two-dimensionally simplifying, and socially schematising 
the individual's self by bending the dicta of the "I" within that (in 
extreme cases surrendering those altogether), so as to present a 
socialpsychologically uncomplicated, undiscriminating and socially 
unproblematic individual consciousness in the service and 
complementation of the humanly anomalous and insensitive social norm, in 
instances where the normative ideals and conditions of society's own 
adjustment clash with the conditions of the adjustment of its individual 
citizens as persons, as particular individuals, as socialpsychologically 
active ensembles of "me"-s and "I"-s. (It should be intercepted here 
that 'autoplastic' or "I"-corrective measures towards adjustment are in 
place according to romantic socialpsychologic practitioners too in 
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certain instances, such as those cases in which the "I" operates 
socialpsychologically dysfunctionally, reality-irrelevantly, by clinical 
standards, which threaten or affect the intra-individual grace of the 
self. However, the romantic, unlike the positivist or empiricistic 
social scientist, will not advocate 'autoplastic' adjustment in 
instances where the root cause of a self's maladjustment in relation to 
the world is not in the dysfunctionality of the self as such, but in the 
dysfunctionality of society and its norms as a public attitude in 
relation to the properly and justifiably fulfilled self or selves. ) 
In contrast with the socialtheoretic positivist, to whom the "I" is 
a redundant and fictitious finery in the idea of the adjustment of any 
self, the romantic always judges the individual's conduct and mode of 
consciousness as more than the stereotypic promptings of its 
sociologically most convenient typecast in its merely socially intuited 
situation. His notion of the socialpsychologically animated and 
illuminated personal "me", is ever 'salient', socialpsychologically 
three-dimensional with the needs and dictates of the "I", to which an 
ever-personal and individually concrete "me" is a unique platform, of 
which it is the peculiar index, and which as a socialpsychologic reality 
is necessary, the romantic will claim; no man, be he a judge or the 
least conspicuously cast participant in the situation, is justified in 
having recourse to a "me" which is reduced to a mere social template 
solely defined by its social roles; no man may be excused from being a 
personally owned-up-to, practical, individual "me" in the 
socialpsychologically concrete and significant idiom. He who doesn't 
care to assume a practical "me" high up in office and parades as an "I"- 
only as type-cast for him, will nevertheless cut a figure as human 
reality, a human reality which is deficient, one that the romantic 
worries about as an unauthentic socialpsychologic phenomenon, just as he 
worries about the display of a sheer "me" in the ordinary, equally 
personally unauthentic citizen who doesn't care to assume the "I" which 
also belongs to every person by necessity, on the romantic's account. 
The person who tries to be social object only as humbly cast for him or 
subject only as prestigeously cast for him, is just as obscene, awry, 
out of balance, lopsidedly developed, unauthentically specialised a 
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phenomenon as human reality to the Sartrian, as is the consciousness of 
the masochistic lover divested of his spiritual as well as physiological 
grace in the sexual act, or the Other who sadistically tries to assume 
mastery over the masochist presenting himself to him as object only. The 
romantic commands every agent in all situations: 'be exactly human, 
quite human, and no more than human'; bringing home and making quite as 
burdensome a present of the "me" to the caretakers as he makes of the 
"I" to the ordinary citizen, by ramming home the personal 
responsibilities and the duties both of the former, the ascribed 
caretaker in the light of the "me" of which he is shy, and in the 
ascribed profane in the light of the "I", in the use of which he may be, 
and often is, unschooled. 
The romantic's complexly grasped, microcosmocally and 
macrocosmically inclusive view of adjustment, with its paradigms of ego- 
fulfilled and fulfilling grace on the one hand, and the opposite 
socialpsychologic obscenities of an "I"-deficiency in the would-be human 
doormat and the "me"-deficiency in the would-be Master in all 
interpersonal contexts (social ones included) on the other, yield a rich 
and more adequate definition of adjustment than a positivistic or 
empiricistic one, as well as a varied and informative typology of 
maladjustments, which have been given an airing in some detail in the 
last two Sections of this thesis. 
In understanding the relationship between the profane and their 
caretakers, the question of deciding who is sacred and who profane may 
be seen as a battle of definitions, depending on whether these two 
opposing categories are seen in the small-letter or the big-letter sense 
- because the dignified human qualities and conditions which make for 
sacredness and amount to master-status, so to speak, on the one hand, 
and the ego-afforded, perpetrated and mediated human contamination of 
consciousness which makes for profane status on the other, are 
considered by conflicting criteria in the two competing traditions of 
social thought, the positivistic one concerned with the big-letter 
aspect of these two human categories in their relationship, and the 
romantic which is concerned with the small-letter aspect of those human 
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categories. Profane and sacred status are both attained and defined by 
ascription according to the positivist tradition, and both are 
maintained by abidance by the ascribed norm differentially existing for 
the ascribed sacred and the ascribed profane, " the ensuing two levels 
of the norm as established, serving to keep ascribed Sacred and ascribed 
Profane apart on the long term. The romantics threaten this positivistic 
definition and effective classification of sacred and profane (a) by 
advocating alternative criteria for excellence as a definition of human 
worth and qualification for master-status; they propose constantly 
earned rather than permanently and rigidly ascribed excellence as human 
reality as a measure of one's entitlement to one's rights;. and (b) by 
serving as a practical ideology for those profane by virtue of 
ascription who are willing and able to emancipate themselves by way of a 
dynamic, alternative, small-letter grasp of their situation, which they 
insist ensures for them the possibility of yet earning an excellence and 
sacred status according to their own definition and criteria of that, in 
the course of their future, as is so evocatively propounded by 
Kierkegaard. 121 
Through being able to posit, in a coherent system of thought, 
socially and socialpsychologically relevant norms in terms of earned 
worth, romantic sociology, or social thought, forges ahead and furthers 
both itself and the sccialpsychologic, human reality which it comprises, 
defines and advocates. The ensuing attitude of consciousness and project 
of being is effective in restoring freedom, certainly as a 
socialpsychologic and maybe also as a successfully and usefully 
innovative social matter, to those who are able and individually 
adequate enough to restore that for themselves, even in a society which 
is characteristically intolerant towards and suspicious of the odd, the 
unafraid, and those who are unwilling to curb any outstanding gift they 
may have so as to fall in with a morality of uncritical and personally 
unearned virtuousness informed by an effortless mediocrity, by the dicta 
of a normative ideal which affords a sense of excellence solely but 
surely to those who want to shine through keeping to the well-trodden 
paths of ascribed value rather than to be shown as conceivably less 
excellent than those who may be more lowly ascribed, in the individual 
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competition of everyone vis-a-vis everyone, defending themselves and 
their elevated position in the world against a morality of personally 
earned worth, by sticking to a morality of convention by virtue of which 
once ascribed high one will always remain high, regardless of personal 
aptitude to justify one's prestigious office and placement in the world. 
Starting, in our job of contrasting the two clashing and competing 
frames of reference for individual excellence (personally and 
authentically earned as opposed to ascribed), we may conveniently start 
with the humanly authentic one. In understanding it, the showbusiness 
truism 'you are as good as your last show' may be helpfully called 
upon, as the saying succintly expresses a system and criterion of 
measuring human worth (one which has a great deal in common with that of 
Kierkegaard's, just quoted), as the acid test of this first of the two 
kinds of contrasting moralities we are concerned with: that which 
consists in and is maintained through the dicta and observance of the 
standards of first-hand, never-stale and never-static human reality. An 
abidance by this kind of standards - those of human reality pure and 
simple without regard to any other consideration - presents a tall order 
for those aspiring to the ensuing, ever-authentic human status and 
dignity, compelling everyone to constantly earn his or her worth. In 
contrast, the moral inherent in the sanctity of ascription gains and 
maintains its inert strength both on account of the socialpsychologic 
and its functionality for society and for its caretakers who are 
appointed in keeping with the dicta of ascribed moral convention. From a 
social psychol ogi c point of view, it's understandable that no-one highly 
ascribed would want to change his prestigeous niche and sacred status 
even of a moderately high degree which he already has and is able to 
maintain by virtue of ascription and through merely observing the self- 
perpetuating dictates of that, for the hard life of constantly having to 
earn one's worth. From a sociologic point of view, it's equally clear 
that by constantly earning and unearning one's worth as a condition of 
one's place under the sun of recognised merit, society would become very 
unstable and disequilibrated. A romantic ethics and style of conduct 
underlain by such ethics, are a threat to society which exists in the 
positivistically approached and constituted norm and in the subservience 
Conclusion - 489 - 
of the individual to the ascribed value of that. It may be said that a 
romantic and a positivistic moral ideology are in a special, dialectic 
relationship to one another as each other's opposites, one unmaking the 
very being of the other whilst maintaining itself. The romantic frame of 
reference in respect to value, as we have seen from the above train of 
thought, makes itself and unmakes society, as a condition of its being, 
elbowroom (or prevalence) and operation. 
From the point of view, not of society's already existing states of 
affairs, but of human reality both in the individual and in society 
dynamically viewed as a process, the feature of the romantic 
socialtheoretic tradition that it insists on the "1" as a necessary part 
of every self in all situations, offers very real value. It carries the 
moral assertion that nobody deserves to be treated as less than human, 
and shows the inhumanity, by profane standards, of that ascribed norm 
and those ascription-abiding individuals, who render a great class of 
humans so, just for being blemished in ways they cannot renounce. It 
also shows the oppressiveness and the sham nature of a morality of 
ascribed virtue as the ideal of individual conduct - the sense of the 
exemplariness of the complete adoption of the social norm undiluted by 
concrete personal standards, as it was satirically presented in the 
story of Lieutenant Kije. The Kije-fable emphasises both the general 
scale and the absurdity of the predictable triumph in society of a 
humanly completely passive conduct. Through never erring - because never 
trying or doing anything (the story implies), through politely not 
existing at all in the ordinary sense of being alive, one never 
accumulates blemishes, never offends from society's and the generalized 
other's sometimes questionably decorous moral point of view; this is how 
an 'ideal' curriculum vitae is produced in keeping with the dicta of the 
ascribed norm. Romantic social thought shows this frame of reference - 
that of socially never offending through always being totally passive - 
as an unadmirable method of rising to high ranks, of achieving 
excellence, of attaining Generalship as it were, of earning one's seat 
among the sacred. 
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However, whilst full of insight in granting the halo to the 
blemished, there are great shortcomings in modern romantic sociology. 
One such consists in its typical feature (and romantic, early Marxism, 
and even later Marxism is included here) that it doesn't, 
characteristically, grant any such 'halo' as human reality to the 
conceivably humanly deserving ascribed sacred as his personal 
possibility, and is in this sense non-egalitarian. The romantic, 
furthermore, 'disconstitutes' too indiscriminately. In rightly drawing 
attention to the anomalousness by absolute measures of a low ascribed 
status often suffered in our contemporary cultures by the project and 
course of the cultivation of real human excellence as an i4eal in 
itself, romantic social thought critically highlights the popularity and 
the unduly easy reinforcement-attachment in the world to the type of 
maladjustment or obsecenity which consists in the Pukka's total 
identification with his highly ascribed social image as an empty 
windbag, which thereby becomes, in actual practice, a common substitute 
for real, authentic personal excellence, and which is the Pukka's or 
caretaker's preferred and characteristic avenue to maintaining his 
superiority as Master, without any substantive beef (by the measures of 
human reality) of a truly excellent individual self underpropping the 
ascribed Pukka's readily granted sacred status in the world. But the 
romantics too often fail to see and to credit, as already observed, the 
occasional exceptions to this rule in the Pukka, moreover, they 
characteristically tend to fail to see (and here they part company with 
the followers of Marx) that the loyalty of the ascribed Pukka to society 
in the name of which he typically conducts himself in the mode of the 
socialpsychologic gracelessness and maladjustment of opting to be an 
"I"-template only vis-a-vis the ordinary profane, is not a loyalty to 
nothing at all. Romantic social theorists and practitioners are 
characteristically blind to the positive being of society which is being 
effectively served even by personally repugnantly unauthentic 
representatives of it, and in being critical of the human-reality-wise 
unauthentic and morally unbecoming Pukka who often, even typically, 
subserves society in the modality of a socialpsychologically offensive 
personal unauthenticity, the romantic often throws out, disconstitutes, 
deconstructs the baby (society itself) in his act of throwing out the 
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social psychological ly dirty bathwater of the humanly objectionable 
attitude of the personally unauthentic sham 'Masters' of society (who in 
reality are very often the spineless servants of that at the same 
stroke, as the romantic is ready to see. ) In meaning to 
socialpsychologically 'disconstitute' the personal pompousness 
(typically coupled with personal spinelessness by authentic human 
measures) of the Pukka, in social situations, they also 'deconstruct' 
society itself, often inadvertently and in an unduly anarchistic and 
blanket way. Aiming the X-ray equipment of their critique at the 'icon' 
depicting the sacred scene to show up the pathetic individual 
sketchiness and inadequate accomplishment by particularistic measures of 
the little stick-men, anatomically poorly drawn, who hide their human 
insignificance 'in the picture' under the regalia of their officialdom, 
the romantics often destroy the icon itself, which may conceivably be 
worth having. They criticise power, but if they were to attain it, they 
wouldn't be able to institutionally consolidate it - they often don't 
understand the need. In viewing the phenomenon of socialpsychologic 
'construction' or 'constitution', they are valuably preoccupied with the 
rationalistic element in that - in other words, with the Pygmalionic 
power of the Other to define our own selves, by way of our learning to 
know our own externally positive "me" through the Other mirroring, 
reflecting, projecting that back to our self more correctly than our 
self would be able to achieve by its own effort, informed by its own 
narcissistic, solipsistic frame of reference alone. But the intellecual 
toll which this recognition and preoccupation of the romantics 
(particularly existentialists) take, is their notoriously insufficient 
understanding of the decisive extent to which one's being as a socially 
and socialpsychologically positive personal "me" is determined in a 
shorthand, routine and directly available manner by way of and with 
reference to the network of the self's roles and the set of social 
facticity within which every self is situated, without constant recourse 
to such a particularistic, concretely Other-prompted and created 
Pygmalionic feedback regarding one's 'real self' or publicly verifiable 
personality all the time. In freeing man from the constraints of the 
ordered and limited imagination of ascribed norm-abidance as one's moral 
horizon, in emancipating that which prior to twentieth-century 
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socialtheoretic romanticism has been regarded as heresy in social 
thought, by resuscitating the exercise of the nihilation in Cartesian 
depths of established society and its artistic and scientific 
institutionally monolithic superstructures, modern social romanticism, 
particularly existentialism, has launched into being and administered a 
fantastically revitalising vitamin-injection to twentieth-century art, 
revolutionalising that by virtue of the ensuing new, disconstitutive 
vision of what has previously been accepted as sacredly and immutably 
social in its idiom and purpose, by introducing the surreal and a 
variety of 'isms' to replace in art the representations of the literally 
and palpably real in that in other ways too, thereby raising our 
contemporary art to the heights of a new renaissance. However, in giving 
birth to the surreal and to the other refreshing alternatives to the 
slavishly representative idiom of a foregone artistic and intellectual 
conventions, the ideology of society-irreverent romantic thought was in 
some instances destructive to the positively real in both theoretically 
and practically detrimental ways, for instance in underestimating, in 
the context of social science, the primary and elemental reality of the 
collective consciousness and its actual powers as sacred on its own 
terms. In challenging sacredness through ascription as the ideal 
criterion of a man's deserts in the world, in attacking ascription, with 
partial justification, as a suitable ideal in assigning sacred and 
profane status, the romantic social theoreticians and practitioners in 
this century typically paid insufficient attention - in fact, overlooked 
- the power and adequacy of ascriptive standards and methods of 
sustaining the Sacred-Profane division and hierarchy in actual society. 
What romantics typically don't care to see and which they are weak 
at appreciating is that society quite simply is - sul generis, as 
Durkheim would say. If one deconstrt4Cts it too much, withdraws 
identification with it as a matter of personal commitment, if profound 
heresies of it are not contained, it will nevertheless go on existing as 
a whole, as society, but a very unfulfilled one, with a great lack, 
substantial Durkheimian anomie in its very being, analogously with an 
individual's life grasped as a whole, in which a man's potentials, 
fulfilled or unfulfilled, are taken account of, are weighed and found 
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either good enough as such, or alternatively found wanting on account of 
its not having become what it 'had to be': its own potential to be what 
it is. Society, a being fundamentally different from and mutually 
exclusive with the 'my world' of human reality, also must be what it is: 
its own positive being, just as the reality of 'my world' is one that 
'has to be' what it is: human reality, in its irreconcilably different 
idiom from that of society. No matter how useful, from the point of view 
of the individual or of a particular social issue, the application of 
'deconstruction' may be, the social consequences of such an act do not, 
and cannot extend to the doing away with the Durkheimian category 
'society' in the actuality of nature, nor of those values and norms in 
which any given society (whether nascent or established) in fact 
subsists, and according to which sacred and profane status is defined 
and assigned, in whatever novel a given and positively social way, in a 
manner to which individual, norm-deviant definitions of moral worth are 
uncongenial and threatening. In terms of society's own positive order of 
reality, a person who has been ascribed his humanly qualitative status 
as either sacred or profane, has been qualified and really 'constituted' 
in that capacity in terms of the external positive reality of society in 
a socially factual, hard-and-fast sense, just by virtue of that 
circumstance alone - the circumstance that such-and-such a status has 
been ascribed to him. The criminal, or other Rachmones so relegated by 
ascription, becomes Profane by definition when identified and declared 
so through and by virtue of prevailing public standards - as a matter of 
the law, of the solemn and formal judgement in which the very being of 
society in fact consists, in its capacity as the Sacred. 'A criminal is 
he who has been punished', Durkheim laconically observes in a statement 
which, however brief and however simple the point it makes, is a 
statement worth making as in defining criminality, this claim is stated 
in a way which excludes any alternative moral frame of reference in 
defining it - particularly the competing romantic one (as just 
described) according to which a man's status and merit, the measure of 
his dignity as an individual, is the extent to which he has earned that 
through an ever-varying flux of human excellence, incessantly exuded in 
the course of one's life in one's capacity as a person. Such a competing 
set of reference would be threatening to and mutually exclusive with the 
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prevailing social one according to which one's righteousness in the big- 
letter, public sense or, in contrast, one's blemished status, consists 
in its being so decreed - moreover, according to which the big-letter 
righteousness of the man who has taken charge of the blemished 
criminal's autonomy as a self (expressed in the exercise of the co- 
ordination of the blemished person's rights and his duties, his "me" and 
his "I", in lieu of him), rightfully consists in the sacred society's 
agent carrying out the job of such caretaking to the letter, for the 
purpose of relegating the criminal (or other kind of Rachetones) to 
Profane status and himself and the authority-perpetrating likes of him 
to a permanent Sacred status, on the long term. The Pukka, from the pant 
of view of society and the norm in which that consists, is really right 
in doing this job; the truth of this, the caretaker's righteousness in 
the big-letter sense, is not a figment of the imagination as the 
orthodox or rather too narrow romantic makes out. Just as the romantic 
fears for the individual's consciousness if the lack in that, the 
potentials he 'has to be' but is prevented from becoming, remains 
unfulfilled, so the committed positivist moralist fears for the being of 
society if the incidence of heresies, maladjustment in relation to the 
positive being of society, deviance from it - madness, crime, suicide - 
show the dark side of social life, its lack, to be very great, causing 
society to be found wanting in relation to its own potentials as 
society, which consist in its being what it is, what it 'has to be' as 
society, sustained by and through its self-ascribed norm in which it 
prevails, upheld by people morally supportive of this end as individuals 
whose chosen project is simply to supremely identify with it. The Pukka 
says with Tillich: 'God needs man'. He sets an example, and offers his 
being to society in a religious spirit. He is often a zealous caretaker. 
To a certain and fateful, decisive extent, he keeps in his hands the 
business of co-ordinating the correspondence between the natural 
aptitude ("I") and the actual chances ("me") of someone not Pukka, not 
Us, Profane; he is positively motivated in enforcing that the Profane 
person's possibilities, potential and actual ("I" and "me") are kept 
apart well and good. As far as he is concerned, the man who has shown 
himself as not Pukka, is not a complete man, is not the kind of complete 
self for which he warmly appehends himself and his fellow-pukka. In the 
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hypothetical instance that a Pukka became convinced that the thick 
police file of a black youth is the record of nothing more than the 
inability of one particular policeman on the beat to conceive of the 
mere presence of this youngster in the street in any other terms than 
'loitering with intent', the Pukka would neither be free nor right in 
throwing the lad's file on the fire and eradicating all other references 
indicative of the boy's blemished status elsewhere too, even if this 
were possible. The Pukka owes it to the collective consciousness which 
he serves not to entertain this possibility, and excludes this from his 
conduct through the most positive of considerations. A person once 
identified as socially incongruous, deviant even regarding this 
intentions in relation to the stability of society and is defined thus 
on public record, has acquired an existence as such in positive social 
reality and has been profaned accordingly as a matter of social fact. If 
the hypothetical Pukka of our example brought the issue of how far the 
young offender earned his blemish in being so classified in society to 
bear upon his attitude to this youngster's case, he would not play the 
game in Durkheimian terms any more, in terms of the positive social 
reality to which he has dedicated the being of his consciousness; he 
would, by this individualistically oriented approach, bring society as 
such and his consciousness as continuous with it, his own raison d'etre 
into question, pick a hole in society. He excludes the Possibility of 
reassessing the youth's case in his own personal lights, not as a 
social psychological, interpersonal matter between the youth and himself 
(which dimension and possibility of attitude is functionally jettisoned 
from his consciousness), but as a matter of solemn, socially sacred 
moral conviction, guided by a moral passion: big-letter righteousness or 
Righteous Indignation. The Rachmones amounts to a holistic image in his 
eyes: one less than Us, less than the Pukka's fellow-Pukka towards whom 
he feels love, but to a whole none the less; a whole of a different, 
other than fully human genre - to the stereotypes 'Mad', 'Criminal', 
'Not Us', 'They'. The Rachmones in his care, is grasped by the Pukka as 
social deviance 'as such' - as that phenomenon which threatens the beill$ 
of society, eating into it, unbalancing its equilibrium, causing 
discontinuity in it, actualising a not-yet known, heterogeneous, 
alternative, deviant, uncongenial, negative being in its fibre. The 
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Rachmones he faces is intuited by him as the sinner, as the deviant or 
criminal in the absolute sense, in a sense upon which the concrete 
content of his deviance or crime doesn't necessarily have any bearing. 
The Pukka hates these stereotypes with a positive, moral passion; the 
mere words 'crime', 'sin', 'madness' shock him. He feels horror in 
encountering them, in a manner in which there is 'nothing personal' in 
his atitude to the blemished in front of him; he would feel the same 
towards every other blemished in the Rachmones' shoes. The Pukka 
doesn't allow his own sentiments to be profaned by thinking of the man 
facing him in other terms, in the human terms reserved by him for the 
Pukka. His consciousness is entirely taken up by the big-letter 
righteousness of his duty to society in doing what he can for his part 
in enforcing the Ascription. From the point of view of the category of 
Being which he supports and for which he deputises - the positively 
social one as distinct from the socialpsychologic one with which the 
romantic is primarily preoccupied, and the romantic typically doesn't 
see that the Pukka who appears to him as an empty windbag is in fact 
filled with positive society itself in a real sense, and he pours his 
society-congenial and corroborative spirit back into society with 
devoutness. He and society are at one, are one, in this process, 
attitude and act. He is the caretaker of society; his consciousness is 
the collective consciousness, and he is thinking in the plural. As far 
as he is concerned, it is, in a meaningful sense, the Norm, the 
Ascription of society itself which this representative of Deviance has 
offended, called into question through his conduct. It is both the Being 
of society and his own solemnly chosen being as the caretaker of it 
which the Pukka in this situation is defending - for if the sacredness 
of Ascription is called into question, what is there left to assure him 
that he is normal, that he is sacred, that he is worthy of his elevated 
Caretakership, of the fact that society, which he protects and which is 
protective to him, quite simply ia; with no clothes on, what would make 
him Emperor in a small way at least, or at any rate someone at one with 
the Empetior, a trusty consciousness in the service of the Empire as the 
very minimum, as a question of the definition of his life-project and 
of the sense of his very being as a person, as a man? The romantic 
social thinker pays undue disrespect (through lack of seeing that his 
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positivist opposite number does a job) and pays the same discourtesy to 
the Pukka which he suffers from the Pukka, in ignoring that both he and 
the society-loyal social positivists are characteristically unwilling to 
entertain that the other may be purely motivated, that the springs both 
in his and in his ideologic opponent's conduct, while humanly 
unattractive when viewed from their own respective points of view, may 
be unsoiled by petty motivation, and neither of these two varieties of 
social thinkers, the romantic and the positivist, see that the other may 
be positively principled in their motivation, through the dedication of 
their selves to the cause of safeguarding human value and moral 
standards in the context of society, their differing understandings of 
the criteria for this aim notwithstanding. This blind spot in the 
horizons of both the romantic and the positivist social scientist is the 
result of their mutual intolerance. Both these types of thinkers 
typically fail to see that their colleagues in the other 
socialscientific tradition want to achieve the good of man in society; 
the romantic thinker doesn't acknowledge that this is the Pukka's aim 
(any more than the Pukka acknowledges that this is the romantic's aim), 
and the romantic characteristically challenges the place and the 
meaningfulness of the seriousness of the Pukka's project (Kierkegaard 
being an exception). 
(3'. 
Finally, in enumerating the social theoretically consequential 
aspects of early and mid-twentieth-century romantic social thought, we 
may mention, still on the negative side of the romantic social 
tradition, its characteristic elitism, which often causes romantic 
social thinking to fall down in practical terms on its own ideals of an 
anthropologic egalitarianism applicable to all. 
In respecting the 
project of self-perfection and self-emancipation - by providing an 
alternative moral to that prevailing by virtue of ascription alone, for 
the restoration of the self's autonomy in those whose "I" could be 
trusted to manage it and who are unduly humiliated through not being 
allowed to do so in terms of real opportunities, 
it forgets about those 
who are not naturally endowed to be able 
to utilise a chance to do soy 
and of whom the romantic social theoretician and/or practitioner, 
expects such an effort as a duty. Romantics 
do society good in 
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discouraging an attitude of dependence on society; a society of 
independent and socialpsychologically autonomous and self-relying people 
is, by ideal standards, a better one than that in which the greatest 
bulk of citizens in socially undistinguished ranks are dependent, either 
through their personal inability to do otherwise or because they are 
effectively forced to rely on caretaking to an overwhelming extent by 
society's dicta demanding such dependence of them as a normative matter. 
However, in spite of the laudability, in general terms and as an ideal 
standard, of the maintenance by the romantic of the universalistic ideal 
reserving, in principle, the responsibility and right for all to present 
themselves as dignified and sovereign selves at all times,. (insisted on 
at least as a need in all), he more often than not forgets about those 
who are potentially and in fact unable to live with such a high degree 
of independence, and he is unaccomodative of the reality of those whose 
dislodgement between "me" and "I" cannot be disregarded and therefore 
made null as a partly personal and partly empirically objective feat on 
the part of the agent supporting such a dislodgement. He leaves out in 
the cold those who need 'taking care of' in our sense, and who are 
better off with caretakers who do their job of representing and 
promoting their welfare, even if in a somewhat insensitive manner, than 
they would be under the reign of the kind of high-minded romantic 
theoriser who would tell them to go and survive in the fair competition 
which goes on in the world among the naturally gifted. 
But even these faults of the 'romantics', as just described and 
listed, are able to contribute to society's good, if drawn on in the 
right dosage. Their nihilative and critical power, when brought to bear 
upon the social sciences and on the practical ways of an actual society, 
can operate as an ultimately constructive double negative which affords 
positive results in society, insofar as the 'romantic's' nihilation of 
society's anomalies (negativities themselves), is able to annul 
malfunctions in public standards, offensive to private ones, too. This 
process, which liberates individual consciousness as such, is also 
generative of outward, positive, concrete consequences. 
'I am exercising 
my freedom fully', Sartre writes, 'when I, who am myself a nothingness 
and a void, make of everything that exists a nothingness. Doubt is a 
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breaking of contact with being. Through doubt, man has a permanent 
possiblity of disentangling himself from the existing universe and of 
suddenly contemplating it from above... In this sense, it is the most 
magnificent affirmation of the reign of the human... There is an order 
of the true because man is free, and even if this order does not exist, 
it would be enough for man to be free for there never to be a reign of 
error because man... can... withdraw at any moment from a false and 
faked nature. ' (41 It is, moreover, important to see that a romantic 
society-critical stance and practice, whose principles of morally 
reprehensible norm-supersession by the standards and dicta of human 
reality, are valuably able and well placed to effect, prompt, inform and 
play a role in all timely social change and in progress, in ways great 
and small. An important class of anomalies in society is constituted by 
the frustration of and insensitivity on the part of the existing norm 
to the simple, basic and socialpsychologically necessary and matter-of- 
fact needs in and for the selves sustaining society in their capacity as 
individuals, this partly subjective aspect and capacity of their 
consciousness demanding its satisfaction in terms of human reality at 
all times, concurrently with the normal selves' role-performance as 
society's 'carriers' and their awareness of the need for their 
participation in society by positively exercising their capacity as 
such, in the positivists' sense; and a society which is chronically deaf 
to the human needs of humans, is dysfunctional, not only from the point 
of view of the individual humans peopling that whom such a rule deprives 
of the chance and necessary actuality of sustaining a dignified self to 
a normal and necessary extent in the terms of human reality, but is 
dysfunctional, in an important and practically consequential sense, as ä 
society too. Human reality is necessary in a world of humans, not only 
in the context of the normally profane, everyday business of personal 
and interpersonal conduct of each of its members at the unavoidable and 
universal socialpsychologic level of their humanly concrete 
possibilities and conduct, but it's also necessary in its relation to 
social life, in which context the role of human reality figures writ 
large, and in which context the established norm is the barometer and 
gauge of society's capacity, as well as axiomatic and proper duty, to 
accomodate the indismissably concrete human needs of its members as 
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individual people and as, to an appreciable extent, sovereign and 
personally autonomous citizens, each and every one of them; and the 
standards of human reality are both the fountainhead and instruments of 
society's changes in instances when the intolerance by society of its 
members as human beings, or selves, assumes humanly insupportable 
dimensions. Our chapter on 'coarse caretaking' meant to demonstrate the 
anomalousness, absurdity and inadequacy of a 'government' both on a 
national and on a microsociologic scale, which expects people to subsist 
as society-carrying "me"-s only, at all times, and which demands the 
foreewesring their sphere of being as salient, social psychologically 
significant selves as well, even in situations and contexts of which the 
tone is properly personal. Our coarse caretaker is someone who bids 
people to shed their capacity as authentic selves even at times when it 
would be appropriate for them to be so, who bids them to give up their 
selves in the ordinary, personal sense in which selves are properly 
complete with "I"-s too. The resulting shortchangedness of the humans 
who are made the 'mere objects' of such caretaking, contaminates and 
qualitatively degrades the daily business of ongoing life under such a 
government, in social ways as well as individual ones, and necessitates 
periods of minor or even fundamental revisions of the norm, which must, 
from time to time, give way to the re-assertion of human reality of 
itself to such a natural extent which is normal and necessary to it as 
human reality. Such a re-assertion of human reality of itself, will 
sometimes occur on a mass scale, in instances where the longstanding and 
systematic oppression of the individuals' 'my world', sphere of 
operation as selves, cannot and will not be supported by society's 
humanly deprived selves any longer. Examples of phenomena on the scene 
of our actual and contemporary world history which bear witness to such 
revisions of the social norm at the instigation of untenably discontent 
and frustrated human reality, clamouring for room in society for its re- 
assertion, are provided by the turbulent aftermath, in our day, of the 
human reality-suppressive Cultural Revolution in China, as well as by 
the current upsurge of religion in its romantic, society-critical and 
nihilative forms, in the face of the individual-alien established 
ideology in present-day Poland and Russia (congenial, regarding its 
central nature, to the current phase of perestroika and glasnost in 
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Soviet society for which - the idea may perhaps be legitimately 
hazarded - this religious frame of reference for norm-deviation 
importantly, and certainly to some extent, paved the way). The 
clandestine or even publicly eruptive popular religious practice in 
these two countries, served, and still does serve, as the instrument and 
medium of the protest of an appreciable section of the masses, against 
the oppression of the self and its fundamental rights as such, by the 
socially orthodox and coercive, individual-contemptuous reigning 
ideology. This movement as just described, may be apprehended as a 
latter-day echo in history, in some important respects, of the first 
Christian revolution, documented in the New Testament, and of the post- 
medieval revolt by the suppressed individual spirit on a mass scale at 
the time of the Reformation. It is perhaps Hegel who was the first to 
systematically and most influentially offer a view of history as an 
ongoing process of alternation between predominantly social-structural 
phases of govenment, typically enforcing their norm with a view to the 
self-perpetration of that, allowing little lee-way for the individual 
spirit, on the one hand, and, on the other band, such phases in which 
this spirit re-affirms itself, in a renewal both of itself and of 
society at its ossified given, but, as the above quoted examples show, 
this proposition on his part is proving itself as one with continued 
meaning and topicality to-day. As for earlier times in our century, 
Hegel's model of the history of society also proved itself as generative 
of a following, as in the works, for instance, of Durkheim, who, for his 
part, also makes a reference to this process as something that is 
predictable and regular, likening the structure of society over time to 
an inert building, edifice, which persists and lasts sometimes 
outdatedly throughout history, and which is from time to time 
illuminated, enlivened and refurbished by periods which he calls 
Renaissances, by periods, in other words, of its being re-furnished with 
life at times when human reality repossesses that, bestowing on that a 
new, topical, 'lived reality'-relevant meaning, filling that with 
novel, vital, new content as society. 's' MacQuarrie, in his 
Introduction to his work An Existentialist Theology, 's' puts forward a 
historical view of religion, which suggests (albeit in part implicitly) 
that the history of religion is a process in which periods of the 
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organisation of that into established normative dogma, are followed by 
phases of the reassertion of the romantic, individual-relevant and 
concerned content and function of religion in the face of its outgrown 
structure in the world, which has usually become unaccominociative of the 
authentic individual's spiritual satisfaction and the interests in more 
than one sense - as egos and as economic units - of the worshippers who 
sustain that religion, and that a view of religion in Europe is 
incomplete without an appreciation of both these phases, which together 
and in their contiguity amount to the history of Christianity. Such a 
dynamic view of society - one that is grasped as a process which is 
complete with its own changes and with an appreciation of one important 
source and systematically recurrent cause of those (the periodic re- 
affirmation of the rights of the masses as selves when that is 
insupportably taken away from them) -a view which is clearly and 
vitally informed, in part at least, by the romantic grasp of social 
science - is realistic and informative regarding society. Such a view 
automatically carries the implication that a narrow positivistic view 
regarding society and its history, which sees social change as 
unpredictably, randomly and inorganically attaching to the history and 
external processes of society, is, in contrast with the above outlined 
romanticism-informed view regarding the social process, incomplete and 
inappropriately torn out of the context of the dialectic interplay and 
alternation between the characteristically synchronic and the 
characteristically diachronic phases, functions and forces of society 
as such, with the two types of phases indelibly tied together in their 
unavoidable contiguity, and whose theoretically acknowledged union, 
romantic fashion, affords a much more adequate account of society's 
dynamicity, development and progression than a narrowly positivistic 
one. Of course, when paying such a handsome tribute to Hegel's insight 
regarding the history of societies, we must stress that his 
idealistically reductionist rendering of that process, which credits the 
claims, needs and rights of the human spirit first and foremost with 
responsibility for the shaping and definition of society at any time, 
amounts to a half-truth only; but this half-truth, it pays to 
acknowledge, is a valuable half of the whole truth regarding the course 
of society as a process. Naturally, we must not forget, as Hegel did, 
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the concurrent and even primary being of society as a positive reality 
independent and outside of the human spirit, with this human spirit 
normally and typically confined as an issue, when not noticeably and 
consequentially challenged by established social authority, to the 
individual consciousnesses of the people populating society as selves. 
This external being of society, ignored by Hegel, as Durkheim has shown 
us, is the solid norm in and as society sul generis, which, in 
synchronically secure phases of society, subsists and operates 
essentially uneffected and untouched by Hegel's 'subject' or its 
citizens' individual spiritual endeavours, and which even at times of 
the mass-response to it by human reality-assertive, society-nihilating 
selves in the diachronic phases of society, (even when such nihilations 
of it occur on a mass scale), doesn't cease to exist, even if it exists 
at such times dysfunctionally, and is seen to do so. The supreme reign 
of society in this external, Durkheimian sense, is the other, more 
evident half of the truth regarding the workings of society, one that 
indismissably complements, at all times, Hegel's spirit-assertive half 
of the truth regarding the course of society and its processes. The 
aspect of consciousness identified by Durkheim: that of society itself 
in its proper and autonomous sphere of being as such sul generis, will 
at no time dissolve into a human spirit or a 'subject'-dominated, social 
positivity-irrelevant, subduing or dismissive historic flux; it was 
short-sighted and erroneous of Hegel to suggest that it does, and that 
this process, as seen by him, amounts to the whole story regarding the 
process and phenomenon of society. All we mean to say here in paying 
tribute, albeit a qualified one, to Hegel, is that the half-truth which 
he brought to bear on the history and interpretation of society, 
valuably and usefully limelights half the mechanism propelling forth 
society (which palpably does develop, propel on, and wouldn't do so had 
Hegel not been partially right), in pinpointing and asserting that the 
subject-inclusive self or selves en mass, which ceaselessly and 
legitimately claim acknowledgement, licence and room for expression and 
maintainance within psychologic and socialpsychologic confines, will, 
when squeezed out of their legitimate area of operation by the reigning 
established norm, pick holes, through their re-affirmation as selves, in 
the social fibre of the positive reality of society in Durkheim's sense, 
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and offer their own standards and medium for the mending of that damaged 
social fibre for and in the future of both mankind and society. It 
follows, and we mean to stress this Hegel-enabled point of view here, 
that the romantic, individual-appreciative and acknowledging approach to 
society is incompatible with - but even so more realistic in 
interpreting social change which is endemic in every society than -a 
purely positivistic one, and the greater adequacy of a 'romantically' 
aware view of social history lies in its capacity to acknowledge that 
the relationship between the being of society in phases of its solid and 
equilibrated zenith, and the phases of the eruption and bursting of 
human reality onto the forefront on the social scene at ties of 
society's nadir, is an unavoidable, fateful and characteristic one, in 
which the Hegelian half-truth regarding the potency of the spirit 
(subject, "I" etc. ), to shape the history of society, is recognised, 
grasped and presented as a necessity; a half-necessity maybe, but one 
without the limited validity of which the being of society as 
predictably changing, is incompletely understood. This, the Hegelian 
half of the story, is needlessly and wantonly dismissed by the 
positivists, and dismissed at the peril of the truth as presentable by 
and available through a holistic social science. Even to-day when, in 
keeping with Descombes' revelation already quoted (reinforced and 
anteceded by a prophetic passage in Sartre) C' CO?, our times have 
passed into post-historic ones, already showing tendencies of 
superseding class-societies as Marx knew, presented and treated those, 
and a bureaucracy, rather than any class in a classical Marxist sense, 
has come to reign in our Northern hemisphere, slowly superimposing 
itself over the different ideologies of particular types of governments 
there (as treated in a former sections, such as Chapter 2 Section 2), 
the call for a witness and claim for elbowroom of a new form of human 
reality (sophisticatedly incarcerated into the shackles of the body of 
computer-stored information regarding selves and transforming those into 
the inert idiom of their possession by society), has grown to be of a 
new, significant relevance. The expression of human reality in our day 
amounts to, takes the shape of and is operative through the exercise and 
assertion of that freedom and spontaneity in the conduct of people, 
whether in units of goups or of individual selves, which comes from 
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conceiving of themselves as living humans, in the face of and as the 
very opposition to the bureaucratic governments which envelop the being 
of the actual societies of the 'Northern hemisphere, and coercively carve 
out, in singular bleakness, the mode and radius for the profane being of 
the ordinary man, the ordinary citizen, as a "me" only, defining him and 
making him into a mere pile of data, determined, tapped and 'taped' in 
the terms of a cold and narrowly society-functional software 
superimposing the grasp of the ordinary citizen as a computer-datum 
upon his own ideals regarding himself as a sovereign person, a living, 
dynamic perpetrator of himself as human reality. This practice by the 
nouveux, bureaucratic Sacred produces, breeds and brings forth a new 
type of social underdog: the nouveux profane, the helpless victim of 
data-hoarding and processing by the force of coercion, in the business 
of the securing and enforcing, demanding, cashing in from the 
individual, aided by the development of a new technologic advancement, 
perfection and efficiency, his socialpsychologically bleak 'carriership' 
in the upkeep of society. 
Finally, on the gain side of a romantic socialscientific modality 
and method of thought, we may repeat in this evaluation of that 
theoretical viewpoint, that, in its light, human reality emerges, 
realistically, as a persistent stratum of reality which will unavoidably 
take place, attain being, either in a dominant or in a dormant, but even 
so always ready-to-hand way, in every situation involving people: in a 
way and idiom, in any case, which is unique and peculiar to itself, and 
stands up on its own autonomous terms, in sharp counterdistinction with 
the being and activity of the different but equally peculiar and 
autonomous modality of consciousness as the collective consciousness or 
society as such. No propaganda, historic account or public relations 
exercise can retrospectively import the attributes of a life spent in a 
personally comely and human reality-wise authentic pursuance and 
observance of the peculiar standards of human reality, into the life of 
a public figure, whether a prominent or an anonymous soldier-ant in 
society, if it has not been there in the first place, if it failed to 
grace the ostensive or unostensive champion of any cause, on the terms 
of its own authentic rules and standards (those of human reality) which 
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always concurrently and distinctly present themselves in consciousness 
for actualisation, alongside with the biddings of the equally persistent 
laws and structures of society outside and inside of consciousness, in 
spite of the fact that people's social 'carriership' is the only mode of 
consciousness to be usually acknowledged and accredited in the 
mainstream social science of our day as providing a legitimate role for 
man in society and in his capacity as an individual citizen, even as a 
self; and a romantic view of society and social psychology is equipped 
to beneficially and realistically redress this bias and balance in 
modern socialtheoretic thought. 
I think there is virtue in entertaining both these approaches to 
social reality which have just been contrasted - the positivistic one 
focussing on that from the point of view of ascribed status and its 
maintainance,, and the other, the romantic frame of reference which 
concerns itself with and throws light upon social reality as the occasion 
and platform for personal human worth and fitness of the self, 
particularly in the potentially critical relation of the latter to 
ascribed status when that is unjustified by socialpsychologic measures 
in the great and in the small, which status the romantic social 
theoretician reserves the right to judge as justified or unjustified by 
individual quality of output and conduct. Furthermore, a romantic social 
theory also relevantly recognises human/eality as the only source of 
change in society and therefore important in a social context too. The 
resulting amalgam of the method of thought in approaching social 
reality, gained from the imaginative and appropriate interlacing of the 
positivistic tradition of thought with the romantic one, affords, in its 
totality, a holistic and realistic insight into the mechanism of 
sustaining as well as animating society, conceiving of society as the 
interrelated package of the collective consciousness outside and the 
occasion for that in and through concrete human reality in terms of the 
self or selves en masse, appreciating and showing these two sets of 
values, social and individual, as related to each other and as 
irreducibly interactive with one another, both in the context and idiom 
of the self and in those of society. I think that such a model of 
society, sensitive to the interaction between a social Scienk4 c. 
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positivism and socialscientific romanticism, is valuable, as the 
insights afforded by just one of these frames of reference in social 
thinking or the other, are incomplete and unduly simplistic - the 
romantics chronically lacking a sober enough appreciation of how real 
ascribed social reality really is, and social positivists often blind to 
the error and danger in not seeking the need for the substantiation of 
ascribed sacred and profane status by individual worth, and to the 
anomalousness of a code of practice which sustains a hierarchy in 
institutions where a fluid and periodically re-assessed correlation 
between social standing and human capacities both in the Pukka and in 
the rachmones is not sought, as an end in itself, particularly at times 
when the witness and need for the gratification of people's individual 
perspective is institutionally ignored and decried, and when, in 
response, those elbow into being in the social field for legitimate 
recognition there; in instances, in other words, when human reality 
comes to the public forefront to demonstrate and state that it will not 
go entirely frustrated, but claims being and recognition by the 
standards, dicta and values whereby it is peculiarly governed and 
informed, no less than this is periodically the case, in reverse, with 
the different norm of the collective consiousness of Durkheim's 
understanding, which will needs assert itself at times when its norm is 
appreciably threatened by excesses of the peculiar norms, or rather 
standards, of human reality, on an historic scale. We nay say, in 
consequence, that the science of the study of society, as well as that 
of the self, according to the principles of a puristic socialscientific 
positivism, affords quite as unrealistic and incomplete an account of 
the self and of society as does a solipsistically narrow, purely 
'romantic' view of the self. 
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